Viennese Culture and Politics, 1861 to 1938:Everyday Expressions of ‘German’ Identity by Carter-Sinclair, Michael
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








Viennese Culture and Politics, 1861 to 1938




Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
This electronic theses or dissertation has been 









The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information 
derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk 
providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 
Unported License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/  
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in 
any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings 










Title:Viennese Culture and Politics, 1861 to 1938
Everyday Expressions of ‘German’ Identity
Author:Michael Carter-Sinclair
Submission for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Awarded November 2012 
 
 



















Word Count: 99,968 (From the beginning of the Foreword to the end of Appendix E, method 
as agreed with King’s College Examinations Office, August / September 2011) 
 
  Page 2 of 272 
Contents 
FOREWORD	  ..........................................................................................................	  6	  
Acknowledgements	  ......................................................................................................................................	  6	  
Some	  General	  Notes	  .....................................................................................................................................	  7	  
ABBREVIATIONS	  ....................................................................................................	  8	  
INTRODUCTION:	  THE	  AIMS,	  DEVELOPMENT	  AND	  STRUCTURE	  OF	  THIS	  WORK	  .....	  10	  
The	  Aims	  Of	  This	  Work	  .............................................................................................................................	  10	  
The	  Foundations	  Of	  This	  Work:	  Theories	  Of	  Nationalism	  And	  The	  Historiography	  On	  
Vienna	  .............................................................................................................................................................	  11	  
An	  Introduction	  To	  The	  Archival	  Sources	  And	  Their	  Results	  ......................................................	  13	  
Power	  And	  Influence:	  	  The	  Archival	  Results	  And	  The	  Historiography	  On	  Vienna	  Taken	  
Together	  ........................................................................................................................................................	  17	  
The	  Structure	  Of	  This	  Work	  ....................................................................................................................	  28	  
CHAPTER	  1:	  	  VIENNA	  1861-­‐1938:	  CULTURE,	  POLITICS	  AND	  IDENTITY	  ...................	  31	  
Conflict,	  Cohesion	  And	  Change:	  A	  View	  Of	  1861	  To	  1938	  .............................................................	  31	  
Geographical,	  Political	  And	  Other	  Contexts	  .......................................................................................	  36	  
Identity,	  The	  Nation	  And	  Nationalism	  .................................................................................................	  39	  
Being	  German	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  47	  
Culture,	  Politics	  And	  Daily	  Life	  ...............................................................................................................	  49	  
Summary	  ........................................................................................................................................................	  52	  
CHAPTER	  2:	  LIBERAL	  AND	  NATIONAL	  CHOICES:	  VIENNA	  TO	  1879	  ........................	  53	  
Liberal	  Ideals	  And	  Practice	  .....................................................................................................................	  54	  
Neoabsolutism	  .............................................................................................................................................	  57	  
  Page 3 of 272 
A	  German	  And	  Liberal	  Empire?	  ..............................................................................................................	  59	  
Liberal	  Consolidation	  At	  Home,	  Austrian	  Ejection	  From	  Germany	  Confirmed	  .....................	  65	  
Liberalism	  Under	  Attack	  ..........................................................................................................................	  67	  
Summary	  ........................................................................................................................................................	  71	  
CHAPTER	  3:	  	  THE	  LOWER	  CLERGY	  AND	  VIENNA,	  1860-­‐1879	  .................................	  73	  
A	  Church	  Persecuted?	  ................................................................................................................................	  73	  
Some	  Suburban	  Parishes	  .........................................................................................................................	  74	  
Priest	  Versus	  Politician?	  ..........................................................................................................................	  76	  
Other	  Concerns	  ............................................................................................................................................	  79	  
Summary	  ........................................................................................................................................................	  83	  
CHAPTER	  4:	  	  THE	  TRANSFORMATION	  OF	  VIENNESE	  POLITICS:	  1879-­‐1896	  ............	  85	  
The	  Antisemitic	  Challenge	  .......................................................................................................................	  85	  
New	  Liberal	  Challenges	  ............................................................................................................................	  87	  
The	  United	  Christians	  ................................................................................................................................	  96	  
Christian	  Social	  Victory	  In	  Vienna	  .....................................................................................................	  106	  
Summary	  .....................................................................................................................................................	  107	  
CHAPTER	  5:	  	  POLITICS	  IN	  THE	  PARISHES	  ............................................................	  109	  
Father	  Dittrich	  At	  Ottakring	  .................................................................................................................	  109	  
Father	  Latschka	  ........................................................................................................................................	  111	  
Father	  Deckert	  At	  Weinhaus	  ................................................................................................................	  117	  
Summary	  .....................................................................................................................................................	  120	  
CHAPTER	  6:	  	  STATE,	  VOLK	  OR	  CLASS?	  	  1896-­‐1914	  ..............................................	  121	  
  Page 4 of 272 
The	  Pan-­‐Germans	  In	  Vienna	  ................................................................................................................	  122	  
Christian	  Social	  Vienna	  ..........................................................................................................................	  126	  
Conflict	  And	  Common	  Ground	  .............................................................................................................	  133	  
Christian	  Social	  Hegemony?	  .................................................................................................................	  134	  
Debating	  The	  Future:	  Which	  Way	  For	  The	  Germans?	  .................................................................	  141	  
Summary	  .....................................................................................................................................................	  143	  
CHAPTER	  7	  –	  RATIONALISING	  THE	  END	  OF	  A	  WORLD:	  VIENNA	  1914	  TO	  1920	  ....	  145	  
A	  Refugee	  Crisis	  ........................................................................................................................................	  146	  
The	  ‘German	  Course’	  ..............................................................................................................................	  147	  
After	  Franz	  Joseph	  ...................................................................................................................................	  149	  
The	  Coming	  Of	  The	  End	  Of	  The	  Empire:	  ‘Not	  The	  Peace	  We	  Had	  Expected’	  .........................	  152	  
Summary	  .....................................................................................................................................................	  161	  
CHAPTER	  8:	  	  THE	  PROVISIONAL	  REPUBLIC?	  	  VIENNA	  1920-­‐1932	  ........................	  163	  
A	  New	  World	  ..............................................................................................................................................	  163	  
Within	  Red	  Vienna	  ..................................................................................................................................	  168	  
A	  Muted	  War	  ..............................................................................................................................................	  176	  
A	  Political	  Reconfiguration	  ..................................................................................................................	  182	  
CHAPTER	  9:	  	  ‘THE	  HOTLY	  RESISTED	  ANSCHLUSS’	  ................................................	  185	  
An	  End	  To	  Austrian	  Democracy	  ..........................................................................................................	  186	  
Between	  Republic	  And	  Corporate	  State	  ...........................................................................................	  195	  
From	  The	  Assassination	  Of	  Dollfuss	  To	  Desertion	  By	  Mussolini	  .............................................	  199	  
The	  Writing	  On	  The	  Wall?	  .....................................................................................................................	  201	  
Summary	  .....................................................................................................................................................	  206	  
  Page 5 of 272 
CHAPTER	  10:	  	  ANSCHLUSS	  AND	  AFTER	  ..............................................................	  208	  
Anschluss	  ....................................................................................................................................................	  209	  
Supporting	  The	  Anschluss	  .....................................................................................................................	  213	  
Father	  Schmid	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  215	  
Father	  Schwarz	  .........................................................................................................................................	  220	  
The	  View	  From	  Post-­‐War	  Austria	  .......................................................................................................	  224	  
CONCLUSIONS	  ..................................................................................................	  229	  
Nation	  And	  Identity:	  Dialogues	  On	  The	  Radical	  Right	  .................................................................	  229	  
Vienna	  As	  An	  Antisemitic	  Hotbed?	  ....................................................................................................	  233	  
Anschluss	  And	  After	  ................................................................................................................................	  234	  
Final	  Remarks	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  235	  
APPENDIX	  A:	  NATIONALISM	  –	  A	  TYPOLOGY	  ......................................................	  239	  
APPENDIX	  B:	  SOME	  CATEGORIES	  AND	  ASPECTS	  OF	  ANTISEMITISM	  ...................	  240	  
APPENDIX	  C:	  VIENNA’S	  DISTRICTS	  .....................................................................	  242	  
APPENDIX	  D:	  THE	  PRIESTS	  OF	  THE	  FOUR	  PARISHES	  ...........................................	  243	  
APPENDIX	  E:	  ELECTIONS	  IN	  VIENNA,	  1932	  .........................................................	  244	  
Table	  1:	  1932	  Absolute	  Figures	  ..........................................................................................................	  244	  
Table	  2:	  Christian	  Social	  And	  Pan-­‐German	  Losses	  To	  The	  Nazis,	  1932	  .................................	  245	  
SELECT	  BIBLIOGRAPHY	  ......................................................................................	  246	  
  Page 6 of 272 
FOREWORD 
Acknowledgements 
In producing this work, I have been fortunate to be advised, assisted and challenged by a 
number of people.  First among these has been Dr. Michael Rowe, of King's College, 
University of London, who acted as my academic supervisor and mentor throughout my 
research.  Michael’s early challenge to me was that I should develop intellectually, and he 
has constantly encouraged, prompted and raised the bar many times, always with common 
sense and good humour.  I hope I have risen to his challenge.  The task would not have been 
as rewarding or as enjoyable without him.  I am also grateful to other academic staff from 
the Department of History at King's College: Dr. Jim Bjork for acting as second supervisor, 
as well as Professor Stephen Lovell and Professor Richard Vinen for examining me at the 
PhD upgrade. 
I owe a great debt to the staff of the many libraries, archives and institutions I have used.  I 
am especially grateful to staff at two archives in Vienna where I carried out the bulk of my 
work on primary sources: Dr. Johann Weißensteiner and his colleagues at the 
Diözesanarchiv, and Hr. Michael Winter and Hr. Bruno Splichal, of the Archiv der 
Bundespolizeidirektion.  These archives opened up avenues of investigation on a regular 
basis and were invaluable in my research.  Staff at the Wienbibliothek im Rathaus and at the 
Österreichischer Nationalbibliothek helped me to find my way through much material.  Dr. 
Susanne Schedtler and her colleagues at the Wiener Volksliedwerkstatt put forward a number 
of very helpful suggestions.  Staff at the German Historical Institute, London, the Guildhall 
Library, London, and the British Library Newspaper Library also found resources without 
which it would have been difficult to pursue this work. 
Academic staff at other institutions have given me time and advice, whether through 
personal meetings or via e-mails.  These include Professor Wolfgang Maderthaner, Verein 
für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Vienna; Dr. Winfried Garscha, 
Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes; Dr. Leslie Topp, Birkbeck 
College, London; Dr. Maureen Healy, Lewis-Clark University; Dr. Judith Beniston, 
University College, London; and Professor Lothar Höbelt, University of Vienna.  The 
organisers of a number of conferences and seminars that I attended, and at which I spoke and 
shared my findings and ideas, also provided considerable assistance.  
This work was undertaken on a part-time basis, but funding came through my continuing to 
work full-time elsewhere.  After many years as a consultant in the Information Systems 
business, a return to the study of History proved too much to resist.  I quit consultancy and 
joined the City of London Corporation in 2005, in a role that was less demanding than 
  Page 7 of 272 
consultancy, but still full-time.  My employers at the City have shown considerable 
understanding.  Without flexible working arrangements, and a lengthy unpaid leave of 
absence so that I could carry out research in Vienna in 2009, this work would not have been 
completed.  I am grateful to all my colleagues at the City who have helped this to happen  
Finally, none of this would have happened without the constant and loving encouragement 
of my partner Christine.  She encouraged me to make the leap back into the study of History, 
knowing how much History in general, and this study of Vienna in particular, meant to me.  
This work has taken a number of years, and Christine has never lost faith that it would be 
completed and be worthwhile.  For this, and for all the other things, I am so much more than 
grateful to her. 
Some General Notes 
Translations 
All translations from the original languages, unless taken from a work already translated into 
English, are mine.  Any mistakes or misunderstandings are therefore mine. 
Place Names 
In the multilingual Habsburg Empire, the language used for place names formed a source of 
much conflict.  In this work, where a commonly accepted English version of a place name is 
available, it is used.  Since the vast majority of references to place names that came from the 
archives were in German, the German name is generally used in these instances.  Where 
necessary, an indication is given of the name of a place as it would appear in current English 
usage. 
The Districts of Vienna 
The Viennese often refer to their City’s districts not by their name, but by the number 
allocated to them at the time of incorporation into the city.  So, Ottakring is commonly 
referred to as ‘the sixteenth’.  In this work, the full name is usually given, except 
occasionally in the footnotes.  As many reorganisations of the city have taken place in the 
last 160 years or so, a map of modern day Vienna is provided in Appendix C.  Vienna’s 
districts are customarily indicated by Roman numerals, and that is the practice here. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE AIMS, DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF THIS WORK 
The Aims Of This Work 
This is a work about identity and belonging in Vienna between 1861 and 1938.  It engages 
with one of the great debates in Austrian history, concerning the nature, aims, depth and 
extent of radical German nationalist feeling that existed in the city in the period down to 
1938.  In particular, it addresses the level of support that existed among radical groups on 
the Right in favour of the joining of Austria and Germany into one country.  This aim was 
known in German as Anschluss, which translates as union, and many, often small, political 
parties put it at the top of their priorities.1  This aim of joining all Germans together was also 
known as the Pan-German policy, as it was theoretically based on bringing together all 
Germans in one country, regardless of the state in which they then lived.  The main focal 
points for early Pan-German efforts, however, were the lands which were to be brought 
together as the German Empire in 1871 and the German-speaking parts of the Habsburg 
Empire.  After the First World War, Germany and Austria were the main, if not only, points 
of attention.  Switzerland and its German-speaking population received little Pan-German 
attention, perhaps because of the long independence of Switzerland outside of the Holy 
Roman Empire.2   
In examining radical German nationalism in Vienna over this period, much of the 
historiography has rested on an assumption that German nationalist sentiment was expressed 
in support for such an Anschluss.3  In this view, the outburst of pro-Anschluss enthusiasm in 
1938 in Vienna – and elsewhere in Austria – was therefore a genuine and long-held 
expression of support for a German nationalist position.  Yet throughout the period there was 
much disagreement about how, or even whether, Anschluss should be achieved, what kind of 
German state it would be desirable to join and what role Austrians – and Austria – should 
play within this state.  There was also much disagreement over many decades about what it 
meant to be German, and who should belong as a German.  In terms of this debate, the 
essence of the Germany that was on offer in 1938 presented a radical solution that can be 
expressed in three brief sentences.  All Germans should be brought together in one state.  A 
German was ethnically defined.  A Jew was not a German.  
                                                      
1 See, for instance, Alfred D. Low, The Anschluss Movement 1931-1938, (New York: East European Monographs, 1984). 
2 Henry Cord Meyer, ‘Mitteleuropa in Pan-German Political Geography’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
Vol. 36, No. 3, 1946, pp.178-194. 
3 Barbara Jelavich on Low, Anschluss 1931-1938, in an untitled review in The American Historical Review, Vol. 91, No.5, 
1986, p.1241. 
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If they are taken at face value, the crowds that gathered in Vienna to greet the arrival of 
Hitler shortly after the Anschluss suggest that the Viennese did support these three elements 
of the radical vision being put forward in 1938.  The size of the crowds suggests the extent 
of German nationalist feeling.  The passion on display suggests that these people were 
willing supporters of the Anschluss, gladly surrendering the independence of Austria.  More 
than this, however, these people must have understood the essence of the German state to 
which Austria was being joined.  The anti-Jewish violence that swept the country as these 
crowds gathered suggests that, for these participants at least, this was an enthusiastic 
endorsement of a racial, antisemitic, exclusionary vision of what it meant to be German.4  
Again, taken at face value, the members of these crowds seem confident that they belonged, 
that they were not excluded, and that they were part of the new order.5 
Yet, as there had been so much debate in Vienna over these very ideas over many years, 
whether the support that these crowds appeared to show for Anschluss was widespread 
among the population in general, even on the Right, must be questioned.  The purpose of this 
work is therefore to address two key questions.  First, by 1938, had support for a radical, 
exclusionary German nationalism become deeply embedded in the political and social life of 
Vienna?  Second, was Anschluss the fulfilment of the visions that those with radical, 
exclusionary, definitions of being German had been supporting in the lead-up to 1938?   In 
order to understand whether these scenes were a momentary outburst, or the expression of a 
whole-hearted endorsement of this particular realisation of Anschluss, the work therefore 
focuses on competing, and yet at times overlapping, visions that evolved in Vienna of what 
it should mean to be German.  In particular, this work focuses on those defined here as the 
radical Right, who promoted visions of being German which were predominantly based on 
the idea that an attributed ethnic origin could exclude someone from being German.  The 
work aims to show how deeply these visions had penetrated Viennese thinking, who was 
promoting them and what they meant.  
The Foundations Of This Work: Theories Of Nationalism And The Historiography On 
Vienna 
To present the events of March 1938 as simply the outcome of a struggle between different 
radical German nationalist visions would be misleading at many levels, however, and a 
substantial body of work has been developed which has examined nationalism in Vienna 
over different periods leading to 1938.  Historians have shown that many individuals and 
                                                      
4 See G.E.R. Gedye, Fallen Bastions: the Central European Tragedy, (London: Gollancz, 1942), pp.294-298, for a description 
of events on the night of the Anschluss. 
5 For a brief discussion of the meaning of crowds for power and belonging, see Ralph H. Turner, untitled review of ‘Crowds 
And Power’ by Elias Canetti, Contemporary Society, (1980), Vol.9, No.1, pp.142-144. 
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groups in the city, and in the wider Empire and the First Republic, rejected not just 
Anschluss nationalism, but nationalism of any kind, and that nationalism, German or 
otherwise, was just one position that people might support, especially in the pre-1918 
period.6  The present work is a contribution to the debate on the importance and nature of 
nationalism over the period, in examining the way it played a part in people’s daily lives. 
Recent works have shown how social, cultural and economic matters interacted with the 
political, whether during the Empire or the First Republic.  This has been shown to apply in 
many locations, beyond Austria’s borders, where daily life, not just the efforts of state-
builders, affects the strength of national feeling.7  There has been excellent work on 
Viennese, Austrian and Habsburg history, but there remains much to do, particularly in 
identifying the mechanisms by which local concerns were linked to wider events in a long-
lasting way, not just as a spontaneous reaction to happenings elsewhere.  The field of 
nationalism studies has contributed many models which can be considered as starting points 
for analysis.8  This work takes existing concepts from this field, and extends and categorises 
them, so that distinctions can be drawn between different kinds of nationalist behaviour and 
the objectives of different nationalists.  This enhances understanding of how nationalistic 
behaviour by different groups could take on very different characters and have very different 
aims.  The concept of ‘banal nationalism’ – developed by Michael Billig, and covered in 
more detail later – is extended and applied as a way of identifying how far nationalism 
entered the conscious and subconscious attitudes of the people of Vienna.9  Banal 
nationalism helps to establish the profundity of nationalist sentiment against ephemeral or 
opportunistic expressions. It also helps to understand how identity was being shaped and 
perceived. 
Study of the historiography on Vienna on the one hand, and an analysis of the literature on 
nationalism as a phenomenon on the other, leads to a clear conclusion: a successful attempt 
to understand the nature and scope of nationalist behaviour in Vienna must extend to a study 
of the meaning, evolution and use of a wide range of day-to-day expressions of identity, 
such as social life and popular entertainments, street names and business advertising, ‘high’ 
culture and sport, posters and meeting places.  Such a study builds a picture of the 
experiences of daily life in Vienna and how interpretations of German identity were 
promoted and absorbed.  This work therefore looks beyond the traditionally identified efforts 
                                                      
6 This includes works such as Eagle Glasheim, Noble Nationalists, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005). 
7 See, for instance, Tim Baycroft, Culture, Identity And Nationalism: French Flanders In The Nineteenth And Twentieth 
Centuries, (London: Boydell, 2004). 
8 See pages 39 to 45 of this work for a survey of some of the main theories to emerge from the field of Nationalism studies. 
9 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995). 
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and aims of nationalists.  It shows that while the pamphlets, newspapers and rallies of 
nationalists were important in the development of ideas of Germanness, the overall 
experience of daily culture also contributed over time to the struggle between different 
visions of the nation. 
From this examination, one conclusion is that no single model of the nation, or of the 
workings of nationalism, is sufficient to contribute to an understanding of events in Vienna.  
The nation was defined and promoted in many ways even by those who saw it as a primary 
source of, and symbol for, identity.  While orators and politicians often gave the impression 
that the nation had its own force, and spoke in terms that created a form of reification of the 
nation, what emerges from the contrasting and sometimes conflicting definitions and uses of 
the nation is the nation as a construct.  Definitions of the nation were used flexibly, and 
different aspects of the nation were stressed at different times.  This was the case not just in 
terms of different people using different definitions.  One person or group could stress 
different aspects at different times, stressing different elements, such as religion or culture, 
that were said to define the nation, in order to emphasize the unity of people who claimed to 
be German.  The same person or group could use the same elements to highlight divisions 
between competing visions of German identity.  The one core aspect of nationalism upon 
which Nationalists agreed was that there is an ‘us’, however defined, and that there is an 
‘other’, which does not belong.  This was a powerful motivating force for those who 
believed in the nation.  The intentions and consequences and of this belief were, however, 
extremely varied.  They ranged from a nationalist-inspired pride in German culture to the 
desire to inflict harm on those who did not belong.  
An Introduction To The Archival Sources And Their Results 
The approach of this work is to examine the links between everyday culture, identity 
formation, power and influence.  The principal archives that have been used were therefore 
selected because they were from organisations which kept a close eye on the daily life of 
Vienna in the period under consideration.  Other archives that have been used recorded 
popular culture and informal influences on the shaping of opinion.  Individuals and groups 
who stood out in their contribution to daily culture, and whose positions at least inclined to 
being supportive of the opinions and views of those on the radical Right, were identified for 
analysis.  As the radical Right covered, at times, a relatively broad spectrum of views, a 
broad range of individuals and groups was uncovered.  
The archives contributed to the approach of this work, which is similar to, but different 
from, the formal approach of an Alltagsgeschichte.  While an Alltagsgeschichte looks at the 
experiences of the masses and attempts to extract direct causal links with wider events, this 
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work does not take the approach that the ‘history of everyday life draws explicit causal 
connections – in all their contradictory tensions – between the processes of the 
microhistorical context and the metanarratives of macrohistory’.10  This work does look at 
the connection between major events and local interpretations, but its focus is mainly on the 
local level, at how groups and individuals influenced, and attempted to influence, each other 
through their contacts, in many ways. 
This work therefore focuses to some extent on influence, rather than power, and it is 
recognised here that there are limits to the exercise of influence.  One person or group does 
not usually have a monopoly on trying to exercise influence on other individuals or groups.  
Nevertheless, the people who came to be examined here – the priests, the local politicians, 
members of the intellectual classes – were influences on the everyday experience of those 
that they encountered because of the near daily contact they had with them and, among other 
factors, because of their social and economic status.  The people examined contributed to 
defining how wider events and significant ideas were experienced by many of those around 
them.  They mediated events and attempted to shape perceptions of identity and belonging.   
Two particularly rich sources of material – the Police archives and the archives of the 
Archdiocese of Vienna – are highlighted here, for the findings they provided and the way 
they influenced the development of this work.  These archives were expected to provide 
evidence that would build up a series of pictures of the less overtly political activities of 
radical German nationalists: that is, activities such as charitable work or social events which 
could be turned to political advantage.  The aim with the Police archive was to gather 
examples of life across the city, and the material here did provide much information on 
political rallies, reports of known activists, fund-raising events and societies that were 
nominally social, but which had political intent.  These materials sat alongside others which 
showed the monitoring of socialists and anarchists, suspected foreign spies, and members of 
the aristocracy who might bring the Habsburg system into disrepute.  These were materials 
which drew a picture of nationalist activity, in its wider context.  This ranged from reports of 
the wearing of banned symbols of German nationalism in the 1850s and 1860s, through 
early Pan-German political successes in local elections in the 1880s and political street 
disturbances in the 1890s, to the monitoring of Nazi activity in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The aim with the Archdiocesan archives was to concentrate on two districts of the city, and 
to choose two parishes in each, in order to gain a starting point for more detailed insight into 
activities of which the priests were aware.  These would be set in the context of the general 
                                                      
10 Paul Steege, Andrew Bergerson, Maureen Healy and Pamela Swett, ‘The History Of Everyday Life: A Second Chapter’, 
Journal Of Modern History, 2008, Vol. 80, pp.358-378. 
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experience of the city, as found in the Police archives and in the secondary literature.  It was 
expected that some participation by priests in politics – in the broadest sense – would be 
found, but this archive was mainly expected to provide observations of society, helping to 
build a rich picture of life in the districts.  The correspondence files of these parishes, as well 
as the parish Chronik, also known as the Gedenkbuch – that is, the annual record of activities 
and events for the parish – were chosen for investigation.   
The districts of Ottakring, in the West of Vienna, and Währing, in the North West, were 
chosen, because they offer comparisons and contrasts, both in their social composition and 
in the ways in which they are sometimes perceived.  Ottakring, for instance, has been 
described as ‘exclusively proletarian’.11  In the period under investigation, however, the 
district had a number of areas of prosperity and a strong bourgeois presence, as it still has.  
Small businesses have always been prominent and Ottakring retains a core of support for 
parties promoting a bourgeois agenda.  Under the restricted suffrage of the last years of the 
Empire, Ottakring’s district council was dominated by an antisemitic Christian Social Party 
that was loyal to the Habsburgs, although it did return the first Socialist MP to the Austrian 
Parliament, the Reichsrat.  Ottakring went on to become known as a significant centre of 
support for the Socialist movement.  
Währing, by contrast, could be perceived as a bourgeois district.  Its streets, its buildings, 
shops and public spaces, offer much more visible signs of affluence than Ottakring.  Like 
Ottakring, it had a Christian Social controlled council in the last years of the Empire.  
However, the coming of democratic elections in the First Republic saw a Socialist majority 
and Socialist mayor in the district council.  Währing also sent more Socialist representatives 
than bourgeois members to other elected bodies.12  Again, though, it had a solid bourgeois 
core which participated, as the period progressed, in societies associated with bourgeois 
interests and in Christian Social activities.  Währing was, however, unlike Ottakring, one of 
the strongest areas of support in Vienna for parties with a pro-Anschluss agenda.  Most, if 
not all, of the Pan-German voters of Währing seem to have switched to the Nazis in 
elections to the Vienna City Council in 1932.13  In this same election, the Nazis overtook the 
Christian Socials as the party with the largest share of the vote on the Right in the district.  
This suggests that at least these residents of Währing might have been among the crowds 
greeting the Anschluss. 
                                                      
11 Monika Glettler, Die Wiener Tschechen um 1900: Strukturanalyse Einer Nationalen Minderheit in der Grossstadt, (Munich: 
R. Oldenbourg, 1972), p.53.  
12 Reichspost (hereafter RP), 22nd October 1923, 25th April 1927 or 25th April 1932 contain detailed results for district, local, 
regional and national elections. 
13 Chapter 9 and Appendix E have more detail on this election. 
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The Archdiocesan archives did yield much material on political life in the parishes and, by 
extension, the districts in which they were based.  Often, this might be the recording of local 
electoral campaigns and their results, or the records of disputes between priest and local 
council over the funding of religious teaching in schools.  More surprisingly, the material 
showed how some priests – by no means all, but a significant number – took a considerable 
part, if indirectly, in political life.  Even in the relatively early part of the period under 
consideration, priests were quick to organise parishioners into anti-liberal coalitions when 
they felt this necessary.  This evidence emerged from an in-depth analysis of four parishes, 
but to check whether such evidence was typical of wider patterns or anomalous, other 
parishes were then also examined, in different ways.   
Leads from the diocesan archive pointed the need to investigate the Chronik and 
correspondence for the parish of St. Rochus in the Landstrasse.  The Chronik of the parish of 
Grinzing, on the very outskirts of the city, was examined, to see if the relative distance from 
the city centre lent itself to different patterns of activity or opinions, compared with more 
central parishes.  A number of other parishes were examined, at least in the later stages of 
the period to 1938, through a reading of parish newsletters found in the archives.  Twelve 
parishes were examined from these primary sources.  In addition, in order to broaden the 
range of analysis, a published survey of twenty five parish newsletters from the 1920s and 
1930s, some of which were included in the examination of primary sources, was consulted.14  
From Chapter 3 onwards, this work shows that a number of priests, with or without a parish, 
were openly active politically, but that their most profound impact may have come through 
their use of apparently non-political spaces, such as the pulpit, parish newsletters, and 
pilgrimages.  
In addition to the priests, another set of people emerged repeatedly from the archives, 
whether police, diocesan archives, National Library or places such as the archive of popular 
culture.  These, broadly defined, were the social, business and voluntary associations, based 
on middle class memberships of small businessmen, self-employed members of the 
intellectual classes, such as lawyers and doctors, or the white collar employees who grew in 
number from the end of the nineteenth century, whether in some form of state employment 
or in the private sector.  These groups played a highly visible part in the daily lives of their 
communities.  Some of these, such as the singing associations and, later in the period, drama 
groups were extremely active.   
                                                      
14 Nina Scholz and Heine Heinisch, ‘… alles werden sich die Christen nicht verfallen lassen’.  Wiener Pfarren und die Juden in 
der Zwischenkriegszeit, (Vienna: Czernin, 2001). 
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These groups were ostensibly non-political, but they are included in this work because the 
evidence uncovered in the course of this thesis and the findings of other commentators 
indicate that many were, in fact, highly political and were often a source of exclusionary 
visions of identity and belonging.  Other commentators, as will be seen, have found that 
these groups also fulfilled political functions, acting as pathways to political participation.  
For instance, singing and gymnastics groups belonged to broader organisations that 
represented specific political viewpoints.15  The members of these associations would have 
known this, and would have joined them at least in part because of this.  They were joining 
organisation where they could meet like minded people. 
In this work, associations are found defending a ‘true German’ spirit at the turn of the 
century.  They turn out in large numbers for celebrations of the birthday of leading Christian 
Social figures.  Later, reports tell of numerous associations turning out en masse to celebrate 
the survival from an assassination attempt of right-wing dictator Engelbert Dollfuss.  One 
association even adopts an openly antisemitic name, thereby publicly declaring that its 
purpose is to attack Jews, Jewishness and other attributes by which it characterises Jews.  
These individual pieces provide clues as to the nature and activities of the associations.  
Their main significance for this work, however, is how they provided not just individual  
meeting places for people of like minds – since people join associations in order to meet 
similar people – but that they were parts of extensive social networks, places and points of 
intersection, where political opinions could be represented as part of a broader world picture.  
Associations of different kinds overlapped one another, and priests were often at their centre, 
the glue that bound them together.  One striking instance of this will be seen in the coming 
together of associational life, antisemitic priest and apparently non-political activity in a 
pilgrimage that took on antisemitic political purpose.  These examples scratch the surface of 
an apparently antisemitic culture, which has already been exposed in other associations not 
studied in depth here, such as the athletics and sporting associations.16  This area would 
reward further research. 
Power And Influence:  The Archival Results And The Historiography On Vienna 
Taken Together 
In the course of the research for this work, the first signs of the strengthening of this 
exclusionary vision came from the material to emerge from the diocesan archives.  At the 
start of the period, the Chroniken and other writings of priests made few, if any, references 
                                                      
15 See page 20 of this work. 
16 See, for instance, Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1988), p.218. 
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to antisemitism.  Without there being a simple linear progression, the findings from the 
priests were that, as the period progressed, antisemitic references became more 
commonplace, not for all priests, but for many.  Significantly, priests also fell back on 
nationalist-inspired rhetoric of ‘true’ German or Aryan values.  The same was true of many 
associations, which moved form describing themselves as being ‘bürgerlich’ to being 
Christian and then, in some cases, to being ‘Aryan’.  Businesses followed similar paths.17  
While priests and others at times expressed doubts and fears as to how their world was 
developing, they were also capable of displays of considerable self-confidence in the 
rightness of their beliefs and in their ability to turn them into concrete expression in the 
everyday world. 
In undertaking the research presented here, however, it was important to be mindful that if it 
was one thing to promote exclusion, it was quite another to have people accept this vision.  
This work has therefore considered whether, and how far, the promoters of exclusionary 
visions were successful, based on a study of a number of elements.  These include material 
found in the archives and from published works on the historiography of Vienna, but the 
conclusions have also been reached through an understanding of the generic workings of 
influence.  They have also been reached through the examination and application of other 
work which has been carried out on the influence of the clergy and of bourgeois associations 
on definitions of identity and belonging elsewhere in Europe through the nineteenth century 
and into the first half of the twentieth century.  In the development of this work, following 
the priests, in particular, aided this work’s attempts to study and understand the impact of 
banal processes.  In this respect, this work’s narrow geographical-cum-social focus over a 
relatively long period has had a similar effect to that of recent work which has gone beyond 
traditional boundaries, geographically, over a relatively short period, to take a trans-regional 
approach.18  It has also allowed the groups studied here to be examined without losing sight 
of their place and significance as part of their wider bourgeois world and Viennese society in 
general. 
Influence is not to be confused with power.  Power may give the ability, among other things, 
to coerce people into behaving in certain ways, but it does not influence what people believe, 
or what they intrinsically want to support.  One definition of influence is ‘the capacity to 
have an effect on the character, development, or behaviour of someone’, or ‘the power to 
shape policy or ensure favourable treatment from someone, especially through status, 
                                                      
17 See page 174 of this work. 
18 Laurence Cole, ed., Different Paths To The Nation, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Introduction, p.2. 
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contacts, or wealth’.19  In other words, influence, whether social, economic or moral, is not 
about forcing people into line, rather it has to do with persuading others to come round to a 
particular point of view, or to act in a particular way.   
Influence can also be defined indirectly, where people attempt to find views that match their 
own, in order to justify them.  This is known as ‘confirmation bias’.  This is the ‘tendency to 
test one's beliefs or conjectures by seeking evidence that might confirm or verify them and to 
ignore evidence that might disconfirm or refute them’.  This confirmation is important to the 
person looking for it, as it provides a ‘rationale’ for beliefs which are known, deep down, to 
be irrational.  It is a bias ‘which helps to maintain prejudices and stereotypes’.20  This is 
expanded below, to explore how those expressing a radical and exclusionary vision of 
belonging might reach their audience, and who that audience might be.  This is an important 
limit on influence, as not everyone will be influenced by a speaker, a pamphlet or an 
electoral campaign, and the propagators of such material know this.  They know and accept 
the limits of their influence, but want to maximise this. 
In analysing the effects of those attempting to exert influence, questions must be asked about 
why they made their efforts, how they went about their work, and whether evidence exists 
that they succeeded.  Many of the associations that are studied here clearly possessed the 
attributes necessary to hold influence.  They had memberships that were made up of men 
(sic) who had status and contacts.  Even those who did not have wealth in absolute terms had 
relative wealth compared with wider society. Some owned businesses.  Others were state 
employees, in relatively senior positions.  Few priests possessed personal wealth.  More, as 
will be seen, had contacts within the Church and beyond, where they would have been able 
to plan events, seek a favour, express an opinion, share views.  Many will be seen enhancing 
their status through other factors: leading by example, demonstrating persistence and 
holding enormous amounts of self-belief.  They were also highly visible in their local 
communities, and used every opportunity to promote their message. 
Priests, for instance, used sermons with such overtly political messages that it was difficult 
to distinguish between their purposes for ‘worship and political motivation’.21  This does not 
mean that they were always successful in their mission but, as Bruce Pauley points out, 
regularly repeated propaganda does have an influence, at least on the susceptible:  
                                                      
19 "influence noun"  Oxford Dictionary of English. Edited by Angus Stevenson. Oxford University Press, 2010. Oxford 
Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  King's College London.  28 April 
2012  http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t140.e0410270 
20 "confirmation bias n."  A Dictionary of Psychology. Edited by Andrew M. Colman. Oxford University Press 2009. Oxford 
Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  King's College London.  29 April 
2012  http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t87.e1772 
21 John Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897, (Chicago: 
University Of Chicago, 1981), p.119.  
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‘Even though it is impossible to prove in any empirical way, it is also 
highly probable that six decades of anti-Semitic propaganda had left Austrian 
Jews so isolated socially, that few Christians were willing to help them in their 
hour of mortal danger. To argue otherwise is to suggest that propaganda has 
absolutely no influence on the public no matter how often it is repeated over no 
matter for how long a time.’22  
This work presents not just the statements of the propagandists themselves, but the people 
they worked with, the people they influenced, and their opponents.  Time and again, 
witnesses attest to the effect they had.  This work looks at the aims of these activists, and the 
constituencies they expected to be able to reach and to influence.  It considers how they 
needed luck, and how they needed to be prepared and able to take advantage of it when it 
came.  In this case, as will be seen, these activists seized on the electoral change of the 
1880s, to make their breakthrough. 
Comments On The Principal Groups Examined 
Some associations which participated in the development of an exclusionary vision of 
German identity in Vienna have been examined elsewhere.  John Boyer has looked at the 
trade guilds.  The student associations, the Bürschenschaften, have been examined by Peter 
Pulzer.23  They have been examined in the wider contexts of Austria and the whole German-
speaking world.  The societies studied here, such as the singing groups, were part of a 
particular bourgeois world, with roots dating much earlier than the period studied here and 
across the wider German-speaking world.  In Prussia, in the early nineteenth century, 
composer Carl Friedrich Zelter created rules to formalise the structure and conduct of 
singing societies, which he thought would lead through education to self-improvement.  He 
created a ‘singing group for patriotic German men, a Liedertafel, which became the model 
for countless other such groups in Germany.’24  In this context, Germany should be taken to 
include Austria.  As will also be seen, German patriotism, as experienced in these societies 
and others, took varying forms and had many intentions, and presents a lesson that we 
should not see ‘German nationalism or national identity… as an undifferentiated whole, 
lurching its monolithic way through the nineteenth century into the disastrous twentieth’.25   
                                                      
22 Pauley, p.322 
23 See Pulzer, Political Anti-Semitism, pp.244-247. 
24 Celia Applegate, ‘How German Is It? Nationalism and the Idea of Serious Music in the Early Nineteenth Century’, 19th-
Century Music, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Spring, 1998), pp. 274-296, here p.293.  
25 Applegate, p.277.  
  Page 21 of 272 
Men’s singing groups may appear not to have a political intent at face value, but as early as 
the 1890s they divided between liberal, German nationalist, Christian Social and Social 
Democratic groups.26  By the 1920s, the groups had rationalised into broadly bourgeois 
groups on the one hand, under the umbrella of the Österreichischer Sängerbund and, on the 
other, the Social Democratic Österreichischer Arbeitersängerbund.  Theoretically, nothing 
prevented the members of these singing groups crossing over, but the ideological and party 
political boundaries between bourgeois and Marxist were too strong to be overcome on a 
permanent basis.27   
Within Austria, however this is defined, and beyond Vienna, singing societies confirm the 
shifts that took place in debates about ‘German’ identity.  Helmut Brenner has shown how 
singing societies in early 1860s Styria had mottos and performed programmes that ‘left no 
doubt of their German convictions’.28  Brenner goes on to indicate how, after 1866, these 
societies had difficulties in reconciling notions of German identity with the promotion of a 
separate Austrian Germanness.29 
The evidence to emerge from this research also confirms that the boundaries within the 
bourgeois camp, between Vienna’s Christian Socials and German nationalists, were often 
broken.  The two groups may not have had the same vision for the nature of German 
identity, but they did, in different ways, attach importance to a shared German heritage.  
Many associations carried the words ‘German’ and ‘Christian’ in their names, but it should 
not be assumed that this implied support for a Pan-German vision that placed the nation as 
the primary source of identity, over and beyond other factors such as religion.  Some of 
these associations were outside of the formal control of the Catholic Church, but others were 
Catholic and sat within one of a number of Church umbrella organisations such as 
Katholische Aktion.  Their events were listed in Catholic parish newsletters of the 1920s and 
1930s, or advertised in Christian Social publications.30  They used ‘German’ in their names 
in the way they used Christian as a synonym for Catholic, with all that implied for a specific 
vision of German identity.  Few, if any, would have rejected the idea that they had a German 
element to their identity.  Many would have supported the Austrian German path, a separate 
path from that of the country that was called Germany, but they still possessed a kind of 
                                                      
26 Rudolf Flotzinger, ‘Zum Topos von der Völker und Stände verbindenden Wirkung der Musik’, International Review of the 
Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Dec.,1981), pp. 91-101.  
27 Flotzinger, p.99. 
28 Helmut Brenner, ‘Lechts und rinks nicht velwechsern! Zur Frage der Identitäten im steirischen Sängerwesen’, Lied und 
populäre Kultur, 47. Jahrg. (2002), pp. 77-102, here p.82. 
29 Brenner, p.82. 
30 See page 174 of this thesis. 
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Pan-Germanism, perhaps one that was culturally or religiously defined, rather than 
politically.   
The strength of this religious attachment should not be downplayed, and can be gauged from 
many quarters.  Franz  Eichert, an antisemitic journalist and convert to Catholicism, spoke of 
the fervour that attended many Catholic voluntary associations in the later 1880s.31  Societies 
that had specifically Catholic names and intent were not alone in this, however, and there 
was also a favourable sentiment – ‘kirchliche Gesinnung’ – towards the Church  in 
numerous associations.32  Conviction – Gesinnung – is the key word here.  The societies 
were a world where the teachings of the Church were given considerable respect.  This 
phenomenon was not peculiar to Vienna and, throughout the period examined here, the 
ordained representatives of the Catholic Church were adept at becoming part of social and 
political life across Europe in general.33   
It had been expected, as mentioned, that the archives would show priests as participants in 
the social and cultural life of their parishes.  Priests do emerge from the archives as frequent 
attendees at society events, as honoured guests, particularly on special occasions, who could 
bless these events, physically and metaphorically.  However, the extent of their participation 
in attempting to shape politics and to define identities was a surprise.  This discovery called 
for an examination of the extent and success of their influence in shaping and diffusing such 
exclusionary visions.  The first prompt for this investigation came from the priests 
themselves, a number of whom boasted of their involvement, formally or informally, in 
politics.  In the same manner as any investigation into the associations, questions would 
therefore have to be asked as to why priests became involved, how, and also as to the 
evidence for any success they might have achieved in their objectives.   
John Boyer has rightly concluded that many factors contributed to the emergence from the 
1870s onwards of what he terms the ‘radical clergy’.34  One factor he cites is that many were 
incapable of reconciliation with the modern world.  This was not just a case of despairing at 
the new, capitalist economic conditions, but also rejection of the politically dominant liberal 
mindset of the mid-nineteenth century.  Some desired a return to an imagined pre-capitalist 
past, as embodied by a Romantic Catholic corporatism, where parliamentary institutions and 
                                                      
31 Boyer, Political Radicalism, p.119 
32 Peter Leisching, ‘Die römisch-katholische Kirche in Cisleithanien’ in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Die 
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34 Boyer, Political Radicalism See chapter 3, ‘Catholic Politics in Vienna: The Radical Clergy and the Restoration of 
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representative politics would be replaced by a world of fixed hierarchies.  Others were said 
to be angered by their exclusion from public life, and their marginalisation from a State for 
which they no longer had any formal use, a liberal denial to the clergy of meaningful social 
activity which had damaged their bürgerlich social respectability.35  It may have been the 
case that some clergy saw politics as the only way to overcome their social isolation, as they 
sought new roles to replace those they had occupied under the pre-liberal social system.36  
Others were said to have frustrations over the decline in the value of their personal salaries 
and status, while others became radicalised out of the desire for social reform, and the need 
to improve the lot of their parishioners, living in the dreadful conditions of late nineteenth 
century Vienna.  In these circumstances, the lower clergy needed to become radicalised to 
demonstrate to those they attempted to win round to their views that they were different 
from the upper hierarchy of the Viennese Catholic Church, which was close to the elites of 
society.  They needed to legitimate their claims to moral leadership, by being seen to be of 
the people and for the people. 
However, while Boyer and other commentators suggest no single cause for radicalisation, 
they do identify one cause above all others, in the desire of the clergy to respond to what 
they felt were liberal assaults on the Church.  In particular, the clergy feared that liberal 
efforts to separate Church and State permanently would destroy not just the power and 
influence of the Church, but perhaps even the Church itself.37  From tentative beginnings, 
they grew louder in their political and personal attacks on liberals and liberalism.  Priests, 
and others, then labelled liberals as Jews.  Anti-liberalism became antisemitism, and the two 
terms soon became mutually interchangeable in many hands.  
To understand the impact of antisemitic activists requires, to some extent, a move beyond an 
analysis of formal politics.  Politics should not be extrapolated into, say, the wider social  
development of antisemitism in Vienna.  John Boyer, for instance, recognises that the priests 
were extremely active in the growth in Vienna of the Christian Social Party, but sees them, 
however, as playing ‘a series of non-dominant agitatorial roles’ in the rise of the Christian 
Socials, used for their ability to distort ‘the religious values of the Church to serve the 
political purposes of the party machine’.38  In this view, professional politicians exercised 
the real power in the party.  This analysis may be correct from the viewpoint of the internal 
workings of the Christian Social Party, but this study is concerned with the general 
                                                      
35 Leisching, p.97. 
36 See Boyer, Political Radicalism, pp.122-183, on the clergy at the time.  
37 See, for instance, Boyer, Political Radicalism, p.137, on falls in the number of priests entering training. 
38 Boyer, Political Radicalism, p.115. 
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development of exclusionary visions of belonging, and it demonstrates that the wider role 
that the clergy played in the development of antisemitism was much more significant than 
that of low-level agitators.  Their activism fostered the growth of the Party by helping, 
among other things, to change attitudes or to encourage the expression of antisemitic 
attitudes that had been secretly held.   
Antisemitic priests played a significant part in Christian Social plans, and set about 
achieving their objectives through a combination of individual and collective effort.  As 
individuals, they preached, wrote parish newsletters and used other ways to spread an 
exclusionary message.  Priests, in order to be recognised as men of the people, threw 
themselves into the struggles over nationalism, antisemitism and anticlericalism.39  They 
used their status as spiritual pastors and teachers of religion, they took part in activities 
involving economic, cultural and educational improvement.  They were frequently engaged 
on official business, as a result of which they were in contact with the district authorities.  
By virtue of this, and simply from his role as parish priest, the ‘priest had, in his commune – 
especially in Church matters – a special and influential position’.40   
In order to judge whether these priests, and the associations that are studied here, were 
successful in their efforts to create a world where, paradoxically, belonging was defined by 
exclusion, a set of criteria needs to be identified that allows an objective assessment to be 
made.  The first of these criteria is to recognise that none of these people would have 
believed that they could convert the whole of Vienna, not even all of Vienna’s non-Jews, to 
their world view.  They would have recognised that there were limits to their influence.  
They would have recognised, for instance, that they could not win over the liberal who 
believed in distinguishing Jews – and others – only by individual behaviour, not by alleged, 
attributed characteristics.  They would have realised they could not reach Catholics who felt 
antisemitism was an irrational and un-Catholic stance. 
Antisemitic activists were still, however, trying to reach a significant number of people in 
Vienna who might be influenced to support public antisemitism.  They were looking to 
appeal to those who were antisemitic, but who kept their antisemitism quiet, to encourage 
them to take a stronger stance in the expression of their antisemitism.  They were looking to 
encourage others, those looking for a justification for their antisemitism, to join an 
antisemitic group or political organisation, so that they could become part of an organised 
movement, or become more active.  They were looking to provide a welcoming environment 
to those who were reticent about expressing their antisemitism in public. They wanted to 
                                                      
39 Leisching, p.99. 
40 Leisching, p.96 
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convert those who were susceptible, or weak, or afraid, or who were looking for simple 
explanations for the difficulties they faced, from people whom they trusted, who could be 
believed.  We see this in, for example, the stories of those who fell under antisemitic 
influence when they were children, and who moved away when exposed to other views.   
Potential antisemites may eventually have become open antisemites anyway, but organised 
antisemitism gave these potential antisemites somewhere to go, a place where antisemitism 
seemed like the natural order of the world.  This was a place where, by extension, 
nationalism, German values, and alleged racial hierarchies, with the Aryans at their peak, 
could become normal, in the eyes of some people.  It was not, however, just the actions of 
individual priests that counted.  It was not even just the actions of priests collectively that 
made a difference in creating conditions for the flourishing of antisemitism where it was 
possible that this ideology might prosper.  The collective actions of large parts of Viennese 
society produced an effect that was greater than the sum of the parts could have managed.  
The collective and overlapping impact of all of those studied here acted in the same way as 
banal nationalism, creating an atmosphere of antisemitism and exclusion that was welcomed 
by those who were receptive, and which was in turn built on by them.   
As will be seen, many of the priests encountered here were confident that their influence 
could be used to convert antisemitic activities into concrete results, but this is a finding on 
their thoughts, and is not evidence to demonstrate that they really did have influence.  The 
writings left behind by others support the views of these priests that they were men of 
influence but, again, in themselves individual statements are opinions.  These writings 
become evidence of the influence wielded when they are viewed together, in terms of a 
cumulative witnessing that these men did have significance.  For instance, Reichspost 
journalist Friedrich Funder, who attended open air rallies addressed by priests, expresses his 
admiration for the leadership they showed in building the movement.  One priest who was 
active in Vienna in the 1920s and 1930s states that he took holy orders because he was 
inspired as a boy by the preaching of one of the most extreme of his antisemitic 
predecessors, Father Joseph Deckert.  Evidence also comes in more tangible form from the 
significant sales of a parish newsletter published by the same Father Deckert.  Opponents of 
those priests who spread an antisemitic message also attested to the influence of the priests.  
As will be seen, leading Social Democrats, liberal journalists and even, in later times, 
Austria’s National Socialists commented on, and complained about, the role that these men 
took in political activity.  In this sense at least, influence was demonstrated by the belief that 
these men were having an impact. 
These priests were highly visible players on the antisemitic front, but the key in assessing 
the impact of these priests is not just to consider them individually, nor even as a group.  It 
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is, instead, important to analyse them as part of the totality of antisemitic activities of all 
kinds, and from all sources, activities which were mutually reinforcing.  This returns the 
focus of analysis of the activities and societies back to the level of Billig’s banal processes.  
Priests and members of the intellectual classes may not have had contact every day with 
their intended constituencies – those that have been identified here – but they did impact on 
the everyday, normal experience of what was acceptable and appropriate, in terms of 
thinking, saying and doing.  Visions of exclusion became an accepted part of the fabric of 
public life.  Again, this has to be qualified with the phrase ‘for certain constituencies’. 
This was not just a Viennese or Austrian phenomenon, and much work has investigated the 
influence that clergy of different denominations could bring to bear on matters that were 
important to them.  Research on Germany has shown how Protestant pastors supported pro-
German Nationalist stances by being ‘robed in authority and surrounded with the symbols of 
Christian tradition’.41  Even as late as the 1930s, pastors were making resistance to Nazi 
ideas difficult to achieve.  As Geyer remarks, what was to be resisted when ‘publications one 
had been taught to respect, and one’s own church leaders, from the pulpit…proclaimed the 
beauty and righteousness of the cause.’42  The influence of the antisemitic Catholic priests in 
general should also not be downplayed: 
‘From the popular religious revivalism of the 1840s/1850s to the involvement 
of the Catholic hierarchy and parish clergy in the development of mass 
democratic politics during the last third of the century, religious language, 
practices, and institutions were, arguably, playing a greater role in European 
society at the beginning of the twentieth century than at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century’.43 
There has been much debate about the relative role that different groups played in the 
development of antisemitism in Vienna.  Bruce Pauley agrees with Boyer when he attributes 
the main responsibility for the rise of antisemitism to antisemitic politicians. Pauley, 
however, goes on to say that, behind these politicians, the Catholic clergy of Vienna was 
‘only slightly less responsible’.44  This work agrees that, seen as part of a wider network of 
activists on the one hand, and also given their highly visible roles, individually and 
collectively the priests of Vienna had a major influence in the development of antisemitism 
and visions of exclusion in the city.  
                                                      
41 Geyer, pp.87-88. 
42 Geyer, p.87 
43 Bjork in Geyer, pp.207-208. 
44 Pauley, p.328. 
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This is not to propose a simplistic model that overplays the role and impact of those priests 
who undertook antisemitic activities.  As Boyer has shown in his work on the Christian 
Social movement, it is necessary to examine the rise and consolidation of an exclusionary 
mindset from several angles.45  It is also necessary to recognise that the importance that was 
attached to antisemitism as a definer of belonging or exclusion also varied over time.  
Similarly, proponents of exclusionary visions did not operate in isolation.  The work of 
others would have helped reinforce their impact on the public imagination, while that of 
others would have worked against them. 
The political activities of these priests were not intended to help pro-Anschluss nationalists.  
They did, however, help to create a world where antisemitism, and alongside it nationalism, 
with its similar ordering of people into groups and hierarchies based on attributed 
characteristics, came to be seen by many not just as a potential way of ordering the world, 
but as the most logical way of ordering it.  They were not alone in this.  Pan-Germans 
frequently used antisemitic language, for many purposes.  This work shows that while 
antisemitism and nationalism are not the same thing, the antisemitic language used by these 
priests as the period progressed became more and more intertwined with the language of 
nationalism.  Many of them spread the message that a good German was also a determined 
antisemite.  Just as it has been demonstrated how, in Bohemia, the process of ‘nationalising’ 
all events, not just politics, acquired a momentum that became difficult to stop once it had 
started, a similar process appears to have been at work in Vienna.46  Catholic priests were 
clearly contributing to an atmosphere which shaped perceptions of what it meant to be 
German, but they were also spreading a message of a separate path of Austrian German 
development. Catholic priests, and others, spread a message that German national spirit was 
linked to antisemitism, an idea whose diffusion became difficult to stop. 
While priests appear in most of the chapters of this work, two relatively short chapters have 
been set aside to look closely at their activities at key points in this study.  These show how 
patterns in their activities were developing over time.  While this moves the efforts of these 
priests to the heart of this work, two contexts within which they exist must be examined.  
The first context is that of the activities of the pro-Anschluss nationalists.  The second, and 
perhaps even more important context, is exposed by a number of sources which show how 
the expression of extreme German identity was aided by a world view where arbitrary 
divisions of people into ‘us’ and ‘them’ came to be considered as normal.  This was a world 
of constant differentiation at many levels, including socially, ethnically, religiously.  The 
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46 See Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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concept and act of differentiation based on nationalist principles became for many an 
important part of this world. 
The Structure Of This Work 
1861 is the starting point for this work, because this was the year that representative 
government, however limited, was properly implemented in the Habsburg Monarchy, after 
false starts in the previous year.47  Local civil institutions were revived, so from this point 
onwards people began to develop a voice in the shaping of the state.  The structure of this 
work reflects how the original questions, and questions raised by material coming out of the 
archival findings, have had to be addressed.  Chapter 1 sets out two themes.  One theme is 
the chronological superstructure of the work, a high level analysis of events across the whole 
period, in order to explain the long line of events.  This is far from suggesting that there was 
a single line of events that had to be followed and which could not be avoided.  Rather, it 
shows the general development of events, to highlight where changes in direction occurred, 
and where new starting points for developments came about, before returning in detail to 
these events in individual chapters.  The second theme of Chapter 1 is the intellectual 
framework for the work as a whole, the models on which it draws and which it develops, in 
order to grapple with underlying events, again before returning to these models in later 
chapters.  This chapter also begins to develop the overlapping dialogues of German 
nationalism and antisemitism in Vienna.  
Chapters 2 and 3 are paired chapters, giving different perspectives on the same period.  
Chapter 2 begins by briefly highlighting some developments in Vienna in the 1850s that are 
important for an understanding of later years, before turning its attention to nationalist 
politics and nationalist agitation in Vienna up to 1879.  It does so in the context of wider 
events, and partly by revisiting some important secondary literature.  Chapter 3 covers 
approximately the same period, but presents an introduction to some of the priests of Vienna 
who are important for this work.  Chapters 4 and 5 move forward to 1896, the years of 
liberal decline and the rise of an antisemitic challenge.  These chapters look at how this 
challenge split between two groups.  On one side were Habsburg loyalists, who saw their 
future in the Empire.  On the other side were the Pan-German nationalists, who believed all 
Germans should be in one, German state.  Chapter 6 looks at the years of Christian Social 
rule on the Vienna City Council, the developing relationship between the two main branches 
of the antisemitic movement, and what this meant for definitions of being German.  Chapter 
                                                      
47 Stefan Malfer argues that Habsburg autocratic rule throughout the 1850s should be seen as an ‘intermezzo’ in the 
constitutional era.  That is not the position taken in this work, as the outcome of 1861 was by no means pre-ordained.  See 
Stefan Malfer, ‘Der Konstitutionalismus in der Habsburger Monarchie. Siebzig Jahre Verfassungsdiskussionen in 
“Cisleithanien”’, in Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Vol. VII: Verfassung 
und Parlamentarismus, Part 1, (Vienna; Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000), pp.11-67, here p.11.  
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7 considers the continuities and changes that existed between 1914 and 1920, alongside the 
search by the Right for scapegoats to blame for defeat in war and the end of Empire.  
Chapter 8 presents an analysis of how the First Republic was viewed by many as a 
provisional state form, if not as a provisional state, while Chapter 9 shows how the idea of 
Anschluss was resisted even by many who considered Austria to be a German state.  Chapter 
10 begins with the Anschluss, but continues beyond 1938 the stories of some of the people 
here.  It considers how these stories, and some post-War reflections on events, contribute to 
an understanding of the period 1861 to 1938. 
Vienna did not develop in isolation and familiar themes from wider debates in Habsburg and 
European history are encountered: for instance, the German nationalist activity in Vienna 
that is covered here must be set in the context of, say, Czech nationalism and wider political 
questions from the same period.  Nor can the activities of the priests be properly understood 
without addressing the question of secularisation, to show that the nature and scope of the 
influence of priests changed throughout the period, but did not go away.48  Other questions 
that have to be addressed come from the specialist historiography on Vienna.  It is 
particularly important, for instance, to understand how the activities of these priests stand in 
relation to two seemingly opposing models for engaging with the history of Vienna.  The 
first of these, that of ‘Red Vienna’, suggests a view that the city as a whole was Socialist.  
This in turn implies that a Socialist vision of inclusion was the dominant paradigm in Vienna 
and that a vision of exclusion would be exceptional.  However, the extent of Socialist 
domination of the city, and the ability of the Social Democrats to influence bourgeois life 
and culture, has long since been challenged by some historians as a myth.49   
Against this is the idea to be found in the works of historians such as Robert Wistrich, that 
antisemitism was widespread and an ordinary part of daily life, and that an exclusionary 
vision of belonging was generally accepted.  Wistrich, and others, go so far as to claim that 
Socialist Democratic leaders were prone to indulge in antisemitic remarks, to whip up 
support.50  This work engages with these views in later chapters, as appropriate.  As will be 
seen, it concludes that the Red Vienna model is useful, but needs to be applied appropriately 
if the role and influence of the priests is to be understood.  This work concludes that the 
Wistrich and Pauley models at the very least overstate the case of ‘antisemitism 
                                                      
48  See David Martin, ‘The Secularization Issue: Prospect and Retrospect’, The British Journal Of Sociology, Vol.42, No.3, 
1991, pp.465-474 and Frank J. Lechner, 'The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal’, Social Forces, Vol. 69, No. 4, 1991, 
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49 Jill Lewis, ‘Red Vienna: Socialism In One City, Vienna 1918-1927’, European History Quarterly, Vol.13, 1983, pp.335-355, 
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50 See Robert S. Wistrich, Socialism and the Jews, (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson, 1982), pp.350-352.  Also Bruce Pauley, 
From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 
p.136 or p.143. 
  Page 30 of 272 
everywhere’, and as such are unhelpful in understanding the importance of the priests and 
their activities. 
This examination of how the Viennese experienced the shaping of identity and belonging is 
a challenging and worthwhile subject in its own right.  However, the importance of the 
subject goes beyond this, raising questions which continue to be asked now.  These 
questions, of nations without states, of otherness, assimilation and tolerance of diversity, 
have a continuing relevance across a wide range of current political and social issues.  The 
history of Vienna over these years, like most other lengthy periods, was a period of great 
change.  It shows individuals reacting in different ways to the erosion of the world that is 
familiar to them.  From these diverse reactions, a city of contradictions emerged, but by 
1938, Vienna seemed to have abandoned a cosmopolitan past for a future of intense German 
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CHAPTER 1:  VIENNA 1861-1938: CULTURE, POLITICS AND IDENTITY 
Conflict, Cohesion And Change: A View Of 1861 To 1938  
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, major economic and demographic changes 
affected the whole of Europe.  Austria was no exception.  Its capital, Vienna, was the 
product of a combination of its own people and culture as well as being a mirror of the wider 
trends that affected Europe.  Studies of the ‘Austrian’ part of the Empire, known as 
Cisleithania, have shown how regional variations in per capita income acted as push factors 
to encourage people with skills to migrate to the cities.  Vienna offered the prospect of a 
better life than most cities in the Empire, even if life there could be incredibly harsh, with 
accommodation being at a particular premium.1  After 1857, the first serious attempts were 
made to remodel the city both within its old boundaries and beyond, in order to improve 
living conditions and to absorb new arrivals.  Vienna’s population grew quickly, from 
476,000 in 1857, to 1,364,000 in 1891, and over two million in 1910.2  
Over time, the administrative structure and even the physical extent of the city of Vienna 
changed with circumstances.  By the late nineteenth century, as the population grew, Vienna 
comprised what is now known as the modern inner city, the Innere Stadt, as well as suburbs 
that were incorporated into the city in two batches, first in 1850 and then in the 1890s.  For 
the purposes of this study, this is the geographical scope of Vienna.  Vienna in the 1890s 
was not too dissimilar in extent to the Vienna of just before Anschluss, which in its turn is 
not too dissimilar to that of modern Vienna.  Appendix C shows a map of modern Vienna. 
In the period to the First World War, buildings of all kinds were erected, far out into the 
suburbs, from workers’ tenements through department stores to sanatoria for rest cures. 
Construction brought disruption as well as benefits into people's lives, but the pace of 
change could be frustratingly slow at times.  In Währing, in the 1890s, the old cemetery had 
long reached its capacity.  Efforts to reach an agreement about how and where to replace it, 
however, dragged on into the 1920s.3  Planned factory extensions threatened to intrude on 
land owned by the Church at Ottakring.  This was less inconvenient for the Church than it 
                                                      
1 See, for example, the per capita figures for 1913, in David F. Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire 1750-1914, 
(Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1984), p.150. 
2 The 1910 estimate is for the population after the expansion of the city’s administrative boundaries in the 1890s but, even 
based on the earlier city limits, the population had grown to 827,000 in 1910.  Jean-Paul Bled, Histoire de Vienne, (Paris: 
Fayard, 1998) pp.179-180.  
3 See multiple instances of correspondence: AEDW WäCor, 1893, 1895, 1896, also AEDW WäCk, 1923. 
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might seem since, if this land could be sold at a fair price, the Church would no longer have 
to pay local taxes on land that brought little benefit.4  
Viennese author Stefan Zweig, writing in exile at the start of the 1940s, portrays pre-First 
World War Vienna, and the Habsburg Empire, as a ‘golden age of security’ and the home of 
a hitherto unknown material and psychological prosperity.5  His memoirs show a longing for 
an age that could never have been, and Zweig has been criticised for an over-romanticised 
sense of the past.6  However, the contradictions between the opinions he expresses and the 
story he tells expose a certain truth.  Zweig writes from the perspective of someone from a 
privileged background, conservative in outlook, a Jewish, bourgeois Habsburg loyalist, who 
turned eighteen in 1899.  Zweig considered even the mass antisemitic Christian Social 
movement that gathered around Mayor Karl Lueger as no real threat to his way of life.  
Referring to Lueger, Zweig says: ‘… his official antisemitism never prevented him from 
staying well-disposed and agreeable to his former Jewish friends’.7  Protected as he was by 
money, and with opportunities for education and travel, perhaps for Zweig this really was a 
golden age.   
Zweig’s material shows, however, the threats to this world, from Socialist agitators on the 
one hand to Pan-Germans on the other, and he would have been familiar with the kinds of 
disturbances that these agitators caused.  He would have known about the huge nationalist 
crowds that spilled onto the streets of Währing in 1892.  Ostensibly there to welcome 
Herbert Bismarck for his wedding in Vienna, these crowds were really hoping for a glimpse 
of Herbert’s father Otto, and they become involved in clashes with the police to do so.8  
Zweig considered these nationalists, who ‘took their support almost exclusively from the 
Bohemian and Alpine districts’, to be an alien import into Vienna, bringing with them as 
early as the 1880s something that was not native to the city.9  Zweig therefore concedes that 
this ‘golden age of security’ was under threat, whether from outsiders or not, long before 
1914.  This contradiction between security, stability and the status quo on the one hand and 
agitation for change on the other, and the conflicts that came out of these opposing positions 
had effects far beyond Vienna’s boundaries.  These were Viennese-accented reflections of 
conflicts taking place elsewhere in the Empire and in other parts of Europe.   
                                                      
4 AEDW AOCk, entries for 1872, 1874 and 1875.   
5 Stefan Zweig, Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers, (Stuttgart: Fischer, 1981), p.14.  
6 See for example H.C. Meyer, untitled review of Die Welt von Gestern, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1954), 
pp.293-294. 
7 Zweig, Gestern, p.82. 
8 ABPD 1892 St1, reports of 20th June 1892.  Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, all ABPD are police reports. 
9 Zweig, Gestern, p.82. 
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As Vienna grew, large groups of people who did not necessarily have German as their first 
language arrived in the city, adding to its diversity.  By 1869, over 40,000 Jews had come in 
large numbers from Bohemia, Moravia and Galicia.10  Many had been brought up in the 
Jewish enlightenment tradition, the haskalah, and embraced German culture, converted to 
Christianity and assimilated as far as they could into Viennese society.11  Later waves of 
poorer Galician Orthodox Jews were Yiddish-speaking, kaftan-wearing, and stood out on the 
streets. 12  All around them were signs of Vienna’s Catholic culture, from the Churches and 
their public ceremonies through the clusters of priests and nuns on the streets to the plaster 
saints that decorated the exteriors of homes and shops across the city.13  Christian Viennese 
society’s acceptance even of assimilated Jews appears to have been skin-deep.14  One view 
of the lack of true assimilation of Jews is that ‘Austria never did accept them’.15  
Nevertheless, care should be taken not to assume that Christian means the whole of Vienna’s 
non-Jewish population, nor should all Christians be suspected of rejecting Jewish 
assimilation.  Nor should assimilation, if it means the loss of a culture, be taken as a 
necessarily worthwhile objective compared with, say, the acceptance of diversity within a 
society. 
Other large immigrant groups also settled in the city.  As many as 100,000 Czechs lived 
there by 1900.  Settling in clusters – as much as twenty five per cent of the population of the 
Simmering district was Czech – they filled jobs across a range of industries from brick 
makers through coffee house waiters to tram drivers.16  Some immigrants arrived with their 
families, but most were male and single.  Married men hoped to be joined by their families 
later.  The first call of these immigrants would be to earlier arrivals from their home town or 
province, to try to arrange jobs and accommodation.  Some immigrants came from rural 
areas but many, especially among Jews, were from urban backgrounds in the Empire’s 
provinces.  Per head of population, Jews were more likely than the Austrian average to live 
in cities.17  They had skills that would be useful for survival in Vienna but social 
advancement, while not impossible, was difficult to achieve.   
                                                      
10 Marsha Rozenblit, The Jews of Vienna 1867-1914, (Albany: State University Of New York Press, 1983), p.95. 
11 Rozenblit, p.17. 
12 Rozenblit, p.21. 
13 See Emmerich Siegris, Alte Wiener Hauszeichen und Ladenschilder, (St.Pölten: Burgverlag, 1924). 
14 See, for instance, Robert Wistrich, The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1988). 
15 Rozenblit, p.196. 
16 Alfred Payrleitner, Oesterreicher und Tschechen, (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003), p.120. 
17 Rozenblit, p.16. 
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Certain years stand out as being critical in the history of this period, with 1897 as a major 
watershed.  This was the year of the so-called furor teutonicus, the ‘German rage’, when 
many Germans throughout Cisleithania took to the streets in violent reaction to Prime 
Minister von Badeni’s language ordinances.18  If implemented, these decrees would have led 
to more Czech speakers in the Bohemian civil service.  As civil servants included employees 
of organisations ranging from postal services through customs stations to state-owned 
transport systems, the effects would be felt among a considerable number of German-
speakers.19  Adding to the general turmoil, 1897 also saw the elevation of the leader of the 
antisemitic Christian Social movement, Karl Lueger, to the post of Mayor of Vienna.  The 
Christian Socials were now, and would be for some time to come, the most successful 
antisemitic movement in Europe.20  The same year also witnessed the appointment of Gustav 
Mahler, a convert from Judaism, as Director of the Royal Opera, and the anti-Jewish 
reaction to this; the return to the Austrian Parliament of Georg Schönerer, a key figurehead 
for racial pan-Germanism in Austria, after a lengthy ban for violent antisemitic activities; 
and, at a different level, in the arts, the creation of the breakaway movement, the Secession.  
All of these events pointed in different ways to splits in Viennese society between the old 
order and competing visions of the new.  Some of the causes behind these events – 
nationalist activity, the challenge to the artistic old order – were familiar across Europe.  The 
sustained success of political antisemitism, however, was peculiar to Vienna.   
The end of the war in 1918 was another clear watershed, with the destruction of the old 
Empire and the creation from it of several new states.  Most, but by no means all, of the 
German speaking areas eventually formed a new Austrian Republic, where the political 
parties – Christian Socials, Social Democrats and the smaller Pan-German parties – now 
competed under a democratic system, but the Republic was built on shallow foundations.  It 
struggled through the 1920s, at times seemingly ready to fall apart.  After the onset of the 
Depression, the whole of the period 1930 to 1938 was for Vienna and Austria a period of 
political, social and economic crisis.  While major upheavals took place in many countries, 
perhaps only in Spain’s civil war was the intensity, extent and duration of violence in this 
period greater than in Austria.21 
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Despite significant ruptures, even after 1918 there were continuities on many levels.  If in 
shrunken form, the intellectual elite still influenced, and was influenced by, events beyond 
the boundaries of city and state.  The Republic may have swept away the Habsburgs, but the 
city retained its Catholic veneer.  The city’s population remained diverse after 1918, but the 
social composition of many of the city’s districts was changing.  In 1937, Father Leopold 
Lojka of the parish of St. Joseph, in the district of Währing, recorded a survey of life in his 
parish.  Alongside a note on the existence of a poor quarter, as well as an area housing 
mainly public servants, he noted: ‘Jewish quarter in the Cottage (area of Währing)... none 
before the war’.22   
Against this backdrop of continuity and change, radical nationalism in Vienna must not be 
interpreted as having taken a single, unopposed, linear path from the 1860s to 1938.  
Habsburg loyalists had challenged Pan-German nationalism, and some people had held a 
genuine commitment to the Empire, whether expressed as dynastic loyalty or as a 
commitment to its supranational character.  In the inter-war period, while a few Social 
Democrats occasionally formed tactical alliances with Nazis in street violence against 
common enemies, the Social Democratic Party, with its commitment to international 
socialism, stood up to Nazism.  This is explored in later chapters.   
The history of Vienna should also not be judged from high profile political events alone.  
Politics is important, because it is through effective control of political and state institutions 
that change can be implemented, but the daily culture of a place or time can be difficult to 
change, as it is based on long experience.  Daily culture can be based on, and expressed 
through, deeply held beliefs, but it can also be governed by how people think they should 
behave and conform, and the ways in which they receive and interpret messages.23  Hence, 
the scenes at the time of the Anschluss could be the representation of inner feelings that had 
been suppressed; it could be a temporary creation of circumstances; or it could be the result 
of fear of the consequences of not conforming.  The history of Vienna to 1938 shows that 
people took different stands on the question of nationalism at different times.  Yet, the wave 
of anti-Jewish violence and the huge pro-Nazi rallies that followed the Anschluss must have 
appeared to confirm that a particular kind of antisemitic, aggressive German nationalism had 
now succeeded in becoming a permanent and dominant feature. 
                                                      
22 AEDW WeCk, 1937.   
23 See for instance Michel De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, (Berkeley: University Of California, 1984). 
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Geographical, Political And Other Contexts 
The story that emerges from this study is set in, and influenced by, several contexts, beyond 
the context of the changing city of Vienna itself.  The first of these is to be found in the 
wider geopolitical context for this study of Vienna, in which political change and the 
physical re-ordering of the frontiers of European states left a Europe in 1938 that was 
completely different from the Europe that existed in the mid-nineteenth century.  At the start 
of the period, Vienna was the capital of an Empire that stretched from Italy to modern day 
Ukraine.  Beyond its frontiers, this Empire exercised an informal leadership of the German 
states, with Prussia as its only serious rival for this position.  This changed as a result of war, 
and the Habsburgs were forced, in turn, from Italy and Germany.  Further war led to the 
Empire’s dismantlement and the end of rule by the Habsburg dynasty, leaving Vienna as the 
capital of a much reduced Austria in the heart of Europe.  By 1938, the threat was that 
Austria would disappear from the map altogether, to become part of Germany. 
These events took place against a backdrop of political change that was happening across 
Europe.  In 1861, most countries were governed by some form of dynastic system.  Great 
Britain was a constitutional monarchy, but few could vote.  The German states, by and large, 
were ruled by princes and their ministers.  Russia was governed by an autocratic Tsar.  
Gradually, this changed.  More people were allowed the vote, and dynastic rule in the 
constitutional monarchies became symbolic: parliaments expressed the will of the people.  In 
other states, such as France, republican systems gained some degree of permanence.  
Activists promoted the nation state as the natural order, and advanced the idea that the nation 
was the bond that unified the people.  Democracy was championed and, after the First World 
War, seemed to have won the day, when states that were said to be democratic and to 
conform with the ideal of the nation state replaced the Empires of Central and Eastern 
Europe.  These states did not last long in this form.  Dictatorship replaced democracy, and 
nationalism was invoked to legitimate the state against enemies abroad and minorities 
within.24 
A further context for this study is that of the development of nationalism within the borders 
of the Empire.  Many of the states that sprang into being from the ruins of the Habsburg 
Empire after the First World War were claimed to be the culmination of national liberation 
struggles by activists who were supported in their aims by the bulk of the people, freeing 
them from the Habsburg ‘Prison of Nations’.25  This however, would be an over-
                                                      
24 Lonnie Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.182-190.. 
25 Johnson, Central Europe, pp172-182; Judson, Guardians, p.233. 
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simplification, and caution should be taken when considering the extent of, and support for, 
nationalism in the Empire in the period covered in this work.  This caution should extend to 
the interpretation of allegedly nationalist activity, such as the gathering of crowds at times of 
‘national tensions’.    
Newspapers of the time carried reports of ‘nationalist’ disturbances, stressing the size of the 
crowds and the level and duration of violence.  These reports were at pains to emphasize the 
nationalist motivation behind these scenes, as part of a defence against the loss of what they 
came to term Nationalbesitzstand.  Nationalbesitzstand can be translated as the territory and 
economic power of a nation, but it does also include the psychological, cultural and 
emotional wealth of a people.  Nationalists claimed this heritage was under threat from 
encroachments by rival national groupings.  Closer examination of events, via police reports 
and the reports of Imperial, rather than local, administrators contradicts many of these 
accounts.  The level and extent of violence tended to be exaggerated, particularly with regard 
to the numbers participating.  The cause of the violence was also often misreported, with a 
nationalist gloss given to a personal vendetta or violence resulting from the excessive 
consumption of alcohol.  Once an event had been given a nationalist interpretation, however, 
it was difficult to remove this alleged aspect of it from the public’s mind.26  In this way, 
events which had not been at all nationalist added to the nationalist mythology of national 
warfare in certain parts of the Empire.  Reporters, whether on the Czech or German side, 
were keen that this should happen.  Their reports also ignored the many examples of cross-
national co-operation in Bohemia, or presented them as acts of national betrayal.27  
While nationalists argued for a vision of society based on national privilege and segregation, 
others were engaged in the struggle to win democratic rights for all people, regardless of 
nation.  Nationalists were not unopposed in their belief that the struggle for the rights of the 
ethnos was more important than the struggle for the rights of the demos.28  Nevertheless, 
nationalist activity certainly increased, particularly in Bohemia.  Despite the distance of 
events from Vienna, it is clear from the timing of riots there that the effects of this increased 
activity were in some way felt and reflected in responses in the city.  Nationalist politicians 
in Vienna became skilled at linking events in Bohemia, the so-called threat to Germanness, 
with the changing social and economic scene in the city.  
                                                      
26 Judson, Guardians, pp.206-213, for evidence of misreporting. 
27 Glasheim, pp.11-12. 
28 I am indebted to Professor Gerald Stourzh for his summation of this struggle during the inaugural LSE Austrian History 
Lecture at the London School Of Economics in 2007. 
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As political rights and the vote spread, radical politicians used street rallies, pamphlets and 
bribery to egg on their supporters.29  However, even within the German camp there were 
competing visions.  Christian Socials used German identity to preach antisemitism, but they 
dared not display too extreme an anti-Slav position, as they wanted Slav support, first 
against the liberals, later against the Social Democrats.  Schönerer-type Pan-Germans lost 
support by attacking the Church and even the Emperor.30  After a brief peak in the late 
1890s, support for radical Pan-German nationalism in Vienna fell back, although it 
experienced occasional brief revivals.  Pan-Germans also faced indifference to nationalism 
in a city where economic survival was a daily concern for large segments of the population.  
While daily concerns should not be taken as automatically overriding longer term concerns 
or desires, it is unlikely that large numbers of the population of the city were making what 
French scholar Ernest Renan described as a ‘daily plebiscite’, a positive identification with 
the nation.31  
A third context for this study is that of the development of nationalism outside the borders of 
the Empire.  This relates in particular to how organised and large-scale nationalist activity 
swept across Europe, taking different forms at different times and in different places.  The 
Italian states came together as a Kingdom in 1860.  While British governments faced the 
political thorn of the Irish question in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Norway claimed a peaceful separation from Sweden in 1905.32  Nationalists justified their 
cause on the grounds of both tradition and modernity, claiming that nationalism could both 
bring back the past and modernise for the future.33  Proponents of nationalism acted at a 
political, economic and social level.  This wave of nationalist sentiment took many forms.  It 
occupied the fields of high and popular culture.  Folk song was described as the root of the 
genius of the people.  A movement for the independence of Finland from Russia found a 
voice in the music of Sibelius, such as his Finlandia overture of 1899.34   
While Nationalist movements within the Habsburg Empire were said to be a threat to the 
Empire’s unity, nationalism outside the Empire – in different forms – also posed a threat.  
Outside of the Empire, irredentist movements – so-called from the Italian for ‘unredeemed’, 
in the sense of incomplete – looked to absorb into recently formed national states, such as 
                                                      
29 Judson, Guardians, p.42. 
30 Boyer, Political Radicalism, p.229. 
31 Aviel Roshwald, The Endurance Of Nationalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.58-59 and pp.212-213. 
32 Michael Rapport, Nineteenth Century Europe, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), p.298. 
33 John Hutchinson, ‘Myth Against Myth: The Nation as Ethnic Overlay’ in Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson, eds., 
History And National Destiny, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp.109-119. 
34 Michael Kennedy, ed., The Oxford Dictionary Of Music, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.299. 
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Rumania or Serbia, citizens of the Empire with whom they shared their language or culture.  
An extension of nationalism, Pan-Slavism, called on all Slavs to be proud of, but to 
transcend, national identity, and to look to their common roots against common enemies.  As 
this movement was heavily promoted by Russia, some saw Pan-Slavism as a front for 
Russian interests.35  Such movements were seen as powerful forces which could ultimately 
destroy the Habsburg Empire and the culture which Germans, not just nationalist Germans, 
felt it represented.  Perhaps this was correct.  In 1913, the Serbian Prime Minister was quite 
open with the French ambassador that Pan-Slavism should act ‘to ensure [Slav] cohesion in 
the struggle against Vienna’.36  Russian foreign policy may not seem to have been directly 
relevant for the ‘man in the street’, especially before the days of universal suffrage and 
responsible governments.  However, if Russian foreign policy seemed to encourage the so-
called disloyal enemy within, perhaps the Czech who competed for jobs and wages, it 
translated a distant matter into a local concern.   
All of these contexts had an influence on how people saw the world.  They were not, 
however, the only contexts.  Supporters of political movements which rejected nationalism, 
for instance, attempted to win people to their views.  The contexts of political change in 
Vienna, and Europe in general, are also high-level influences on expressions of German 
identity, and a more immediate, and final, context for this section is that of the everyday 
experience.  Even more so than the city of today, the Vienna of 1861 to 1938 was a world of 
street culture, communal places, and shared living quarters.37  Admittedly, events were 
mediated by the press, political parties, the Church and other organisations.  However, the 
informal contact, the neighbour, the work comrade, the co-drinker at the local bar and other 
social networks all had a significant and wide-reaching influence, as did the drip effect of 
popular newspapers, songs and entertainments.  In this way, covert propaganda, reinforced 
by a supportive local culture, linking wider events to local concerns, would be successful in 
creating for some the sense of a threat to a way of life or their very identity.  It would also 
succeed in defining, for some, who was said to belong and who was not.  Everyday culture 
would prove to be a significant influence on ideas of who belonged and who did not belong. 
Identity, The Nation And Nationalism 
Any examination of nationalism and national identity raises questions concerning the nature 
of identity and how it is constructed.  It is now generally agreed that identity is a complex, 
                                                      
35 Hugo Hantsch, ‘Pan-Slavism, Austro-Slavism, Neo-Slavism: The All Slav Congresses and the Nationality Problems of 
Austria-Hungary’, AHYB, 1965, Vol. I, pp.23-27. 
36 Hantsch, p.35. 
37 J. Robert Wegs, Growing up working class: continuity and change among Viennese youth, 1880-1938, (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University,1989), pp.55-74. 
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shifting phenomenon, not a given, fixed characteristic of a person, and that ‘Identities are 
considered and bound to change.  What one identifies with at any given moment may 
depend upon the situation and the threat or challenge one is facing’.38  It is also recognised 
that socialization and social roles play a major part in the development of identity, and that 
some individuals ‘accept’ roles given to them, while others are more active in creating 
identities from social surroundings.39  Identity changes over time according to various 
influences, and the components of identity take on different levels of significance for the 
individuals concerned.  National identity is one such component of an individual’s overall 
identity, but little consensus exists on what it is, nor even what goes to create it. 
Socialization is a key component of the definition of identity that is used here.  Without 
social groups, and the interactions they provide, definitions of identity would be based only 
on the self, without reference to any other person.  The social group provides opportunities 
to demonstrate one’s own identity and to experience and share in that of others. 
Models have been developed to assist in understanding the nation and nationalism, but none 
is universally accepted as definitive.  These models can be grouped in many ways, but they 
usually vary in their approach to two competing ideas for defining the nation, civic 
nationalism and ethnic nationalism.  The first idea, civic nationalism, proposes that 
citizenship is the key and, while nationality comes in essence from place of birth, 
immigrants may acquire citizenship by demonstrating acceptance of deeply held local 
values.  Civic nationalism is often seen as essentially individualistic.40  The second idea, 
ethnic nationalism, proposes that one cannot gain or lose a national identity, which is 
inherited through kinship.41  Ethnic nationalism is often considered to be essentially 
collectivist.42 
Appendix A shows how some of the major theories regarding nationalism fit into a spectrum 
of views as to whether the civic or the ethnic definition of nationalism is key.  For the 
purposes of this study these models are placed into five broad groups, from which their 
commonalities as well as their differences emerge.43  First, there are two groups which are 
based on the view that, to varying degrees, nationalism is a modern phenomenon, part of 
                                                      
38 Holger Briel, ed., German Culture And Society, (London: Arnold, 2002), p.70. 
39 John Scott and Gordon Marshall, eds., A Dictionary of Sociology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Oxford 
Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  King's College London.  11 August 
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40 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads To Modernity, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
41 See T.H. Eriksen, Place, Kinship And The Case For Non-Ethnic Nations, in Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson, 
eds., History And National Destiny: Ethnosymbolism and its Critics, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) 
42 Greenfeld, Nationalism, p.21.  
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urban, industrial society.  The first of these groups – the modernists – broadly argue that 
modern industrial conditions require societies to be more homogeneous than they had 
previously been.  Societies are political communities, where participation is through mass 
movements.  Industrially organised print media are the primary mechanism for the creation 
of these new national societies.44  Here, nationalism is an invented phenomenon.  
Differences do exist within this group of modernists, for instance between Gellner and 
Hobsbawm, but they see modernity as central to an understanding of nationalism.45 
Another modernist school of thought is that of political nationalism.  Here, nationalism 
derives from an ideology invented by a political class.  This political class seizes advantages 
from states being organised along national principles, as it forms the elites of those states.46  
This would be especially so for those who go on to make up the elites of newly formed 
states, perhaps after a breakaway from a multinational state.  Political nationalists usually 
recognise other nations’ rights, although not always.  A further group that embraces 
elements of  modernist thinking is that of cultural nationalism, which is said to emerge 
where a people fears that its way of life is under threat.  Cultural nationalists aim to preserve 
or revive national languages and traditions, and they stress kinship and common past 
experiences, such as war or resistance.  Cultural nationalists are tolerant of diversity within 
the nation, and accept that the nation can be made up of many sub-cultures.   
Against this stands a group labelled historicists, who view nationalism as a natural 
phenomenon, with roots deep in the past and in shared kinship.  Here, nationalism affects 
modernisation; it is not caused by it.  Nationalism is the natural divider of the world into 
states based on nations.47  A final group is the ethno-symbolists or ethnicists.48  Ethnicists 
view nations as being rooted in shared intrinsic values and the search for security at times of 
crisis.  They also view the nation as being rooted in a common kindred past, the ethnie, the 
predecessor of the yet-to-be-formed nation.  Generally, ethnicists agree that symbols help to 
legitimise changes to social organisation.  They share historicists’ belief in the intrinsic 
nature of the nation.  In this work, no single model is taken to be able to provide an 
explanation of nationalism.  Both the nation, nationalism and the forms that nationalism 
takes are considered to be contingent, dependent on a particular set of circumstances.  This 
                                                      
44 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1991).  
45 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell,1980) and Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 
1780, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
46 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 
47 The historicist case is argued by, among others, Hastings and Roshwald.  See Adrian Hastings, The Construction Of 
Nationhood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Roshwald, Endurance. 
48 For a volume dedicated to the work of a leading proponent of Ethnicist views, Anthony D. Smith, his critics and his response, 
see Guibernau and Hutchinson, History And National Destiny. 
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work shows that nationalists were quite prepared to use whichever definition of the nation 
suited their purposes at a given time, as long as it furthered their aims. 
Appendix A represents each group of theories regarding nationalism as sitting on several 
dimensions, and these are the typology’s most important feature.  The dimensions show 
approximately where particular views of the nation and nationalism are positioned in the 
debate over whether nationality can be acquired or is innate.  The radical German groups 
studied in this work are generally positioned towards the Ethnic end of the Ethnic-Civic 
dimension, but in interpreting this model care should be taken not to confuse complex, often 
shifting positions regarding nationalism for what may appear on paper as a static, two-
dimensional relationship.  While the diagram represents these positions as being at different 
points on these dimensions, it represents ideal types, not every possible variant of 
nationalism, and different viewpoints do exist within these groupings.   
Most importantly for this study, the dimensions show how the concept of ‘banal 
nationalism’ crosses all categorisations.  It is the common thread, the everyday experience 
which provides the foundation for deeply felt expressions of nationalism.  It sits alongside 
Renan’s concept of the ‘daily plebiscite’, the unconscious and conscious coming together of 
the act of giving oneself to the nation.49  An examination of daily activities, of spoken and 
unspoken commitment to the nation, exposes the depth of absorption of national sentiment.  
That is why the level of examination chosen for this study is this everyday experience of 
daily culture and why, in this work, the concept of banal nationalism is critical.  The concept 
of banal nationalism offers a means of examining how an environment that was conducive to 
the development of both antisemitic and extreme nationalist attitudes was created. 
Michael Billig defined banal nationalism as: 
‘the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be 
reproduced.  It is argued that these habits are not removed from everyday life, 
as some observers have supposed.  Daily, the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, 
in the lives of its citizenry.  Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in 
established nations, is the endemic condition’.50 
In this original definition, within established nation-states diverse factors create a ‘rhetoric’ 
which reinforces the nation-state as the natural unit of allegiance.  Publicly displayed flags 
act as daily reminders of the nation without appearing as a forced message.  Reports of 
international sports competitions may not seem nationalist in tone, but allusions to the nation 
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support a national ‘rhetoric’.  This definition has elsewhere been extended to include proto-
states, where autonomous regions promote a national vision via such banal mechanisms.51  
In this work, the definition of banal nationalism is extended further, to include any daily 
activity which supports the creation of a nationalist vision for the organisation of society.   
Where a state is not founded on national principles, nationalist organisations replace Billig’s 
institutional propagator of nationalism.  These organisations find support for their efforts not 
just by overt political activity, but from popular songs, nursery rhymes, humour and folk 
tales which reinforce national stereotypes.  They find support in the subconscious codes that 
are triggered by street names and public buildings.  This daily activity creates or reinforces 
individuals’ views of themselves and their relationship with the national ‘other’.  
Nationalism has to compete with other ideologies at this ‘banal’ level, as it is not the only 
phenomenon that can be shaped by ‘banal’ processes.  The same could be true of religious or 
social ideas and other mindsets.  This daily identification has been picked up recently by 
Rogers Brubaker, who has made models of nationalism even more dynamic.  In Brubaker’s 
work, the sense of national identity is a process, formed by social relationships, where the 
nation is defined and redefined on a regular basis.52  Still more recent models look at aspects 
of social relationships and nationalism in the context of social networks and social 
mobility.53 
While no single definition of the nation can be created that is sufficient to represent all the 
differences in the views outlined above, it can be said that nationalism ‘turns devotion to the 
nation into principles or programmes.  It thus contains a different dimension from mere 
patriotism, which can be a devotion to one’s country or nation devoid of any project for 
political action’.54  Nationalism is therefore a political activity and can be a doctrine for 
which its more extreme advocates are prepared to kill or die, although it is not unique in this.  
Other forms of nationalism may still allow for competing loyalties, such as religious or 
political ties, but for extreme nationalists the nation is everything.  For the purposes of this 
work, nationalism is defined as the doctrine which puts the nation above all else as the 
primary source of identity and group loyalty at a given time.  Such a definition includes 
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Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag 2010) by Pieter Judson, <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2011-2-191>.    
This research was uncovered late in the preparation of this work, so is not considered here  
54 The definition of ’Nationalism’ in Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, eds., The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  King's College London.  11 
August 2007  http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t86.e866.  
  
  Page 44 of 272 
those who wish to bring the whole nation into one political unit, as well as those who accept 
a multi-national state, but who want to see, at the very least, that their nation’s culture and 
rights within it are protected.  Nationalist activity, however, can also be carried out by those 
who do not place the nation above all else, but for whom the nation is a significant factor in 
self-identification.  The key element in this is that, as identity is complex and shifting, the 
national element of identity can become the principal element to be fostered or protected at 
times of a perceived national crisis.   
In its analysis of nationalists and nationalism, and in order to identify features that 
nationalists put forward as common to the nation, this work draws on several models of the 
nation and nationalism that have been developed by specialists in the field of nationalism 
studies, such as Anthony D. Smith.55  Smith has been recognised as one of the leading 
experts in a field which is the subject of much debate.  Smith’s work has evolved over the 
years, and he has changed his opinions over such matters as the elements that make up the 
nation.56  For the purposes of this work, one interpretation of the work of Smith, and others, 
that has proved useful is a model synthesised by Jan Penrose.57   
The Penrose model builds on the idea that, for nationalists, the nation is a distinctive group 
of people, different from others; it occupies a distinct territory; and the nation has a 
powerful, perhaps even mystical, link with its territory.  In the Penrose model, the nation as 
a distinctive group is marked out by three potential cultural bases: a common language; a 
common religion; and common traditions, identified not just by current rituals, but a shared 
history and shared symbols.  These cultural bases are the outward symbols of the unity of the 
nation and the means by which its members are kept together.  The regular reiteration by 
Nationalists of the elements and cultural bases in this model serves to make these seem 
natural and intrinsic properties of groups and individuals.  Nationalists may ignore or vary 
the relative importance of these cultural bases if they are in reality something which may 
divide the nation.   
It will be seen in this work that while nationalists consistently use language and territory, for 
instance, as national unifiers, religion can be used by nationalists as something which may 
either unite or divide a nation.  Pan-Germans will be shown to emphasize religion when 
attempting to highlight alleged differences between Christian Germans and Jewish Germans.  
They will be shown to play down religious differences when attempting to minimise 
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conflicts between Catholic Germans and Protestant Germans.  Evidence will be shown as to 
how several approaches to religion were used to give concrete form to thoughts on what 
bound Germans together, and what separated them. 
By the start of the period examined here, advocates of nationally-based political and cultural 
theories were arguing that, through the free expression of national sentiment, whole 
communities linked as a nation could throw off the old dynastic order and move into a 
modern world, where liberty and authority derived from popular legitimacy.  Writers such as 
Herder and Fichte were among the most prominent nationalist theoreticians.  Both thought 
that all human progress, not just that of one nation, depended on the free association of 
nations.58  This world would be one founded on a community of nations, based on equality 
and the particular characteristics of each people.  As the century progressed, however, more 
aggressive views of national distinctiveness gained weight.  Here, nations assumed their 
place in a hierarchy based on the alleged qualities and abilities attributed to them.  New 
questions were raised about who made up the nation and who was not part of it.  This was no 
academic debate: between 1861 and 1938 more radical nationalist activists used tools 
ranging from the widening franchise to street violence to demand the realisation of their 
principles in concrete form. 
For this work, radical German nationalists are defined as covering a broad spectrum.  They 
define the nation in an ethnic, exclusionary way.  This includes those Christian Socials who, 
at times of crisis, placed the defence of the German nation above all other priorities.  It also 
includes the Pan-Germans, those who felt the future of German Austrians lay within a 
Greater Germany.  While in the early part of the period Pan-Germans included Jews, Jews 
became the most significant group which would later be excluded from nationalist societies.  
Radical German nationalists are also taken to include those who could be termed antisemitic 
cultural nationalists, who saw no contradiction between Germanness and the Habsburg 
Empire or the Austrian First Republic, but who wanted these states to have a predominantly 
‘German’ character.  These radical groups overlapped in different ways with groups which 
favoured a unified German state, but which had very different motivations for this ambition, 
such as those who considered such an aspiration as nothing more than a logical cultural 
objective.  This included the likes of the Social Democratic Mayor of Vienna, Karl Seitz, 
who talked of the need to preserve Austria until Anschluss was possible.  For Seitz, the goal 
was intellectual and cultural unity.59   
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Aufklärung?, (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2004), pp.36-42. 
59 Low, Anschluss 1931-1938, p.20.  
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The focus of this work, however, is on those who usually followed an antisemitic line and 
came from the Right of the political spectrum.  This covers both Pan-Germans, such as 
Schönerer, and many Christian Socials, whether they were in the party or supported its 
objectives.  Like the many positions that could be taken with regard to the national question, 
antisemites were not always agreed on their position towards Jews, nor on what should be 
done with regard to the so-called ‘Jewish Question’.  Positions even changed over time.  The 
starting point for an antisemitic line was that Jews were outsiders not just in the German-
speaking world but in the whole of the Christian world.  Religious antisemitism could allow 
that if a Jew converted then that was the end of the need for antisemitism.  However, other 
forms of antisemitism were invented, in order to argue that a Jew was always a Jew, under 
any circumstances.  Categories such as racial antisemitism were developed, based on what 
would now be considered pseudo-science at the most, in order to produce ‘proof’ of such 
arguments.  These categories are shown in more detail in Appendix B. 
Antisemitism is here defined as a range of prejudicial attitudes towards Jews simply for 
being Jews.  This could be anything from social or economic discrimination against Jews for 
not being Christian, through to a hatred of Jews simply for being Jews.  Antisemitism is not 
the same as a casual comment that may be hurtful to someone who is Jewish, if this is not 
based on prejudice against Jews in general.  Individuals make comments based on the way 
they perceive the world, and based on how the world is portrayed to them.  This especially 
applies to those who have had little education, or who are educated and influenced by those 
who have antisemitic views.  For this reason, not everything that may now look or read like 
antisemitism really is antisemitism, defined as prejudice against Jews because they are Jews.  
In this way, a piece of propaganda that targets Jewish Capitalists is not antisemitic if its aim 
is to target Capitalists who happen to be Jewish, rather than being based on targeting Jewish 
Capitalists as a sub-set of all Jews.  It may be ill-judged and in bad taste, but it is not 
antisemitic.  This point will be developed throughout this work.  
Antisemitism is a relative of radical nationalism, in that it takes attributed characteristics and 
places people into groups alleging who can and can not belong to a particular nation.  In a 
hierarchy of nations, it places Jews at or near the bottom of the pile.  The Anschluss, and the 
Viennese reaction to it, appeared to demonstrate that this belief in nation as a component of 
race, and not as the coming together of people with shared values, had become the dominant 
view in Vienna.  This work examines whether this was the case, by studying not just the 
immediate post-Anschluss reaction, nor just the views of the political classes, but by 
scrutinising how deeply such views had penetrated into the daily culture of the city.  In so 
doing, it examines whether the ethnic vision of nationalism that was being promoted by 
certain nationalists in Vienna had become dominant by 1938.  This work is concerned with 
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the processes through which radical German nationalist sentiment was created, and the 
social relations which contributed to such feelings.  It is particularly concerned with how 
processes such as the conscious propagandising efforts of radical German activists worked 
alongside changes in the underlying culture of the city, in the form of people’s assumptions 
about and perception of the nature of society.  
Being German 
Nationalists promoted visions of a single, unified German people, but questions were also 
asked as to whether it was possible to be a ‘good German’ at the same time as being a ‘good 
Austrian’, or if there was even an opposition in these ideas.  In the nineteenth century, 
similar questions were being asked in Bavaria, Saxony and Hanover, and the other German 
states.  Many reconciled what could now, perhaps anachronistically, be viewed as conflicts 
between particularist local loyalties and broader German visions.60   
While local activities, dialects and loyalties were the primary focus for everyday life, the 
Holy Roman Empire, and then the German Confederation, had provided some framework 
for the formulation of matters that affected all lands considered to be German.  High German 
was the repository of a culture that produced a living and growing body of world renowned 
literature.  The Confederation, and institutions such as the Zollverein, a customs union, 
allowed local Heimat loyalties to parallel wider allegiances. 61  In the sense proposed by 
Benedict Anderson, a much larger German community could be imagined.62  
Yet, some things could divide Germans from each other.  People were loyal to their local 
dynasty and local traditions.  They followed their own religion and, even leaving aside Jews, 
the main Christian groups had very different histories.  Evangelical Germans pointed to 
Lutheranism as a German faith that bound them together.  This tradition divided Evangelical 
Germans from their Catholic counterparts.  Catholicism offered a different bond, to a 
universal Church, and the Habsburgs promoted Catholicism as a means of unifying all of 
their subjects. 
An understanding of this complexity is important for analysing one term that will be 
encountered frequently in this work: Pan-Germanism.  Pan-Germanism can be defined as a 
political philosophy that aims to bring all Germans together in one state, and which requires 
                                                      
60 Cole, ed., p.2.  
61 See, for instance, Abigail Green, ‘Representing Germany? The Zollverein at the World Exhibitions, 1851–1862’, The 
Journal of Modern History, Vol. 75, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 836-863. 
62 See Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
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this outcome for Germans to be fulfilled.63  In another, looser sense, Pan-Germanism 
indicates a sense of common feeling, a shared cultural heritage among all Germans, and a 
sense of shared national identity which stretches into the past and which, it is imagined, will 
also reach into the future.  It is ‘the universal sense of all Germans belonging in a larger 
community united by culture and ethnicity’.64  Such a definition requires no political 
outcome resulting in the unification of all Germans in a single state.  It does not require 
Germans to live in a state where they are the only group, defined ethnically, linguistically or 
culturally.   
Pan-Germanism as identified by Gerald Stourzh develops the ideas of the Sprachnation or 
the Kulturnation.65  Here, the bonds between Germans do not necessarily even have to be 
ethnic, or based on kinship, but can be a shared linguistic or cultural legacy.  This allows 
that, those who identify with German language and culture, but whose ancestors are not 
linked by recognised kinship as having a German heritage, or whose ancestors have no 
association with a generally recognised German territory, may belong to the German nation.  
This allows for assimilation of non-Germans who have become thoroughly Germanised in 
language and culture.  These ideas do not so much divorce a cultural stance, on the one 
hand, from a political stance that may exist in a policy of Pan-Germanism on the other, but 
show that a cultural stance can be part of a political stance or it can be independent of it.66  
A second effect of viewing Pan-Germanism not as an ethnic, but as a cultural phenomenon, 
is to allow for different, competing notions of belonging, as a German, without removing the 
nation as a potential place for identification.  The Kulturnation allows competing cultural 
spaces to exist alongside each other.67  A German could identify with a transnational 
Catholic community, creating links with non-Germans in the process, since the ethnic nation 
is just one element of identity.  Nevertheless, however Pan-Germanism is defined, caution is 
required.  It is a term that has become associated with the likes of extreme Right-wing 
nineteenth century politician Georg von Schönerer, but it has also been associated with those 
of Austria’s Social Democrats who, in the 1920s, wished to unite Austria with the Weimar 
Republic.68  Each expressed a Pan-Germanism that was very different from the other.  
                                                      
63 Pulzer, Political Antisemitism, pp.221-228, explores Pan-Germanism.   See also Julie Thorpe, Pan-Germanism And The 
Austro-Fascist State, 1933-38, (Manchester: University Of Manchester, 2011), passim, for a detailed analysis of the term. 
64 Thorpe, p.7. 
65 Gerald Stourzh, Vom Reich zur Republik: Studien zum österreichisem Bewusstsein im 20. Jahrhundert, (Vienna: Atelier, 
1990), pp.19-20. 
66 Stourzh, p.20. 
67 Stourzh, p.73. 
68 Thorpe, p.28.  
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Culture, Politics And Daily Life 
A culture is made up of sub-cultures and counter currents, and is ‘an assemblage of forces 
and people(s) interacting in certain ways under certain conditions’.69  However, the visible 
behaviours of people making up a culture may suggest one thing when competing or 
contradictory values are also displayed by the people undertaking them.  Attendance at a 
pro-Nazi rally in 1930s’ Vienna implies German nationalism of a particular kind, but the 
people attending may also be members of another Rightist group the Vaterländische Front, 
set up in the mid-1930s to promote Austrian independence. This suggests a competing 
loyalty to a different vision, or even simple self-interest in being associated with the 
governing group.  Attendance alone cannot be said to prove where someone’s inner beliefs 
lie.  
Political cultures may not reflect the outward forms of political life – political structures – 
that they are meant to support.  For example, after the First World War, the new First 
Republic adopted the political structures of a democratic state: free elections, democratic 
institutions and free political parties.  Alongside these structures, however, was an 
unreformed political culture, and the Republic inherited little of substance from the Empire, 
if political culture is taken to be ‘The norms, values, and symbols that define and help to 
legitimate the political power system of a society’.70  The Republic lacked legitimacy and 
unifying symbols.  It inherited a culture of violence that had emerged in the 1880s as an 
apparently legitimate instrument for the achievement of goals in politics.    
In analysing the interaction of culture, politics and identity from the perspective of 
nationalism, propaganda is a good marker of nationalist activity, in that it is visible and it is 
intended to be noticed, whether consciously or not.  As mentioned when explaining why this 
work has, to a large extent, followed the paper trail left by priests, an important distinction 
must be drawn between ‘agitation propaganda’, which aims to change attitudes, and 
‘integration propaganda’, which aims at reinforcing attitudes.71  Both types of propaganda 
are found in Vienna over the period studied, and are used by a wide range of activists.  From 
the perspective of those spreading an antisemitic message, activists generally used agitation 
propaganda more heavily in the earlier part of the period studied here, as they attempted to 
win people round to their views.  Later in the period, integration propaganda was used, 
                                                      
69 Briel, p.vii.  
70 John Scott and Gordon Marshall.  King's College London.  11th August 
2007:  http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t88.e1061.  
71 Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Oxford Reference Online. 
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almost as a way of reassuring audiences that the views they held were widespread.  The 
mechanisms for spreading propaganda also developed over the period, adding new weapons 
to the propagandists’ armoury.  For instance, newspapers remained a favourite tool as they 
became cheaper and more readily available, and public gatherings in halls continued to take 
place, but larger scale gatherings were made possible following the introduction of electric 
loudspeakers.  New mass media, in the form of cinema and radio, made it possible for wider 
audiences to be reached, and for more propaganda than ever before to be distributed.  
Modern propaganda is a mass activity: ‘a set of methods employed by an organized group 
that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of 
individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated 
in an organization’.72  However, it must not be assumed that a causal link exists between 
nationalist propaganda and the spread of nationalism.  Other factors come into play, such as 
the ways in which propaganda and banal nationalism support each other.  As will also be 
seen, the dividing line between overt and covert propaganda is blurred.  Messages coming 
from the church pulpit, for instance, may not have had primarily nationalist objectives, but 
did often add to layers of nationalist propaganda being laid elsewhere.   
Activists on the radical Right worked to create a culture that was supportive to their 
message.  They used formal propaganda distribution, but they also used social networks, 
which were of considerable importance as a distribution mechanism.73  Within these social 
networks, radical activists devoted considerable energy to promoting specific visions of the 
nation.  They generated definitions of who should belong and who should be excluded.  In 
so doing, different nationalist groups emphasized different combinations of the elements of 
the nation and its cultural bases, outlined in the Penrose model above, according to their 
objectives and circumstances.  For instance, Pan-Germanism of the Schönerer variety, which 
was ethnic, exclusive in terms of kinship, partly mystically defined and secessionist has a 
close fit with this model.  Germans, to this group, are ethnically distinct.  They occupy the 
so-called historic lands of the Holy Roman Empire and they have a strong link with this 
territory.  They speak a common language.  Their religion is said to be the Protestant faith 
and they imagine a shared past, back to Roman times.  Schönererians also fit the model in 
terms of how it defines nationalist goals: in this case, secession from the Habsburg lands into 
a perceived homeland, the German Empire.  The variety of nationalism being promoted is 
                                                      
72 Jacques Ellul, quoted in  Monroe E. Price, ‘The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global Competition for 
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aggressive ethnic-territorial: Schönerer’s views on Jews and Slavs were based on a sharply 
hierarchical world, founded on national principles.   
The model also holds good for other groups of nationalists who had different aims from 
Schönerer.  For example, many who are here defined as German nationalists in Vienna in the 
period to 1918 were pro-Habsburg and devout Catholics.  Their aim was to maintain German 
cultural and political hegemony in the Empire.  They promoted a German Austrian 
particularist vision, not a Protestant Pan-Germanism.  So, they stressed language and a 
shared past, and usually put less emphasis on religion, except where this concerned Jews.  
Lueger’s political movement was Christian, not Catholic, and did not explicitly exclude 
Protestants.  At key times, however, it did stress the importance of Catholicism as an 
essential component of German Austrian identity and opposed Pan-Germans. 
While models are useful analytical tools, they must nevertheless be applied critically and 
appropriately.  For instance, models help to depict social networks, but they do not recreate 
the networks as they existed at the time.  Models also tend to give too clean a picture of 
events so, when applying them, it is important to look at the detail within the picture.  
Models look for conscious decisions based on principles and the subconscious decisions 
affected by ideological fits between an individual’s beliefs and a propagandist’s ideology.  
Models do not expose decisions which are based on compromise.  These compromises are 
important historical evidence, a recognition of the reality of politics, since an individual may 
choose an unlikely ally, if that ally can help to achieve the individual’s goals.  Alliances may 
be formed against a common enemy.  Finally, not all outcomes should be attributed to their 
initiators’ stated intentions.  Caution should be exercised not to attribute all nationalist 
success to  nationalist activity. 
There must also be caution against seeing nationalism or antisemitism everywhere.  In a 
work on business behaviour, Supreme Court President Emil Steinbach included a children’s 
rhyme to demonstrate what he considered the natural order of the world: 
‘The Emperor wants your loyalty and duty, 
The preacher wants to owe no money, 
The nobleman boasts ‘I am free’, 
The Jew drives his usury’74 
Steinbach’s perception of this ‘natural order’ could suggest that he held an antisemitic 
position, but Steinbach was presenting no more than a set of stereotypes, however distasteful 
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they are now: Steinbach was the son of a convert from Judaism.75  It must also be 
remembered that, whatever Steinbach’s intention and no matter how many readers he 
reached, such statements were common and would have contributed to views of the world 
held by Viennese of many origins, but these views need to be interpreted in their wider 
context.76   
Summary 
This chapter has outlined the chronological and theoretical underpinnings of this work.  It 
has done so by pointing to some of the major events in Vienna, from the perspective of a 
study of nationalism in the city in the period 1861 to 1938, and it has indicated that such 
events cannot be treated in isolation from their wider European setting.  The long-term 
economic and social changes of growth and immigration; the impact of events such as war 
and the subsequent exclusion from the new Italy and Germany, or the Badeni language 
ordinances; reaction to events on the so-called language frontiers in Bohemia and Slovenia; 
reaction to events in Europe after the First World War; all reflected European conditions.  
Other cities experienced antisemitism, but the rise and sustained success of antisemitic 
parties in Vienna is an exception in major European capitals before the rise of the Nazis in 
Germany.77  In Vienna, this points to a specially aggressive form of ethnic nationalism.  This 
chapter has shown where this variety of nationalism exists in the context of studies of 
identity, particularly national identity, culture and politics.  It has begun to show how it 
came to be spread via the propagandistic use of perceived elements of the nation and its 
cultural bases, coupled with the effects of banal nationalism, to promote dissatisfaction at an 
alleged threat to or worsening of the position of Germans – as defined by radical nationalists 
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CHAPTER 2: LIBERAL AND NATIONAL CHOICES: VIENNA TO 1879 
The focal point of this chapter is formed substantially by the years 1861 to 1879.  This was a 
period when, on the level of domestic politics, a constitutional settlement granted a voice in 
the shaping of the state to people other than those from a narrow elite that served the 
Emperor.  It extended this elite in the most limited of ways, but it was the first step towards 
later extensions of the franchise that would be significant for defining identity and belonging 
in Vienna.  This was a period when politicians classed as liberals enjoyed great electoral 
success. They formed the national government first of Austria and then, after 1867, of 
Cisleithania.  Liberal administrations ran the Vienna City Council.  They promoted liberal 
principles, such as an inclusive vision of the equality of all citizens before the law. 
At the level of international politics, the first half of this period was overshadowed by the 
possibilities for settling the ‘German Question’, how and whether to achieve the unification 
or reform of Germany.  These possibilities had implications for the internal politics of the 
Habsburg state.  Many would have assumed in 1861 that the Habsburgs would continue to 
play a leading role in ‘Germany’, whatever that role might be.  The Austro-Prussian war of 
1866, and the creation in 1871 of a German Reich centred on Prussia, changed this.  Within 
this context, the chapter shows how debates concerning the nation and identity were by no 
means confined to formal political activity, and how apparently non-political daily activities 
could be turned to political effect.  
This period is important for this thesis for debates that took place about aspects of identity 
and belonging at the time.  Its importance also lies, however, in how later critics – the broad 
grouping here defined as the radical Right – interpreted the period and used it to promote 
their own visions of citizenship and society.  Some attacked it for its anticlericalism, some 
for its economic policies.  Others attempted to associate the period with the imposition of 
‘alien values’ on Austria in general, and on Vienna in particular.  They condemned a period 
when alleged liberal ‘dominance’ threatened a ‘natural’ German and Christian basis of 
society.1  They would claim that liberals were a powerful, unified block, a claim which has 
been highlighted by Lothar Höbelt as ‘a fiction’.2 
The ‘liberal era’ was the result of what preceded it, and this chapter begins by examining 
briefly those events and the conflict of ideas that took place between liberals and their 
opponents who then ruled Austria.  Later activists on the radical Right would attempt to 
                                                      
1 See also Karl Tauchmann, Geschichte der Pfarre SS Rochus und Sebastian auf der Landstrasse in Wien III, (Vienna: Pfarramt 
Verlag, 1933), p.43. 
2 Lothar Höbelt, Kornblume und Kaiseradler: die deutschfreiheitlichen Parteien Altösterreichs 1882-1918, (Munich: 
Oldenburg, 1993), p.25.   
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portray the pre-liberal period as one which they were trying to re-create, to justify their 
efforts at excluding those they believed should not belong. 
Liberal Ideals And Practice 
The pre-liberal world was, in essence, built on the institutions of monarchy and religion, 
coupled with custom and practice.  The rulers of pre-1848 Austria justified Habsburg reign 
as being based on a ‘divine right of kings’.3  Many supported this view, such that, except at 
times of tension, the dynasty did not have to assert its authority solely through repressive 
measures.  Groups and individuals were assigned places not in conflicting classes, but in a 
hierarchy of estates that was meant to bring harmony to the State.  Regional institutions 
functioned as intermediaries to the State, often via the aristocracy.  Local institutions 
provided pressure valves for social disputes.  Privileges were granted to cities and trade 
guilds and to and a narrow range of citizens.  Education, for most, aimed not at developing 
individuals, but at producing loyal subjects.  An imperial bureaucracy supported the 
Emperor.  The Church preached loyalty to the Emperor, and the Emperor confirmed that this 
was a Christian society.  Jews occupied a place within the state, but were in many ways 
outside of its society.  They were only occasionally allowed to enter it, usually after 
conversion.  Before 1848, Jews had no rights to own property.  They were banned from 
becoming, among other things, teachers, judges or army officers.  They could not employ 
Christian servants or apprentices.  Apart from the few who had residency rights in Vienna, 
Jews could stay for a maximum of three days in the City, and were not allowed to be active 
in trade or business there.  They paid a special tax, for ‘toleration’.  This discriminatory age 
would later be evoked by antisemites who wished to turn back the clock.4  
Liberal ideals had their roots in Enlightenment, and were based on notions of progress and 
rationality rather than custom and practice.  Liberals aimed to create a situation where 
political participation was based on ‘rational’ rules, although only the most radical liberals 
demanded democracy.  Liberals did not want to see a repetition of the events that took place 
after the revolutions of 1789.  Instead, they saw liberalism as a liberating ideology, whose 
principles would transform society.  Among the key policies they put forward to achieve this 
was the reduction of the power of the Church and the freeing of the economy from guild 
restrictions.  The Church and the guilds were considered to be key factors holding back 
economic and social development.  A further target for liberals was the education system of 
                                                      
3 This section on the pre-1848 period draws on R.J.W. Evans, ‘1848-1849 in the Habsburg Monarchy’, in R.J.W. Evans and 
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Revolution 1848-1849, (New York: Greenwood, 1957), pp.3-16. 
4 On pre-1848 Jewish laws, see Rath, pp.15-16 and p.103. 
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the old order, which was to be reformed in the name of progress.  Liberals also sought to 
find new ways to bind people into a common purpose, and to legitimise the State.  For this, 
they looked to the nation, as the source of sovereignty, rather than the dynastic principle.  
Such ideas were viewed with deep suspicion by the dynasty, and liberals and liberal ideas 
were heavily suppressed in Austria before 1848. 
These were the broad principles that encouraged liberal thought when, in 1848, across 
Europe, as in Vienna, liberals rose against the old order.  More immediate concerns were 
also spurring on liberals in Vienna.  The central authority of the State had been under 
challenge since the mid-1840s, as harvests failed and an industrial slump set in.  The factory 
system was entering Austria, destroying the handicrafts sector of the economy.  Towns and 
cities, especially Vienna, were becoming increasingly overcrowded and filled with the 
unemployed, as migrants from rural areas sought work. The Habsburgs convened an 
‘assembly of notables’ to address state finances and plans for a resolution to economic 
problems.  They also called the assembly as a result of liberal attacks on the incompetence of 
the state administration, and liberal pressure to open political participation to more people, 
whose contribution might assist the State. 5 
In March 1848, liberals in Vienna rose against the Habsburgs, supported by elements of the 
working class, and with a number of Jews prominent among their leaders.  Similar revolts 
broke out in other Habsburg cities, and the revolutionaries forced the dynasty into promises 
of concessions.   This led to nearly two years of fighting across the Empire between rebels 
and dynasty, as the balance of power swung between them.  Eventually, the Habsburgs 
crushed the rebels and regained control of their lands.  These events, which have been 
detailed elsewhere, are important, but some key battles of ideas and what they came to 
represent are more significant for this study.6  
The first point to make clear is that Vienna’s liberals were not a single, unified block, 
gathered around an agreed set of policies and aims.  Liberals were a loose coalition of men 
from the bourgeoisie, but also from progressive elements within various ranks of the 
aristocracy.7  They included the representatives of students from the university, such as 
journalist Ignaz Kuranda, of relatively poor Bohmenian origins, who had moved to Vienna 
in his twenties.8  Broadly, they agreed on an ideologically liberal approach to matters already 
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6 For the events of 1848-1849, see Sheehan, pp.656-729. 
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discussed, such as secularisation, education and the liberalisation of the economy.  They also 
agreed in broad terms that the nation should be the source of sovereignty, even if this meant 
in reality support for a constitutional monarchy, rather than a republic.  The problem for the 
liberals of 1848 was that agreements on theoretical approaches did not correspond to messy 
reality, whether within the Habsburg lands or with regard to ‘Germany’. 
In 1849, a constitution for the non-Hungarian parts of the Empire was drawn up by delegates 
to an assembly that was meeting in the Moravian city of Kremsier.9  This constitution 
promised the achievement of the liberal objectives outlined above.  It promised the 
emancipation of peasants and Jews.  It also recognised the diversity of the Empire, and 
promised equality of all nationalities and freedom to use local languages.  It was, based on 
the idea of a central authority based in Vienna, although it attempted to add elements of 
federalism to take account of regional representations.  It was a liberal ideal of the rational 
state, run efficiently, in a way that paralleled Josephinism.  The constitution was never 
implemented, as the Habsburg army closed the assembly. 
The constitution also ignored events that were taking place elsewhere.  When revolution had 
broken out in 1848, Austria’s German liberals seized their chance to address the German 
Question, by joining a parliament called in Frankfurt, for delegates from all the ‘German’ 
lands.  Political and economic reforms were discussed, and delegates called for all Germans 
to be brought together in one state, but a solution could not be found as to how the Habsburg 
Empire could be integrated into such a state.  The position of the dynasty, with its ties to its 
non-German lands, was one problem.  The linguistic and national composition of the Empire 
was another.  In this respect, areas of the Empire that could be defined as homogeneously 
German presented few problems, but this was not the case everywhere in the multinational 
Empire, with its overlapping populations.  In a foretaste or what was to come, German 
liberals fell out with Czech liberals.  The Czechs boycotted Frankfurt, as an assembly that 
had nothing to do with them.10 
Attempts to implement a kleindeutsch solution, bringing together all of the German states 
except for Austria’s German-speaking lands, fell apart when Friedrich Wilhelm IV of 
Prussia rejected the offer of the crown of such a new Germany.11  The offer of this crown 
showed that, in return for most Germans being brought together, some liberals were 
prepared to leave other Germans outside a new German state.  In the aftermath of 1848, 
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10 Evans, p.189. 
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liberals had shown that they were not a single, cohesive movement, and that some would 
compromise in order to achieve some of their aims. 
Liberals may have failed in 1848-1849, but the familiar battlegrounds of sovereignty, 
secularisation and education would flare up again, but now the national question for 
Germany, with the idea of identity coming from belonging to a national community was 
prominent in a way it had not been before.   In many ways, the Habsburgs and the liberals 
were competing narrow elites, with different value systems.  For a period, the Habsburgs 
would be able to  hold down the liberals and their ideas but, when they eventually found 
they needed them, they reached common ground. 
Neoabsolutism 
After the crushing of the revolution, the Habsburgs revoked the rights won after 1848 and 
set about consolidating their rule throughout the Empire, through a policy known as 
neoabsolutism, achieved initially by brutal suppression of any attempt at rebellion.  The 
long-term objective was the revival of an Empire that was felt to have fallen behind its 
international competitors.  This would be achieved by the establishment of a centralist, 
authoritarian government, based in Vienna, which would govern with firmness and suppress 
dissent.12   
The Habsburgs rewarded their old supporters for their loyalty.  In 1855, a Concordat was 
reached between Church and State which effectively made the Church the arbiter of morality 
in the Empire.13  The Concordat gave the Church authority over marital matters and control 
over the education of all young Catholics in any school, public or private.  In any subject to 
be taught there should be no contradiction with Catholic teachings on morality.  In return, 
the bishops were required to take an oath of allegiance to the Emperor before they could take 
up an appointment on imperial soil. 
German was to be the dominant culture and language, but this did not mean that the state 
was a German state.  This was not a simple statement about the supremacy of German 
culture, even if German was regarded as having a high value.  This was evidence of the 
continuation of Josephinist policies, which aimed to provide a strong and centralised state.  
For instance, in 1850 German became the de facto language for the internal functioning of 
the state administration in the Voivodina, despite this being an area of mostly Romanian 
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speakers.  The German language was a means to an end, at least in this respect, although it 
did tend to favour native German speakers.14   
The Habsburgs used the standard repressive methods of autocratic states.  Press censorship 
was heavy.15  Yet, as one avenue of protest was closed down, another opened, and even 
everyday items became a means of resistance.  In 1853, the authorities tried to ban items of 
clothing, including the so-called Kossuth hat, named in honour of a style favoured by the 
Hungarian revolutionary.16  Correspondence shows that even the police enforcing the ban 
were unsure of what they could do.  One local police officer wrote to Vienna that he was 
having trouble preventing them from being worn, because he was unsure of their design, so 
he requested a sketch.  On receiving this, he asked for sketches of other hats that were 
banned, to make sure he was not letting anything slip.  Fourteen further sketches were then 
sent to him.  The impression given by the correspondence is that either the officer was 
genuinely confused or he was poking fun at his superiors.17  Such tales were common.  The 
police seized hats that might be used by students as revolutionary symbols from a shop in 
Vienna’s fashionable Kohlmarkt, run by the widow of Herr J. B. Hardtmuth.18  They were 
aware of many instances of students showing their support for German nationalism through 
the wearing of nationalist symbols on their clothing.19  Reports of the manufacture of items 
in the ‘forbidden three colours’, the gold, black and red of the ‘German’ flag, also 
circulated.20  
Not all of the labours of the Habsburgs’ administrators were aimed at repression.  
Administrators drew up plans for political and physical renewals of Vienna, to give Austria a 
capital that would rival the appearance of any other major European city, and which would 
be a centre for the efficient administration of the Empire.21  Deregulation of economic 
activity was carried out.  In 1854, the railways were freed to competition and a bidding 
system for railway franchises was introduced.  In 1859, trade Guilds, which controlled much 
                                                      
14 Ágnes Deák, From Habsburg Neo-Absolutism to the Compromise, 1849-1867, (Boulder: Atlantic Research and Publications, 
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17 ABPD 1851-1860, among others, 22nd April 1853 and 28th November 1853. 
18 ABPD 1851-1860, 30th April 1853.  
19 ABPD 1851-1860, 10th March 1854.  
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21 Bled, p.178. 
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economic activity through restrictive practices, lost many of their powers, and sectors of the 
economy were opened to free competition.22  
Efforts at repression did not always achieve their intended consequences, nor were all 
sustained completely throughout the period.  Hungary, despite the best efforts of the 
Habsburgs, was never completely held down and, according to recent research, even 
underwent something of a cultural and economic revival.23 
 In 1851, the Habsburgs suspended the Gemeindegesetz of 1849, a law that allowed local 
communities to elect their own representatives and to run their own affairs.  Theoretically, 
the suspension restricted local freedom of action.  Nevertheless, local cadres, even if under 
neoabsolutism they often proved to be Habsburg placemen, were learning about the realities 
of administration, and how to influence local developments.24  As the 1850s progressed, the 
Habsburgs also began to make accommodations with some of the elements that had stood in 
opposition to the dynasty, or which had at least been suspected of potential disloyalty.  The 
state bureaucracy began building bridges with the upper bourgeoisie in the late 1850s in 
Vienna.25  Such allies would soon be needed.  In 1859, Austria was lured into war with 
Piedmont and France, and lost.  Austria ceded large portions of its Italian territories to the 
nascent Kingdom of Italy that emerged from the war.  Defeat on the international stage had 
consequences at home.  The Habsburgs now looked to build domestic alliances, rather than 
simply imposing themselves on the State.  Neoabsolutism was over. 
A German And Liberal Empire? 
Once again, the Habsburgs needed to strengthen their state.  Externally, the Habsburgs 
needed to improve the diplomatic and military position of the Empire.  Internally, they 
needed political stability and economic growth.  A lid had to be kept on national aspirations, 
especially as far as Hungary was concerned.  Politically, the state’s dealings with its citizens 
were now to be based on liberal principles.  The 1861 February Patent, confirmed at the time 
of the Ausgleich, therefore decreed all citizens of the Empire to be equal before the law, if 
not equal in terms of political rights.  It was a partial reinstatement, at least, of the principles 
of the Kremsier constitution, and Liberals hoped it would be the start of further reform.26  
This constitution was an invitation to a tiny percentage of the population, the predominantly 
                                                      
22 Boyer, Political Radicalism, p.56. 
23 Deák, p.81 and p.422. 
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25 Redlich, p.9 
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German upper bourgeoisie, to participate in the government of a centralised state.27  After 
1861, and despite temporary suspensions of the constitution at times of national emergency, 
decades of legally defined, rather than arbitrary, rule followed.  The liberals of the 1860s 
went on to win the battles for the constitutional state that they had set out to win in 1848, at 
least in part because of the external failures of the Habsburgs in Italy.28  This intertwining of 
internal and external politics would continue throughout the Empire.  
The early 1860s were not just a political clean break.  Several key pillars of pre-1860s’ 
Austria remained in place.  The monarchy demonstrated that this society was based on 
hierarchy.  Citizens had their place.  Liberals and Habsburgs would have agreed that this was 
still a German Empire, and they would have had considerable agreement on the status of 
German culture as the leading culture, if perhaps for different reasons.  They would have 
believed that Austria was a leading player in ‘Germany’, however that was defined.  Any 
liberal government would have been expected to reach out to the state’s allies throughout 
Germany, and to support ‘Habsburg efforts to make good the loss of Lombardy by re-
asserting their position in Germany’.29 
Others were asking basic questions about the purpose of the Habsburg state, its intentions, 
and how it served and bound together the people.  Debates on these matters emerged in 
public soon after the constitutional settlement of the early 1860s.  For instance, one issue of 
Viennese satirical magazine Figaro shows a sketch for a suggested frieze for the new, 
elected lower chamber of parliament.30  The frieze shows a history of the previous ten years, 
from the suppression of attempts to create a state based on liberal principles, via the 
Kremsier Constitution of 1849, through a period of attempted centralisation and 
Germanisation.  Through censorship and bribery, neo-absolutist Austria was kept in place, 
until it was pushed over by Napoleon III, then rescued by a constitution.  The magazine 
questions what the 1861 constitution means.   
In another cartoon, Figaro shows various ways in which state and people can be aligned.  
The nations of Great Britain – England, Scotland and Ireland, but with no reference to Wales 
– are shown to be united under law.  France is bound together under the leadership of 
Napoleon III, Hungary under Andrassy.  Austria is shown as united only under the state’s 
national debt.  The constitutional settlement of 1860 to 1861 was here explicitly recognised 
                                                      
27 ‘Federal’, in the context of Austrian history, did not necessarily mean devolved.  It could mean a system of using local 
institutions to strengthen central control.  See Höglinger, pp.62-63 for an outline of debates on the matter. 
28 Höbelt, p.16 
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as a compromise between the dynasty and the liberals.  It was something that would not have 
come about without war, and which had at its heart not the resolution of political principles 
but the elimination of state debt.  Such newspapers and periodicals, however limited their 
readerships, show what was being debated, at least among the political class of the time.31   
Figaro also sheds light on the local political life of Vienna.  After 1860, members of the 
Vienna City Council, and of the districts, were no longer Habsburg placemen, but were 
elected, if on a very limited franchise.  Figaro refers to the members of the City Council as 
the ‘new fathers of the Commune’.32  A booklet with the title ‘The New Fathers Of The 
Commune Of Great Vienna’ repeats this phrase, and lists in some detail the backgrounds of 
these representatives.33  The booklet goes to some lengths to establish the members’ liberal 
credentials, in keeping with the spirit of the new age.  Many members of the City Council 
were indeed veterans of 1848, yet Figaro is more sceptical about the nature of some of these 
representatives.  It asks what kinds of liberals sat in the Council Chamber.  It asks what has 
really changed since the days of neo-absolutism, when some members who had previously 
supported clerical opinions, or some who had been resolutely conservative, now claimed to 
be liberal.34  This contradicts the later viewpoint of many on the radical Right that Vienna 
City Council was now a solid bastion of liberal principles.  Liberals were divided into many 
factions and sub-factions, and liberal principles meant many things to many different people. 
Illustrating this, the elections of 1860 returned liberals of various shades.  ‘Centre liberals’ 
made up a little more than half of the members of the Council, ‘right liberals’ almost sixteen 
per cent, and ‘left liberals’ eighteen per cent.35  But, in 1861, some inside the council 
chamber had either come late to these views or proclaimed their support for liberal 
principles only from political expediency.  Figaro’s assertion that nearly everyone was 
claiming to be liberal emphasizes the point that only the proclamation of a liberal message 
would win political influence at this time.  Whether this message was sincere is open to 
question, given that the veterans of 1848 sat alongside those who had previously held very 
different views.  At the very start of the new era, then, there were questions over the 
commitment to liberal ideals of some of those who held power and influence. 
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32 Figaro, 13th July 1861.  
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Apart from domestic politics, the German Question was an important consideration for 
Austria’s liberals in the 1860s.  A broad agreement may have existed between liberals and 
Habsburgs when it came to asserting Austria’s position in Germany, but the devil lay in the 
detail.  In 1863, in an attempt to gain the upper hand in Germany, the Habsburgs attempted, 
but failed, to reform the German Confederation, to give themselves more of a say in its 
running than their Prussian rivals.36  This avoided a conflict between Austria’s liberals and 
the Habsburgs, as the liberals would only support the reforms if they led to an elected 
representative body for the Confederation, which they did not.37 
This did not mean that Habsburgs and liberals were always at odds.  In 1863, for instance, 
celebrations were being planned for the five hundredth anniversary of Rudolf of Habsburg 
becoming Count of Tyrol.  Flags were hung in the Habsburg black and yellow, alongside 
others in Tyrolese green.  Unlike the earlier reports of bans on the ‘forbidden three colours’, 
flags also hung in the German national colours of black-red-gold.  Franz Joseph was invoked 
as ‘leader’ of Germany, and ‘liberals praised Franz Joseph as the monarch who had given 
Austria a constitution, whilst hailing him too as the renewer of Germany.  Praise was 
fulsome: 
‘We call for God’s blessing on all the steps by which your Majesty tries to 
renew and strengthen the Confederation of German lands’.38 
Liberal hopes in Franz Joseph may have had their origins in the then political situation in 
Austria’s great rival in Germany, Prussia where, in 1862, Bismarck attacked Prussian 
liberals who had refused his military budget.  At this time, Austria, with its liberal 
constitution and liberals in Parliament, must have seemed a better bet for their vision of the 
future.39  Taking a German national position and simultaneously remaining Habsburgtreu 
were at this time highly possible.  A reconciliation of the German Question with the 
Habsburgs’ aims in Germany – whether these were anything ranging from Habsburg 
leadership to a strengthening of the smaller German states against Prussia – was still 
possible.  Liberal ideals and national unity, perhaps in some federal form, still seemed to be 
feasible goals.40  
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Nevertheless, a real threat to the Empire from nationalism was emerging in the form of the 
complex question of the Schleswig-Holstein succession.41  In the inns and drinking houses of 
Vienna, the issue lifted nationalist passions.  There were calls for Austria to take action, 
along with other German states, against Denmark.  Gatherings called for volunteers to 
support any military efforts.  Fund raising events took place.  Alarmingly for the authorities, 
those becoming involved in these events were not just hot-headed and youthful students.  
Clerks and lower officials were said to be playing a leading part.42  The Schleswig-Holstein 
question was being discussed right across the city, in many settings, including singing 
groups.  These groups were a popular form of male association at the time, and a way for 
respectable men with like-minded opinions to meet, converse and explore business and 
career opportunities.  One such group, the Ottakringer Liedertafel was formed in 1864, and 
the Ottakringer gathered for their first meeting, on 2nd March 1864, at the Ottakring Brewery 
Hall.  The song sheets for the occasion include patriotic songs about Austria, but also about 
the German nation.  All proceeds were to go to a fund for Austrian volunteers fighting in 
Schleswig-Holstein.  The programme began with the ‘German folk song’, The Schleswig-
Holstein Song:   
‘Schleswig-Holstein bound by the sea 
German tradition, high alert, 
Give true loyalty, hard earned, 
Until a finer morning dawns!  
Schleswig-Holstein brother tribe, 
Do not weaken, my fatherland!’43 
The second meeting of the Ottakringer, on 11th May, included a mixed bag of music 
including Mendelssohn, and ended with the national anthem, Österreich mein Vaterland.  By 
29th June, the Ottakringer were still meeting at the brewery hall in Ottakring, but this time 
along with sixteen other singing groups, including those of the Erster Wiener Turnverein 
and Hermann.44  The Ottakringer included in their programme a Festival Motto, composed 
by Ferdinand Merrenz, a member of the Liedertafel: 
‘German men, German strength, 
German women, virtuous, 
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German customs, German loyalty, 
German songs, German and free!’45 
Such songs formed part of a longer programme that included the singing group from the 
nearby district of Hietzing singing Österreich, mein Vaterland.  It seems that these groups 
saw no contradiction between this expression of the group’s Germanness and its ability to be 
loyal to the Habsburgs as German princes.  As has been stated, German nationalists at this 
point may have envisaged the Habsburgs as leaders of a unified Germany. 
As the conflict to the North intensified, further charitable concerts to raise funds took 
place.46  The programmes and the venues became more ambitious.  This was a flurry of what 
can be described as expansive nationalism, the desire to defend lands that were seen as part 
of Germany, but which were under threat from a foreign power.  While these calls were 
being made, however, in 1864 Austria was outmanoeuvred by Prussia over the Schleswig-
Holstein question.  It was now challenged in its role as nominal leader of the German 
Confederation, that had been established after the defeat of Napoleon.  This challenge 
eventually led to war, and Austria’s defeat by the Prussians at Sadowa on 3rd July 1866.  As 
a result, the German Confederation was dissolved, and the North German Confederation, 
under Prussian leadership, came into being.47  In August 1866, the Peace of Prague 
effectively excluded Austria from a role in those German lands it did not directly control.  
Habsburg possessions in Italy were also greatly reduced, with the loss of the Veneto.  Some 
perceived this as the end to an era.  
Franz Joseph had his own view on the situation in Germany.  Even after Sadowa, he still 
believed that Germany could be won back.  After all, the political set-up in Germany had 
changed many times in the past century.  He appointed the anti-Prussian Count Friedrich von 
Beust, former prime minister of Saxony, as his Foreign Minister.  Beust was instructed to 
bring to a successful conclusion long negotiations which had been taking place between 
representatives of the Emperor and the Hungarians, who had been among the most powerful 
opponents of the centralised state favoured by the German liberals.  It had also been feared 
they might yet again rebel. 
In February 1867, the Hungarian Constitution was reinstated and on 15th March 1867 the 
Hungarians swore an oath to a new political compromise, the Ausgleich.  The Empire was 
now Austria-Hungary, with Hungary beyond the reach of the German liberals.  The 
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relationship between the state and the German liberals, on which the 1861 settlement had 
been based, had been changed at will by the dynasty.  Crucially, however, the constitutional 
idea remained intact.48 
Liberal Consolidation At Home, Austrian Ejection From Germany Confirmed 
The Ausgleich was a major development in the history of the Empire.  It would later poison 
relationships and influence many stances on how the Hungarians had damaged the state’s 
strength.49  Yet German liberals, despite anger at the break-up of the unitary state, accepted 
the fait accompli and went about building a liberal and German state in the non-Hungarian 
part of the Empire, Cisleithania.50  In Cisleithania, the 1867 December Constitution 
regulated matters.  This constitution guaranteed individual rights, and declared equality 
before the law.  National rights were also guaranteed, at least on paper, even if a system 
known disparagingly as ‘electoral geometry’ tilted voting strength towards the German 
bourgeoisie.  The gerrymandered franchise gave Germans, by virtue of their above average 
tax contributions or educational status, more seats in assemblies at the regional or 
Cisleithanian level, even when they were in a minority.   
This constitution was later held up as a model of how the liberals had brought an alien 
philosophy into Christian Austria, and tried to drive Germans from the Church.  The 1867 
Constitution superseded the Concordat of 1855, and confirmed the secularising stance of the 
state.  It did so indirectly, through guarantees of freedom of belief and conscience, for 
individuals and groups.  Directly, it reduced the role of the Church in schools, and the 
Church lost to the state its previous jurisdiction over marriage.51  Liberals who also 
happened to be sincere Catholics were in a difficult position.  Even the Emperor was put at a 
disadvantage.  His ministers had attempted to negotiate with the Church, but Franz Joseph 
accepted that compromise was impossible with the reactionary Pius IX.52  Franz Joseph may 
in fact have been relieved that a new start was possible.  He had taken offence at the Papal 
Declaration of Infallibility of 1870.  He was equally resentful that Pius IX had ‘flirted with 
Italian nationalism’.53  Beyond constitutional matters, the liberals continued to extend 
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laissez-faire policies and, economically, the period 1866 to 1873 was one of expansion in 
Cisleithania.54   
The constitution had attempted to resolve one potential area of nationally-inspired tension, 
by making Galicia, in effect, an autonomous region within Cisleithania.  The Germans of 
Cisleithania accepted this compromise without opposition.55  Galicia had never been part of 
their homeland, so nothing would be lost by Galician autonomy.  Liberals considered most 
of the rest of Cisleithania to be a German cultural and political sphere, although challenges 
to German privileges were rising.  In Bohemia, where Germans enjoyed better political 
representation than Czechs, and German was a privileged language in its use in state 
employment, Germans were outnumbered by Czechs.  After 1867, the Czech political class 
demanded the raising of Czech status, some calling for the dualist settlement with Hungary 
to be replaced by a tripartite settlement involving the Czechs.56 Behind the scenes 
negotiations began. 
In February 1871, the Hohenwart ministry took office and continued these negotiations, with 
a view to producing a formal Czech Ausgleich, known as the Fundamental Articles.  This 
would give Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia a significant degree of autonomy and, if enacted, 
would allow greater use of the Czech language and open more public jobs to Czech 
speakers.57  It would thereby diminish the relative importance of the German language, 
potentially altering the lives of German speakers in Bohemia.  The German reaction was 
predictable.  German deputies walked out of the Bohemian Diet.  In Vienna, there were 
reports of tension, and fears that students at the University would riot.58  The Hungarians, 
fearing that Slavs in their part of the Empire would demand concessions, made their 
opposition clear.59  On 20th October 1871, a month after his own Prime Minister had put 
them forward, Franz Joseph rejected the Fundamental Articles.  There would be no 
compromise for the Czechs.60   
The reactions of politically active and nationally minded Germans to change in Bohemia 
could not have been more different to their reactions to the changes brought about by the 
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Hungarian Ausgleich.  These Germans dug in against the Czech Ausgleich, in contrast to 
1867 when, despite what amounted to token protests, they gave up hope of a role in 
Hungary.  Their attitude seems to have been that they had never really had much influence in 
Hungary, so they were abandoning little.  Their reactions in 1867 and 1871 were also 
governed by the realities of politics.  Germans who agitated against a Czech compromise 
thought that they could achieve their goals.  They believed they could ultimately rely on the 
State using force if Czech demands went too far.  German actions in 1871 were therefore 
driven in part by political realities, and in part by principle.   
Czechs had previously made claims for rights in Bohemia but, after 1871, Germans now 
began to feel that such claims might succeed.  The Empire’s German liberals had watched as  
the Habsburgs had at least contemplated an attempt to strengthen their state, by negotiating a 
settlement that would have changed the relative position of Czechs and Germans in 
Bohemia.  The doors to constitutional reform had opened in 1861, and other groups now 
wanted to come through them.  German liberals now saw that the Empire could continue to 
change, and not necessarily in their favour.  
Events outside of the Empire also continued to shape the Habsburg state and its 
development.  On 18th January 1871, after victory for Prussia and its allies over France, the 
German Empire was declared.  Now, Franz Joseph had to recognise that Austria’s exclusion 
from the new Germany was a long-term settlement, and that his ambitions in Germany were 
at an end.  By way of acknowledgement, he dismissed Beust.   
 
Liberalism Under Attack 
Fears of Czech intrusions into German privileges persisted.  The German Association, which 
had been founded in Vienna in 1869, promoted liberal opposition to a Czech Ausgleich.  In 
March 1871, the Association organised the second German Austrian Party Conference in 
Vienna.  Ignaz Plener, a leading liberal, wrote that he and his allies prevented German 
Bohemian deputies from attending, as they wanted to discuss the ‘protection of German 
nationality in Austria (which is really not in the least threatened, despite the Hohenwart 
cabinet)’.61  Plener’s comments show that splits existed within the liberal movement, 
between liberals based in Vienna and those from Bohemia. 
Splits also emerged between generations.  Conflicts between established politicians, the 
Alten, such as Plener, and a new generation, the Jungen, show the latter inclining to 
                                                      
61 Judson, Revolutionaries, p.170. 
  
  Page 68 of 272 
Germany, but still with the primary aim of winning support for German interests and 
influence in Austria-Hungary, not for union with the Reich.  It was also partly a conflict of 
approach as much as a conflict of goals, since both factions defined German identity in 
progressive terms, and were open to the idea of assimilation for others.  The Jungen did 
believe in ‘a rising tide of Slav political gains in Austria’, but older liberals appreciated the 
efforts of their younger colleagues to rejuvenate their movement.  Any definitive split that 
would harden existing divisions on the nationality question was at a very early stage in 
1871.62  
These disputes over the nationalities question are obvious points in tracing the evolution of 
notions of German identity, but other areas of liberal philosophy would also come under 
scrutiny in this respect.  The first of these, laissez-faire economic policies, would later be 
used to complain about allegedly ‘Jewish’ unfair practices, which hit hard at ‘honest 
German’ tradesmen.  This was especially the case after a stock market crash in 1873 led to 
widespread business closures and unemployment.  Free market theory demanded that the 
economy be left to run its course until the markets found new equilibrium points.  As the 
government followed this orthodoxy, business after business collapsed.  The effects were 
worsened by an underlying restructuring of the economy, as new modes of production 
threatened traditional artisanal ways.63   
The resultant unemployment and misery was attributed firmly – and probably justly – to the 
economic line taken by the liberals.   Economic difficulties after 1873 did not, however, 
prevent the liberals from pressing on with their plans in other areas, such as attempts to 
secularise society.  In 1874, after years of delay, the 1855 Concordat was finally 
repudiated.64  The state had regulated its relations with the Catholic Church, but the wealth 
and influence of the Church was such that it remained a ‘privileged public corporation’ in 
the Empire.65  Secularisation was a further liberal philosophy that would later come under 
attack as un-Christian and un-German, but in the 1870s, a widespread ‘embittered reaction’ 
that would come from some quarters against ‘Manchester liberalism’ had not yet set in.66  
At the time of negotiations over the Fundamental Articles, liberals had expected a coup, led 
by conservatives, that would reverse constitutional gains, but this fear went away.67  After 
                                                      
62 Judson, Revolutionaries, pp.168-170. 
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the crash of 1873, however, a new anti-liberal movement, based on antisemitism, began to 
coalesce.  Its geographical heartland was Vienna, and it was in Vienna that it would find its 
earliest successes.  Antisemites had been active in the city even in the 1860s, but they had 
been limited in their influence.  In the 1870s, this emerging movement became bolder and 
more insistent, coupling liberal economic and educational proposals as Jewish assaults on 
Christian values.68  This movement’s roots lay in resentment at liberal economic policies, 
alongside religious and racial prejudice, but some leading figures in the antisemitic 
movement would even emerge from the liberal ranks.  Antisemites targeted liberalism as a 
front for alleged Jewish plots to dominate Christians.   
These antisemites were often from guilds or other groups, such as the lower clergy, which 
claimed to have been disadvantaged by the constitutional state.  Liberals had indeed 
implemented some policies which deregulated guild control of economic activities, and in so 
doing had caused an unintended outcome: guild members, master craftsmen and others who 
had been protected by former regulations began to see themselves threatened by liberal 
reforms.69  This ignored the reality of the changing nature of economic activity across 
Europe.  Factories and international trade were making guild-based products uncompetitive.  
However, antisemites stuck to their line that it was ‘Jewish’ liberalism that was the root 
cause of their problems.  Jews were said to be stealing business from the traditional guilds 
and their members, and impoverishing working Christian people through usury although, in 
reality, Jews were to be found in many occupations and at many social levels.70  
Antisemites were also attempting to take advantage of mass Jewish immigration into 
Vienna, which brought the presence of Jews in Vienna in large numbers for the first time.  
The number of Jews in Vienna soared from less than 16,000 in 1854, to over 40,000 in 1869,  
then on to almost 75,000, ten per cent of the total population of the city, in 1880.71  Lothar 
Höbelt has described Viennese antisemitism as a ‘challenge’ and ‘response’ to the speed and 
scale of such immigration, which took place after the 1860s.72   
This overlooks two points, however.  The first is that antisemitic outbursts were part of a 
longer tradition.  As William Bowman has shown, antisemitism was rooted in the Catholic 
colleges for priests.73  The second point is that those who turned to antisemitism seem to 
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have done so in order to achieve certain ends.  Members of the guilds were attempting to 
remove the competition of house-to-house hawkers of goods, who were often Jewish, so 
removing Jews would somehow alleviate economic difficulties.74  Some members of the 
clergy thought Jews encouraged a non-Christian outlook.  This ties in with the idea 
presented by Julie Thorpe that understanding the purpose of antisemitism is more important 
than understanding its nature.75  This is true, but a qualifier needs to be added that some 
active antisemites had a prejudice towards Jews that had no end other than prejudice.  In this 
case, the root causes of their prejudice, perhaps a deep exposure to antisemitism from their 
education or their daily experience, would be at least as important in understanding their 
views as would be the aims of their antisemitism. 
The source of the attacks on liberals is a reminder that liberals did not make up all of 
bourgeois Vienna.  The bourgeoisie of the liberal world was, in general, relatively affluent, 
as measured by their tax contributions, which entitled them to vote from the 1860s.  Another 
bourgeoisie existed, lower down the social scale, without major reserves of capital, which 
found little comfort in laissez-faire economic policies when times were hard.  Another 
bourgeoisie also existed for whom Catholicism was genuinely important.76  The anticlerical 
laws, and their outcomes prevented them from being allies for the liberals.  The stance that 
liberals took towards religion and economics would come to haunt them, especially when 
the franchise was extended in the 1880s.  This stance would be repeatedly portrayed as 
incompatible with a Viennese identity based on Christian-German values.   
The liberals could also at times be their own worst enemies, and the long years in power 
were taking a toll.  Liberals were accused of taking bribes for the awarding of contracts.  
Scandals rocked the Vienna City Council, eating away at the liberals’ authority.77  Ironically, 
their fall from government came over a matter of principle, in the form of a protest against 
Imperial military intervention, ostensibly as a peace-keeping mission, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Liberals were replaced by a coalition of conservatives, and clericals, the so-
called Iron Ring, under Count Eduard von Taaffe.78  After nearly twenty years in national 
government, the liberals were out of power.  Faced with this reversal of fortunes, liberals 
would attempt to re-group, to take on their conservative opponents.  The next two chapters 
will explore where and how new opponents other than the conservatives would emerge, who 
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would try to keep the liberals, in the form they had existed to 1879, from making a return to 
power.  
Summary 
This chapter has focused on Austria’s German liberals up to 1879.  One reason it has done 
so is because, to this point, liberals were key players in trying to shape a German identity for 
the state, as well as trying to infuse the state with liberal values.  The chapter has therefore 
outlined the broad base of liberal principles, which rested on constitutionalism, personal 
responsibility, secularisation of the state, and free market economics.  It has shown that the 
Habsburgs attempted to suppress the application of some of these principles in the early 
years of neoabsolutism, while simultaneously starting to compromise over others.  Habsburg 
defeat abroad allowed the liberals to take over government in the 1860s, where they 
attempted to build the state they wanted.   
Two defeats for liberal aims came as the Habsburgs were driven out of Germany and a 
separate Hungarian sphere was carved within the Empire.  The liberals had little control over 
these events.  Their aim of a centralised Empire, based on liberal principles and German 
culture, was lost.  An end to Habsburg involvement in the lands covered by the new 
‘Germany’ also put an end to any visions Austria’s German liberals may have had for a 
larger German state that would have involved them.  Liberals were more successful in 
cementing foundations for constitutionalism, secularism and laissez-faire economic policies.  
Their vision of citizenship as inclusive was flawed by modern standards, in demanding 
assimilation, but at least it was not exclusive, and possibilities of coming to belong did exist. 
Debates were taking place that would later shape critical matters of who could and could not 
belong, especially from a nationalist and antisemitic perspective.  These debates were 
beginning to show that the ‘process of ‘becoming national’ derives from the social and 
cultural creation of new group identities, which involves the ‘invention’ or re-discovery of 
national myths and traditions.79  Some were going about developing the process of 
‘becoming national’ by meeting regularly in a singing society, where they could boast about 
the position of German strengths and virtues above those of others.  Even daily dress could 
reinforce such views, with items of clothing being used to express an otherwise banned point 
of view, from Hungarian peasants to Viennese students.   
Liberal factionalism meant that single issues came to dominate, political jockeying became 
the standard and normalised the politics of interest groups.  The roots of liberalism were 
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shallow.80  The conflicts within the liberal movement meant that different histories of the 
people, events and nature of this period could later be presented.  In some hands, these 
histories became deliberate distortions of the 1860s and 1870s, and the period that preceded 
it, for the benefit of those who claimed to want to destroy the liberal inheritance, and thereby 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE LOWER CLERGY AND VIENNA, 1860-1879 
A Church Persecuted? 
Chapter 2 has shown aspects of political developments, as conventionally defined, in Vienna 
and Austria in the years from 1861 to 1879.  Chapter 3 concentrates on one important sector 
of Viennese society, some of the lower clergy in this period.  The chapter considers the early 
stages of antisemitic activities among some of these priests, and also outlines some of their 
daily routines, in order to explain the context of these activities.  In so doing, it identifies a 
general chronological division.  First, from 1861 to around the mid 1870s, where 
antisemitism was found among priests it was generally a compartmentalised activity.  It was 
a subject that was specifically raised and debated.  Often, the message was proclaimed 
through niche newspapers, with their limited reach, and antisemitic attacks took the form of 
denunciations of the State’s alleged assaults on the Church.   
Then, about the mid-1870s, some priests went on the offensive, often from positions within 
parishes.  It was at this time that a number of factors came together as an impetus to action.  
Liberal secularising policies were being implemented, an economic crash had occurred and 
large scale Jewish immigration was taking place.  The Kulturkampf was in progress in 
Germany.  Priests were also lamenting a decline in their personal status, as their engagement 
with politics became more direct, and they began to gain prominence.  They used 
antisemitism in politically slanted sermons, speeches and supposedly religious publications 
in order to attack Jews or the liberal state and its relationship with the Church, aiming at 
political change.1  Their comments were peppered with explanations of what they were 
attacking and why.  In so doing, they were changing not just the language of politics, but 
helping to change the way people viewed the world on a daily basis.  They promoted an 
exclusionary, ethnic view which they would have considered not to be nationalist, but which 
indirectly played its part in the reinforcement of exclusionary, ethnically based nationalism.  
Chapter 2 described how Church-State relations fluctuated.  Under neoabsolutism, the 
Church was a highly privileged corporation, a cornerstone of the State.  In the ‘liberal era’, 
Church privileges were curtailed, but it retained considerable influence at many levels in 
society.  The chapter shows that, despite clerical complaints, priests were not completely 
frozen out of politics in the 1860s.  Priests continued to play a significant social role, and 
local politicians tried at times not to confront them, but to work with them.  In these cases, 
politicians seemed to be seeking the legitimising authority of the Church. 
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Within the Church at this time, priests of a new generation were either in training or in their 
first parishes, learning skills which would see them later make headway in attacking the 
liberal state in the 1880s and 1890s.  Something of a myth was built up about the 
relationship between Church and State which, essentially, depicted the Church as having 
been persecuted relentlessly over a long period by a liberal state that tried to destroy it.  This 
myth became a repeated commonplace among many of the lower clergy and the Catholic 
press.  This view is found in many places, such as the Chroniken of the parishes, or official 
parish histories.  For instance, writing of the early liberal era in Vienna, the Chronik from 
the parish of Grinzing talks of the ‘most uncomfortable period in the history of the parish’ 
and of the Communal administration being run by liberals ‘under the influence of the 
Freemasons’.2   This was nothing less than a life and death battle, part of the wider war 
unleashed by alien, Jewish liberalism, for the soul of German, Catholic Vienna. 
Some Suburban Parishes 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the Church had done little to help parishes to cope with the 
increases in population that had taken place in Vienna and its suburbs.  Change, when it 
came, was ad hoc and no systematic attempt was made at reorganising the parishes until 
1940.3  The burden of care on priests had therefore been increasing.  Priests led physically 
and emotionally demanding lives.  Several masses were held each day.4  Each year also 
brought hundreds of weddings, baptisms and funerals to a parish.5  Fortunately for these 
priests, they were not alone in carrying out their work.  Parishes were often staffed with 
curates, junior priests who were fully ordained but unable as yet to take up a parish of their 
own.  This may have been because of a lack of available parishes, or because the curates 
lacked sufficient experience at that time, and curates might spend years working at a parish 
on a temporary basis until their position was confirmed.6  The life of a curate could be 
precarious.  While the salary for a parish priest was guaranteed through the Ordinariat, the 
office of the Archbishop at St. Stephen’s Cathedral in Vienna, a curate’s salary had to be 
requested from the Ordinariat, often in arrears.  While curates might wait years for their 
own parish, this system gave them exposure to the full range of parish activities.  
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In addition to looking after their curates, priests had to deal with a considerable amount of 
daily administration, including the care of church buildings that were often in disrepair.  In 
Ottakring, for instance, Father Emmanuel Paletz, priest since 1848, spent much of his time 
in correspondence with the Ordinariat.  He wrote often about the need for assistants to help 
him in his work.  He sent reminders about the need to pay them.7 Much of this 
correspondence was dashed off, in barely legible handwriting, and was simply a record of 
daily routines.  Occasionally, when Paletz wrote about matters he considered to be 
important, his handwriting became more measured and he used better paper.  In 1861, Paletz 
made no mention in the parish Chronik of the political changes happening either in the 
capital or nationally.  He wrote, however, in great detail about a thunder storm that had hit 
Ottakring, the damage it caused to church buildings, and the danger to his parishioners that 
the damaged buildings represented.8  The Chroniken and correspondence of the parishes of 
Währing and Weinhaus contain similar records of the need for funds for building work.9  
The same applies to requests for funding for teachers.10  Priests across the city had to cope 
with increasing congregations, squeezed into crumbling buildings.  They had to learn the 
skills to manage their curates.   
One potential form of support from outside the Church was that of a patron, and any support 
obtained from a patron would have been welcome, but a patron could also present problems; 
the provision of cash could be taken as a licence to interfere with the running of a parish.  In 
the nineteenth century, the Czartorysky family funded the church at Weinhaus.  In return, the 
family, and not the Archdiocese, appointed the parish priest there.11  The family also 
expected to be involved in the running of the local school.  A long-running dispute over who 
should control the school – priest or patron – came to a head in the 1860s, and was finally 
resolved only with the intervention of the local Imperial administration, the Statthalterei.12  
This was much to the relief of the incumbent priest, Father Adam Schwandner, whom the 
Statthalterei supported.  Displaying no gratitude for his patron’s financial support, and with 
total belief in the justice of his stance, Schwandner recorded the end of the dispute with an 
emphatic ‘Victoria!’ in the parish Chronik.13    
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Priest Versus Politician? 
Despite the rigours of their work, many priests stayed at the same parish for long spells.  
Schwandner was at Weinhaus for sixteen years.14  Paletz was at Ottakring from 1848 to 
1873.15  Their longevity in office would have helped parish priests to exercise authority over 
their parishioners.  Many enhanced that authority by hard work in their community, even if  
the constitutional settlements of the 1860s presented a challenge to this authority.  The 
nature of this challenge lay not so much in the detail of the settlements as in the liberal 
principles that underpinned them.  The 1860s removed the privileges the Church had held in 
areas such as marriage and education.  Despite retaining influence over religious teaching in 
schools, and while it retained its position at the centre of many social networks, the Church 
was now, legally at least, one corporate body among many.  It retained a voice in the 
shaping of public policy, but other voices now had the right to be heard too.  Among these 
voices were the legal political parties that were being formed, as well as the various societies 
that were emerging after the constitutions guaranteed at least some freedom of association.  
In 1861, Vienna City Council represented the views of the electorate in districts I to IX.  
Beyond the Gurtel, the local communes had their own elected representatives.  In many 
cases in the 1860s and 1870s, the pattern of liberal pre-eminence within the Gurtel was 
repeated in these communes.  These patterns show the solid bourgeois credentials of the 
representatives, as home-owners, master builders and above all as bourgeois.16 
The picture that has been painted – often by people from within the Church – was that this 
was an age where the Church was immediately under attack from secularising liberal 
administrations.  This picture has often been summarised by later commentators, such as the 
author of a history of the parish of St. Rochus, in the Landstrasse district, who in the 1930s 
described liberals as attempting to deprive the Church of all influence, aided by Jews and 
Marxists.17  Friedrich Funder, later editor of the Reichspost, looked back on the 1860s and 
1870s as a time when liberals dominated Parliament, the University, the bureaucracy, the 
literary world,  but ‘not satisfied with ruling over the political stage and public opinion, they 
tried to make the religious thinking of the people subject to their views’.18  
In some parishes, this was said to have led to the almost complete destruction of religious 
activity.  At St. Rochus, for instance, it was claimed that religious life only revived after 
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1892, with the appointment of an energetic champion of the Church, Father Karl Gold.19  
The Chroniken and correspondence of the parishes give a rather different picture.  Certainly, 
the liberal period did see new laws which required the building of schools that fell under the 
control of local authorities.  These schools were not, however, beyond the influence of the 
Church.  Father Paletz of Ottakring, for instance, remained as a member of the Ottakring 
commune council until 1869, on a co-opted basis.20  He was eventually removed from the 
council after a dispute with other members over religious education.21   
While this was no doubt a blow to Paletz, he had grasped how politics worked in the liberal 
era, and took up the fight using the new political weapons available to him.  On 31st August 
1869, Paletz protested that the ‘worthy’ members of the commune of Ottakring had decided 
to build an elementary school.22  Yet within a month Paletz was writing to the Ordinariat 
about the need, and the right, to appoint a teacher of religion to this school.23  A similar route 
had been followed by Father Magnollo in the parish of Währing.  In 1867, he had requested 
that the Ordinariat’s office provide a curate to run religious education for the new 
commune-built school in his parish.  Magnollo did at least seem to recognise the need for 
this school, to cope with the growing population in the area.24   
Priests had no intention of letting education slip from their influence, even if, as in the case 
of Grinzing, the Chronik records the ‘separation of the elementary school from the Church’ 
as early as 1861.25  Details concerning schooling are carefully noted in the Chroniken.  In 
1861, Father Schwandner listed how many children were in the elementary and more 
advanced schools, even down to the level of those who repeated a year.26  In 1862, Father 
Magnollo recorded changes in the personnel on the school committee in Währing.27  In 
1871, Father Paletz was still unhappy with how the commune of Ottakring was handling the 
question of religious education in the elementary school.  Perhaps suspecting that the liberals 
were attempting to avoid their responsibilities in this regard, he formed an alliance with 
Pastor Wilkens from the Evangelical Church in Vienna and Herr Huffner, for the 
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‘Israelites’.28  Together, they invoked the law and forced the commune to provide sufficient 
funds for teachers of religion at the school.29  Paletz also recorded that this was the year he 
was named as ‘defender of religion’ by Filipp, Freiherr von Weber.  The juxtaposition in his 
Chronik of his actions and the award he received suggest the two are likely to have been 
linked. 
Across Vienna, a general pattern emerged of priests, as was their right, defending the role of 
the Church in education.  This occasionally brought them into conflict with liberal 
politicians but, in the 1860s and even in the early 1870s, the picture is more complicated 
than this.  Sometimes the parties involved were at daggers drawn.  For instance, it is hard to 
imagine a good relationship existing between the priests of the parish of St. Rochus on the 
one hand and the liberals of the city on the other, after the 1863 appointment of Josef Pia as 
a curate to the parish.  The Chronik of the parish records delight that Pia’s services have 
been obtained.  It records that Pia had been editor-in-chief of the Österreichischer 
Volksfreund, although it fails to mention that this was an anti-liberal and viciously 
antisemitic newspaper.30  On his appointment, Pia made donations of several gold objects for 
mass and general decorative purposes, so his arrival at the parish would have been noticed 
by parishioners.  His track record at the Volksfreund would have made his appointment 
equally visible to liberal politicians.   
Nevertheless, priests and politicians were not all at war with each other all of the time, and 
forms of accommodation emerged which allowed them to appear together in public.  They 
gave each other mutual seals of secular and spiritual approval at significant events in the life 
of the city.  The 1871 Corpus Christi procession in Ottakring, one of the major Church 
events of the year, was led by Father Paletz, but also attended by a swathe of civic 
dignitaries, including a Member of Parliament, Dr. von Stremayr and Bürgermeister Ignaz 
Kuffner, chairman of the commune’s managing committee, the Bezirksausschuss.  This 
should not be surprising.  Many politicians, even those with a secularising agenda, would 
have been raised as Catholics and may have been practising Catholics.  Ignaz Kuffner was 
Jewish.31  Such events provided a point of contact between priest and politician.  Father 
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Magnollo ensured the Church had some say in the appointment of teachers at the new school 
in Währing, while liberal politicians trumpeted the school’s achievements.32  
Priests could become involved in politics, but they had to balance their workloads, and the 
world around them was not standing still.  In 1871, for instance, Father Paletz was involved 
in raising money for a middle school and for a hospital in Ottakring.  In September 1872, in 
an effort to ward off a cholera outbreak, a pilgrimage was held, at which there was ‘great 
participation’.33  In 1873, Paletz records the coming of the trams to Ottakring and the 
financial catastrophe of the great crash.  By contrast, he hardly pays attention to the elections 
of that year to the local council, simply recording a list of those who were successful.  As 
might be expected, the list comprises local bourgeois: builders, inn-keepers of the more 
respectable kind and property owners. 34   
Other Concerns 
Politics were important for priests, but formed only one concern among many, and their 
daily lives reflected the harsh nature of existence at the time.  The Grinzing Chronik of 1862 
records the hardships still caused by the failed harvest of the previous year.35  The priests, 
protected by an income from the Archdiocese, may not have experienced the physical effects 
of this failure, but the psychological effects of their parishioners’ suffering must have been 
difficult to bear.  At times, the dangers of life came even closer to home.  In Ottakring, both 
the priests’ home and the parish offices were a source of much correspondence with the 
Ordinariat over the years.  Complaints were particularly common about overcrowding in the 
home, with priest and all curates lodged there.  On the night of 18th February 1876, fire 
broke out at the home as the priests slept.36  Only swift action by one of the curates made 
escape possible, but the damage caused by the fire was such that the accommodation was 
rendered uninhabitable.  As a result, some of the priests moved into the parish offices, while 
others found temporary lodgings in private homes in the area.37   
This kind of experience must have served to embed the priests even further into the life of 
their parishes.  Their spiritual leadership, and also their sharing in the daily experience of 
their parishioners can only have reinforced their authority.  The same effect came from their 
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relatively high level of education.38    The priests’ authority would prove to be important for 
the ways in which they would later shape political developments in their parishes, although 
some priests seem to have kept some distance from the practicalities of politics.  For Father 
Magnollo, and others like him, this meant simply recording events and remaining loyal to 
the Habsburgs and the idea of Austria.  Magnollo recorded that the war year 1866 ‘was an 
unhappy one for Austria’, and he reserves a page each for events in France, Italy and 
Bohemia.39  Other priests, though, were emerging for whom politics was taking on a more 
practical dimension.  Two appointments made in this period highlight this change.  The first 
was that of Father Carl Dittrich, who at the age of 52 took over from Father Paletz at 
Ottakring in 1874, and who is covered in more detail in Chapter 5.40  The second is Father 
Joseph Deckert, who took over the church of St. Joseph in Weinhaus in October of the same 
year.41   
Father Deckert was thirty-one when he arrived at Weinhaus.  He had been educated at the 
Piaristengymnasium in Vienna’s Josefstadt, then at the Knabenseminar.  Deckert was a 
braggart and all the indications are that he was a swindler.42  He was, however, full of 
organisational ability, charisma, dynamism and seemingly unlimited self-belief.  Deckert 
inherited some long-running problems at Weinhaus and immediately took steps to remedy 
them.  These steps included founding a charity for poor schoolchildren and the launching of 
a fund-raising campaign for church restoration work.  The restoration campaign took off, 
initially with support from sixty members, who made donations by subscription.43  In 1875, 
this campaign was formalised as the  Church Renovation Association, and by the end of the 
year it had 4,071 members.44  The statutes of the Association list the members of the 
committee.  There were priests, curates and local notables, but no sign that Deckert had any 
resonance beyond his own parish.45  Deckert then changed this, by founding a newsletter, the 
Sendbote des heiligen Joseph, the stated purpose of which was to boost the renovation fund.  
Such confidence in the commercial prospects of a newsletter from the priest of a small 
parish in North West Vienna may have seemed misplaced, yet issue two, from February 
1876, carried mail from satisfied readers as far away as Austrian Galicia and Switzerland.  
                                                      
38 Bowman, Parish Priests, p.107. 
39 AEDW WeCk, 1866. 
40 AEDW AOCor, 12th February 1874, for Dittrich’s application. 
41 AEDW WeCk, 1874.  
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43 AEDW WeCk, 1865. 
44 Joseph Deckert, Der Sendbote des heiligen Joseph, (Vienna: Verlag des Sendboten), February 1876, p. 7. 
45 The statutes for the Kirchenbau-Verein are dated 31st October 1880, but are in the AEDW WeCor, box for 1900-1910. 
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After only four issues Deckert could report that the newsletter was selling 10,000 copies a 
month.46  The Sendbote, and other activities by Deckert, made his name widely known 
across the Empire and beyond.   
The declared purpose of the newsletter may have been fund raising, but political content 
featured from the start.  The second issue contained an appeal to pray ‘for the endangered 
Catholic Church, for the Holy Father... who for their true faith suffer persecution, and for all 
Christian communities which, through the persecution of their priests, find themselves in 
great spiritual need’.47  The date makes this a likely reference to the Kulturkampf and 
Bismarck’s attacks on the Church in Germany.  At the start of the second year of 
publication, Deckert then turned his sights very firmly against Austria’s liberal 
government.48   
Deckert quoted extensively from a speech that had been given in Vienna in the previous year 
by a Baron Raimund von Stillfried.  Stillfried had warned his listeners that while the 
opponents of the Church in Austria were leading a less violent campaign than those in 
Germany, those in Austria were shrewder.  These opponents were trying to divide the 
bishops from the rank and file clergy.  They were trying to reduce the pool of potential 
priests, by removing exemption from conscription for those who were studying theology.  
They were trying in particular to reduce the authority of the Church, by establishing state 
authority over marriage and, in so doing, they were dividing the people from the Church.  
Stillfried ended with an appeal to multiply the Catholic societies, and to revive Catholic 
values, so that a Catholic Austria might be revived.49  This was an attempt to use the form of 
the institutions of liberal civic society, the association, against the liberal state.  This forming 
of Catholic associations had been common since 1848, but most of them were charitable in 
nature.  Catholic associations with overtly political ends were new and had been frowned on 
by the upper reaches of the Church, at least until the 1860s.50 
In using this speech, Deckert was showing his belief in the ability of Catholics to fight back 
against the liberal state.  He also intended to show that support for an anti-liberal stance 
could be found among those who seemed to be part of the establishment.  Stillfried was at 
least reasonably well-connected.  In 1876, at the age of thirty seven, he had already left 
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50 William Bowman, ‘Religious Associations And The Formation Of Political Catholicism In Vienna, 1848 to the 1870s’, 
AHYB, 1996, Vol. XXVII, 65-76, here pp.70-72.  
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behind a career in the army.  He was of sufficient wealth to have managed trips to the United 
States and the Far East.51  He was not untypical of the kind of aristocrat whose support 
priests would later find valuable.   
In the 1870s and subsequent decades, Deckert continued his line of combining anti-
liberalism and antisemitism with loyalty to the Habsburg state.  He attacked the Pan-
Germans in the Empire relentlessly.  Other priests equally took pride in being singled out as 
enemies of the Pan-German movement.  For instance, in 1878 the then incumbent priest at 
Währing, Father Adolf Khu, took care to record that he had been attacked by the German 
nationalist newspaper, the Deutsche Zeitung.52   
It has been argued that one of the primary motivations for priests like Deckert to begin their 
agitation was their declining social status, as the relatively low salaries of priests reduced 
their ability to engage in bourgeois activities, or to make substantial charitable donations.53  
This may well be true but, given the wider context, it can be no coincidence that Deckert and 
Dittrich began their most directly political engagement, in the parishes, at the time the 
Concordat was being revoked by a liberal administration.  One other factor may have 
influenced the decisions by Deckert and Dittrich to become politically active.  As Höbelt 
indicates, this was a time when mass immigration of Jews to Vienna was taking place, and 
Jews as liberals were an easy target.54  This was at a time when the effects of the crash of 
1873 were either being felt or feared by Deckert’s parishioners.  Links were certainly being 
made between Jews and Capitalism and its effects, not just in Vienna, and not just by 
‘Germans’.55 
Nevertheless, while the signs are here of the beginnings of organised political activity, the 
extent of that activity should not be overestimated, especially as Deckert was a singularly 
energetic activist in the incipient antisemitic movement.  Not all priests displayed his vigour 
or his desire to develop an antisemitic challenge.  In this early part of the period, the material 
that was uncovered in the Chroniken and the correspondence rarely covered more than the 
daily routine.  The correspondence usually covered requests for the payment of salaries for 
curates, for more curates to cope with the workload generated by the city’s growing 
population, or applications for funding for building repairs.  Inventories and rather anodyne 
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histories of the parishes are found.  Only occasionally did something out of the ordinary 
intrude, such as one mention of Austria’s defeat against Prussia in 1866.56  At this stage 
there was no evidence of antisemitism in the Chroniken, nor in the correspondence that was 
examined.  Some priests in the 1860s were engaging in antisemitic attacks, however, using 
publications such as the privately published Wiener Kirchenzeitung.57  Their attacks were 
denunciations of the State’s alleged assaults on the Church.  In this sense, they were 
defensive of the Church’s position. 
Summary 
Priests responded to the secularising agenda of the liberal administrations in a variety of 
ways.  Father Paletz and Father Schwandner engaged with the new rules of the liberal age to 
lobby for teachers.  They do not seem to unduly concerned that they will be able to extract 
concessions from politicians, even if they were certainly determined to protect the religious 
life of their communities.  Father Paletz even learned that a coalition with Evangelical and 
Jewish interests could yield results.  Sometimes, younger priests, like Father Deckert, 
engaged with the liberal State in a confrontational way.  At this stage, they tried to convince 
people of their cause.  This reaction has been described as ‘occupational anxiety’, an element 
of concern by priests that they were losing social status, and therefore influence over their 
parishioners.58  This was, though, more than a reaction to a loss of personal status.  Whatever 
the intentions, when the State made civil marriage available, and cross-denominational 
education compulsory, priests felt such moves to be attacks on the mission of the Church. 
Nothing emerges from the records studied from this period that explicitly describes the 
German aspects of Austrian identity as being under threat.  Defeats in war are mentioned as 
simple recording of events.  Some priests do emerge who have in their sights a different 
threat, to Austria’s Christian identity.  Unlike Fathers Paletz and Schwandner, they attack, 
rather than engage with the state.  Circles that gathered around the Volksfreund or the 
Kirchenzeitung were beginning to single out liberals and Jews as threats to the Christian 
aspects of Austria’s identity.  They were starting on a road that would lead some to suggest 
that Jews did not, and should not, belong.  In this respect, these were some of the first 
implicit claims that German aspects of Austrian identity could come under threat from a 
‘foreign’ element. 
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John Boyer has appropriately described Deckert as ‘probably the most vulgar antisemite’ 
among the clergy.  As Boyer also states, it was Deckert’s repeated use of the Jew as outsider, 
corrupter and scourge of society that was intended to spread an antisemitic message.59  
Deckert alone, however, was not enough to change the atmosphere of a city, perhaps not 
even the atmosphere of his parish and district.  It required priests, the associations of which 
they were members, or which they influenced, and similar groups with antisemitic 
foundations, to change the culture of parts of the city, through a daily propaganda that, for 
some, became perceived as common sense.  Deckert, and priests like him, helped lay the 
foundations for the long-term development of antisemitism in Vienna, as will be seen in 
subsequent chapters.   
  
                                                      
59 Boyer, Political Radicalism, p.156. 
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CHAPTER 4:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIENNESE POLITICS: 1879-1896 
The Antisemitic Challenge  
In 1879, as the liberals fell from government at the national level, Karl Lueger was a 
relatively unknown, 35 year-old councillor in the Vienna Rathaus.  A lawyer, he represented 
Vienna’s Landstrasse district as a reforming liberal, having stood against the alleged 
corruption of some of the more established Council members.  In order to further his cause, 
the Catholic Lueger allied with a fellow liberal, the Jewish Julius Mandl, in their so-called 
‘Progress and Economy Party’, which functioned as a faction within the liberal ranks.  The 
two men ran a small club, Unity, and Mandl published a journal, Progress, but their 
influence was limited.  Neither man was in the inner circle of the liberal party.  
Lueger was in many ways the liberal model of a good citizen.  As the son of a servant at the 
Vienna Polytechnic, and therefore lacking the social contacts that might have eased his 
progress, Lueger had earned his position in life, not inherited it, and he was a long way 
down the party hierarchy.1  Yet, by 1895, he was in effective control of the most powerful 
elected office in the country, that of Mayor of Vienna and, two years later, Lueger himself 
became Mayor.  He did so now as leader of a new, anti-liberal, anti-Jewish Christian Social 
movement, a movement he did not create, but which he shaped and led to power in Vienna.  
In 1879, Lueger had allied with Mandl.  Long before 1895, Lueger had changed on many 
fronts and he had long left his liberal, tolerant past behind him. 
In the period to 1896, Lueger, the Christian Social movement and its allies transformed 
Viennese politics.  Since the story of Lueger’s rise has been well documented, this chapter is 
not focused on the detail of this rise.2  Instead, this chapter uses the emergence of Lueger 
and the Christian Socials as a framework on which other developments with long-term 
significance for Vienna can be traced.  It looks at changes in political culture, such as the 
routine recourse to violence on the streets, and changes in the use of the language of 
antisemitism.  It outlines some of the developments within an Austro-German vision of the 
world.  The analysis of these changes is then complemented in Chapter 5 by a return to the 
parishes of Vienna.   
This chapter emphasizes two points.  First, this new movement was not without roots in 
Vienna’s recent past.  Lueger may have left his tolerant past, but he had not left behind all of 
his liberal values.  The Christian Social movement that he came to lead shared the liberals’ 
belief in self-reliance.  It was proud of, and prepared to defend, ‘German’ culture and 
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privileges.  It may have been Christian but, in its early days at least, it was not necessarily 
clerical.  As such, it was attractive to those who had only ever held a shallow allegiance to 
true liberal values, especially once it started to be successful.  This meant that Lueger was 
not the only Viennese who passed from one movement to the other.  Second, developments 
in Vienna were not typical of events elsewhere in Austria.  Outside Vienna, liberal parties 
became more focused on local issues, which often involved nationality and language 
disputes, especially in places such as Bohemia and Styria.3  As a result, liberal parties 
evolved from being ‘liberal’ to becoming first ‘German liberal’ then ‘German nationalist’.   
Lothar Höbelt has charted these developments in considerable detail in terms of the two 
main strands that existed within the liberal movement before 1879, the ideological 
(freisinnig) and the nationalist.  As Höbelt points out, outside of Vienna antisemitism 
succeeded briefly in creating cleavages within the ranks of each of these groups, but it did 
not create new groupings out of them, based on positions that either supported or opposed a 
new, post-confessional, antisemitism.  Rather, outside Vienna, splits remained focused on 
the classic liberal dilemmas, of clerical versus anticlerical, of whether the state should 
intervene and, if so, how far.  The situation was different, however, within Vienna, where a 
movement focused on antisemitism came together for the long term.4  
Antisemitism may have united the new movement but, as Höbelt also points out, Christian 
Socials in particular succeeded because their leaders were also more astute politicians than 
their liberal counterparts.  They recognised that, in the 1880s, a ‘paradigm change’ had 
occurred in Austrian politics.  Old liberal battles for a political settlement that respected 
constitutional arrangements had been won, but liberal politicians did not move on.  They 
failed to take account of electoral changes that brought new people the vote, and for whom 
politics was not just about high-level political principle.5  In Vienna, these new electors, 
lower down the social and economic scale than traditional liberal supporters, would be lured 
away by antisemitic politicians who combined populist antisemitism with the offer of a 
better deal for white collar workers.  This deal would come either directly from the 
municipality, for its workers, or from pressure on the national government to improve civil 
service conditions.6  Opportunism, as well as principle, motivated at least some of the 
politicians and some of the voters. 
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New Liberal Challenges  
In 1879, a Conservative-Clerical-Slav coalition came together to form the national 
government, with Count Taaffe at its head.7  This coalition brought together conservative 
Germans, Poles and Czechs.  While liberal administrations had promoted the view that a 
strong, centralised state was vital for future prosperity and security, Taaffe’s new 
government, in a spirit of ‘reconciliation and understanding’ was committed to giving some 
measure of autonomy to provincial institutions.8  He did not, however, actively privilege one 
nation over another, except in as much as he maintained a status quo that favoured the so-
called ‘historic nations’.  Changes that gradually affected the balance of national interest 
were carefully introduced.  The Stremayr language ordinances of 1881, for instance, 
introduced a limited reform, permission for the  Czech language to be used in certain areas 
of the outer civil service in Bohemia.9   
Taaffe’s government attempted to temper the excesses of laissez-faire economics with 
measures such as workers’ health and accident insurance.10  These policies may have seemed 
far-reaching at the time, but they were in reality limited in scope.  Nevertheless, they were a 
reversal of some liberal approaches.  One liberal difficulty in how to react to these moves 
was what has been described as their symbiosis, as ‘Germans’, with the state.  Their position 
as a Staatsvolk, tied to the future of the Empire, made outright opposition impossible.11  As 
such, the liberals, who hoped to return to office, were in danger of being left behind, on the 
one hand by parties which proposed state intervention as a remedy to the difficulties of 
modern Capitalism, and on the other by those who might take up a more nationalist position, 
or both.   
After 1882, when the franchise was extended, mass parties which promoted the rights of the 
nation, as opposed to say, the rights of class, did emerge.  A good number of these parties, 
though, were not completely new creations.  Many were radicalised versions of liberal 
parties, which added the word ‘German’, for instance, to emphasize that they were both 
liberal and national in outlook.  This might initially be a means to express a defence of 
German interests but, in later years, the use of the word ‘German’ might add a more 
aggressive tone to a party’s programme. 
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Within groups where the national interest was thought to be the priority, however, rivals 
attempted to be the sole representatives for each nation.  Splits arose between Young Czechs 
and Old Czechs.  In Vienna between 1879 and 1896, those who promoted radical, 
exclusionary visions of the rights of the German nation broadly described themselves as 
antisemites.  They divided between two seemingly irreconcilable, at times mutually 
antagonistic groups, although it must be stressed that the reality was much more complex.  
Both across these groups and within them, there was considerable fluidity.  At one extreme 
of the positions taken by the Pan-Germans, or German nationalists, for instance, one 
prominent figure, Georg von Schönerer, called for all Germans to become part of the new 
German Reich.  Antisemitism was a major element in the programme of Schönerer’s Pan-
Germans, but union with Germany was its priority.  Other German nationalists, such as Otto 
Steinwender, were more pragmatic and he, and others like him, placed more emphasis on 
searching for ways to protect German interests within the Habsburg Empire.12  German 
nationalists usually, however, shared a strong anticlericalism. 
A second group, which eventually came under Lueger’s influence and evolved into the 
Christian Social movement, also believed in German national solidarity, but its approach to 
the future of German Austria was different.  Up to the fall of the Empire in 1918, it would 
call for the ‘protection’ of the German Volk within the boundaries of the existing Habsburg 
state.  Its core values consisted of a fierce loyalty to the state, antisemitism, Catholicism and 
calls for the protection of bourgeois sectors of society.  Christian Socials believed that the 
Germans and Slavs were an Aryan family. Within that family, disputes might arise, in which 
case the Christian Socials were staunch defenders against any threat to German identity, but 
Christian Socials promoted a vision of the peoples of the Empire as being able to live within 
one state.  To this vision it made one exception: Jews, who were labelled as an alien 
intrusion.13 
By the 1890s, the Christian Socials were defining their relationship with German 
nationalism.  A distinctively Austro-German vision of the state was being established as the 
dominant strand within the party, one that favoured an Austria separate from predominantly 
Protestant Germany.  This vision, however, was one that supported close ties with other 
Germans from outside Austria, especially if those Germans were Catholic.  This vision was 
flexible enough never to exclude from the Party those who supported other key elements of 
the Party’s programme, but who would have welcomed union with Germany.  The Christian 
Social vision aimed to protect the German character of Vienna, but it was predominantly 
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tolerant, culturally, in its approach to most non-German Christians in the Empire.  Lueger 
could appeal to all Catholics in the Empire as ‘Brothers in Austria, brothers in Christ’.14  
This did not stop Christian Socials from being brutally racist towards their fellow Jewish 
citizens. 
In 1879, however, the antisemitic movement as a whole was in its infancy in terms of 
political organisation, and factions that called themselves liberal still controlled nine out of 
every ten seats in the Vienna council chamber.  Estimates give almost fifty per cent to those 
labelled Centre liberals and thirty-eight percent to the Left.15  A highly restricted franchise 
meant that political action through the voting system was, at this time, unlikely to be 
effective against the liberals.  Those who opposed liberal policies took to using other routes.  
On the 11th November 1880, a meeting was organised with the slogan ‘Craftsmen against the 
pedlars’ trade’.16  Craftsmen, bound by guild rules and practices, complained that travelling 
pedlars, bringing with them cheap, often mass-produced goods, were a threat to their 
livelihoods.  At the meeting, there were calls for the restoration of compulsory guilds.  The 
speeches made it clear that the threat to the mainly Christian craftsmen was from Jewish 
pedlars.  Significantly for later events, this meeting was attended by Lueger. 
By late 1881, anti-liberal organisations rooted in Vienna were growing and merging.  These 
included the recently founded Österreichischer Reformverein, an umbrella organisation for 
trade and guild based organisations, which drew its membership from a wide range of 
people with differing views on how to face up to the problems of modern Austria.  The 
Reformverein, like other groupings, was fluid and contained people whose later views would 
draw them into conflict with each other.  Its members overlapped with those of other 
organisations.  Robert Pattai, first Vice President of the Reformverein, worked with 
Schönerer on the preliminaries to the political manifesto known as the Linz Programme.17 
Schönerer, in his turn, worked on the manifesto with Jews.  This Programme was ambiguous 
enough to be seen by some as a statement calling for union with the German Reich and by 
others as a call for the protection of German interests in the Habsburg Empire.18  What the 
Linz Programme did not define was the meaning of being German.   
Pattai now moved into open calls for antisemitic action.  He declared in February 1882 that 
the Jews of Vienna were a symptom of liberalism’s ‘Manchester theories’, which he 
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despised.  He called for economic reform which would impact on these Jews, and which he 
believed was a necessity for Austria.19  The Neue Freie Presse reported in March 1882 that a 
row over antisemitism had turned into a brawl at a Vienna Reformverein meeting.  In  April 
1882 Schönerer chaired a meeting of the Verein der Deutschen Volkspartei, which was 
forcibly dissolved by the authorities because of antisemitic speeches.  Violence occurred 
elsewhere and was becoming a feature of Viennese politics.  The people behind these 
organisations were persistent.  The Verein der Deutschen Volkspartei was banned by the 
authorities for its antisemitism, but by June 1882 Schönerer helped to replace it with the 
Deutschnationaler Verein.20   
As far back as 1848, and the original emancipation of Jews, support for an antisemitic stance 
had been coming from small business owners, guild masters and their apprentices.21  It 
should not be concluded, however, that the members of these groups were all heading down 
the same road.  In 1882, for instance, the trial took place of Josef Engel and 28 others, 
accused of being anarchist bank robbers.  Of the 29, ten were apprentice carpenters, two 
were shop assistants, one was an office worker, several were apprentices in various trades, 
and one was a master carpenter.  They came from all over the Empire and beyond, even 
from Prussia.  Twenty declared themselves to be Catholics, one refused to answer, one was 
Jewish and seven were registered as without religion.  No single interpretation can be placed 
on the mixture of religious affiliations found among this group of anarchists, especially as 
that of being without religion – konfessionslos – was an officially recorded status, not an 
opinion on religion.22   
While the members of this anarchist group were not rich, they were not on the lowest rungs 
of society, and came from the social sectors where antisemites were busily recruiting.23  So 
antisemitic groups were not alone in recruiting from these strata.  If anything, it is known 
that the incipient Socialist trade unions were successfully mobilising apprentices in the 
struggle for better conditions.  In 1883, strikes by apprentice ironsmiths, and in particular by 
the bakers’ apprentices, caused the police considerable anxiety, and there were many more 
strikes by apprentices in the early 1880s.24  The extent of antisemitic activity and 
organisation by 1883 should not therefore be overestimated, as the relative attention given 
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by the police at the time to the various strands of the growing Socialist movement shows the 
extent to which the latter were considered a threat to public order, and therefore to the 
political status quo.  The police seem to have spent more time monitoring a group of Italians 
in Vienna who were suspected of being anarcho-syndicalists than in watching antisemites.25   
The police were forced to pay more attention to the antisemites, however, when a scandal 
broke out that gave the antisemitic movement considerable impetus.  The Nordbahn, the 
Northern Railway out of Vienna into Bohemia, was a concession that had been sold in 1836 
to Salomon Rothschild, and the company remained in the hands of his family after his death 
in 1859.26  The terms of the concession had been condemned by significant elements of the 
press, and by a number of politicians, as too easy on the concession holders.  Uproar 
followed when the Nordbahn concession was renewed in 1884, with the same company, on 
terms which were at least as favourable as the earlier concession.  In April 1884, Schönerer 
and Lueger addressed a public meeting in Vienna, calling for the nationalisation of the 
Nordbahn.  The issue became a touchstone for the anti-liberals.27  The Nordbahn scandal 
was a national issue and, in May 1884, Schönerer presented the Austrian parliament with a 
petition of more than 33,000 signatures calling for nationalisation.  
As the 1880s progressed, antisemitic agitation and Pan-German activity, especially by 
Schönerer, whether actual, planned or rumoured, was monitored closely.28  A high point of 
this activity came with celebrations for Bismarck’s seventieth birthday.  Newspapers such as 
the Deutsche Zeitung set the tone with articles that began: 
‘Far beyond the borders of the German Empire, as far afield as German 
hearts are beating, all gather to celebrate the day’.   
According to the paper, Germans in Austria had a duty to send good wishes to their brothers 
in the new Reich, to forget old quarrels and to unite the princes and the peoples of the two 
imperial German states.29  To this end, Vienna’s Pan-Germans, led by Schönerer, arranged a 
festival, a ‘Celebratory Greeting Of The German Nationalists in Austria’.30   
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The event took place on 1st April 1885, at the Sofiensaal in the city’s Landstrasse district.31  
By 8 a.m. it was in full swing.  As Schönerer arrived with his wife in their coach, large 
crowds were already inside and outside the hall.  The outside of the Sofiensaal was covered 
in garlands.  The speakers’ platform was decked in flowers, with the Pan-German symbol, 
the cornflower, heavily used.  Schönerer opened the event by reading aloud a telegram he 
had sent to Bismarck, in which he remarked that all in Vienna who possessed a German 
national spirit would join in this celebration.  Schönerer proclaimed: ‘Hail and blessings to 
the creator of the German Empire’.  Bismarck’s response was also read out.  The event 
consisted mainly of speeches, including some from members of the Reichsrat, the reading of 
letter after letter and telegram after telegram signed by the ‘German Nationalists of Vienna’, 
much cheering and proposing of birthday greetings.32  According to the police, the messages 
were kept within the bounds of legality but, at any rate, letters and telegrams for the event 
had already been intercepted.  Only two telegrams had contained ‘questionable content’.33   
Although the meeting was meant to be non-political, calls came from the floor for universal 
suffrage.  Calls also attacked what was known as the ‘curial system’, which privileged 
certain voters.  Under this, voters were allocated to a curia, a kind of electoral college, 
according to qualifications such as tax paid or education.  The higher curiae had fewer 
members, so fewer votes needed to be gained by successful candidates.  Shouts also rang out 
about the Nordbahn scandal.  The only note of originality on the day seems to have been 
provided by an 87-line poem by Adolf Hagen in honour of Bismarck’s birthday, which 
began: 
‘All of Germany celebrates here the feast of feasts, 
It gladly greets the day on which was born 
The German hero...’34  
This was not the kind of paean likely to induce a passionate reaction, but excitement broke 
out when someone in the crowd began taking notes, causing many to suspect he was a 
journalist.  Shoving and pushing followed so, fearing that the man might be assaulted, the 
police pulled him from the hall.35 
The police may not have found the speeches and correspondence alarming, but they were 
surprised by the size and nature of the crowd on a Wednesday morning.  It was estimated 
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that 3,000 people attended the meeting, from all social classes, including approximately 300 
women, despite women being barred from political activity.36  This mixing of class and 
gender was a potentially ominous sign of the success of Schönerer’s appeal.  Nevertheless, 
as a result of information coming from the meeting, the police were able to trace a number 
of anonymous political pamphlets with Pan-German and antisemitic messages to the student 
group Silesia, in the Josefstadt district.  The members of this group belonged to several 
university faculties.37  
The Bismarck birthday event was at least confined to one location.  Little more than a month 
later came a bigger challenge to public order.  Elections to the City Council were due, and 
police were stretched to cover all the planned political gatherings.  Newspapers carried long 
lists of venues where these would take place, across the city and out into the suburbs.38  The 
labels used to describe political gatherings, even in newspapers which carried notices of 
meetings for all political persuasions, show that the terms anti-liberal and antisemitic had 
become synonymous.  These meetings also show that politics as a mass phenomenon was 
beginning to emerge on both the Right and the Left, and in turbulent form.  On the 29th May 
1885, police needed reinforcements to deal with simultaneous Socialist and antisemitic 
demonstrations in Vienna’s Neubau district.39  On the same day, the Mayor of the district of 
Mariahilf informed police that Robert Pattai was planning secret antisemitic agitation.40  
How secret this planned agitation was, however, must be called into question.  One Viennese 
newspaper had just reported Pattai and his fellow antisemites meeting in an inn to draw up 
‘battle plans’ for the elections.41 
After the elections, the police continued to monitor any reported antisemitic agitation, such 
as the activities of a businessman from Germany, Josef Hoffmann, in September 1885.  An 
anonymous tip-off had alerted the police to a meeting of antisemites at a private address in 
the Währing district.  After an extensive investigation, police raided and searched 
Hoffmann’s lodgings in Ottakring, where a large quantity of antisemitic material was 
confiscated.  Hoffmann was later fined for possessing this material.42  Under questioning, 
Hoffmann explained that he had inherited a great deal of wealth from the family businesses.  
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He said that he could have used this wealth to live like a rentier, but that was the way of the 
Jew, not a true German, so he had turned over the running of the businesses to trusted staff 
and taken to the road to spread the antisemitic message.   
In Berlin, he had been given the names of antisemites that he should contact in Vienna and 
other cities on his travels, and this was what he had been doing.  These included Pattai and 
Ernst Schneider, an engineer and businessman from Währing.  It is not known how many 
people were spreading the antisemitic message in this way, but it is clear that antisemitic 
networks were already established in Germany and Austria by this period.  The ‘antisemite’ 
Schneider had recently been spotted in Brünn as an agitator during strikes that had taken 
place there, but he had made little if any impression on the workers.  As a factory owner 
himself, Schneider was presumably trying to convince the workers that the Jew, not the 
‘German’ factory owner was the enemy.43  Schönerer was recorded in several locations, and 
he also sent representatives on his behalf to numerous towns.44  The Berlin police reported to 
their colleagues in Vienna that copies of the Korrespondenzblatt, the newspaper published 
by Schönerer’s Deutscher Schul-Verein, were in circulation there, despite being banned.45 
Despite much activity within these networks, with Schönerer, Pattai and Schneider featuring 
prominently, it was not all necessarily co-ordinated nor to the same ends.  Josef Hoffmann’s 
description of Pattai and Schneider as antisemites, and not as German nationalists, indicates 
what they were against, not what they were for.  Schönerer was certainly both a Pan-German 
and an antisemite.  Pattai, at least in the 1880s, stood close by the Pan-Germans, but 
gradually became more ambiguous as to whether Germans were best served in the Habsburg 
Empire or the German Reich.  At this point, with political parties in their formative stages, 
the label antisemite, or anti-liberal, served to bring such people together.   
In the City Council elections of 1886, one candidate who was previously unknown to the 
police, a man called Wiedenhofer, stood in the Neubau district.  He and others were 
suspected of making Pan-German and antisemitic shouts at public meetings but, because of 
the general commotion, the police could prove nothing.46  Official electoral announcements 
record that Wiedenhofer won election to the district council.47  Although this provides 
evidence that political gatherings were becoming relatively large scale affairs, these City 
elections offer important insights into the functioning of the electoral system.  They show 
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the small numbers needed to win seats in elections at that time.  Wiedenhofer was elected 
with only 108 votes, and others were elected with still fewer votes.  The election of 
Wiedenhofer should also caution against drawing too many general conclusions about where 
the antisemites were beginning to make breakthroughs.  It is true that the most fruitful 
recruiting ground was the third curia, that of the lower bourgeoisie, the artisans and the shop 
keepers.48  Wiedenhofer, however, was elected to the first curia, that of the upper 
bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, the layer of society that was said to be most loyal to the 
Habsburg idea of the state. 
At about the same time as these individual antisemitic triumphs, liberal factions were 
beginning to split, first over the nationalities question, then over antisemitism, and it was 
often local issues that sparked divisions in their ranks.  These factions were also failing to 
understand the realities of the new politics.  The electorate they had previously faced was 
based on a Großbürgertum that formed an extremely shallow layer of society.49  In 1885, the 
liberals suffered electoral setbacks in Vienna when candidates from beyond traditional 
liberal circles made promises to alleviate the economic hardships being faced by City 
employees, whose salaries were not keeping up with the cost of living, and small business 
owners, who faced new competition.   
The 1885 elections were the first to be held under a new franchise that extended the vote to 
the lower middle classes.  The third curia, the lowest, was the destination for these new 
voters.50  They were, among other things, artisans, clerks, municipal officials and teachers.51  
The United Christians learned to combine programmes that contained demands for the 
restriction of state employment for Jews with calls for controls on occupations where Jews 
were considered to be making undue progress, whether this be pawn broking or medicine.52  
The newly enfranchised now voted for candidates who understood their particular concerns, 
not those of the upper bourgeoisie.53  Lothar Höbelt asks whether the splits in the liberal 
movement, caused by trying to satisfy the new electorate, emerged because of antisemitism 
or divisions between social reformers and traditional free market liberals.54  The answer is 
that antisemitic politicians combined an appeal to economic self-interest with an easily 
identifiable scapegoat for local conditions.  
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In the same way, local conditions took on major importance at other levels of politics.  In 
Bohemia, some Germans felt that Czechs had been making gains at the expense of Germans 
since the installation of the Taaffe government in 1879.  In response, elements within the 
Vereinigte Linke created a breakaway grouping, the Deutscher Klub.55  This was more a 
parliamentary faction than a political party, but it had an auspicious birth, with fifty MPs 
joining, mainly from Bohemia and Styria.  Other members of the Vereinigte Linke joined a 
newly established rival, the Deutsch-Österreichischer Klub.  Its members came mainly from 
Vienna and those areas which were distant from the capital, such as the Bukovina.56  The 
Deutsch-Österreichischer Klub was still inclined to defend German privileges, but less 
stridently than the Deutscher Klub.   
The newly established groupings struggled to stay unified.  Members of the Deutscher Klub 
argued, among other things, about the position of Jewish author and politician Heinrich 
Friedjung as editor of the Klub’s party journal, and Schönerer’s April 1887 proposals in 
Parliament to ban certain kinds of Jewish immigration.57  The proposal was rejected, but it 
split the Klub.58  By 1888, members of the Deutscher Klub and the Deutsch-Österreichischer 
Klub joined together again, this time in the Vereinigte Deutsche Linke.  Their numbers were 
reduced in the wake of 1888 elections under the new franchise, and they were moving in a 
more nationally-inclined direction.59  Parts of the liberal movement mutated into ‘German 
liberals’, then ‘Germans’.  
The United Christians  
By 1887 a new, anti-liberal opposition, that would come most strongly from the suburbs of 
Vienna, was emerging.  Antisemitic activists criss-crossed each other in spreading their 
message.  In this year, Schönerer and his associates continued to be involved in Pan-German 
agitation, in Troppau, across Lower Austria, and in Währing.60  These activities were 
beginning to have results, as evidenced in the inns of the Prater, where enthusiastic pro-
Schönerer cries were frequently heard, and violence sometimes accompanied this 
enthusiasm.61   
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Whether this was driven by deep-seated nationalist fervour or it was drink fuelled is open to 
question.  Two men who were arrested for violent behaviour and shouting antisemitic 
slogans turned out to be members of the Catholic Political Union.  Their defence was that 
they were students and that their behaviour was a youthful aberration. Nevertheless, the 
students were from the Währing and Hernals districts, a long way from the Margareten and 
Mariahilf districts where the incidents took place, and it was noted that they had behaved in 
this way while taking the time to cross two of the city’s districts.  The result of their appeal 
for clemency is unknown.62 
Alongside the physical violence came a drip feed of antisemitic language.  Newspapers such 
as the Österreichischer Reformer were filled with stories of Jewish plots and corruption.63  
The Reformer promoted the work of German antisemite Paul de Lagarde, including his fight 
against the ‘privileged position’ of the Jews and for a ‘true’ national spirit.  Lagarde’s 
German background was used as evidence that antisemitism was ‘natural’ and crossed 
borders.  It was also noted that Lagarde based some of his ideas on those of the Austrian 
antisemite, Robert Pattai.64  Other pieces proclaimed pride in the performance of anti-liberals 
in recent elections in Vienna.  The Reformer also carried advertisements for antisemitic 
books and pamphlets, which could be obtained at the bookshop of the newspaper’s editor, 
Cornelius Vetter, in central Vienna.  The advertisements, like the articles, would have been 
seen by the relatively small number of people who bought the Reformer, but it is a 
reasonable speculation that the advertisements, with their casual antisemitism, were at least 
as influential in shaping opinion among readers as the heavily political articles.   
At this time, Schönerian Pan-Germans, as well as those from other Pan-German groups, 
rubbed shoulders with antisemitic Habsburg loyalists against the common Jewish ‘enemy’.  
‘Respectable’ antisemites like Lueger confined their violence to their rhetoric, and turned a 
blind eye when street scuffles broke out between rank and file antisemites and their 
opponents.  In 1888, however, Schönerer went too far, and effectively shut himself off from 
future co-operation with all but the most extreme German nationalists.  Schönerer and his 
supporters had been indulging in minor street attacks on political opponents, but they had 
somehow managed to avoid punishment.  He then made a mistake.  After a violent attack on 
the staff and equipment at the offices of the Neues Wiener Tagblatt, on 8th March 1888, 
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Schönerer was sentenced to four months in prison, the removal of his political rights for five 
years, and the stripping of his patent of nobility.65   
In Vienna, as sentence was passed on Schönerer, violence was expected to break out as a 
show of support for him.  The police called in reinforcements across the city, strengthening 
the number of men at police stations, official buildings and sites where public gatherings 
might take place.  Cavalry was at hand, but stayed out of sight in case its presence sparked 
trouble.  Demonstrations did take place, and those taking part came from right across the 
city, yet the police managed to restore order quickly where trouble did break out.66  
Schönerer probably expected that the punishments would lead to his becoming a political 
martyr, and certainly the initial reaction suggested that this might happen.  Once the moment 
had passed, however, Schönerer’s isolation began to set in.  Others continued their work 
without him.  Ernst Vergani, editor of the Vienna-based Deutsches Volksblatt, organised a 
summer Germanenfest.67  Posters to promote it talked of the 2,000 year old kinship of the 
German people.  They stressed the idyllic nature of the venue, Wachau, among the oldest 
settlements of the German ‘tribe’.  This tribe was said to live in the Ost-Mark, an allusion to 
the old region of the Eastern Holy Roman Empire, the frontier against the non-Christian 
tribes of the time before the East was converted.  The posters show Wachau next to the 
Danube, symbol of the never resting, powerful spirit of the German people.68  Vergani used 
these symbols of territory and kinship as evocations of factors which he claimed unified the 
German people. The wholesome images are in stark contrast to how Vergani had promoted 
himself as ‘tribune’ of the ‘nationalist’ wing of the Christian Social Party, a man who mixed 
‘filthy racism’ with Pan-Germanic sentiments.69 
Later in 1888, crowds gathered in Vienna for a musical commemoration, the reburial of 
Franz Schubert.70  Schubert had been buried in the cemetery at Währing, but his body was 
now to be transferred to the Central Cemetery in the South East of the city.  On a September 
Sunday, at least thirty five singing groups from across the city gathered at 7:30 a.m. outside 
the Votivkirche, in central Vienna.  These groups were regulars on Vienna’s social 
networks.  Groups which had confirmed their attendance before the day included the 
Ottakringer Liedertafel, the Käufmännischer Gesangverein, the Simmeringer Liedertafel. 
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and the Sängerbund der Bäcker.  Responses were still to be received from nearly twenty 
more groups, including the Wiener Männerchor, the Eisenbahnbeamten-Gesangverein and 
the Wiener Liedertafel, and the women’s group, Syrènes, based in Weinhaus, which had 
close connections with Father Deckert’s parish church.  The event was organised by the 
Wiener Männergesangverein.  Participants gathered in formal dress, to accompany a 
procession to the Central Cemetery.  The Währinger Liedertafel began the procession from 
Währing.  By the time the Votivkirche was reached, 1,200 singers had gathered.  One 
hundred and fifty carriages joined the procession.  Among the participants was a, by now 
aged, brother of Schubert, aided by the priest from Währing, Father Aumann.71 
The significance of this event is the presence of a large number of groups that were already 
associated with, or which would become associated with, radical German views.  As has 
been noted elsewhere in this work, singing groups split roughly along political lines, 
according to the political climate.  This shows that the networks on which the Christian 
Social Party, in particular, would rely were already well established before the Party was 
founded.  Specifically Catholic societies were developing which, William Bowman has 
demonstrated, would be important in helping to lay the base for a Christian Social movement 
that was in essence Catholic.72  Other societies also existed that did not have a specifically 
Catholic purpose, but where Catholic priests exercised much influence.73   
This was also a time when associations and societies, like political parties and factions, were 
being dragged into arguments over the nation and its importance as an organising principle.  
For instance, The Academic Association of German Historians, a seminar group based at the 
University of Vienna, whose members often also belonged to the university geography 
seminar, was founded in 1889, as a breakaway from the official history seminar, which was 
open for membership to all who were interested and qualified, ‘without distinction of nation 
or religion’.  In 1914, the authors of a celebratory pamphlet on twenty fifth anniversary of 
the association proclaimed as a proud achievement that the breakaway group restricted 
membership to ‘Germans’ only, in response to ‘threats’ from ‘enemy nations’.  They stated 
that their ‘leading stars’, in this order, were ‘Nation and knowledge’. The authors lamented 
that the geography seminar, to the best of their knowledge, had not followed this route.74 
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This association may have been small in number, but the range of its contacts and influence 
should not be underestimated.  Members included senior civil servants, academics and 
journalists.  They included future Chancellor or the First Republic, Michael Mayr.75  The 
pamphlet does not explicitly state that prohibitions on any religious groups, such as Jews, 
were in place, but the phrase that the group had previously welcomed members ‘without 
distinction of nation or religion’ suggests that this had changed. 
The importance of the Academic Association of German Historians for this thesis is that it is 
yet another example of an association, whose membership came from the bourgeois, 
intellectual classes, that was part of a movement away from inclusive approaches to 
belonging, where interest in a particular subject was no longer enough to qualify for 
membership.  Even experts in a given field would be shunned if they failed to meet criteria 
of nationality or, apparently, religion.  Exclusion was being spread by members of 
associations like this.  Care must be taken, however, not to attribute such plans to all 
associations that used the word ‘German’ in their names.  The main membership of the 
Deutsch-österreichische Schriftsteller-Genossenschaft was open only to ‘German’ writers, 
but it did offer membership as observers to all who were interested in German culture.  
‘German’ associations such as this, which did not talk of the need to ‘protect’ German 
interests, or which were positively open other than to Germans, emerged very rarely in this 
research.76 
It was at this time, too, that one newly formed group, the United Christians, held its first 
Vienna meeting, at the ‘beim Goldenen Luchsen’ inn, in Neulerchenfelder Strasse, now in 
modern day Ottakring.77  The group was an informal, and shifting, set of alliances among 
non-liberal factions.  It had first come to notice as an ad hoc coalition which unexpectedly 
won elections for the Reichsrat and the Upper Austrian Landtag.78  At this time of fluid 
political alliances, Friedrich Funder describes the United Christians as having in their ranks 
former liberals, Catholics, antisemites, German nationalists, and even those who had not 
been inside a church in years.79  The group was also said to embrace conservatives and 
Democrats.80 
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The group aimed to act as an umbrella for different antisemitic groups which existed in the 
districts.  Whereas antisemites had often stood against each other in elections, they now 
began to organise and to spread propaganda in common.  One antisemitic pamphlet, 
prepared for the 1889 elections, was elaborate and well-produced, and carried a subtitle 
which claimed it made a contribution to ‘the characterisation of our opponents’.  The 
pamphlet was confident enough to describe as famous the leaders of the anti-liberal 
movement, which it recognised was also known as the antisemitic movement, as well as the 
United Christians. 81  At a second curia election gathering of 1889 in the Alsergrund district, 
antisemitic cries rang out.  Candidates standing in the second curia described themselves as 
‘antisemites’ or members of the ‘United Christians’.82  By 1889, about thirty ‘anti-liberal’ 
members were sitting on the Vienna City Council.83  1889 was also the year that Karl Lueger 
formally broke from the liberals, after he addressed an antisemitic gathering, in the presence 
of Karl von Vogelsang, editor of the antisemitic newspaper, Vaterland.  Vogelsang 
recognised Lueger as the leader the Christian Social movement needed to bring its disparate 
groups together.84  
Friedrich Funder later described the appeal of the Christian Social movement as being 
initially that of a broad movement of those forced down by the new conditions which 
‘liberalism had created in the capital’.  Craftsmen of all kinds could now barely make a 
living.  They had poor homes and workplaces.  This was why, he believed: 
‘A people tormented by the bitterest need raised itself and directed its gaze 
with hope towards men who had put themselves at the head of a struggle 
against the ‘arch enemy’, the economic and social oppressor, liberalism’.85  
This was also a people who may have been bourgeois, but who had previously been outside 
of politics, and who now found nothing for them in liberal values.  They looked back to a 
‘corporate and feudal view of the world’, where Guilds and regulations had protected them 
and their families.  The great disappointment for these people, as loyal Catholics, was that 
the Church did not engage with these issues to help them.  The Christian Social movement 
rose in Vienna, therefore, in opposition to the official line of the Church, creating a conflict 
between older Catholic Conservatives and younger Christian Socials.86 
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Antisemitism and anti-liberalism were aspects which helped to create a bond between the 
disparate groups and individuals that came to it, but they were not the only factors.  Whether 
they were Pan-German or Christian Social, those on the Right could point to shared 
traditional bourgeois values of civic responsibility, self-reliance, and aid for the deserving.  
They were involved, as will be seen, in charitable and voluntary groups, where these values 
could be put into practice.  This was why the antisemites could line up, in the 1890s, as the 
Bürgerklub.  They were as bourgeois as their liberal opponents, but in different ways.  From 
his estate in Lower Austria, Schönerer could display patriarchal values that were not all that 
different from the power of patronage that Lueger would later exercise as Mayor of 
Vienna.87  Whether Catholic or Protestant, those under the banner of the Bürgerklub could 
unite for the promotion of a Christian Vienna, underpinned by German values.   
What ‘German values’ meant could not always be agreed.  As a young man, on resigning 
from a reading society that had turned from Austria to Prussia for its leadership, Lueger had 
claimed: ‘If you cut me, you’ll find black and yellow’.88  This was used against him, when 
Schönerer and his allies taunted Lueger that he could not sleep without the Habsburg black 
and yellow colours over his bed.89  Behind the taunting was a serious point.  Contemporary 
observers noted that when Lueger was in control of Vienna City Council he ‘made loyalty to 
the Emperor part of the City’s municipal administration’.90  Pan-Germans who disagreed 
with this loyalty might find themselves disadvantaged so, although certain values brought 
the various strands of the United Christians or the Bürgerklub together, others drove them 
apart.  Apart from the many positions that might be adopted on the future of the Germans in 
terms of the state or states to which they might belong, anticlericalism was another area of 
dispute.  Antisemitism was a way to bring these factions together, as a lowest common 
denominator. Antisemitism might be genuinely felt by many within these groupings, but 
others might see in it the opportunity for practical politics against a common enemy.  
Whether Karl Lueger, for instance, was an opportunistic antisemite or one out of conviction 
has been much debated.91  
By 1890, Schönerer had served his sentence and was free, but his chances of leading a 
unified antisemitic movement had gone.  After his release from prison, it seemed as if he had 
resumed ‘business as usual’.  He was seen visiting addresses in the Vienna suburbs, or 
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dining at the Hotel Sacher.92  His followers drew up petitions, calling for support for the 
return of his political rights and his title.  Labels with the words ‘Hoch Schönerer’ were 
produced to add to envelopes, to raise the visibility of this campaign.  Pre-printed postcards 
invited people to pro-Schönerer meetings, but this was all surface activity and Schönerer’s 
chance, if had ever had one, had passed.93  Schönerer was treated as a loose cannon in those 
parts of antisemitic circles where at least the appearance of respectability was important.94   
Antisemitic activities continued throughout the year.  In October 1890, more than one 
hundred antisemites were reported to be gathering in the Hernals district, although the 
purpose of the gathering is not recorded.95  Rumours circulated of an antisemitic conference 
being planned for later in 1890, although police intelligence initially turned up nothing 
concrete.96  The scarcity of information reaching the police may have been because of a lack 
of detailed preparation by those meant to be organising the conference.  This was delayed 
several times, until it was eventually planned for 15th November but, because of disruption 
to travel caused by bad weather, the conference was held back for two more days.  At this 
point, the Hungarian antisemite Baron von Onody, who was billed as a guest speaker, turned 
up but did not wait the two days before returning to Budapest.97   
The organisers of the event struggled on.  Several large gatherings that had been planned to 
take place throughout the city were turned into one central gathering, but even then 
attendance was sparse.  Reports talk of ‘Christian MPs’ like Ernst Vergani being there, 
alongside representatives of the Christian Social Party, three years before the generally 
accepted date of the party’s foundation.98  The agenda included discussion of plans for a 
further extension of the City, by joining the suburbs to Vienna.  This seems not to have been 
sufficient to attract people to the meeting.99  Again, in terms of relative attention, the police 
were more concerned with a Socialist gathering of the same month.100 
In October 1890, the Deutsches Volksblatt made appeals not to split the ‘Christian and 
German’ antisemitic vote in elections to the Reichsrat, calling for a united front against the 
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liberals.101  Even at this early stage, however, antisemites who were gaining seats were 
mainly of the Christian Social, pro-Habsburg kind, and Lueger was increasingly secure as 
leader of the majority of antisemites.  For instance, Vergani’s brand of Pan-German 
antisemitism still had supporters in Vienna, but Vergani’s status was increasingly secondary 
to that of Lueger in the Christian Social movement.102  
Yet the antisemites as a whole were challenging the liberals and, by 1891, the liberals were 
losing their hold on Vienna city council.  Some of their core voters, employees of the City, 
were crossing over to the antisemites, after broken liberal promises on raising salaries.  The 
antisemites now made this offer.103  The 1891 Spring elections to the city council gave the 
liberals 69.6% of seats to 30.4% for the Bürgerklub.104  Yet the liberals won only because 
the electoral system favoured the higher curia, and the number of seats did not reflect the 
number of votes.105  This was the last time the liberals enjoyed this advantage from the curial 
system.  The City Council was undergoing a major expansion, this time beyond the Gurtel.  
In 1892, the suburbs beyond this limit were brought into the city, giving Vienna twenty-one 
districts and, by and large, the electorates of these districts were weighted towards the lower 
curiae where, in general, the antisemites were finding their greatest support.106  The 
imbalances of the curial system had shifted in favour of the antisemites. 
The 1890s were a decade when violence at times hit Vienna hard.  In 1890, workers had 
taken to the streets to riot against high food prices.107  In June 1892, Pan-German 
sympathisers also caused near riots.108  The occasion was the wedding in Vienna of Otto von 
Bismarck’s son, Herbert.  When Herbert and his father arrived by rail, for his marriage to the 
Countess of Hoyos, huge crowds had gathered, making up an informal wedding procession, 
but in reality mostly having come to cheer his father.109  Shouts expressing German 
solidarity went up from the crowds.  Prominent among those cheering the Bismarcks were 
students from the University.  Some of their number were arrested when fighting broke out, 
and mounted police used batons to keep the crowd under control.   
                                                      
101 Deutsches Volksblatt, 4th October 1890, available in ABPD 1890 St3.  
102 Pulzer, Political Antisemitism, pp.171-172.  
103 Boyer, Political Radicalism, pp.350-354. 
104 Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 1, p.600. 
105 Pulzer, Political Antisemitism, pp.168-169. 
106 Pulzer, Political Antisemitism, p.172.  
107 Boyer, Political Radicalism, pp.231-232. 
108 ABPD 1892 St1, 22nd June 1892. 
109 ABPD Studenten 1. Numerous reports around 20th June 1892. 
  
  Page 105 of 272 
Violence was not just the preserve of youth, however.110  Hermann Roys, a 42-year old 
painter from the Währing district, claimed that he had set off from home with a friend, in the 
hope of ‘catching a glimpse of Prince Bismarck on his arrival in Vienna’.  After Bismarck’s 
arrival, Roys had tried to navigate his way home through the heart of the city, but he had 
become caught up in the crowds that formed from a series of police blockades.  Turning 
from one street to the next, Roys found these crowds rowdier and denser, and the police 
precautions sterner.  Carried along in the general confusion, Roys eventually found himself 
at the front of a crowd that was blocked by contingents of police from the front and from the 
rear.  One police contingent had drawn sabres.  It is unclear what sparked trouble, but when 
Roys dropped his hat and attempted to retrieve it he was struck by several blows to the head.  
It was only with the help of a number of strangers that Roys was able to receive treatment at 
a nearby pharmacy and then make his way to a police station to register a complaint.111  
Roys would not have been alone in receiving this manhandling from the police.  Despite 
this, Bismarck’s visit must have raised Pan-German spirits.  In a clear endorsement of those 
with Pan-German sympathies, Herbert Bismarck visited the Pan-German MP, Karl Wolf.112   
Wolf later challenged the Cisleithanian Prime Minister, Badeni, to a duel, which made 
headlines, but it won neither power nor influence.113  Winning power and influence was 
something which, instead, Christian Socials were steadily doing.  They built up their 
organisation and used, for instance, the institutions and patronage of the Viennese suburban 
district councils, some of which they now controlled as part of the broad antisemitic 
movement, to enhance their position.114  Christian Social leaders distanced themselves from 
the more radical aspects of their Pan-German allies, but they also kept an eye on people in 
their own ranks.   
Ernst Schneider earned no rebukes from leading Christian Social figures for suggesting that 
author and cleric August Rohling, who had accused Jews of the ritual murder of Christian 
children, should be invited to stand as MP in Lower Austria.115  Some, however, were ready 
to ditch Schneider, because of his association with the ‘revolutionary’ wing of the party.116  
Ludwig Psenner, who had helped persuade Karl Lueger into the movement, gave ferociously 
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antisemitic speeches.  He talked of the Jew as a plague bacillus that infected Europe, 
multiplying itself in the cities of Germany and the Habsburg lands, despite the best efforts of 
the ‘indigenous’ people to eradicate it.117  He, too, was gradually marginalised within the 
Christian Social Party, not because of this language, but because his approach did not match 
the ‘respectability’ the Party wanted to project.  
The Christian Socials repeatedly stated that they wanted to work within the system, and were 
different from Schönerer, who wanted to overthrow it, an approach that was paying off.  
Some who might earlier have willingly been seen with Schönerer were turning away from 
him.  The gymnastics association Ottakringer Turnverein was investigated in late 1893 after 
reports that Schönerer had met members of the group in an Ottakring inn.  Members of the 
committee vigorously denied this, saying that no such meeting had occurred and, besides, 
the committee members had been away from Vienna on business at the time.  The gist of the 
matter seems to have been that Schönerer and members of the group had been in the inn at 
the reported time, but there had been no formal meeting.118   
Regardless of what had really happened, that the committee members distanced themselves 
from Schönerer is striking.  Members of gymnastics associations such as the Ottakringer 
Turnverein were often prominent supporters of radical German ideas.  Rooted in politics, 
some gymnastics associations were now declaring that Jews were no longer welcome as 
members.  Some associations were going so far as to declare themselves to be German, not 
German-Austrian.  In this, associations mirrored the split between Habsburg loyalist and 
German Nationalist branches of the antisemitic political movement.119  
Christian Social Victory In Vienna 
Political change had been coming for some time, both locally and nationality and, in 1893, 
after fourteen years as Prime Minister of Cisleithania, Count Taaffe resigned, to be replaced 
by a coalition of clericals, Poles, and German liberals, who finally returned to government.  
The government was troubled, and limped on only as far as 1895.120  In Vienna, elections to 
the City Council were held in Spring 1895.  The result gave 53 seats to the liberals and 46 to 
the antisemites.121  Further elections took place in September 1895, from which the 
antisemites, predominantly the Christian Socials, secured a narrow majority. Nevertheless, 
the victory of the antisemites in 1895 was incomplete.  The delight of Father Ignaz Aumann 
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of St. Laurenz-Gertrud, that the liberals had been ‘shot through’ in these communal 
elections, thanks to the ‘efforts and magnificent agitation’ of Lueger, was tempered by a 
major disappointment.122  The Emperor, appalled by the antisemitism of the Christian 
Socials, had not given his approval of Lueger as Mayor.  Instead of Lueger, his deputy, Josef 
Strobach, was appointed as Mayor.  Lueger would have to wait two more years, and go 
through much political manoeuvring, before he finally took up office.123  However, Vienna’s 
antisemites had few grounds for complaint as to how they were treated.  The Hungarian 
government at this time clamped down heavily on antisemitic activities and antisemites 
found little success.  Perhaps significantly, too, the Hungarian franchise was even more 
highly restricted than that in Austria, and the electoral system was heavily bent to favour the 
liberal, Magyar establishment.  The kind of constituency that nursed the economic 
grievances and which formed the bedrock of antisemitic support in Vienna was unavailable 
to antisemites in Budapest.124 
The Christian Socials would not relinquish control of the city until after the First World 
War.125  This lengthy hold on power could suggest that the Christian Socials commanded a 
popular mandate in the city.  The reality is that the combination of the highly restricted 
franchise and the curial system gave the Christian Socials an unfair advantage.  The 
Christian Social Party never held the support of anything like a majority of the adult 
population.  In 1900, for instance, the population of Vienna was a little over 1.6 million, but 
there were fewer than a quarter of a million eligible voters.126  The franchise had been 
extended far enough for the Christian Socials to reach out to the lower middle classes, 
allowing them to overcome the liberals among the bourgeoisie, but it had not yet been 
extended to the working classes, where the Social Democrats found their support.   
Summary 
This chapter has shown that the rise of the antisemitic movement at the local level in Vienna 
was made possible by a combination of circumstances in which they found themselves and 
conditions they helped to create.  The liberals, who had run the city since the 1860s, lacked a 
central organisation.  They were a collection of factions, rather than a party.  They were also, 
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at the national level, beginning to move apart from each other over questions such as 
economic intervention by the state and the importance of the nationalities question.  Unable 
to mount a challenge to the Conservative Taaffe government, they failed to adapt to new 
political realities, including a new electorate.  Some liberals followed a path of increasing 
the nationalist content of their programmes. 
In Vienna, a bourgeois, but decidedly anti-liberal movement grew up.  This  included former 
liberals and bourgeois who were pursuing their own interests, such as city employees, 
looking for a party that would give them what they considered their fair rewards.  This 
movement was, initially, based around groups such as German nationalists and Catholic 
Habsburg loyalists, who had previously been opponents, who came together under the 
umbrella of associations such as the United Christians, on an antisemitic and anti-liberal 
ticket.  They came together under a banner of antisemitism, as a lowest common 
denominator.   They shared some values, but were divided by others.  They combined 
economic interest and antisemitism to gain support among those who could vote under the 
franchise of the 1880s and 1890s.  Tensions between various streams of this antisemitic 
movement never completely eased and, even as they took power, splits emerged.  The 
Christian Socials, better organised, were in place to take advantage of these splits.  Yet, the 
two groups did not really form separate camps, except in as much as the restricted franchise 
kept out the Social Democrats and allowed feuds between German nationalists and Christian 
Socials to be feuds within a family.  Once the Social Democrats were able to compete freely, 
in the First Republic, German nationalists and Christian Socials would come back together 
against the common enemy. 
The antisemitic movement had succeeded in making antisemitism a source of debate about 
how policies should be constructed, and for whose benefit.  The liberal era of tolerance and 
equality, even if assimilation was understood to be how to achieve it, was being rejected.  In 
terms that ranged from religious to racial antisemitism, it was becoming, perhaps had 
become, acceptable to discuss in some circles the reasons for excluding fellow citizens.  This 
was a significant first step towards a path that might lead to forcible exclusion, or worse.  
Chapter 5 now shows how some people on the ground were spreading messages of 
exclusion. 
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CHAPTER 5:  POLITICS IN THE PARISHES 
This chapter continues to analyse developments in the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
by considering certain priests who were involved in shaping politics in Vienna.  It examines 
their very practical role in building the Christian Social movement, in order to provide a 
deeper understanding of how the antisemitic message was spread so successfully.  The 
antisemitic message would have hit a chord with those looking for scapegoats for their 
circumstances or their fears, but without the priests as a capable and experienced cadre of 
propagandists, it would have been more difficult for the antisemitic movement to succeed.   
These priests provide prime examples of how organisation and persistence, from a dedicated 
set of activists, can further an ideology.  This is not to say that priests were alone in this 
work, but they helped to lay the foundations for the exclusionary ways in which many 
people would come to see the world.  This chapter looks in particular at three priests who, in 
different ways, were connected with the Christian Social movement from its early days.  The 
chapter goes a little beyond 1896, to complete part of the story of one of these priests, Father 
Adam Latschka.  Another of these priests, Father Deckert of Weinhaus has already been 
encountered, but the chapter begins with Father Carl Dittrich of Ottakring.   
Father Dittrich At Ottakring 
In the same year, 1874, that Deckert was appointed to Weinhaus, Father Carl Dittrich, 
something of a high flyer in the Church, took over the parish of Ottakring.  In March 1882, 
as rector of the Knabenseminar he had given a speech to the Joseph of Aramathea Society in 
Vienna, in the presence of the archbishop and other high ranking clergy.1  Dittrich described 
the nineteenth century as an ‘age of discoveries’, but one characterised by social misery.  
According to Dittrich, governments no longer understood the rights and demands of the 
people.  He condemned the secularising actions of the State against the Church, calling for a 
response from that other feature of the age, the public association.  This was an age in which 
associations were ‘shooting up like mushrooms’, and he believed that Catholic associations 
should multiply and turn their power on the State.2  
During the 1860s, Dittrich had been associated with the antisemitic Kirchenzeitung, but it is 
not known if he was actively involved at that time in electoral campaigning against the 
liberals.  His Ottakring Chronik entries for the election years of 1879 and 1882 show no 
more than a list of successful candidates, but this may have been because Dittrich did not 
want to record the success of the liberals.  The 1887 Chronik entry is not by Dittrich, but by 
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one of his curates, Father Haberl.  This entry shows that Dittrich was certainly involved 
directly in the elections of that year, as the local Bürgermeister had complained that the 
election had seen clerical involvement.3  Haberl agreed that this involvement had been 
‘vigorous’, and also noted that the campaign had seen the participation of the Christian 
Social Union, an umbrella group for Catholic organisations, but this had been 
‘unsuccessful’.4  Two local businessmen, had stood for the Christian Socials but ‘had fallen’.  
Haberl explained to the Bürgermeister that he personally had made no political efforts in the 
nine years he had been at the parish.  He did, however, record that Dittrich had tried to rally 
opponents of the liberals, mainly by having the women of his parish organise social 
gatherings where they, along with Father Dittrich, could persuade male voters to oppose the 
liberals.5 
Haberl’s comments about his own involvement are perhaps disingenuous.  He complains 
that one liberal candidate for the office of Bürgermeister, Herr Dick, was unworthy of the 
office, especially as Dick had tried to cajole Gemeinde officials and workers to vote for him.  
While Haberl may not have taken part in active anti-liberal campaigning, he would likely 
have made his views on politics known to his parishioners.  Haberl’s comments about the 
ability of the Christian Social Union to mount a presence in Ottakring suggest that it was 
already rooted in previous organisations in the area, as it was in March of that year that the 
organisation was founded, by Fathers Abel and Latschka.6  As Haberl records, however, 
‘these efforts were in vain’.  He notes: ‘Who is not with me is against me.  We could not 
prevent our opponents from succeeding in the elections to the communal council’.7 
Despite this setback, the priests at Ottakring were prominent figures.  In September 1888, for 
example, the priests led around 4,000 people in a pilgrimage to Mariabrunn.  This was part 
of a wider pattern of pilgrimage activity.  Adelheid Popp, who would later become a leading 
Social Democrat, related how she had fallen under the spell of antisemitic priests in her early 
teens, around 1880.8  She describes how, on pilgrimages and at masses, priests described 
Jews as a threat to the ‘normal’ life of Vienna.  At the urging of her priests, the young Popp 
distributed propaganda, and tried to dissuade friends from buying from Jewish shops.  It was 
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only as she moved away from the influence of the Church, reached adulthood and became a 
member of the Social Democratic movement that Popp rejected antisemitism.9   
In 1889, Father Dittrich was ‘removed from office’ at Ottakring, as the result of a scandal 
where his assistants had been overcharging for Church ceremonies, such as weddings and 
funerals.10  Dittrich was not involved in the scandal, but he had failed to manage his staff.  
His successor, Father Wilhelm Pokorny, inherited a parish that was being subjected to long-
term change from the wider world.  In 1892, the commune of Ottakring, along with the 
commune and parish of Neulerchenfeld and other areas nearby, became part of the new 
district of Ottakring, absorbed into the City of Vienna.  The population of this district had 
grown by 24,000 in the decade to 1891, to more than 61,000.  Of this population, 58,324 
were Catholics.  2,365 were Jews.11   
By now, as Dittrich had hoped, the number of associations that looked to the Church as a 
sponsor or a source of authority, had grown.  This had been a long-term process, but by the 
1890s these associations had become a part of daily life.  In 1893, Pokorny attended a dinner 
to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Ottakring Volunteer Fire Brigade.12  In 1895, 
a shelter for the homeless was founded in Ottakring, with the Archduchess Valerie as its 
sponsor.  In the same year, a charitable hospital also opened, sponsored by Princess 
Wilhelmine, and under the spiritual care of the church at Ottakring.13  These organisations 
provided ways for people to meet and to express views with people who shared them.  They 
gave opportunities for people to demonstrate their commitment to the community, and to be 
seen to be doing so.  Pokorny did not, however, enjoy these associations for as long as he 
might.  In 1897, he too was caught up in allegations of financial wrong-doing, and he 
resigned.14  His replacement at Ottakring was Father Adam Latschka.  
Father Latschka  
Adam Latschka had been born in 1847 to a poor farming family in Lower Austria.  His first 
permanent appointment was as curate at the parish of Perchtoldsdorf, not far outside Vienna.  
This was a parish in a state of spiritual disrepair when he arrived.  Church attendance was 
mostly limited to the old, with many people attending only on major feast days or for 
baptisms, weddings or funerals.  Latschka set about changing this, by bringing in Jesuits for 
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missionary work.  He undertook visits to parishioners who did not attend mass.  He 
organised prayer meetings, and he arranged work for the unemployed.  In so doing, Latschka 
achieved his major goal: he revived church attendance at Perchtoldsdorf, where he stayed for 
eight years, until 1880, when he took a junior post at the prestigious Votivkirche in Vienna.15   
Latschka occupied this post for seventeen years.  Although this role proved to be 
undemanding for a man of energy, it allowed Latschka to undertake social-cum-missionary 
work among the growing number of factory workers in the city.16  He was heavily involved 
in a campaign to improve conditions for the largely female workers at the Rosenau tobacco 
factory, in the Alsergrund district.  When the factory moved to new premises in Ottakring, 
Latschka was again involved, helping to ensure adequate facilities for personal hygiene and 
health.  The factory was a substantial structure, built between 1893 and 1898, and spread 
over twenty thousand square metres.  The factory hall was four to six metres high, giving 
good ventilation.17  In his involvement in the building of the factory, Latschka was a priest 
who recognised the importance of practical considerations.  The practical and the religious 
mixed together when he became one of the founders of a Catholic working women’s 
association.18  
By this time, Latschka had also become directly involved in politics, as had other priests.19  
He was co-founder of a group known as the Christian Social Union, successor to the by now 
defunct Reformverein.20  Then, in 1889, Latschka was elected to the Vienna City Council for 
the Alsergrund district.  He was by now something of a public figure, with the police 
recording his attendance at a public meeting of antisemites in Alsergrund in 1890.21  
Through the United Christians he rubbed shoulders with prominent politicians, including 
Lueger.  He was busily involved in several associations and was a writer on religious 
matters.22  So it is surprising that Latschka then decided to leave the Votivkirche and to take 
on a busy parish, as he did when he took over the parish of Ottakring, in 1897.   
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It has been suggested that Latschka and other antisemitic priests carried out their activities 
despite the disapproval of their superiors.23  After all, the Austrian bishops had tried, but 
failed, to obtain ‘… a papal condemnation of the Christian Social movement from Pope Leo 
XIII’.24  Latschka seems not to have been aware of any disapproval, nor does it seem he was 
part of a group of priests who disobeyed orders from a ‘remote’ hierarchy.25  His letter of 
application for the post at Ottakring seems instead to reveal his confidence in his relations 
with at least some of this hierarchy.26   
In this application, Latschka talks of his work with Catholic working women’s organisations 
and of his literary achievements.  He draws attention to his political involvement, and hopes 
that this will find favour from those making the appointment.  His activities certainly had no 
negative effect, as Latschka beat fifteen other applicants for the post.27  One of these 
applicants, Father Johannes Pax, who did eventually take the parish at Ottakring, wrote of 
how he had failed to win the job, despite his excellent references and testimonials, to a 
curate who was three years his junior.  Pax, for one, did not see the upper hierarchy treating 
Latschka as a rogue antisemitic priest.28   
By 1899, as a result of population growth, the parish of Ottakring had a huge number of 
parishioners.  It was therefore split into two parishes.  Ottakring was re-named Alt-
Ottakring, and a parish was created based on a brand new church at Neu-Ottakring.  
Latschka applied for this new church.  His application for this second parish is more humble 
than his application for the parish he now wanted to leave.  He admitted that he should not 
be applying after such a short time in his present post, and he wrote that he would 
understand if he was rejected, but Latschka was fortunate.  Some lay members exercised 
influence in the Church, so it was useful to him that the sponsor of the new church was 
Count Alois von Liechtenstein, an early and prominent supporter of the Christian Social 
movement.  Liechtenstein, a member of the Reichsrat and Landtag for constituencies which 
covered Ottakring, would have known Latschka.29  
A biography of Latschka draws heavily on his entries in the Chronik from Neu-Ottakring, 
his second parish in Ottakring.30  His 1899 entry has little to do with church affairs.  Instead, 
                                                      
23 Whiteside, Socialism, p.148. 
24 Boyer, Political Radicalism, p.348. 
25 Whiteside, Socialism, p.148. 
26 AEDW AOCor, 29th March 1897. 
27 AEDW AOCor 1897, list of applicants. 
28 The comments are in Pax’s 1899 application for the post.  AEDW AOCor 31st January1899.  
29 Boyer, Political Radicalism, pp.70-71.  
30 Loidl, Latschka, pp.6-12.  
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he wrote of the rise of the liberals and the emergence of the Christian Socials, as a response 
to the ‘threat’ from ‘the Jews’ towards ‘his people’.  Latschka conceded that the word 
‘Christian’ in United Christians had been intended as a term of exclusion.  Members were 
often only nominally Christian, but at least they were not Jewish.  Latschka is quite certain 
that the liberals fell because ‘the Jew’ was their Achilles heel.  He describes Jews as 
subjecting the ‘indigenous’ Christian people to robot, a term suggesting serfdom.31  The 
Neu-Ottakring Chronik is a near copy of the entry Latschka made at his previous parish at 
Alt-Ottakring, in 1897 but, among changes in the second Chronik, the alleged threat to 
‘Christian society’ is not from ‘the Jews’ but from ‘the Jew’, a much more personal threat.  
The word robot did not appear in the earlier Chronik.  By adding the term, Latschka creates 
a world where robot defines relationships between Christians and Jews.32  
Priests had many reasons for becoming involved in politics.  A desire to relieve social and 
economic problems was significant, as can be seen from Latschka’s involvement with 
charitable groups in Ottakring long before he was a priest there.  Antisemitism was a major 
motivation for Latschka, but this was not religious antisemitism based on blaming Jews for 
the death of Christ.  In a prayer book written by Latschka – and one that was widely used in 
education – in response to the question ‘Who killed my Saviour?’ Latschka was quite clear: 
‘Who else but I and my sins?’33  He did, however, indiscriminately blame all Jews for the 
economic and social problems that confronted Vienna, and his antisemitism was linked with 
his political fears and rooted in his perceptions of the modern world.34 
However, Latschka’s main motivation for becoming involved in politics was religious, and 
redemption was at the root of all he did.  He rejects the faith of earlier generations of clergy 
in the ability of the poor to redeem themselves.  In his view, the Church had to reach out to 
the poor, or their souls would be lost to ‘Godless Socialism’.35  The root of Latschka’s social 
and political involvement was therefore charitable endeavour with a bigger purpose.  This 
was why he worked extremely hard at each of his parishes to build his congregations.  
It has been said that, in Vienna, ‘serious Catholic politics simply did not exist until the late 
1880s and that at this point priests immediately became an appendage of Christian Social 
antisemitism’.36  An alternative view is that organised and serious Catholic politics became 
                                                      
31 AEDW NOCk, 1899 and Loidl, Latschka, p.7.  
32 AEDW AOCk, 1897; AEDW NOCk, 1899.  
33 Latschka, p.76. 
34 AEDW NOCk, 1899. 
35 AEDW AOCk, 1897. 
36 Boyer, Political Radicalism, p.143. 
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viable from the late 1880s because it built on the earlier activities of priests and Catholic 
societies in the districts.  Politics was not just concerned with the winning of votes, 
important as this may have been.  Politics was also about contacts and influence, and priests 
were adept at building these, through one-off events like pilgrimages and through their 
regular participation in social networks.  Groups like the Christian Social Union and the 
United Christians were important organisations that brought smaller groups together, but 
these groups pre-dated them.  It must not be forgotten, however, that other factors played a 
significant part in antisemitic success.  It is particularly the case that if the franchise had not 
been extended in the 1880s, antisemites would probably have been unable to find sufficient 
electoral support.  Nevertheless, as can be seen through the Chroniken or the memoirs of 
Adelheid Popp, priests were playing a part in organising group activities and propaganda 
before 1887.  These foundations provided a model for how the Christian Social movement 
could develop.  Priests did not become an appendage of the Christian Social movement.  
They used the movement to spread their closely linked spiritual and political messages. 
A powerful weapon to this end was the large-scale, public religious gathering.  Latschka 
goaded the Socialists by inviting priests who were known for the vehemence of their 
preaching to give open air sermons at his parish.37  These meetings were primarily religious 
in purpose, but must have had the flavour of a political rally.  Latschka himself was 
described as having used the harshest of antisemitic language, at some of the stormiest 
meetings in the suburbs.38  The transcripts of these particular sermons are not available, but 
the content of others given by these invited preachers is known.  These include those of 
Father Heinrich Abel, one of Latschka’s favourite guest speakers.   
In 1892, regular participants in a pilgrimage asked Abel to become involved in its 
organisation.39  He noted that the vast majority of pilgrims were women, 400 compared with 
40 men, so he threw himself into the work of using these pilgrimages to re-integrate back 
into the Church men who had left it.  He then turned to a tried an trusted method to gather 
recruits: the association.  Abel invited the male members of the Marianische 
Kaufmannskongregation, which had been founded in 1890, to spread the word among its 
members that an all-male pilgrimage was being started.40  Abel ordered that women were to 
‘stay at home’ when he led pilgrimages.41  He used a light touch, to avoid alienating 
                                                      
37 AEDW NOCk, 1899. 
38 NFP, 4th July 1905, p.10; Wiener Zeitung, hereafter WZ, 4th July 1905, p.4. 
39 Heinrich Abel, Pater Abel, S.J. und die Wiener Männerfahrten nach Maria-Hell, (Vienna: Marianische Kongregation der 
Kaufleute, 1907), Foreword. 
40 Abel, Wiener Männerfahrten, Foreword. 
41 Funder, Vom Gestern, p.111. 
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potential returnees to the Church.  For his first year in charge, a three day pilgrimage in 
1893, Abel arranged for rosaries and prayer books to be on sale for those who had none, but 
no one would be forced into praying or singing.42  He demanded only the observance of 
Sunday mass, fasting on holy days, and the taking of the sacraments at Easter.43  Abel 
records that eventually he was so successful that large male congregations joined evening 
gatherings at the Augustinerkirche in central Vienna, a few days before pilgrimages took 
place.  Six thousand were said to be present in 1899, despite an antisemitic rally at the 
Rathaus at the same time also attracting large crowds.44  Even allowing for exaggeration, the 
numbers must have been large.  Printings of Abel’s preaching ran to up to 20,000 copies.45   
Before the 1895 pilgrimage, Abel preached that the Jew was the new Turk; the Star of David 
the new crescent moon; that a new crusade was needed against the Jew.46  The language used 
was insistent.  Newspaper editor Moritz Szeps was called ‘Moses Szeps’, the press was the 
‘Jewish press’.  Abel preached loyalty to the Habsburg state.  He claimed his pilgrimages 
were for the peace and unity of all Christians in Austria, and that he had no quarrel with 
many members of Protestant churches.  This seems to have created fertile antisemitic 
ground.  Within a couple of years, special trains were booked for pilgrimages, and discounts 
obtained on block bookings for accommodation.47  Abel had used a combination of ploys to 
attract these men, from an appeal to those seeking all-male comradeship to an approach that 
would not embarrass those who had not been to church for some time.  He had chosen a 
proven way to spread the word, the association.  
For Abel, a clear hierarchy of nations existed.  Good German values should inform the 
Empire, but the ‘Aryans’, despite their differences, came from the same line: Slavs and 
Germans were cousins.  For him, the Jew was the problem, stirring up distrust between 
nations.  Jews were destroying the healthy diversity that national cultural differences gave 
the Empire.  The nations within the Empire would work together if it were not for the Jew.  
In a printed version of his speeches, Abel stated that people should approach their struggles 
in a ‘true German way’ rather than in the Jewish manner.  In Nancy Wingfield’s terms, Abel 
had set about ‘creating the other’, encouraging his audience to construct barriers between 
themselves, as those who belonged, and a Jewish other that was to be considered an alien 
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intrusion.48  Abel published these thoughts ‘with the approval of the Ordinariat of the Prince 
Archbishop of Vienna’.49  Despite the views that Abel expressed about Jews, Friedrich 
Funder considered Abel a ‘priestly renewer of religious life’, who possessed a 
‘magnanimous gentleness’.50   
Abel’s speech before the 1895 pilgrimage took place in the same year as the liberals lost 
control of Vienna, but his brand of Catholic antisemitism, with fidelity to the Empire and 
toleration of its Slavs as ‘fellow Aryans’, was not yet fully in charge of the City Council.  
The coalition that had defeated the liberals, the Bürgerklub, still contained a significant 
number of Pan-Germans, when Lueger set about consolidating his position.  Those with Pan-
German views who stayed within, or moved into, the Party were sidelined but, from their 
point of view, they were still in power.  Others found themselves up against the Christian 
Socials’ now powerful party organisation, and they frequently lost.  Christian Socials, for 
instance, made inroads into parts of Währing that had once been a nationalist stronghold.51 
It had become clear that the antisemite who wanted success in Viennese politics would have 
to follow a line of Habsburg loyalty, and align with the newly dominant force.  Former hard-
line Pan-Germans like Ernst Vergani turned to the Christian Socials to fend off the challenge 
from Schönerer and his allies.52  Robert Pattai had not long before barely disguised his 
anticlericalism, and he admitted he was no Christian Social, but he took Christian Social 
help.53  Latschka must have been delighted when he recorded in his Chronik that Pattai was, 
after the Christian Social victory, ‘speaking fluent Catholic like a bishop’.54 
Father Deckert At Weinhaus 
At Weinhaus, Father Joseph Deckert was a controversial figure.  Whatever the truth of 
stories of financial wrong-doing, in 1888 Deckert had sufficient funds for a lengthy visit to 
Rome.55  A decade later, he embarked on an even longer pilgrimage to the Holy Land.56  
Deckert’s self-belief was high.  In 1889, other priests alluded to the ‘tragic events’ at 
                                                      
48 Nancy M. Wingfield, ‘Introduction’, in Nancy M. Wingfield, ed., Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict And Nationalism In 
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50 Funder, Vom Gestern, p.110. 
51 Höbelt, p.101. 
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55 AEDW WeCk, 1888. 
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Mayerling after the death of Crown Prince Rudolf.57  Deckert was confident enough to 
describe Rudolf’s death as ‘suicide’.58  He turned his skills in oratory and writing to 
propagandistic effect.  Many speeches he gave in his parish were also published in booklet 
form.  In 1893, Deckert published speeches that he had given at Weinhaus to raise funds for 
Catholic theologian August Rohling, who was on trial for having accused Jews of 
committing ritual murder of Christian children.  In their titles and in the language they used, 
these speeches were violent, repetitive and built on stereotypes of Jews.59  They were 
designed to whip up the audience and to inspire a reaction from their targets.  Deckert 
records a series of talks, at an overflowing church, where he delighted at goading the ‘Jewish 
Press’.60   
It has been said that this should not be taken to indicate that large numbers of people were 
being reached, as the suburban churches of the time were relatively small.61  This is true, but 
the numbers should not be underestimated.  The speeches were often repeated over several 
evenings.  They were only part of a network of activities that took place in which priests 
participated.  Their audiences would have been from social classes that were relatively 
influential at the local level.  Deckert boasted of links with the antisemitic members of the 
local council management committee.62   
The metaphors in his pamphlets continued to hammer home messages about the ‘Jewish 
threat’, metaphors repeatedly used by other antisemites to put down layer upon layer of 
negative images of Jews.  Deckert, like Heinrich Abel, compared Jews to earlier Turkish 
threats to Vienna.63  He linked Jews with questions of work, wages and usury.64  Deckert 
engaged with the question of racial antisemitism, in an 1895 pamphlet dedicated to Lueger.65  
This was a response to a pamphlet from earlier that year, which had condemned racial 
antisemitism as un-Catholic.  The author had called for a new, non-antisemitic, Catholic 
people’s party.  In response, Deckert declared that he was glad the debate on racial 
antisemitism had been re-opened.  It gave him the opportunity to answer some Christian 
Social antisemites who were asking if they should join with the Pan-Germans, who were 
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exhibiting traces of racial antisemitism, or if they should instead join the Catholic 
Conservatives, who were not.  
Deckert attacked the Conservatives for claiming a monopoly on patriotism.  For Deckert, 
Christian Socials were at least as patriotic as Conservatives towards the Habsburg state.  
Deckert then proposed that racial antisemitism was a statement of fact, not necessarily racial 
hatred, as Jews had done nothing to elicit sympathy from the antisemites, nor had they done 
anything to lessen the ‘powerful antipathy’ that antisemites felt in their hearts towards them.  
In his view, a struggle was taking place against ‘Jewish domination’.66  The patriotism felt 
by Deckert and his allies set them against the Pan-German idea of union with Germany.  
Nevertheless, this did not mean that he and his supporters were less antisemitic than the Pan-
Germans.  ‘We too, therefore, are racial antisemites’.67  Deckert, like Latschka, seems to 
have enjoyed the favour of the Church.  In 1895, from Parliament, Count Windischgrätz 
called on the Ordinariat to take action against Deckert.  As was commented later, Deckert 
was able to maintain his antisemitic activities.68  
John Boyer has argued that in the Christian Social Union, founded in 1887, the clergy 
‘sacrificed religion for a mildly nationalist and secular antisemitism’ and expected other 
bourgeois groups to sacrifice anticlericalism in return.69  This may have been the case with 
some, but for the priests presented here religion remained at the heart of their political 
activity.  Politics was a means for them to protect the influence and power of the Church.  
Deckert and other priests supported visions that promoted strict hierarchies of the nations, 
including Jews.  This was not mildly nationalist.  Nor could the kind of antisemitism spread 
by the likes of Father Deckert or Father Abel be described as ‘secular’.  It covered a full 
range of hatreds of Jews.  
Boyer has also argued that, in 1887, the founders of the Christian Social Union took a 
‘gamble that antisemitic voters would tolerate Catholic priests as sub-leaders and 
agitators’.70  Priests in some parishes may have been satisfied with such a role, but some 
priests, such as Father Deckert, had by 1887 long established for themselves positions of 
influence and authority at the local level.  In public rallies, social work and pilgrimages, they 
were replicating methods that had been used successfully in other parts of Europe, such as 
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France and Germany.71  The priests of Vienna were exploiters of tried and trusted methods, 
and Christian Social politicians recognised the role the priests played in building the 
movement.  If, as has been stated, these politicians used Bezirk institutions to raise their 
influence, they also used them to reward their clerical activists.  In Grinzing, the district 
council bought and demolished buildings, including the old town hall, to free up space next 
to the church.  As the Grinzing Chronik records, the district council ‘showed itself to be very 
generous’.72 
Summary 
The involvement of priests in politics in this period demonstrates that informal political 
channels are an important means to propagate political messages.  This evidence is 
important as a demonstration of how priests were involved in politics, but the examples of 
other activities used here show how, in various ways, priests were involved in political 
activity at many levels, and used preaching at church services, public meetings, their 
writings and their social involvements, in order to develop networks along which an 
antisemitic message could be spread.  As John Boyer has written, apparently non-political 
activities, such as pilgrimages, were used.73  School children, who had not reached an adult 
awareness of the matter, were enlisted to spread propaganda.  In relentlessly hammering 
home their message, antisemitic priests were contributing to a change that was at least as 
profound as the replacement of the liberals by the Christian Socials in power on the Vienna 
City Council.   
Priests used antisemitism as a means of constructing ‘the other’, to distinguish between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’.  The likes of Father Abel portrayed Jews as completely foreign, alien to the 
‘normal’ order.  ‘Aryans’ were the ‘true’ indigenous people of the Empire, and Slavs and 
Germans were cousins.  However, ‘German values’ were to underpin the state, alongside 
those of Christianity.  In this respect, these priests were mixing a form of Pan-German 
cultural identity with a corrupted interpretation of a universal Christianity and Aryan 
brotherhood.  They were helping to change the language of politics and creating, for some, 
an orthodoxy, that defined identity and belonging by exclusion. 
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CHAPTER 6:  STATE, VOLK OR CLASS?  1896-1914 
One prominent, but overdsimplified, conceptualisation of politics among German speakers 
of Cisleithania is that of the ‘Three Camps’ (drei Lager).1  This model was originally applied 
to the First Republic but, by extension, can be applied to the last two decades or so of the 
Empire.  It proposes that Germans moved in three irreconcilable, rarely overlapping camps, 
as Christian Socials, Pan-Germans or Social Democrats, promoting loyalty to State, Volk or 
class respectively.  In this model, Cisleithanian politics was not about winning voters with a 
particular set of policies at a given election.  It was about persuading people to sign up for 
one camp for life.2  
According to the theory, parties represented their interest groups, and aimed to control the 
powerful state bureaucracy in order to be able to act on their behalf.3  Each of the camps was 
said to launch vicious attacks on their opponents, which created barriers that could not be 
lowered.  Certainly, Christian Socials and German nationalists fell out over ‘liberal’ issues 
of secularism, education, and where a German Austrian’s primary loyalties lay.  The 
Christian Social movement also ‘released a new characteristic into Viennese politics which, 
with the best will in the world, could not be subsumed under the collective term liberal.’4  
However, rather than being divided into two of the three camps, it is perhaps better to 
describe Christian Socials and German nationalists in Vienna as being two parts of the same 
camp, agreeing on many things, but divided over others.  At times, they came together as a 
bourgeois front against common enemies. 
The period begins with the Christian Social Party, alongside German Nationalist allies, as 
the leading contingent in a common antisemitic front, newly in control of Vienna, although 
the Christian Socials would soon have the upper hand in this front.  The party would now 
have to address how it might implement talk of acting against Jews and ‘Jewish Capitalism’. 
It would soon also have to address the dilemma of whether it existed on behalf of all of the 
so-called ‘indigenous’ Christian peoples of the Empire, or whether its priorities were to 
defend the Germans who made up its core support, if State and Volk came into conflict.  This 
chapter considers how successful Pan-Germans and Christian Socials were in their attempts 
to shape notions of identity and belonging.  The chapter ends in 1914, with preparations for 
war, and uncertainty as to the form Austria as a whole might be about to take. 
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The Pan-Germans In Vienna 
In March 1896, further electoral success consolidated the position of the Christian Social 
Party on Vienna City Council.  Liberal candidates were defeated and two thirds of successful 
Bürgerklub candidates were Christian Social, as opposed to German Nationalist.5  Christian 
Socials stressed their respectability, and proclaimed the party as a party of the Empire, a 
Reichspartei.6  In April 1897, these tactics yielded results, and Lueger was confirmed as 
Mayor of Vienna.7  In this month, too, Schönerer was back: after a break of nine years, he 
was re-elected to the Reichsrat.8  Several other Pan-Germans formed a group with him, but 
they were a small part of a highly fragmented political spectrum, which included parties that 
represented other varieties of German nationalism.9 
Out of the blue, the Cisleithanian First Minister, Count Badeni, presented the Pan-Germans 
with an opportunity to promote themselves as defenders of all things German in the Empire.  
Badeni had been appointed by the Emperor with the aim of winning support for his 
government in the Reichsrat.  Czech MPs, obstructing business in the hope of obtaining 
advantageous changes to laws regarding the use of the Czech language in Bohemia, formed 
a major obstacle to this aim.  Badeni, determined to make parliament a working institution, 
set course to make concessions to Czech demands.10 
The Badeni Language Ordinances, introduced in April 1897, aimed at giving Czech the 
same status as German inside the public services in Bohemia.11  By the terms of the decrees, 
all officials in Bohemia would be required to have a written and spoken command of 
German and Czech by July 1901.12  Such abilities were far more common among Czechs 
than Germans.  Going above Parliament, and aiming to avoid opposition from the German 
Parties – usually taken to mean the liberal and national German ‘Left’, from the 
Constitutional Party to the Deutsche Volkspartei, but not the likes of Schönerer’s 
Alldeutschen13 – he decreed the ordinances into existence.   
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A tremendous reaction exploded from many Germans, as a conflict over language rights in 
Bohemia came to be perceived as an attack on the rights of Germans in the Empire as a 
whole.  This reaction to the ordinances was not confined to  extremists.  The Neue Freie 
Presse, displaying the national side of its liberal character, turned against an ‘imposed 
settlement’.14  Riots by Germans erupted in major cities, first across Bohemia, then 
elsewhere in Cisleithania.15  Schönerer quickly made himself the central figure in opposition 
to the ordinances, obstructing business in parliament while simultaneously calling Germans 
onto the streets.  He portrayed any attempt by ‘German’ politicians at compromise, however 
limited, as a betrayal of the German people.  The government also made tactical mistakes, 
not the least of which was that the German parties had not been made fully aware of the 
extent of negotiations the government had held with the Czechs until the detail was 
announced via the press.  Badeni now tried to negotiate with the German parties.16  One by 
one, however, parties with a German base joined the opposition.  Even the Social 
Democrats, who favoured the ordinances, protested at the government’s handling of the 
matter.17  The Christian Socials, too, were rocked by this crisis.  Lueger, who originally 
underplayed the significance of the ordinances, came under pressure from some within his 
own party to oppose them.18  On 24th May, Lueger decided to side with the German parties, 
excluding Schönerer.19  
Riots eventually reached Vienna in November 1897, forcing Badeni’s resignation, and the   
eventual repeal of his language ordinances in 1899.20  Now, places with large Czech 
populations broke into violence, and martial law followed.21  Violence receded, but only 
gradually.  However, Badeni’s language ordinances had a long-term impact.  It has been said 
that they were a decisive turning point in the relationships between the nationalities of the 
Empire.22  This was so for the political class, although Pieter Judson has shown that not 
everyone, even on the ‘linguistic frontiers’, became involved in ‘national struggles’.23  
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Nevertheless, it is fair to say that, in formal politics during the Empire, the national element 
became the dominant element the longer time went on.24  
It would be easy to conclude that the Christian Socials had been ‘subject to the same crude 
pressures from Pan-Germanism as were the other German parties’.25  After all, however hard 
they might try, they were now seen as an essentially German party.26  However, their actions 
in 1897 were for the short term, and the longer term proves that for most, like the more 
moderate German nationalists, ‘Germanness’ ‘did not require the sterilisation of other 
national political movements and institutions for their own identity’.27  The Christian Socials 
would have preferred to play a long game, using a message of Christian unity to build 
bridges with Slavic parties where possible.  They had not been able to do so, for fear of 
seeing their support ebb away to the Pan-Germans.  
German nationalists of all shades, especially the Schönerians, now portrayed themselves as 
having prevented an Imperial government from betraying the Germans of the Empire.  They 
also portrayed themselves as the true protectors of German culture, especially as far as 
religion was concerned.  In April 1899, police noted the close connection that Schönerer was 
making between Protestantism and the German people, as he threw his weight behind the 
Los-von-Rom movement, an attempt at engineering mass conversions from Catholicism to 
Lutheranism.28  According to the reasoning behind Los-von-Rom, no ‘true’ German could 
also be loyal to the internationalist Catholic Church.29 
1899 saw considerable efforts in Vienna by those associated with Los-von-Rom.  Pan-
German meetings returned to the Sofiensaal.30  ‘Anti-Catholic’ pamphlets were widely 
distributed.31  There was even a novel called ‘Los-von-Rom’.32  Such efforts yielded small 
returns in the long term.  Historically, net conversions in Vienna to Lutheranism had run at 
between 500 to 1,000 a year.  After jumping to 6,385 in 1899, and peaking at 6,639 in 1901, 
net conversions fell to little more than 1,000 in 1910.33  In typical Schönerian manner, the 
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movement shot itself in the foot.  It used pastors from Germany as recruiting agents, and 
these pastors indulged in anti-Habsburg propaganda.  As a result, many were expelled by the 
authorities.34  The momentum from 1897 did give the German nationalists a boost.  In the 
national parliamentary elections of 1901 the pro-Schönerer tendency won 22 seats, a gain of 
14.35  Other less extreme German Nationalist groups, such as Steinwender’s Deutsche 
Volkspartei, which captured 41 seats, also made progress.36  However, little progress was 
made in the capital, with gains mainly away from Vienna.37   
In Vienna itself, the Christian Socials hounded the Nationalists.  Christian Socials repeatedly 
promoted a vision of being ‘good Germans, good Christians and good Austrians’.38  In 
Vienna, the Pan-Germans garnered sufficient support to make their presence felt, but not 
enough for real influence.  The national elections of 1901 gave them 40,000 votes.39  Given 
the highly restricted franchise, support would have been higher than the numbers who voted, 
but even an estimate of 50,000 supporters in Vienna in the pre-war period leaves the Pan-
Germans far behind the hundreds of thousands now mobilising behind the Social Democrats 
and the Christian Socials.40  After a brief surge, decline set in for overt German nationalists 
of all colours in Vienna.  In Lower Austria, once seen as a natural homeland, German 
nationalists lost ground massively to Christian Socials.41  In the 1907 national elections, 
Schönerer too was defeated heavily.42   
Some Pan-Germans, such as Josef Pommer, were astute as to what was needed for long-term 
success. Pommer believed, from experience, that formal politics was essential, but that 
societal life changed long-term attitudes, and ‘served... as the means of expression for a 
grounded Pan-German and antisemitic world view’.43  Pommer’s assessment of the 
importance of societal life was correct.  In 1906, 30,774 social or charitable associations 
existed in Cisleithania, with 3,544 in Vienna alone.44  These societies were significant 
politically.  As Peter Pulzer comments, after 1900 ‘parties played an increasingly smaller 
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and social or semi-political organizations a larger part in political antisemitism’.45  
Associations had become increasingly politicised, and acted as a means for political 
participation.46  The Social Democrats had a large and readily recognised network of 
associations.  Links between associations and the Christian Social Party, on the other hand, 
while looser and less obvious, did exist.47   
As a member of the student society Silesia, Pommer had helped to develop the 
Satisfaktionsverbot, under which gentile students who insulted Jews rejected demands from 
the insulted party for a duel, on the grounds that Jews were unworthy of satisfaction.48  In 
1897, Pommer was elected as MP for Celje, centre of language disputes between Germans 
and Slovenes.49  Pommer was also a leading performer of the Volkslied, the rural song that 
had been popularised in Vienna, and he attributed some of his success to singing groups, 
where communal singing promoted antisemitism almost subconsciously.  Yet the activities 
of the likes of Pommer ultimately came to little in Vienna for Pan-Germans.  Lueger 
marginalised German nationalists electorally as he purged the Bürgerklub.  German 
nationalists then regressed in Vienna in the new century.  
Christian Social Vienna 
Support for the Christian Social Party came mainly from white collar workers and those with 
small businesses.  It has been said that many who voted Christian Social did so out of fear of 
a changing world, since Christian Social rhetoric offered a vision of comfort, a promise to 
return ‘Christian society’ to its allegedly natural state, protected against its liberal Jewish 
enemies.50  In Ottakring around 1900, economic changes meant that some business owners 
were exposed to new competitors.  If these businesses failed against competition from new, 
larger scale producers, no state safety net would prevent their owners from slipping into 
poverty and into the proletariat.  Businesses that might have been under threat can be found 
in advertisements in Ottakring trade directories, for watchmakers and the manufacturers of 
                                                      
45 Pulzer, Political Antisemitism, p.182. 
46 Haas, Hans, ‘Politische, kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Gruppierungen in Westösterreich (Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Tirol, 
Vorarlberg)’ Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Vol. VIII: Die politische 
Öffentlichkeit, Part 1, Vereine, Parteien und Interessenverbände als Träger der politischen Partizipation, (Vienna: 
Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2006), pp.227-395. 
47 Werner Drobesch, ‘Vereine und Interessenverbände auf überregionaler (Cisleithaner) Ebene’, in Rumpler and Urbanitsch, 
eds., Habsburgermonarchie Vol. VIII, pp.1029-1132. 
48 Mochar-Kircher, p.79. 
49 Mochar-Kircher, pp.170-192; Sutter, Vol.1, pp.107-121; Sutter, Vol.2, p.46. 
50 Boyer, Catholic Priests, p.358.  
  
  Page 127 of 272 
leather uppers for shoes, or for glove manufacturers who sold their own products through 
their own stores in the district.51  
Bourgeois fears of the consequences of descent into the proletariat would have been 
heightened by the presence of workers who, each working day, ‘swarmed like ants’ through 
the narrow streets of Ottakring towards the factory district in Neubau.52  Social Democratic 
journalist Max Winter described proletarian life in Ottakring as a ‘panorama of misery’.53  
Everyday pursuits, such as work or the search for shelter, could take on tragic dimensions.  
Ottakring workers died of poisoning from the chemicals used in a horse hair factory.54  A 
homeless woman, aged 45, died of injuries incurred trying to find overnight shelter in the 
ovens at a local brickworks.55  People committed suicide rather than live with the pain of 
their illnesses.56  Vienna, though, was not exceptional.  In 1907, Winter was shocked by 
children running wild in London, in conditions far worse than those in any of Vienna’s 
proletarian suburbs.57  
Nevertheless, the extent of fear among the Christian Socials’ bourgeois support should not 
be over-stated.  Alongside those in businesses threatened by modern times others, such as 
Emeric Langsam, an installer of electrical lighting, embraced change.58  Ottakring’s inns and 
restaurants continued to flourish and described themselves repeatedly with three words: 
elegant, first-rate, bourgeois.59  Not all whose businesses failed would have given up without 
trying again.  Business owners were part of social networks which promoted self-reliance, 
active citizenship and Christian values.60 
Priests were often embedded in these networks, and clerical activity continued to be a 
principal means of developing support for the Christian Social view of the world.  Old 
school priests continued in the ways that had brought them to prominence.  Father Deckert 
unleashed a torrent of antisemitic pamphlets from Währing.61  His language was violent and 
aggressive, but other priests, too, used the same language and imagery.  According to Father 
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Josef Scheicher, a Christian Social MP, even international tensions were the fault of Jews, 
turning Aryan against Aryan.  The only solution, for the defence of the ‘German people’, 
was to return Vienna to the Viennese, Austria to Austrians.  Laws were needed regarding 
‘those who were and are foreign among us’.  The reference to Jews was clear.62  Scheicher, 
Deckert and other priests were not confined to the outer reaches of the Christian Social 
movement.  Scheicher was a prominent figure in the movement for over thirty years.63 
Father Deckert died in March 1901.64  His will shows a legacy of over 107,000 Crowns.65  
His legacy was not just financial, however, as he became a role model to hold up for 
admiration.66  Deckert was buried in the presence of the parish sponsor, Prince Czartorysky, 
Mayor Lueger and senior representatives of the Church.  While the burial of a priest was an 
occasion for the powerful to turn out, this was a consecration of Deckert and his views.  This 
is confirmed through the establishment of charities named after Deckert, and the description 
of Deckert by Father Joseph Pachmann, Deckert’s immediate successor, as a ‘true priest, full 
of living belief’.67 
On his death, in 1905, The Neue Freie Presse recognised Latschka’s importance in the 
development of Viennese politics and attitudes.68  It noted his significance in developing 
clerical associations in the districts, and how he was among the first in ‘mobilising women 
against liberalism’.  In his later years, he had stepped down from his seat on the Council, but 
he had continued his activities in the Viennese Christian Social associations.  Father 
Latschka left barely enough for his funeral costs, a regular mass to be said and small 
amounts of money for his immediate family, but he inspired a considerable legacy of 
loyalty.  On 3rd July 1905, a curate at his parish, Father Brunner, sent two letters to the 
Ordinariat.  In the first, he wrote that Father Latschka had died that morning.  In the second, 
which Brunner sent immediately after the first, he resigned as Spiritual Provisor for the 
parish, stating that he was unable to continue without the support of Latschka.69  
Latschka’s death allowed recent trends in Vienna finally to reach his parish.  A small, but 
noticeable, number of children of people from other faiths, or of no faith, were being 
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received into the Catholic Church.  This required permission from the Ordinariat and was 
requested through the parish where the ceremonies would take place.  No evidence was 
found that Latschka ever made such a request, although before Latschka’s death one of his 
curates did write to the Ordinariat for permission to baptise one child of a mixed marriage.70  
In the immediate period after Latschka’s death, however, the number of such baptisms at 
Neu-Ottakring rose.   One case was Wolf and Eugeny Szuran in late 1905.71  He was Jewish, 
she was Catholic.  As marriages across religious boundaries were not allowed, the only route 
for them to come together legitimately had been for one of them to de-register from their 
faith, as the law had required since 1868.72  They had married in 1900 and two children from 
this marriage had been baptised as Catholics.  They now wished the same for a third child.73  
Numerous requests also now came from people who wanted either to join or to return to the 
Church.74  For some, conversion was the fulfilment of an honest desire to cross into 
Catholicism.  Doubtless, changes were also made in order to fit in with the new Christian 
Social Vienna.  As the Christian Socials controlled the patronage of the city, Jews would 
find it difficult to progress in this branch of public service, perhaps even after conversion.75   
Yet, it has been said that Christian Social supporters were disappointed with the Party in 
power, and calls were made in the 1900s for the exercise of ‘authentic’ antisemitism.76  The 
Party may not have displayed a formal antisemitic façade, especially as it moved closer to 
being part of the Establishment, but its leaders practised exclusion, in their use of City power 
as patronage, and to enforce prejudice against Jews.77  Support for this conclusion comes 
from another small but noticeable trend that emerged after 1895, that of changing surname, 
away from names that might be perceived as Jewish in origin.  In 1895, the Ordinariat 
forwarded instructions to the church of Saint Rochus in the Landstrasse for such changes.78  
The Lower Austrian Statthalterei directed the Ordinariat to change the surname of one 
Heinrich Baruch to Krutter.79  Many other name changes followed.80  
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Changes in clerical antisemitic activity also occurred at this time, much of this being down 
to the taking of parishes by new generations of priests, who no longer felt the need to 
explain their cause.  They assumed that people would agree with their antisemitic viewpoint, 
which slips in casually, at the most routine opportunity, aiming to reinforce attitudes.  In 
1896, an outbreak of measles closed a school in the Grinzing area of the city.  The local 
priest recorded that the outbreak passed over Jews who were taking a summer break there.  
‘Antisemitic Grinzing’, as he termed it, had become a meeting place for the ‘shabbiest’ Jews 
of Vienna, because ‘the usual occupants are otherwise indisposed’.81  In Währing, Father 
Treml at St. Laurenz noted Lueger’s death in 1910, after long years of struggle against 
‘liberalism, the enemy of the people’.82  No attempt is made to explain why liberalism was 
the enemy of the people, nor to define ‘the people’.83 
By the turn of the century the Church was encouraging Catholics to take part in public life, 
as a means to protect the Church.  Some have identified this as part of a Catholic revival in 
the city dating back to the 1890s.84  This was certainly the decade when the revival became 
obvious, but the roots of revival go back at least to the 1860s, and the ‘importance of the 
1860s and 1870s in the development of political Catholicism in Austria has largely been lost 
because of the sharp focus on the Christian Social Party of the 1880s and 1890s’.85  Indeed, 
it was not just long term preparation that helped the success of this revival.  The 
breakthrough came then, but the roots of the revival also lay in the wide range of 
associations in which members of the movement were active.  
By 1900, singing groups remained extremely active.  Each district might have several, and 
some had been long established.  The author of a history of the bourgeois Ottakringer 
Liedertafel, which celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 1908, understood that, while singing 
was the primary activity of these groups, they had a wider significance.86  To him, singing 
groups were keepers of a tradition which sat at the heart of German values.87  The author 
argued that these groups were akin to the small objects held in a museum, which are ‘the 
most valuable indicator of the cultural condition of a people’.88  Over the years the 
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Ottakringer Liedertafel had several hundred members.  In 1908, it had 92 active members 
who participated in performances, mostly professionals and businessmen.89  Honorary 
members included current and past priests of Alt-Ottakring.90  Families were well integrated 
into membership, contradicting the argument that a generational revolt took place in Vienna 
around 1900.91  In 1908, the group included Rudolf Lehner and his three sons, all school 
teachers. 
The Liedertafel had ties with similarly minded singing groups and charitable organisations 
in Austria and abroad.92  Between 1860 and 1879, the group went from giving a handful of 
performances per year to fifteen performances per year.  The figures then went up in leaps 
and bounds.  Between 1901 and 1907 the group averaged 55 performances per year, 
including fourteen per year with other groups.  The bare statistics, however, do not tell the 
whole story of the networks in which the Liedertafel operated.  On 6th October 1898, the 
group performed at the dedication of the church at Neu-Ottakring, in the presence of Father 
Latschka and the church’s patron, Count Liechtenstein.  Also present was the Emperor.93   
Bourgeois groups and associations overlapped each other with considerable frequency.  The 
Ottakringer Liedertafel provided the entertainment as the Ottakring Volunteer Fire Brigade 
celebrated its 35th anniversary at a dinner in October 1903.  Elected representatives from the 
Bezirk and City councils, including Lueger, were present, and the evening finished with a 
great ‘Hoch’ to Franz Joseph.94  These volunteer fire brigades, and other voluntary groups, 
were much more than a means of protection.  They were a way for citizens to show they 
contributed to public life, as members of associations that were embedded in life in the 
districts.  Marches were even composed in honour of these associations that were embedded 
into social life in the districts.95  The silver wedding of the captain of the Ottakring Brigade 
gives evidence of this.  Karl Kantner and his wife arrived at church in Alt-Ottakring in 
October 1906 to find a surprise party.  Father Johannes Pax, Latchka’s successor as parish 
priest, greeted them at a church decorated for the occasion.96  Celebrations went on into the 
evening, spent at a café owned by one Franz Tichy, a member of the Ottakringer 
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Liedertafel.97  Eighty eight firemen attended.  Entertainment was provided by the 
Gesangsklub der Feuerwehr, under the direction of Karl Lehner, of the Liedertafel.   
In 1906, priests and members of bourgeois associations and business groups, with a 
considerable representation from Ottakring, gathered at large scale celebrations for the 
sixtieth birthday of Count Alois Liechtenstein, ‘benefactor’ of several Ottakring charities.  
These took place in Ottakring’s Richard-Wagner-Platz, in front of the newly-built and 
imposing Bezirk offices.98  This was a public demonstration of Christian Social power, in the 
manner of Lueger’s attendances at events to commemorate the founding of churches or 
schools.99  Lueger knew that a highly visible presence of leading Christian Socials was a 
means of demonstrating Christian Social control of power.100  Priests, highly visible 
representatives of a Christian Social vision of the world, repeated this tactic at local levels. 
Friedrich Funder later proposed that the movement owed its success to three men.  One was 
Lueger, representative of the Viennese bourgeois.101  The second was Prince Liechtenstein, 
an aristocrat who gave up his place among the Conservatives, winning for the fledgling 
movement the Hernals-Ottakring constituency of Vienna in 1891.102  The third was Heinrich 
Abel, a man capable of crude and earthy talk, but whose rhetoric could rouse an audience.  
According to Funder, the success of these men came from a ‘harmony’ that emerged from 
their very differences.103 
Aristocrats may not always have existed as figureheads of the party when it came to district 
level organisation, but two elements did exist: the party organiser and the priest.  As John 
Boyer has described, Christian Social Party strength lay in its district organisation, despite 
the sometimes chaotic atmosphere that local competing groups could create.104  Men like 
Anton Baumann, in Währing, chosen personally by Lueger, ran the Christian Socials with 
firmness and diligence.105  In the same district, at the parish of Weinhaus, he found support 
for Christian Social ideas from Father Deckert.  
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Conflict And Common Ground  
Christian Socials frequently highlighted the differences between themselves and Pan-
Germans.  One priest described the Pan-German Alldeutsche Tagblatt as a blasphemous, 
Prussian-weaned, atheistic Los-von-Rom sheet.106  Other priests, like Father Abel, took a 
similar line.  They favoured German culture, but vigorously opposed its expression in Pan-
German terms, especially when Protestantism was involved, and Pan-Germans and Christian 
Socials came into conflict in many areas.  Education was a major battle ground for the two 
camps, and Lueger was determined to control the schools.107  Speaking to the Lower 
Austrian assembly in December 1904, Lueger proclaimed that ‘… teachers who instruct our 
children must be of good Austrian, good German, and Christian disposition…. Others cannot 
and will not be tolerated’.108  All who took up residence in Vienna, including Slavs, were 
required by the Christian Social administration to swear an oath to protect the German 
character of the city.109  German nationalists complained that Lueger purged Pan-Germans 
from public employment.110  They may have claimed to be good Germans and good 
Christians, but for Lueger they were not good Austrians.  
This dispute over education was also part of a longer war over the role of the Catholic 
Church in the State, with German nationalists, with secularising ambitions, fearing an 
increase in the formal influence of the Church.  For instance, a brief revival of active 
anticlericalism broke out when clericals tried for the reintroduction of confessional schools 
around 1900.111  This may have seemed a permanent point of division.  As Lothar Höbelt 
indicates, the ‘German electorate’ divided over anticlericalism, a position set in Parliament 
from 1891, at a local level later.112  This is true, but Germans on the Right also found 
coalitions of convenience when necessary.   
Politicians and their supporters in the two antisemitic groups also often found common 
ground in the cultural sphere.  For instance, Josef Pommer’s Pan-Germanism and Karl 
Lueger’s Habsburg loyalties seem to put them at opposite ends of the antisemitic political 
spectrum.  Yet Lueger sent a message of congratulations to Pommer on the occasion of 
Pommer’s sixtieth birthday, in which he spoke of his joy that Pommer used folk song for the 
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‘benefit and piety of our German people’.113  Similarly, Richard von Kralik, a prominent 
music critic for the Christian Social Reichspost and playwright, was an ardent Habsburg 
supporter and a devout Catholic.114  Yet Kralik, like Lueger, was not isolated from Austrian 
antisemites who leant in a Pan-German direction.115  In 1913, Kralik was co-founder of the 
Christlich-Deutsche Volksbühne, a group for the promotion of ‘true Christian German 
values’, which reached out to all Germans.116 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the expression ‘Christian-German’ was 
becoming a Leitmotif that could be used by a broad spectrum of the political Right.  The 
Christlich-deutscher Turnverein, with which Kralik was later connected, was founded in 
Kleinmünchen, near Linz.117  The Währinger Turnverein, another gymnastics group, 
published the Mitteilungen des christlichen-deutschen Turnerbundes 1900.118  This use of 
‘Christian German’ sat alongside the use of the word ‘Aryan’ to give another common 
ground, that of language.  Kralik worked for the Kaiser-Franz Joseph-Jubiläums-Theater, 
founded in 1897 and soon nicknamed the ‘Aryan Theatre’, whose management boasted that 
no Jew could be found at the front or back of house.119  
Other expressions of German solidarity in daily activities were common, such as in the 
Ortsgruppe Ottakring des Bund der Deutschen in Niederösterreich.120  The local newspaper 
reported that a ‘pleasurable fund-raising event’ had been held by the group at an Ottakring 
restaurant, to collect clothes for needy children of German Austrian origin.  This lasted until 
dawn, with speeches, songs and raffles.  The naming of the group, its intention to distribute 
clothing to Austrian German children, show that in this world even charity could be 
segregated along national lines.121  
Christian Social Hegemony? 
Despite Christian Social electoral success in the city after 1895, Vienna in these years was 
not a place of total Christian Social dominance, nor was antisemitism dominant in all walks 
of life and in all sections of the population.  Antisemitism may have been everywhere, in 
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terms of the antisemites trying to spread their message everywhere, but they did not succeed 
everywhere.  Individuals and organisations did challenge the antisemitic message directly.  
One of these, the Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus, never grew beyond a few thousand 
members, but these included some of the most significant Viennese of the day.122  The 
association did not promote itself well.  Its newspaper, the Freies Blatt – Organ für Abwehr 
des Antisemitismus, was worthy but dull.  Any organisation that wanted to reach a mass 
audience needed to be far more street-wise and punchy in its communications than the 
Verein.123  The movement against the antisemites did receive support from one prominent 
source.  The Emperor described antisemitism as an ‘illness’ which was reaching the highest 
levels of society.124  Even the Emperor, however, could not put a lid on antisemitism. 
Antisemites would have hoped that electoral success from 1895 onwards was just the first 
stage in their take-over of political life in Vienna.  They would have been aiming to build 
their antisemitic ideology into a widely accepted orthodoxy, not just one that was accepted 
by their ‘natural’ constituency.  Christian Socials set about achieving the dominance of ideas 
by finding many avenues for the spreading propaganda, not just formal politics.  Gauging 
the success of this approach is difficult, and debate continues as to just how propaganda 
works and is received.125  It is possible to attempt to build a picture of prevailing attitudes by 
examining the evidence that is available from the popular culture of the time, but this 
evidence must be interpreted in its historical context, and not just taken at face value.  
One popular form of entertainment, variety theatre, featured acts combining music with 
jokes and comic sketches.  One of the most successful acts was the Budapester 
Orpheumsgesellschaft.126  First appearing in Vienna in 1889, the Orpheumsgesellschaft 
performed over the next thirty years.  An abiding feature of the Budapester was a routine 
that was ‘peppered with jokes about Jews... for the amusement of an audience that was, to a 
great extent, Jewish’, although many non-Jews were also in the audience.127  While the 
performers in the Budapester were Jewish, this did not save them from the wrath of Jewish 
members of the audience who grew tired of the Jewish stereotypes that were put in front of 
them.  Some accused the Budapester of playing into the hands of the antisemites, by 
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justifying antisemitic caricatures.  As one irate newspaper correspondent declared: ‘We want 
no seed bed for antisemitism in the Leopoldstadt’.128  
It should not be concluded that antisemitism was so widespread that even some Jews fell 
into the trap of repeating stereotypes unthinkingly.  The use of stereotypes may just as easily 
be self-parody on the part of performers.  It has correctly been written that, in ‘engaging 
with various forms of Viennese humour, one constantly runs into expressions concerning 
Jews that the modern reader can interpret incorrectly’.129  This is especially the case if no 
context is considered and only the comments themselves are examined.  To modern 
sensibilities, comments, jokes and songs with an apparently antisemitic flavour are rightly 
shocking, but they form only part of a view of the world based on multiple hierarchies of, 
among other things, race, nation, class, gender and religion.  The lyrics of songs with what is 
described as antisemitic content often also contain other views that modern sensibilities 
would find just as unacceptable.  Some people would have joined in with Jewish jokes in the 
same way they joined in with jokes about mothers-in-law or about fat, philandering 
businessmen, not through any antisemitic motive.130  Jokes about alleged ‘Jewish 
characteristics’ may now be considered repellent, but jokes from the period under 
consideration are not all to be taken as expressions of antisemitism as it is understood today.  
They were crude and simplified reflections of how the world seemed to be ordered.  
This ordering of the world is visible in different ways, such as at the American Bioscop 
cinema in Ottakring.131  Programmes were long and varied, showing everything from scenes 
of New York or Paris to the grotesquery of a ‘Cure For Ringworm’.  Yet these sometimes 
bland, sometimes distasteful, films also betray attitudes to life.  A filmed ‘ethnographic 
study’, entitled ‘In The Negro Village By The Congo’, drew on all the European clichés of 
African life, as it described the mass of village ‘natives’.  ‘In a colourful swirl, the negroes 
(sic) stream through the streets, to take part in one of their festivals’.   Ascribing to these 
‘natives’ an ‘incomparable skill’ at stripping palms for food, the image is one of foraging 
people who take food from nature, rather than by farming.  ‘The native uses his free time for 
dancing and games, which he greatly loves’.  This is comparable with antisemitic depictions 
of Jews as parasites who shun work and prefer to live at the expense of others.132  
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These images of the world of the white man (sic) as superior to those of others, yet with a 
hint of the threat that comes from these others, are repeated constantly.  In film of a world 
championship boxing match between Jack Johnson and Tommy Burns, the element of the 
fight that attracted most attention was that the challenger was the ‘huge Negro’ Johnson.133  
The programme declared that ‘the spectators place all hope in the white man’.  Burns stands 
against ‘the powerful Negro’.  When the judges declared Johnson the winner, ‘Burns, 
incensed over his defeat, refused the handshake of the Negro’ and left the ring.  No comment 
is passed on the unsporting behaviour of Burns.  Perhaps Johnson, like the Jews of Vienna, 
was not considered ‘worthy of satisfaction’. 
This world view categorised people not as individuals, but as members of racial or national 
groups with ascribed characteristics, but these late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
attitudes were not the views of everyone, otherwise racial supremacists, nationalists and 
antisemites would not have been trying so hard to convince and to recruit.  As has been 
shown elsewhere, nationalists were often deeply disappointed that their co-nationals did not 
display enthusiasm for nationalist doctrine.134  The same applied to antisemitism.  Pan-
German and Christian Social antisemitism provided a backdrop, but people who lived in this 
world, and who used casual insults or jokes which stressed the Jewish nature of their targets, 
may not have condoned antisemitism.  In behaving as they did, they were fitting in with how 
the world was portrayed to them.  This is not the same as antisemitism, as prejudice against 
Jews simply for being Jews.  This does not diminish the insidious and damaging nature of 
antisemitism, but it does help to identify where and when it occurred and where it did not.   
The notion that antisemitism was everywhere also reduces genuinely antisemitic comments 
and actions to nothing more than a general background noise, and can attribute antisemitism 
to groups and individuals who were not antisemitic.  One quarter that has been attacked as a 
source of antisemitism in Vienna is the Social Democratic Party, yet attacks on the Social 
Democrats often fail to distinguish between Socialism as an ideology, individual members 
and their attitudes, and the Party as a whole, especially its culture.  Some individuals within 
the party would have held views that were incompatible with the universalism of Socialism, 
but the culture of the Social Democratic Party was not a racist culture.  The leaders of the 
Party in Vienna have been attacked for failing to tackle antisemitism directly, but such 
attacks fail to take account of the belief of the leaders of the Party that antisemitism was a 
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secondary issue to the class struggle.  For them, the proposition that ‘The history of all 
hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’ held true.135   
Two main charges have been brought against the Social Democrats with respect to 
antisemitism.  The first is that the party did not attack antisemitism.  Yet, Social Democrats 
disrupted Christian Social rallies on numerous occasions.136  Father Adam Latschka recorded 
Social Democratic attacks on antisemitic public meetings.  Latschka claimed that Social 
Democratic attacks were so strongly mounted that they were counter-productive, in that they 
rallied antisemitic support.137   
The second charge is that the Social Democratic movement predated, and allowed itself to 
be infiltrated by, antisemitism.  The chronology, however, shows a different story.  One 
work, in a section headed ‘Antisemitism breaks into the Socialist ranks’, singles out a 
passage in the memoirs of Social Democrat Adelheid Popp, where Popp admits that she had 
engaged in antisemitic activities.138  This singling out, however, does not mention that Popp 
is clear that her involvement with antisemitism was restricted to her immature years, and that 
she had been encouraged by priests to boycott Jewish shops and to spread the antisemitic 
word.  Popp is perfectly clear that the Socialists opened her eyes to a number of questions 
apart from antisemitism, such as women’s emancipation.  She is also perfectly clear that the 
Social Democrats broke into antisemitic strongholds, not the other way around.139   
Sustainable evidence against the Social Democratic party as a party of institutional 
antisemitism is lacking.  One ‘Social Democratic’ writer, Christian Hinteregger, has been 
brought forward in an attempt to demonstrate that the relationship between the Social 
Democratic Party and Jews, from the 1890s into the inter-war period, was ‘problematic’.140  
Hinteregger’s pamphlet ‘The Jewish Swindle’ is used as the evidence to prove this.  Yet 
commentators who use this evidence in this way differ as to its meaning and significance.  
Bruce Pauley states that the pamphlet’s title is a pun, with the secondary meaning of ‘the 
swindle about the Jews’.141  It would be reasonable to conclude therefore that Pauley 
believes Hinteregger’s primary meaning is the swindle by the Jews.  Yet this misses the 
                                                      
135 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto Of The Communist Party, (Lodon: Verso, 1848, 1998 Edition, Eric Hobsbawm, 
ed.), p.34. 
136 See, for instance, ABPD 1893 St1, 12th September 1893.  
137 AEDW AOCk, 1897.  AEDW NOCk, 1899. 
138 Böck, Susanne ‘‘Kuhl bis ans Herz hinan’? Das ambivalente Verhältnis der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie zu den Juden, 
1890-1950’ p.272-283, in Klamper, ed.  See also Popp, pp.58-59. 
139 Popp, pp.67-70. 
140 Böck in Klamper, ed., p.276. 
141 Pauley, pp.142-143. 
  
  Page 139 of 272 
point behind Socialist propaganda that used images of rich Jews.  These people were rich 
and they were capitalists, which is why they were being attacked.  Socialists also argued that 
the real swindle in Christian Social antisemitism was that it aimed at fooling people into 
ignoring the real problems of society: the class system and economic relationships.  Over a 
long period, even newspapers that would have been expected to be supportive of a Christian 
Social agenda acknowledged the argument that the Christian Social Party attended to the 
interests of large scale capitalists, to the neglect of the petit bourgeois Christian rank and 
file.142   
The blanket case against the Social Democrats rests on a repeated gap between evidence and 
conclusions.  Another critic of the Social Democrats who cites Hinteregger concedes, in a 
footnote, that Hinteregger was probably a pseudonym.143  Attacks on ‘rich Jews’, ‘Jewish 
capitalists’, or even Zionists, are equated with antisemitism.144  These are not the same thing.  
The Socialists are condemned as being prepared to offer ‘at most’ spiritual and material help 
to poor Jews.145  It has to be asked what else they could offer.   
Accusations of antisemitism in the Party are turned on leaders who had Jewish backgrounds.  
Pauley and Robert Wistrich both condemn these people for distancing themselves from their 
‘co-religionists’.146  No consideration is given as to whether leaders of the Party who came 
from Jewish backgrounds considered themselves to have a religion.  Social Democratic 
leaders are condemned for creating a party where only those Jews who had abandoned their 
religion, and who were not capitalists, could feel comfortable.147  Given that the Social 
Democrats formed a Marxist, anti-bourgeois, atheist party, they would expect people who 
joined to be in sympathy with their aims, whether they originally came from Catholic, 
Protestant or Jewish backgrounds.  
The case of Victor Adler highlights this point.  A founder of the Social Democratic Party, 
Adler was an opponent of Zionism, who saw himself as German.  He believed that the best 
way forward for Jews in Austrian society was through assimilation. 148  Adler treated 
antisemitism as a secondary issue, rejecting the arguments of Socialist colleagues like Karl 
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Kautsky, that antisemitism was Social Democracy’s most dangerous opponent.149  As Jack 
Jacobs has pointed out, Adler made mistakes.  Attempts to appropriate the language of 
antisemites, such as through the ironic use of the word ‘Aryan’, backfired badly.150  Adler 
converted from Judaism to Protestantism in 1878 but, in his will, he stated that he converted 
to Protestantism to help his children to assimilate, without the problems he felt would come 
from being konfessionslos. 151  Adler was trying to promote assimilation as a positive step for 
Jews.  He had left behind religion, not just his Jewish roots.  He had no ‘co-religionists’. 
Adler would certainly have rejected criticism that the Social Democrats should have adopted 
a philosemitic stance.152  This incorrectly implies that philosemitism is the opposite of 
antisemitism, and was the only way to combat antisemitism. Social Democrats would have 
considered philosemitism to be as irrational as antisemitism.  For them, the best way to 
attack antisemitism was to show what they perceived as the true roots of the Christian Social 
Party, not to privilege a group based on attributed religious, national or racial qualities.  
It is important in analysing Vienna in the period under consideration to be aware that the 
effect of these attacks is to build a wall of criticism against the Social Democrats, which 
outweighs any concessions made that the Social Democratic Party was not a party of 
antisemitism.  Pauley eventually accepts that ‘such attacks were not motivated by racial or 
religious antagonism’, and that the Social Democrats’ world ‘was not divided between Jews 
and Christians but between capitalists and the proletariat’.153 
Yet the general tenor of Pauley’s work creates the impression that the Social Democrats 
were antisemites who, in his words, attacked ‘Jewish capitalists with the same rhetoric used 
later by the Nazis’.154  The Social Democrats made mistakes in their propaganda.  They were 
guilty of bad taste.  However, a party whose intellectual cadre, by Pauley’s estimate, was 
eighty per cent Jewish, did not use the same rhetoric as the Nazis.155  As Pulzer writes, 
despite ‘superficial resemblances’, Social Democrats and antisemites were at ‘opposite poles 
of the political world’.156 
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In his analysis of antisemitism, Pulzer accepts that coming to an awareness that there was 
‘an antisemitism of the left in the course of the nineteenth century is nothing new’, but he 
works from the premise that the Socialist Left in Europe was, ‘with some qualifications, 
anti-antisemitic’.157  This position is adopted in this thesis.  This does not mean, as has been 
said, that no member of the Social Democrats was antisemitic.  As Jacobs writes, ‘there was 
a rainbow of perspectives within the socialist world on the Jewish question’.158  This is true, 
but it does not mean that each view carried equal weight.  A full analysis of antisemitism  
among Socialists would require far more space than is available here, but this thesis does 
take the view that the case for the extent of antisemitism in the Party has been considerably 
overstated.  As shown in Adelheid Popp’s memoirs, the Socialists were leading an education 
process to counter antisemitism and antisemites.   
Worryingly for the antisemites, the curial system and the restricted franchise held down the 
Social Democratic vote, but only temporarily.159  As late as 1900, the only district where a 
majority of votes had been cast for the Social Democrats had been Ottakring.  By 1906, the 
Social Democrats held a majority of votes in seven of the city’s districts.160  The day was 
coming for Christian Socials to face up to the fact that they attracted the support of only a 
minority of the citizens of the city, albeit a substantial minority.  In 1912, the Social 
Democrats took a majority of votes in just under half the districts.  This was despite only 
18.1% of the City’s population being eligible to vote, and with a franchise heavily weighted 
against the party. 161 
Debating The Future: Which Way For The Germans? 
Democratic reform was not the only area of political speculation, and Nationalists of all 
kinds developed reform plans that might benefit them.162  German nationalists had long 
promoted visions for change, such as the 1882 Linz Programme.  These visions had been 
pursued from opposition but, after the turn of the century, some German nationalists entered 
government.163  Here, they faced the dilemma that, unable to command a majority in 
Cisleithania, they had either to turn for allies to their clerical foes, the Christian Socials, as 
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Germans, or to their national rivals, who were bourgeois and anticlerical.164 German 
nationalists also continued to be divided among themselves, on questions such as state 
intervention.  The outcome was a series of shifting alliances, crossing over ideological and 
national boundaries, which exhibited a fluidity in politics that would not be expected if the 
bourgeois parties are considered using the ‘Three Camps’ model.   
Unlikely alliances were formed.165  Czechs sat in cabinet with representatives from German 
parties, although not without protest at the over-representation of Germans.  German 
nationalists sat in a cabinet headed by a clerical, Count von Beck, a cabinet which ostensibly 
supported the ‘German Course’, the maintenance of German privileges in the Empire, but 
which de facto opened the way for the use of Czech in the inner service of the Bohemian 
administration.166  In this cabinet, they were joined by the Christian Socials, who in 1907 
merged with the Catholic Conservatives.167  Christian Socials now looked to position 
themselves, as a Reichspartei, for the whole of Austria, but still maintained a position as a 
‘legitimate national party’, defending German interests in the Empire, wherever they came 
under threat.168  
German nationalists gathered under the banner of the Nationalverband, but this was little 
more than a parliamentary grouping.  They lost nearly all their parliamentary seats in 
Vienna, and now found their support, mainly, in the zones of national conflict in Bohemia 
and Styria.169  Periodic, and unsuccessful, calls were made for the merger of all antisemitic 
forces.170  A certain sense of being ‘kindred spirits’ existed between the Christian Socials in 
Vienna and the German nationalists in the provinces but, in Vienna, the two groupings had 
been locked in a bitter struggle, down to the turn of the century.171   
In 1908, Richard Bienerth, a member of Franz Ferdinand’s Belvedere faction, replaced 
Beck.  German Bohemians withdrew their support, because of the presumed stance of Franz 
Ferdinand in favour of giving the Czechs a greater say in the Empire yet, in 1910, the 
government and some German nationalists were said the be ‘arm in arm’ when it came to 
plans to create a government of technocrats who would referee national disputes.172  Karl 
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Lueger died in 1910 and the Christian Social Party lost its electoral touch.  In the national 
elections of 1911 it performed well in the provinces, but poor policy decisions and internal 
disputes opened the way in Vienna for some successes for German nationalists and, above 
all, for the Social Democrats, as late efforts to unite bourgeois factions came to nothing.173   
In Parliament, the Nationalverband could now count on over one hundred members, but too 
much should not be read into this figure.  Several parties existed within the 
Nationalverband, and 41 members described themselves as independents.174  This was a 
broad alliance, elected on a highly restricted franchise, not a party that was ready for mass 
politics.  Nationalist groupings joined the Christian Socials in following a course of loyalty 
to the state, but continued to speculate about reform of the Empire.175  Plans were put 
forward for the division of Bohemia, or for going beyond Trialism, with areas designated as 
the preserve of local national elites.176  
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, in June 1914, brought an 
abrupt, if temporary, pause in plans for change, as the declaration of war on Serbia acted as 
an initial impulse to unity.  Differences were to be put aside, and Austrians of many 
viewpoints subscribed to the notion of a Burgfriede, a civil peace, in the face of the common 
external enemy.  Even some Social Democrats fell in line with this view at the start of 
war.177  Unity was the order of the day for most, but it was not long before some saw in the 
war the possibility of new beginnings, based on their earlier plans.  The Burgfriede proved to 
be short lived. 
Summary 
Between 1896 and 1914, the Christian Socials controlled the power of Vienna City Council.  
They did so at first with their German Nationalist allies in the Bürgerklub, with whom they 
were able to bury their differences over the relative importance of the nation, and also over 
matters such as anticlericalism.  Their alliance of convenience allowed them to defeat the 
long-ruling liberals.  It was not long, however, before Lueger tightened his grip on power, by 
either eliminating or sidelining German nationalists who would not follow a Christian Social 
view of the world.  However, the Christian Socials offered a sufficiently broad bourgeois 
agenda to allow others to cross into their ranks.   
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In power, Christian Socials attempted to protect what they defined as Vienna’s Christian 
German character, including making those newly taking up permanent residence swear an 
oath to this effect.  While they were prepared to work with Pan-Germans, many of whom 
had a Protestant agenda, they may have been more comfortable with the idea of Catholic 
Slavs who assimilated into German culture.  For Christian Socials, in general, the nation was 
important, but often secondary to religion.178  German nationalists took a very different line.  
At the time of the Badeni Language Ordinances, even the more moderate German 
nationalists pursued a hard line in public opposition.  In government, however, they could be 
more conciliatory, such as during the Beck cabinet, when Czech became a de facto language 
of use in the Bohemian inner service.  German nationalists looked to protect German 
bourgeois interests, even if this meant marriages of convenience with bourgeois Czechs. 
Towards the end of the reign of Franz Joseph many people, not just German nationalists, 
began to draw up plans for reform.  In an ideal world, German nationalists would have 
preferred national solutions but, as a minority in Cisleithania, they recognised the need for 
allies from other nationalities.  They also recognised that the old politics, that of disputes 
between the limited bourgeois electorates of each nation, was being challenged by a politics 
of class, with nations divided  among themselves, and that a purely bourgeois politics was 
probably drawing to a close.  Yet, Christian Socials and German nationalists alike were 
building a legacy in Vienna during this period.  Vienna City Council discriminated against 
Jews, and Socialists and others who did not fit.  Some Jews changed names, or converted, to 
try for acceptance, but exclusionary visions on who belonged, and what made up the identity 
of a ‘true’ Viennese, had taken root among a considerable section of the population.  Spread 
by politicians, but also by priests and other ‘respectable’ members of bourgeois society, it 
was now acceptable in many circles to say publicly that Jews were ‘the other’, the outsider 
who could never belong.179 
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CHAPTER 7 – RATIONALISING THE END OF A WORLD: VIENNA 1914 TO 1920 
This chapter begins just after the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia in July 
1914, and ends shortly before October 1920, in the very different circumstances of the new 
Austrian Republic.  It covers this period in order to chart the evolution of thinking among 
parts of the radical Right as it faced two completely different worlds of possibilities, not 
least in terms of defining identity and belonging.  In 1914, within the radical Right, shifting 
alliances were built between Pan-Germans of various hues, Christian Socials, and even non-
German bourgeois groups.  In July 1914, the extreme Right continued to hold aspirations for 
German dominance within the multinational state.   
By 1920, such aspirations had been shattered, and the radical Right faced very different 
prospects.  They now lived in a democratic, much reduced and linguistically mostly 
homogeneous state.  This state was ideologically divided, broadly, though not entirely, 
between a Social Democratic Vienna and bourgeois rural regions.  Within the new Austria, 
the main enemies of the radical Right were now Marxists, but they intertwined Marxist 
threats with alleged threats from Jews, against the German and Christian character of 
Vienna.  As David Rechter has written, the impact of the ‘Jewish Question’ was the prime 
mover of politics among Jewish groups, but it was also high on the list of priorities for the 
radical Right.1  The main nationalities question facing the Right was whether their future as 
Germans lay alone or as part of the new Weimar Germany. 
Between 1914 and 1920, the experience of war, material deprivation, hunger and 
demographic change in Vienna affected the entire population.2  Against this background, 
numerous groups and individuals attempted to shape the future. The tensions that had 
existed before the war, concerning political reform and national expectations, continued, but 
in a new and even more intense manner, as the First World War ‘exacerbated tensions 
embedded within the polity’.3  This chapter shows how expressions of German identity on 
the radical Right were examples of both continuity and change.  Against the background of 
high-level politics, this study of identity returns to some groups and individuals who have 
come under consideration, to show their exclusionary reactions to change.  The chapter 
shows how, in the aftermath of war, the radical Right attempted to build on myths of 
betrayal, labelling scapegoats as un-German and un-Christian. 
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A Refugee Crisis 
Despite calls for unity in Autumn 1914, the Burgfriede broke down.  The war, ‘as 
everywhere in Europe’, exploded tensions, and politicians looked to further their positions.4  
Gustav Gross, chairman of the Deutscher Nationalverband, was formulating war aims even 
before war had been formally declared.5  Gross wanted to reorganise the Empire, creating 
once and for all a German hegemony, victory permitting, even if it necessitated a coup.6  
Yet, younger affiliates of the Nationalverband criticised Gross for betraying anti-clerical 
principles, through the ‘clerical alliances’ he entered into with the Christian Socials.7 
Even in the early days of the war, however, German radicals saw not just opportunities but 
threats, especially in the influx of refugees that in late 1914 flooded into Vienna as a Russian 
offensive bit into Galicia.8  Official statistics for November 1914 indicate 80,000 refugees in 
the city.  These were not just Jews, but Jews counted disproportionately among the 
refugees.9  While official reports spoke of ‘compassion’ for these refugees, who were after 
all internal migrants, ‘compassion’ must have been limited.10  Police reported from the 
Leopoldstadt and Brigittenau districts that the locals felt ‘invaded’ and, after some initial 
sympathy, even Vienna’s Jews turned against the incomers, at least to some extent.11   
As early as September 1914, Christian Socials had called for an end to acceptance of any 
further refugees in the city, and even repatriation if the Russian advance had not yet reached 
the homes of refugees.  Mayor Richard Weiskirchner complained that the refugees were 
devouring scarce resources and were a health hazard, further cramping the already 
overcrowded city.  Weiskirchner had deeper objections to the refugees, however.  In his 
view, they were ‘incapable of adapting to Viennese mores’, and ‘their presence posed a 
threat to the city’s character’.12  Weiskirchner was not alone in attacking the refugees from 
the Right.  Heavily antisemitic articles appeared in the press from early in 1915, in 
contradiction to the principles of the Burgfriede.13 
                                                      
4 Boyer, In Power, p.369 
5 Höbelt, p.313 
6 Boyer, In Power, p.381. 
7 Boyer, In Power, p.381. 
8 Rechter, pp.68-70. 
9 Rechter, p.74. 
10 Rechter, pp.22-23, and p.93. 
11 Rechter, p.93.  
12 Rechter, p.72, p.78 and p.93. 
13 Rechter, p.94. 
  
  Page 147 of 272 
The refugee crisis eased a little in the summer of 1915, after the Austrian reconquest of 
Galicia, and the police saw ‘great joy’ at the subsequent departure of many refugees. 
However, any relief must have been slight.  Official statistics show that, in October 1915, 
125,000 refugees were destitute in the city, with up to 60,000 more non-destitute.  The 
situation worsened again with new Russian offensives in Spring 1916, as refugees headed in 
any direction where they might find safety.  Vienna remained their prime destination.14 
By this time, Jewish refugees who headed to Vienna must have known that they would face 
very difficult circumstances.  Jewish groups, sometimes funded by the government, set up 
centres where refugees could find food, work and accommodation.15  They did not, however, 
find acceptance.  Vienna’s westernised Jews attacked the ‘ostentation’ of Galician Orthodox 
Jews, whose wearing of jewellery in a traditional manner was seen as offensive at a time of 
hardship.  Academic Samuel Kraus, while recognising an ‘authentic Jewish heart’ in these 
Orthodox Jews from the East of the Empire, felt it was hidden beneath their ‘repulsive 
exterior’.16  Vienna’s antisemites took the opportunities that came from an  easily 
identifiable and visible target.  The initial targets of the antisemites were the refugees but, as 
will be seen, Vienna’s own Jews became their targets too.17   
The ‘German Course’ 
Throughout the war, German nationalists continued to try to win government support for a 
‘German course’, policies to favour Germans and to Germanise Cisleithania.  They 
attempted to reinforce their own image as the Staatsvolk, often using claims of alleged 
disloyalty on the part of other peoples in the Empire.18  The authorities sometimes found 
evidence to support such claims.  Reports from New York in October 1914 indicated that an 
allegedly Entente-backed Czech committee for the independence of Bohemia had raised a 
sum of over $23,000 for its aims.19  Signs of ‘Slavic radicalisation’ could be found closer to 
home.  Statements taken from the inn zum silbernen Bären, in the Prater, confirmed that 
Czechs who had been drinking there in December 1914 had loudly sympathised with 
Serbia.20  Reports of alleged disloyalty by non-Germans of the Empire were common.21  
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Before the war, many had expected that change would come with Franz Ferdinand.22  The 
war that followed his death seemed to offer the opportunity to fulfil expectations, but this 
was an uphill task for German groups.  Mass mobilisations saw young and active members 
of political groups called up in late 1914.23  The Vereine, the ‘central, collective expression 
of ethnic society’, were also affected by mobilisation, but also because the authorities 
recognised their underlying political nature and curtailed their activities.24  Parliament, 
which had been adjourned in March 1914 by Prime Minister Count Stürgkh, because its 
functioning was badly affected by obstructionism, no longer provided an outlet for German 
protests.25  Stürgkh maintained its suspension into the war, governed by decree, extended 
censorship and aimed to suppress all activities that might harm the war effort.26  
Nevertheless, German groups, as they had before the war, proposed many programmes for 
permanent German predominance in the Empire.27   
From 1915, radical German nationalists formulated their demands into a manifesto that 
became known as the 1916 Osterbegehrschrift.28  The Osterbegehrschrift, put forward by all 
the German non-clerical parties, contained familiar radical German demands, but also 
exceeded previous limits.29  It called for close military and economic ties between Austria-
Hungary and Germany, and the continuation of dualism.  Galicia would occupy a special 
position in Cisleithania, and Dalmatia would be separated from this part of the Empire.30  
This would provide a German majority in what was left of Cisleithania, and a justification 
for the legal enshrinement of German as the state language.  Bohemia would be divided into 
Kreisen, each of which would be characterised as either German or bilingual.  None would 
be characterised as Czech.  These German demands were so ambitious that they even met 
the scepticism of many Bohemian Germans, who wondered how such demands could be 
imposed on the Czechs.31  
The Osterbegehrschrift is another example of a programme that in part united and in part 
divided radical Germans, as the Christian Socials did not sign up to the programme.  
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However much some Christian Socials would have sympathised with the aim of enhancing 
the position of the Germans of Cisleithania, support for such an extreme programme would 
have undermined Christian Social claims of being a Reichspartei.  The fact that the non-
clerical parties supported the programme underlines old divisions between clerical and non-
clerical parties.  The programme can be seen as an example of how radical Germans 
developed their own agenda, but also reacted to what was perceived to be a radicalisation on 
the part of other nationalities in the Empire. 
Without power, however, such plans had no prospect of becoming reality, so German 
nationalists would have taken heart from Stürgkh’s hints that he might enforce a settlement 
in Bohemia.32  In January 1916, Stürgkh had also commissioned one of his ministers to 
prepare a new constitution for Cisleithania.33  Yet, by the time the proposals were ready, 
Stürgkh was too busy working on the coming Ausgleich and on food problems to give them 
consideration.  Stürgkh was then murdered, in October 1916.  Stürgkh may have been 
buying time by not taking a clear position, as he was at the same time also talking to the 
Czechs about possible reforms.34  Any deal to favour the Germans was a long way from 
completion, and depended on other interested parties.  For instance, Hungarian assent to any 
reorganisation would have been vital, and was far from assured.35 
After Franz Joseph 
In November 1916 Franz Joseph died, and Karl was proclaimed Emperor.36  Karl 
immediately made his priorities clear, and the first act of Prime Minister Ernest von Koerber 
under Karl was to reorganise food supplies.37  Koerber was soon replaced by Karl, and in 
December 1916 he gave way to Heinrich Clam-Martinic.38  German nationalists formed a 
large part of an expanded cabinet that was created in January 1917, something which 
provoked Czech protests.39  Rumours of a forced solution to the question of Bohemia 
persisted, but Clam-Martinic maintained an ambiguous position.  While Clam-Martinic 
promised Germans that a ‘new ordering of internal relationships would be carried out’, he 
stipulated that this was not an immediate priority.40  The new Emperor’s closest advisers 
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counselled Karl to stand by the Germans, as the cornerstone of the Empire, but they also 
warned Clam-Martinic against using force to achieve a solution in Bohemia.41  In 1917, 
despite the importance attached to Bohemia by German nationalists, state priorities remained 
a new Hungarian Ausgleich and food supplies.  
By 1917, war weariness had long since set in.  Karl, influenced by the events of the Russian 
Revolution, secured the relaxation of some political controls and the restoration of open 
party political activity.42  Discussions about plans for reform continued at the highest level, 
but this was not enough for some and, in April 1917, some German nationalists threatened to 
resign from the Cabinet.43  On 30th May 1917, the Reichsrat re-opened, with membership 
based on the last elections, from 1911.  A number of Germans in the cabinet opposed this 
‘democratic course for government’.44 
One unintended consequence of the relaxation of political controls was a sudden and 
alarming increase in antisemitic activity.  In Vienna, German nationalists led these attacks, 
and Christian Socials followed, from parliament, the Rathaus and the press, from the latter 
half of 1917 into 1918.45  Antisemites justified themselves by, among other things, pointing 
to yet another refugee crisis.46  Antisemites tried to stir up public opinion and, towards the 
end of the war, the antisemitic mood grew worse.  Antisemites had settled into a mindset 
where generally they felt no need to explain why Jews were the enemy.  Where explanations 
were made, they were extreme in their violence, and had become part of the everyday 
experience.   
In October 1917, for instance, the weekly Währinger Bezirksnachrichten, published by the 
Währing branch of the Christian Social Party, led on the need for the paper’s continuing role 
as protector of all ‘honest working Christians’ of the Währing district, against the ‘threats’ 
and ‘lies’ of the ‘Jewish Press’.  Judging by the rest of the content in the newspaper, others 
in the district shared this view.  The Bezirksnachrichten carried advertisements for a 
considerable number of local associations, many of which included the words ‘Christian’, 
‘German’ or ‘Christian-German’ in their names.  In cities such as London or Paris, words 
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like ‘Christian’ would be purely descriptive, but in Vienna these words were loaded with 
meaning.  ‘Christian’ was, to a considerable extent, synonymous with antisemitic.47   
Over forty associations appear in the events column of one edition alone of the 
Bezirksnachrichten.48  Some were oblique in their support for antisemitism, but stressed their 
Germanness.  The Währinger Liedertafel, for instance, had long expressed its pride that it 
was not just a singing group, but a group which was at the forefront of the movement to 
protect German identity.  Its publications boasted that, while the group’s efforts in this 
respect, and its willingness to show leadership, had not always been appreciated, they had 
come to be valued.49  Some went so far as to proclaim their anti-Jewish purpose in their 
name, such as the Deutsch-antisemitischer Herrenklub ‘Jung-Währing’.  Jung-Währing was 
a well-connected organisation, not a fringe group that was beyond the pale.50  Its tenth 
anniversary was to be celebrated at the ‘wilder Mann’ inn, under the patronage of the deputy 
mayor of the district, Herr Dworak.  It would also be attended by Weihbischof Dr. Pfluger.51  
In December 1917, the attitude of the Bezirksnachrichten towards German unity was equally 
clear.  In an article entitled ‘The Position Of The Germans In Austria’ it proclaimed that the 
Christian Social Party was the true standard bearer of Germans within the Empire.  Pan-
German parties were working against the interests of the Empire as a whole, and were 
nationalist splinter parties.52  The Bezirksnachrichten carried articles extolling the value of 
German culture, but showed no enthusiasm for the coming together of all Germans in one 
state.   
The Bezirksnachrichten was not alone in attacking Jews at this time.  Prominent Christian 
Social politician Leopold Kunschak declared that ‘anti-Semitism is more justified now than 
ever before.  Usury, price fixing and black marketeering are undertaken almost exclusively 
by Jews’.53  Yet, as John Boyer has pointed out, such activities were far from a Jewish 
preserve.54  MP Heinrich Mataja attacked his own Christian Social Mayor, Richard 
Weiskirchner, for being insufficiently antisemitic.  Rank and file Christian Socials called for 
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the restoration of the ‘old policy’, alongside an ‘enormous outbreak of hatred of Jews in 
Viennese kleinbürgerlich circles in 1917 and 1918’.55   
The viciousness of antisemitic attacks was in stark contrast to positions taken on the 
nationalities question by leading antisemites.  Leopold Kunschak would later go on to 
propose a legal separation of Jews from the ‘indigenous’ German Austrian population.56  In 
1917, however, he was conciliatory when it came to questions of nationality.  He urged his 
colleagues to accept that Germans should accept that they could never command a majority 
in the ‘democratic age’.  They should instead work to protect German interests, but 
alongside the other peoples of the Empire.57  It is a reasonable conclusion that that 
Kunschak, and others, believed the Jews could not be a people of the Empire, and could not 
belong. 
The Coming Of The End Of The Empire: ‘Not The Peace We Had Expected’  
Late in 1917, Ludwig Heppenheim, parish priest at Weinhaus,  was cautiously optimistic as 
he wrote his Chronik: ‘We believe in justice and conscience.  Peace movements are growing 
among the peoples, if the leaders will only listen....  What is certain is that the Empire will 
never be destroyed’.58  More realistic assessments were made elsewhere, a few months later.  
Joseph Redlich describes how, after the failure of the German Spring offensive of 1918, the 
feeling pervaded that the War was coming to an end.59  The Imperial Parliament was now 
seen as an assembly of the peoples gathered together one last time.60  
In many respects, the destinies of these peoples were being decided elsewhere, by those who 
would be the victors of the war.  In January 1918, President Wilson published his Fourteen 
Points programme, which aimed to ensure that ‘The peoples of Austria-Hungary… should 
be accorded the freest opportunity for autonomous development’.  It called for ‘national self-
determination’, and was the death-knell for the Habsburg Empire.61  When, in May 1918, 
Viennese newspaper Die Wahrheit wrote that a revision of Austria-Hungary on a national 
basis was inevitable, it would not have realised how far-reaching that revision would be.62 
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The feeling was widespread, however, that change was to follow soon, as reflected in the 
pages of the Währinger Bezirksnachrichten.  The paper had been resolutely anti-Pan-
German in 1917, but cracks were beginning to appear in its position as the end of the war 
was perceived to be drawing near.  In June 1918, the paper gave huge prominence to a 
forthcoming Deutscher Volkstag at Vienna's Rathaus.63  The conference, with delegates 
from across the Empire, was to discuss the dangers to the state of the activities of the North 
and South Slavs, the perilous state of food supplies and the alliance with Germany.  The 
paper declared it the duty of all Christian Socials to participate in this gathering of the 
German people in Austria.   
This was a high profile event, with speakers to include Count Liechtenstein and Mayor 
Weiskirchner.  The Pan-German content of the conference is clear.  For example, Karl 
Angermayer, 'Chairman Of The Eastern March, Vienna Region And Surrounding Areas' 
appealed for all ‘Ostmärker’ to attend the Deutscher Volkstag.64  Such language is indicative 
of the thinking of at least some of those at the event.  Austria, or at least part of it, was again 
being portrayed as the Mark, the historic Eastern frontier of the Holy Roman Empire against 
Slavs and non-Christians.65  Those attending the Volkstag may have gathered in order to 
discuss how to protect ‘German’ interests in the Empire, but the areas in which they found 
agreement were generally negative in nature.  Mayor Weiskirchner again accused Jews of 
using the war to profit from shortages. Heinrich Mataja joined in.66   
Antisemitism helped to bring Christian Socials and German nationalists together, but old 
divisions kept them apart.  Rank-and-file German nationalists objected to the collaboration 
of their leaders with the Christian Socials, on the grounds that the Christian Social Party was 
promoting regional autonomy, hence threatening the unity of the state, and the favoured 
position of Germans within it.67  Robert Pattai returned to his former predominantly 
German-orientated course, and in 1918, spoke in favour of the Pan-Germans.  Pattai was 
immediately repudiated by Christian Social leaders.68  Archbishop Piffl warned 
Weiskirchner against taking too nationalist a line, and against supporting the 
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Nationalverband, threatening to form a separate Catholic party if Weiskirchner went too 
far.69  
By October, defeat was close.  On the home front, people were hungry, ill and cold.  
Agitation against the dynasty was rising.  German Nationalist political groups splintered into 
even smaller factions.70  Karl tried to keep his lands together, by declaring the Cisleithanian 
part of the Empire to be a federal state, and Austria-Hungary signed an armistice with the 
Entente, but it was too late.71  State after state was declared into existence, then seceded from 
the Empire.  In Vienna, uncertainty was the order of the day, and senior politicians failed to 
predict the near future: Karl Renner drew up a draft constitution for what would become 
German Austria but which, in October 1918, he termed South East Germany.72  In Währing, 
the Bezirksnachrichten was caught in two minds.  Its edition of 30th October 1918 led with a 
six-verse paean to the new state that was being born, the ‘Lied der Deutschösterreicher’.73  It 
declared that it would never forget Old Austria, but ended with the plea: ‘Protect, oh German 
God, your German Austria!’  The paper, however, must have thought that German Austria as 
an independent entity would be short-lived.  It went on to call on the Christian Socials to 
meet with the German nationalists, to plan for the future.74 
In Vienna, a few leading Christian Social figures tried to hold out against the declaration of a 
republic, but finally had to concede to reality.75  On 11th November 1918, Karl renounced his 
rights to participate in government.76  The next day, before cheering crowds, the Republic of 
German Austria was proclaimed from the parliament in Vienna.77  A provisional National 
Assembly was formed.78  Despite the presence of a reasonably large number of Czechs who 
would stay on in Vienna and a cluster of Slovenes in Carinthia, the state was 
overwhelmingly populated with Germans.  German Austria, in accordance with the 
nationalities principle, was styled as an integral part of the new German Republic.  Few 
understood the consequences for this rump of Austria, and few foresaw the ‘the radical crisis 
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in the concept of Austria and of Austrian consciousness after the downfall of the 
Monarchy’.79 
The Bezirksnachrichten was now attempting to explain the fall of the Empire.   On the day 
Karl stepped aside, the paper started a six part series on ‘The Jews And The War’.80  The 
Bezirksnachrichten attacked Jews for their supposed avoidance of conscription and their lack 
of enthusiasm for the war.  It accused them of collaboration with invading Russian armies in 
Galicia, and extended old economic stereotypes to label Jews as profiteers, usurers of food, 
and inherently untrustworthy.81  In the Bezirksnachrichten, such attacks on Jews were 
commonplace, providing scapegoats for all of the ills of war.  Explanations for these attacks 
were rare but, when the paper did feel the need to explain, it went to extreme lengths to 
develop its case.  These attacks fitted into a pattern of verbal and ‘mild’ physical assaults on 
Jewish refugees in Vienna, just after the founding of the Republic.82 
For all the bravado of the Bezirksnachrichten in running this and similar articles, Christian 
Socials and Pan-Germans alike would have been deeply concerned that their world was 
being swept away.  Bourgeois sectors of society had difficulties not just in maintaining basic 
standards, but even food supplies.  These sectors felt themselves to be at a disadvantage 
compared with other classes.  They perceived that while the rich had money, and workers 
were fed at work, the middle classes suffered on fixed incomes.  Middle class suffering was 
made worse by self-infliction: some would not queue for food, as this reduced the ‘proper 
distance’ from working classes.83  
The values of the Empire and those of the radical Right had by no means been perfectly 
aligned, but shared beliefs in hierarchy and the centrality of Christianity had given the 
Empire and the radical Right common ground.  A heavy paternalism prevailed, and 
stereotypes ridiculing women who worked, for instance, were common.84  Now, democratic 
and Socialist movements, those who wanted to separate church and state completely, 
feminist movements, and others, would be free to stake their own claims to provide the 
values on which the new state would be based.85 
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Alongside longer term considerations, immediate shocks also had to be faced.  Two blows 
struck home.  The first was that German Austria was prevented from becoming part of the 
new German Republic, even before the Versailles peace treaties had been signed.86  The 
French were especially vigorous in opposing Anschluss, partly in an attempt to prevent 
Austrian manpower from becoming part of a German army.  Peace terms were dictated to 
Germany, Austria and Hungary.87  Austria was forced to keep its independence, and its 
people could only renounce this with the consent of the Council of the  League of Nations.88  
A second blow to German-Austrian self-determination came when German speaking areas 
of the former Empire, on the largest scale in Bohemia, were prevented from joining German 
Austria.  The victors of the war rejected claims by the German Austrian national assembly 
for all German areas of Cisleithania to be included in the new state.89  Plebiscites in these 
areas returned large majorities in favour of union with German Austria, but these were 
ignored in favour of giving Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent Italy, what were 
considered to be defensible borders against potential aggressors.90  
Bohemia, whatever the reality that Czechs formed a majority of the population as a whole, 
was considered by many German Austrians to be a part of German Austria, and not just by 
Pan-Germans.  A few months after the separation, leading Social Democrat Otto Bauer 
appealed, on behalf of the estimated four million Germans in Czechoslovakia, for the fair 
implementation of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and the joining of all Germans to the new 
German Republic.  Bauer was motivated by cultural nationalism and fellowship, but also by 
a very practical concern.  German Austria was not believed to be economically viable.91  As 
Bauer wrote to fellow Social Democrat Karl Renner, Anschluss was the only way forward, a 
point ‘even the bourgeois parties’ conceded.92  The feeling also existed that Austria, as it 
was being shaped, was ‘a state without a national tradition’.93  German Austria’s national 
traditions were beyond its borders, in the wider German cultural area.  The new Austria was 
a rump, cut off from its heritage.  
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As 1919 opened, it was clear that the new order was not attractive to those on Austria’s 
Right.  In Vienna, the Church at the highest level set out its opposition to the post-war 
settlements, both internationally and domestically.  In a pastoral letter of January 1919, the 
bishops and archbishops of German Austria (sic) offered their sympathies to the brave 
armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany, who had been ‘undefeated in the field’.94  The 
letter discussed the peace at length.  This was a time when myths were being built about the 
Central Powers being ‘stabbed in the back’ from the home front, by disloyal Slavs, Jews and 
Socialists.95  The pastoral letter’s portrayal of the ‘undefeated’ did not allow the intrusion of 
the reality was that the Central Powers would have been defeated if they had continued the 
war, as the German High Command had recognised.96  Nevertheless, the letter was accurate 
when it declared: ‘God be thanked.  The war is over, peace is near!  But not the peace we 
expected’.97  It was not just defeat, but the peace terms and the denial of self-determination 
that were shattering blows.  ‘Not the peace we expected’ was, if anything, an 
understatement.   
The bishops also used the pastoral letter to spell out their understanding of the new world as 
it affected Austria domestically.  For them, a new war was now beginning behind a façade of 
democracy, this time against believers.98  While some on the Right condemned democracy 
as a dangerous concept, the bishops believed the danger lay not in ideas but the ways in 
which they were applied.  The political nature of the state was irrelevant compared with the 
values that underpinned that state.  These should include religion, family, property, the Ten 
Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount. The bishops were alarmed that the new 
Republic would instead distance the Church from the state.  Above all, the establishment of 
‘free’ schools and ‘free’ marriage, independent of the Church, would remove the people 
from the sacraments they needed for salvation. 
The importance of this pastoral letter for an understanding of the political stance of the 
Church in the next two decades cannot be overemphasized.  The letter declared that all 
priests should show unconditional loyalty to the new state, at least while a new constitution 
was being drawn up.  The bishops accepted the nationalities principle as a means for 
organising the state, when they declared that ‘as Germans’ they felt loyalty to German 
Austria.  Statements that democracy was not to be feared and that the form of the state was 
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irrelevant to the Church can be taken as true at some level, yet an implied threat exists here 
too.  The Church would support a democratic state only if it was based on Christian 
principles.99  In other words, the Church would support the state for now, but the state could 
lose this support if the constitution was not to its liking.  This does not mean that the Church 
would support the violent overthrow of the state.  In 1919, the Church was just setting out on 
its relationship with the new Austria, but it wasted no time in declaring what it expected of 
the state.   
In Weinhaus, the importance of the message was certainly picked up by Father Heppenheim, 
as he transcribed the opening of the pastoral letter in his Chronik for 1918.100  In order to 
ensure that the rank and file faithful also understood its importance and its meaning, the 
letter was to be read at mass in all parishes on 26th January and 2nd and 9th February 1919.101  
These dates were chosen with care.  A week after the final reading, elections to a constituent 
assembly for German Austria took place.  The election was marked by vicious antisemitism 
on the part of the Christian Socials and Pan-Germans on the one hand, and Marxist 
sloganeering by the Social Democrats on the other.   
In the difficult conditions of the post-war winter, the results trickled in.  Early indications 
gave the Social Democrats 72 seats, followed by the Christian Socials with 64.  Various Pan-
German parties returned 24 representatives, and other parties collected a handful of seats.102  
Final results gave the Social Democrats 41% of the vote with 36% for the Christian 
Socials.103  No party came near to controlling a majority of the 179 seat assembly, and a 
coalition including the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats was formed.104  Despite 
fears on the Right, the Social Democrats had been kept at bay in the national elections.  The 
elections for the Constituent Assembly were the first to be held under a full, free and equal 
suffrage for all classes, and for men and women alike.  The Right had commanded sufficient 
support in rural areas to stand firm at the national level.105   
In Vienna, the situation turned out to be very different when, in May 1919, elections to the 
city council took place.  Here too, the franchise was fair and equal for the first time, and the 
Social Democrats achieved an outright majority, pushing the Christian Socials down to a 
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little over a quarter of the vote.  The Social Democrats won one hundred of the 165 seats, 
and made inroads beyond working their class constituency, into the disaffected middle 
classes to whom the Christian Socials had promised much, but had delivered little.106  The 
first post-war inheritor of Karl Lueger’s position as Mayor of Vienna was now Social 
Democrat Jakob Reumann.107 
The result was a reaction to the long-term misery of life in Vienna for many of its 
inhabitants.  It came when Vienna’s citizens finally had a fair chance to express their views 
on how they wanted to shape the city.  During the Empire, Vienna may have offered better 
prospects than life in other cities, but the Christian Socials had done little for the proletarian 
population.  They had beautified parts of the city and improved certain aspects such as 
transport, but many people lacked access to even the most basic amenities.  Death rates in 
pre-war Vienna had often been far worse than those in other major European cities.108   
The change in the political direction of the city opened the door to tackle much of what had 
gone before.  The city council drew up ambitious plans for health provision, secular 
education and social housing.109  The housing crisis was serious before the war but, after the 
war, as soldiers returned from prisoner of war camps and refugees flooded the city, such 
problems and subsequent shortages of food and fuel threatened to create significant social 
unrest.110  Yet international events cast doubt on the feasibility of the Socialists’ plans, as the 
terms of the Versailles peace settlement demanded reparations from the new republic, to 
make it pay for the war.111 
In Weinhaus, Father Heppenheim was drawing his own conclusions about the connections 
between international events and the city’s Socialist administration.  These were all signs of 
the modern world and its rejection of religion.  Writing in 1919, he launched a long tirade 
against Vienna’s Socialists, reflecting much of the thinking of the pastoral letter sent earlier 
that year by the bishops.  According to Heppenheim, the people needed to hold firm 
together.  Peace had brought nothing but hunger and misery.  Bolshevism, a ‘madness’, was 
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aiming to destroy religion.  This aim was not something confined to Vienna, as the 
Bolsheviks were now a world power. 112 
Heppenheim was at pains to stress the dominance of the Social Democrats on the Vienna 
City Council.  Like that of others, his writing can give the impression that such control 
reached everywhere.  In 1919, the Party won a majority of the vote in elections for the city 
council, and its share would edge upwards over the next few years, but it did not control 
everything in the city.  The Party was dominant in the council chamber.  It began to shape 
culture, but attitudes that existed in the city before the war persisted into the new republic.  
Many of the societies on the Right that have already been encountered continued to thrive, 
presented their vision of the world, and remained at odds with the Social Democrats. 
Across the political spectrum, however, and across Austria, hope gave way to despair at the 
results of the international settlement.  Peasants who had hoped for freedoms from their 
landlords faced new disappointments.113  Animosity grew between peasants and workers as 
their needs in the post-war world diverged.114  The aristocracy, the landed gentry, 
industrialists and the petite bourgeoisie tried to resist change.115  In the rural areas, militias 
sprang up, the likes of the Heimwehr and the Heimatschutz.  They protected against 
incursions of foreign invaders, such as ‘irregular bands of Yugoslavs’, who tried to seize 
territory for new states.  They also protected against workers’ groups from the cities, who 
attempted to commandeer food.116 
Pan-Germans would have seen the solution to these problems in forging a union with the 
new Weimar state.  Christian Socials had not changed their basic position, and despite their 
loss of the municipality of Vienna they were within touching distance of control of the 
government of the new Austrian state.  Anschluss with the Weimar Republic, whatever sense 
it seemed to make economically, was not an attractive option for the Christian Socials, and 
without their support it was unlikely to come about.  In national elections in October 1920, 
they gained 42% of the vote to the Social Democrats’ 36%.117  Whatever qualms they had as 
a new constitution for Austria came into being in October 1920, an independent Austria was 
a more attractive home for them than the potentially Socialist state to the North.118 
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Summary 
Between 1914 and 1920, the world changed radically as a result of war.  The demise of the 
Habsburg Empire transformed the possibilities that were open to the radical Right in its 
efforts to create political settlements that would favour Germans.  During the war, they had 
planned for German domination of a large part of Central Europe.  Efforts had been made to 
gather allies within the Empire – Hungarians, Poles and Italians – in order to dominate the 
‘non-historic’ peoples.  Plans for reorganisation of the Empire were often the result of 
responses to conflicts that had continued from before the war, and were often also extensions 
to plans that German nationalists in particular had been making then.  Even as the 
Burgfriede was being declared, some such as Gross were attempting to strengthen the 
‘German Course’. 
At times, however, the radical German Right in Vienna turned on another target, with a 
vicious ferocity.  The Burgfriede was breaking down at the same time as a refugee crisis was 
overwhelming Vienna.  There is no doubt that it increased the wartime suffering of the 
people of Vienna, but Mayor Weiskirchner’s attitudes towards Jews suggest that he and 
other radical Germans also used it as an excuse to attack Jews in general and to create 
Jewish scapegoats.  The differences in the attitudes displayed by Leopold Kunschak to 
nationalities questions on the one hand, and the position of Jews in Austria, illustrate the 
‘Aryan mindset’ that had taken root in parts of the Christian Social Party.  This continued 
the earlier work of the likes of Father Abel: that the Jew was the real enemy.  From 
Weiskirchner’s attacks on ‘Eastern Jews’ as people who could never fit into Vienna, it was a 
short step to claim that no Jews should have been allowed to settle there. 
The peace that emerged after 1918 was not the peace that had been expected.  It was harsh 
on the remnant state of Austria, but it also brought shocks within the state, to those who had 
been supporters of ‘authoritarian’ Habsburg rule and had been accustomed to the privileged 
place of the Catholic Church in society.119  As they tried to rationalise the end of a world, the 
radical Right, in the form of barely veiled threats against the Republic, could not disguise its 
antidemocratic nature.  Now that the Empire was gone, this group could look only to the 
rump Austria or to the revised Germany to the North.  Barred from Anschluss, some radical 
nationalists could not accept the Austrian state, because of its boundaries.  Radical 
nationalists, and a number of Christian Socials, could not accept the democratic nature of the 
state.  Many Christian socials rejected the secular state.  
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This was a legacy of war and its consequences that would haunt the Austrian First Republic 
such that, for thirty years after the coming of peace, ‘stable political and social institutions in 
Austria were virtually impossible...’120  The effect would be a state in constant flux, where 
definitions of identity and belonging were constantly under challenge, and the search for 
scapegoats for all of the ills of society became an acceptable part of life for many.  Radical 
Germans had begun the war with high hopes of being able to influence how the state defined 
itself.  They had hoped to be one of the privileged groups in the Empire, and perhaps the 
pre-eminent group in a Cisleithania defined by its German identity.  At the end of the war, 
they were being consigned to a state which, in one way or another, they were having trouble 
considering as their home.  
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CHAPTER 8:  THE PROVISIONAL REPUBLIC?  VIENNA 1920-1932 
In October 1920, as a consequence of the Versailles treaties, the state of German Austria that 
had been declared in November 1918 was dissolved.  ‘German’ was to form no part of the 
name of the state that took its place, the Austrian Republic.1  Troubled by political 
instability, often by political violence, this Austria mirrored the widespread uncertainty that 
post-war Europe was experiencing.  In the early 1920s, many predicted the fall of 
democracy in Austria, with tensions between Left and Right being identified as the most 
likely cause.  This chapter addresses the question of what those on the Right would wish to 
see as a replacement for the Republic, as it says much about their views on nation, identity 
and Germanness.  It does so in  two ways.  The first is to examine support on the Right for 
the idea of the Austrian Republic as a provisional state, which should eventually be absorbed 
into Germany.  The second is to examine support on the Right for the idea that the Republic 
was a provisional state form, and that Austria should remain independent, but be shorn of its 
newly erected democratic institutions.   
The chapter examines how Right-wing sub-cultures continued to contribute to the creation 
of exclusionary views of the world, and that even at the peak of ‘Red Vienna’ these sub-
cultures remained more than a trivial minority.  Christian Social and German Nationalist 
sub-cultures had distinct and at times vigorous differences, but they often ‘worked closely 
together during most of the First Republic and shared the same social basis’.2  They buried 
their differences and formed alliances against the common enemy, resulting in the ‘bitter 
political conflict between the bourgeois and socialist blocs in the years following the First 
World War’.3   
One other key point emerges from an examination of these exclusionary subcultures.  The 
challenge to Red Vienna was often presented by those on the Right as a struggle between the 
urban and the rural.4  This challenge, however, was driven by people of influence, 
sometimes with power, who were from or near to the grass roots, and was already alive 
within the city itself as the Austrian Republic was born in October 1920. 
A New World 
The October 1920 constitutional settlement came in the middle of a long period of turmoil 
that outlived the end of the war.  Across Europe, violent clashes frequently marked attempts 
to reach settlements to replace the era of Empires.  By 1920, the successor states of the 
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Habsburg Empire were at various stages of their nation-building projects.  Czechoslovakia 
grappled with the problems it inherited in the form of a large minority of German former 
inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire.5  Poland looked aggressively at territory beyond its 
borders, and waged war with the Soviet Union.6  In 1920, Admiral Horthy effectively 
became dictator in Hungary, blaming defeat in war on the imposition of alien values on the 
people of Hungary.7  He denounced Budapest as a hotbed of liberalism and communism, and 
declared his government to be ‘national and Christian’.  By implication, Jews and atheistic 
Socialists were part of the guilty past.8   
Austrian politicians used these terms when proposing provincial breakaways from the new 
Austria, between 1919 and 1921.9  To them, the provinces were the soul of a true timeless 
Austria.  Plebiscites in places such as the Tyrol demanded that provinces be allowed to leave 
Austria and join the Weimar Republic.10  The Vorarlberg voted to join Switzerland, but none 
of these plebiscites resulted in anything concrete.  Some concluded that this Austria, and 
Austrians, had been forced together, and that no historical, religious or cultural grounds 
could justify the state.11  
At the same time as these attempts to reject Austria as an independent state took place, 
others hoped that Austria could be transformed from within.  This republic was, for the 
Social Democrats, a transitional stage on the way to a socialist state, whether as part of 
Germany or not, but the Social Democrats were far too reformist by 1920 to force the issue 
through a Soviet-style revolution, and were set on the transformation of the Republic by 
parliamentary means.12  Many Christian Socials also only grudgingly accepted the new state, 
and some of their number would have preferred a reformed constitutional monarchy, rather 
than the Republic.13  From the beginning, therefore, the settlement of 1920 lacked profound 
support, at least among segments of the political classes.  The high turnouts for elections 
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indicate that voters felt the arguments were important.  Over eighty per cent turned out for 
the national elections of October 1920.14 
The Social Democrats talked of a workers’ state and even formed workers’ councils that 
mirrored those of the Soviet Union.15  Some Social Democrats thought that social revolution 
was the priority, and that Anschluss was an irrelevance.  Other Social Democrats, such as 
Otto Bauer, saw Anschluss with the new German Republic as a key aim, and Anschluss by 
peaceful means was an element of the Social Democrats’ programme.16  For Bauer, it would 
be sensible, practical and liberating to create a German-speaking space by peaceful means.  
This aim was based on a cultural view of the nation, not an aggressive form of nationalism.  
It was a way of bringing German culture into one state.  It was an inclusive vision, that 
allowed for assimilation, as well as for the rights of minorities.17   
Within the Christian Social Party, the idea of Anschluss, while it was not without support, 
had limited appeal.  It would end any remaining hopes that Catholic values could be placed 
at the centre of public life, and practical considerations also arose, as Austrian industrialists 
feared competition from German industry.18  As long as solutions could be found to 
immediate economic problems, such considerations outweighed the undeniable fact that a 
common German feeling (Deutschfühlen) and a German consciousness prevailed among the 
intellectual and political classes.19 
Viennese society was deeply divided.  Viciousness erupted in the 1919 and 1920 elections, 
and street fighting broke out, a reflection of the images of violent struggle in the posters of 
all parties that filled the walls of the streets of Vienna.20  Christian Social and Pan-German 
propaganda was filled with anti-Jewish, racially-motivated imagery.21  All Jews were a 
threat in this world view.  The viciousness of the politics reflected the harshness of an 
economic situation which, as 1920 went on, became progressively worse in the whole of the 
new Austria.  The people of Vienna suffered, as the capital’s trade routes with the former 
Empire’s hinterlands had been severed.  The city retained an industrial sector, but its 
economy was now excessively focused on administration, bureaucracy and entertainment.  
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The city’s white collar workers, the sort of people who belonged to singing groups and 
attended church, could barely be paid.  Unemployment, poverty, hunger and housing 
shortages combined.22  The situation was made worse by the large numbers of refugees who 
remained in the city, still including many Galician Jews.  Failure by the city’s Socialist 
administration to succeed in expelling those who had no residency rights was described by 
Christian Socials as typical of a ‘red Jewified Vienna’.23  Attempts to expel these refugees, 
however unsuccessfully, were greeted by some later commentators as signs of Socialist 
antisemitism.24 
After the elections of October 1920 the Social Democrats broke their coalition with the 
Christian Socials, who now emerged as the largest party in a Right-wing coalition 
government.25  This coalition aimed at economic retrenchment.  Within Vienna, in contrast, 
in order to remedy years of neglect, the Social Democratic City Council was drawing up 
expansive plans for a programme of house building and social welfare.  There were now two 
clear directions of policy in the country, but neither could outweigh the other and this caused 
considerable political tension.  Vienna was also part of Lower Austria, and the needs of the 
city were different from the needs of the Lower Austrian rural areas.  Politicians therefore 
drew up plans for Vienna to break from the rest of Lower Austria, and to become its own 
Land.  This would not solve all problems, but it would mean that some of the tensions 
between Vienna as local authority and a quarter of the country’s population on the one hand, 
and Vienna as federal capital on the other, would be released. 
In October 1920, survival and the immediate future were the priority, even if the bigger 
issues were never completely dispelled, as can be seen in the thinking of some priests.  
Father Pax was still at Alt-Ottakring, as he had been since 1899.  In 1921, he was having 
such a struggle to keep the parish afloat on limited resources that the federal Minister for 
Education took the unusual step of writing to the Mayor of Vienna, asking him to aid with 
funding.26  At the same time, in Weinhaus, Father Heppenheim raged at a charitable mission 
of American Quakers in his parish.  This presumably came with strings of a religious nature 
attached, which Heppenheim considered a threat to his Catholic parishioners.27  Heppenheim 
unleashed diatribes against the Social Democrats which show that he considered them to be 
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at least on a par with the Soviet Communists.28  Heppenheim did not see out the winter, 
dying in February 1921.   
Heppenheim’s successor, Father Leopold Lojka, took office in October of that year.  Lojka 
had been a priest in various roles and parishes from 1897, and he would have needed all his 
experience as he endured a difficult and wearing introduction to his new parish.  The winter 
was ‘terribly cold’, something that was exacerbated by a complete lack of coal.  Then the 
worldwide influenza epidemic hit the parish.  At its peak, influenza caused six deaths a day, 
and Lojka had to deal with these on top of deaths from other causes.29  Yet these everyday 
concerns did not prevent him from reflecting on the past.  Lojka had been a schoolchild in a 
choir in the district of Döbling, not far from Weinhaus.  This choir had been invited to sing 
at Weinhaus, where Lojka heard Father Deckert, the early antisemitic activist, preach at the 
very church which he now ran.  Lojka tells us that Father Deckert had been an inspiration in 
his becoming a priest, ‘perhaps the main prompting’ for his taking holy orders.30  
Others in the 1920s also attested to the influence of earlier priests.  In 1926, Jakob Fried 
noted how the Christian Social Party of 1896 had been one which used religion from 
opportunism and for the sake of appearances.  It had been a Catholic party on the surface 
only.31  According to Fried, some priests had been willing simply to accept City council 
subsidies for Catholic organisations, from the hands of the Christian Social administration, 
in return for their participation as political agitators.32  This had now been changed and, 
according to Fried, the Party of 1926 possessed a true Catholic spirit. The principal credit for 
this should go to Father Heinrich Abel who, in the 1920s, was still active on pilgrimages.33   
Both Abel and Lojka battled for a Church struggling to maintain its privileges in the First 
Republic.34  For all the need to address immediate concerns, Lojka went to great lengths to 
copy into his Chronik a large section of a pastoral letter the Bishops had sent in 1921: ‘At 
last, the fiction of Peace can be addressed’.35  It accuses the Socialists, ‘here in Vienna’, of 
waging war from on religion, especially in the schools.  This, it says, is nothing less than a 
Kulturkampf.36  The pastoral letter of November 1918 from the Bishops of German Austria 
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had warned that they would support the Republic only as long as it was run on Catholic 
principles.  The 1921 pastoral letter repeated the warning to Vienna City Council.  In this, 
the Church was challenging a new world.37  Catholicism had once been central to the support 
that kept the Habsburgs in place, and had been privileged in the state.38  Now, just as had 
been the case at the time of the liberals, the Church clashed repeatedly with the State over 
matters such as marriage and education.39 
Within Red Vienna 
On 1st January 1922 the City of Vienna become a Land in its own right.  This arrangement 
was sensible from an administrative point of view, but it highlighted the contrasts between 
‘Socialist Vienna’ on the one hand and the rest of Austria on the other, between old, 
Catholic Austria and the new Republic.  Supporters of the old order saw huge Socialist May 
Day parades overwhelming celebrations of the Virgin Mary.40  They saw November 
celebrations of the declaration of the Republic as an opportunity for the Socialists to ‘insult’ 
centuries of Habsburg rule.41  The priests of Vienna reflected these thoughts, and the same 
concerns as had been raised in the past, from the time of the early liberal governments to the 
Bishops’ attack on the alleged post-war Kulturkampf of the Vienna Socialists, came to the 
surface repeatedly.  In 1922, Father Lojka described the education proposals of one Socialist 
MP, Frau Schlesinger, as terrorism and persecution.  Lojka had a particular objection to the 
‘American style’ placement of boy next to girl which, in his view, could only lead to sexual 
arousal.  His anger was no less pointed towards mixed-sex Sunday excursions encouraged 
by Socialists, when children should be at mass.  He clearly despised those he described as 
‘Sozilehrer’.42 
This, however, is not just a representation of Lojka’s views of the struggle between Church 
and State.  He goes on to reveal what underpins his anger:  
‘In this way, Christian youth is made Godless and immoral, which is the 
goal of Jewish freemasonry, whose willing slave is Social Democracy’.43 
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Lojka felt no need to explain the connection between Jewish Freemasonry and Socialism.  It 
was to him self-evident, but this was not just a private thought in the Chronik.  Each Chronik 
was inspected, so the inspector was expected to understand what was being said.  He would 
also have been expected to understand why Father Lojka recorded in 1922 that he had been 
told that one procession at the church was ‘as beautiful as in Father Deckert’s time.  I am 
satisfied with this praise’.  Similar pride shows through, as Lojka informed the office of the 
Archbishop that he had been appointed to the management committee of the ‘Dr. Deckert-
Vereinshaus für den XVIII Bezirk’.44 
Like priests in other parishes, Lojka struggled under post-war conditions to make ends meet.  
Weinhaus had once been a rich parish but, in 1912, the sponsor of the parish had paid a 
settlement to the Church in order to renounce his obligations.45  Income from that source was 
therefore no longer available.  However, the parish Sendbote, founded by Deckert as a fund 
raiser for the parish, was still being published in the 1920s.  It is to be assumed that at some 
point the Ordinariat had taken over the receipts, as Lojka wrote to the Ordinariat and 
appealed for the proceeds to be made available to the parish ‘as in the terms of Deckert’s 
will’.46  The Sendbote must still have been selling reasonably well, as Father Lojka was able 
to report an easing of the finances, but it was not before 1927 that he could record that the 
financial situation was fully resolved.47 
While no records of Father Lojka’s sermons exist, it is probable that he would have passed 
on to his parishioners his sentiments regarding education, the city of Vienna and Jews.  He 
seems to have been successful in retaining his parishioners, noting that at Easter 1922 
Haydn’s ‘Seven Last Words’ was performed to an overflowing church.48  Lojka’s 
observations over the coming years show him to be confident in his own abilities and 
knowledge.  As would be expected, he supported the thrust of Christian Social policy for an 
independent Austria, a policy which received a major boost in 1922, when Monsignor Ignaz 
Seipel took over as Chancellor.   
Seipel, a figure of prominence in both the Church and the Christian Social Party, would be 
Chancellor for five of the next seven years.49  He was an enthusiast for Austrian 
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independence.50  He was also typical of a significant strand in Catholic approaches to the 
post-war world.  He had initially, if reluctantly, led Catholics to accept democracy.51  
Ultimately, he would demonstrate a ‘contempt for democracy which had all along been a 
dominant theme of Catholic thought’.52  This made it easier for others on the Catholic Right 
to reject democracy. 
Lojka could not completely banish his fears as to whether the national coalition forced on 
the Christian Socials might yet undermine this pro-independence policy, or even if their 
coalition partners could be trusted in other ways.  Lojka would have been concerned, 
however, that an agreement between Christian Socials and German nationalists in 1922 
committed the parties to ‘initial contact’ with the German government to explore 
possibilities for Anschluss, even though there were significant numbers of ‘Anschluss 
opponents’ in the Christian Social ranks.53  Anschluss was the key policy aim of German 
nationalists, but it was a secondary issue for many Christian Socials.  In 1922, though, 
Anschluss receded as an issue, when economic difficulties forced the government to seek a 
rescue package from Britain, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.54  Seipel had needed to 
renounce Anschluss for twenty years in return for loans.55 
Lojka sympathised with the opponents of Anschluss.  In 1923, he wrote that Seipel, the 
‘rescuer of ‘little Austria’’, was steering Austria between the Scylla and Charybdis of 
bankruptcy and revolution.  He was less flattering to the Christian Socials’ coalition 
partners, the Deutsche Volkspartei, whose liberal roots he recognised when he described 
them as ‘... these gentlemen who would like to join in with the Sozi (sic) Kulturkampf’.56  
Anticlericalism remained a feature of the political outlook of many German nationalist 
groups, and had potential to cause difficulties for the allies on the Right.  Lojka was a keen 
observer of politics.  He described the German-Russian accord of that year as a ‘bombshell’.  
He noted that there had been antisemitic agitation at the universities in Prague and Vienna.  
He suggested that these would be exploited, presumably for propaganda, by the Social 
Democrats.   
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Lojka is a realistic observer of the elections for the Reichsrat and Vienna City Council.  In 
the national  elections, the Christian Socials had risen from 42% to 45% of the vote, with the 
Social Democrats rising from 36% to just under 40%.57  Not falling for the line that the 
Social Democrats were completely dominant, he believed that the National and City 
elections had turned out ‘fifty-fifty’ over all, but he recognised that in Vienna the ‘Red 
floodtide’ had not yet peaked.  As evidence, he notes that in elections to the Währing district 
council, the Socialists did well and appeared to be moderate, but they were moving people 
into the area, through their building programmes, to ‘arm themselves’ for the next election. 
Alongside these direct political references, Lojka took time to register his disgust at the 
opening by the City Council of a crematorium, despite a government ban on the 
development of such a facility.58  Lojka believed the crematorium would find many 
customers among his ‘dear compatriots’, the Viennese.59  Lojka must therefore have 
believed either that cremation would be spiritually dangerous for Catholics, or that it would 
be harmful to the Church.  Cremation, along with modernity in general, had been seen by 
some in the Church as a sin.  It had even been associated by some Austrian clerics with plots 
by Protestant Pan-Germans to trick Austria’s Catholics into losing their souls.  These clerics 
declared that the dead should be buried, not cremated.60  If Lojka believed that the 
crematorium would be harmful to the Church, this might have been on the grounds that it 
deprived the Church of income from funerals or that it was a further step in the separation of 
the people from the Church.  Whatever the reason, Lojka was clear in his mind that this was 
yet another action by the City in its Kulturkampf.61  Lojka was being perhaps unduly 
pessimistic, but he had some cause.  In Vienna at this period, thousands were estimated to be 
leaving the Church every year, with the figure peaking at 23,000 in 1922.62  Despite this, and 
despite suffering from illness over the next two years or so, he was able to report that while 
the Stolla, the official income of the parish, was falling, the number of participants at mass 
was up, as was their contribution to collections.63 
While Lojka pursued a line in support of Austrian independence, occasionally a priest would 
take a different direction.  In 1921, Father Leopold Schmid, then a curate at Adam 
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Latschka’s old parish of Perchtoldsdorf, was actively supporting the Pan-Germans.64  
Schmid – who will be encountered again later in this work, as parish priest at St. Rochus –   
recognised that a Pan-German audience would be sceptical about his involvement in their 
cause, given the Church’s long-standing support for an independent Austria, so he set out his 
own position.  At a rally in April 1921, he told his audience that all of Austria’s ‘Christian 
German brothers’ needed to stand together, regardless of their denomination.  Once this 
happened, the problems of the class struggle and the ‘Jewish question’ would become 
resolvable.  Schmid urged Austria’s Catholics to take their German co-religionists as role 
models for how they should view Germany, and to give up on the idea of an independent 
Austria.  Schmid assured his audience that, whatever their public statements, most priests in 
Vienna privately supported a Pan-German line.65  This was either an exaggeration or a 
misunderstanding on Schmid’s part.  In general, Vienna’s priests did not support Schmid’s 
suggestions for the abandoning of Austria. 
Political activity by priests varied from parish to parish.  At Neu-Ottakring, Father Leopold 
Rössler had taken office in 1912, and he stayed until October 1938.  His correspondence and 
Chronik entries between these dates show no signs of political activity.  At Alt-Ottakring in 
the early 1920s, the ageing Father Pax also seems to have had no involvement in politics, but 
he did become involved in a very public libel trial.  The editor of a local newspaper, the 
Ottakringer Bezirksblatt, accused a lay church assistant of financial wrong-doing.  Pax 
defended his assistant, but this opened a can of worms.  The running of the parish and its 
finances were called into question and an investigation was launched, chaired by a Christian 
Social MP.66  To the embarrassment of all connected with the parish, Pax lost the libel 
case.67   
During the enquiry, Pax had been assisted by a curate, Father Karl Schwarz, who had been 
appointed with the specific brief of looking after those spiritual aspects of the job which 
were now beyond the elderly Pax.  Schwarz went well beyond his remit and, by the end of 
the libel trial, he was well known to the Ordinariat.  Schwarz showed himself to be a man of 
wide interests, including petitioning to hold masses according to Armenian and Ukrainian 
rites.68  Schwarz had taken up the cause of former military men in his parish.  He had made 
repeated representations on their behalf to the Ordinariat for space to be made available for a 
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war memorial to be consecrated at the Alt-Ottakring parish church.69  At a time when the 
Church was concerned that such memorials might take on political significance, Schwarz 
was persistent in his request, eventually succeeding.70  Then, after the libel trial, he pushed 
for the removal of Pax.  Pax, he declared, had embarrassed the Church by supporting a man 
generally considered to be a liar.71  Pax was effectively frozen out, then retired, leaving 
Schwarz in day-to-day control of the parish.  Cardinal Archbishop Piffl then made Schwarz 
parish priest, as Schwarz had shown himself ‘worthy and suitable’ to take the parish, with 
immediate effect.72 
Courts and libel trials were one way of settling disputes, but Austria was afflicted by 
underlying violence throughout the 1920s.  Right-wing groups such as the Heimwehr, a 
militia often linked with the Christian Social Party, but which also had links with other 
radical Right parties, clashed with the Social Democratic militia, the Schutzbund.  The 
Heimwehr, and similar Right-wing militias, traced their origins back to the end of the First 
World War.  They justified their continued existence into the middle and late 1920s by 
pointing to a ‘Red Threat’.73 
Right-wing militias were, to some extent, reflections of, and extensions to, the Right-wing 
government coalition.  The Heimwehr, for instance, was not a party-based organisation.  Its 
members came from all parties of the Right and none.  Heimwehr provincial organisations 
were normally run by a committee in proportion to the local strength of Christian Socials 
and German nationalists.74  It was also not a single, national organisation, more a federation 
of provincial Heimwehren, reflecting local concerns.  The strength of the movement lay in 
the rural areas, and it has been estimated that 70% were peasants.75  The lack of strong 
central leadership often led to internal divisions, complemented by clashes with other groups 
on the Right, such as with the more ‘nationalistic’ Heimatschutz in Styria in the early 1920s.  
Unsuccessful attempts were made to unite these groups, including an effort by Seipel to win 
finance for a strong, unified anti-Socialist force in 1921.76   Nevertheless, they remained a 
possible source of armed support for the Right-wing government.77  
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Violence took on many forms, and language continued to become more violent too.  By the 
1920s, Deckert’s once controversial antisemitic sentiments had become commonplace 
among significant sections of the population.  For instance, multi-page flyers produced in 
this decade by the Währing–based Karl-Lueger-Bund proudly promoted German and openly 
antisemitic societies in that district.  These flyers could list up to fifty societies publicising 
their gatherings.78  German, in these circles, was shorthand for non-Jewish, and this aspect of 
language can be  seen in many sources. 
In July 1926, the Vienna-based gymnastics organisation Deutscher Turnerbund (1919) 
organised the Second Federal Gymnastics Festival, in Vienna.79  Its commemorative 
programme included that perennial feature of nationalist publications, a list of ‘German’ 
businesses.  The definition of German seems to have had some flexibility, as the list includes 
business owners with Slavic names such as Maly and Plaschkowitz.  The 
Deutschösterreichsiche Tages-Zeitung advertised here, describing itself as ‘the only 
independent people’s (völkisch) newspaper in Vienna’.  Whereas previous publications by 
gymnastic groups had stressed the words German and Christian, this commemorative 
programme indicates that changes were in progress.  The word Aryan appears in an 
advertisement for a department store, the Arisches Warenhaus in Währing.   The Warenhaus 
clearly had a view on what would appeal to those who attended the gymnastics festival.  The 
word ‘Aryan’ has been carefully selected, as it does not appear in advertising in other 
publications, where it appears simply as the Warenhaus on the Währingergürtel.80 An 
advertisement for the Österreichischer Beobachter, an Austrian version of a German 
National Socialist paper, indicates that the Nazis believed the gymnastics event might be a 
fruitful recruiting ground.  
Other groups participated in a range of activities where efforts were being made to shape 
Austria’s German identity.  Catholic and nationalist theatre groups frequently used the 
opportunities and occasions presented by the churches with which they were associated in 
order to disseminate a Catholic, German message. In 1926, the Verband katholischer 
Schriftsteller und Schriftstellerinnen Österreichs organised plays at churches and religious 
sites across Vienna.  Among those taking part in these groups was playwright Richard von 
Kralik.81 
                                                      
78 Mitteilungen christlicher Vereine in Währing, available in the Austrian National Library for 1924 to 1929. 
79 Commemorative programme for Festordnung des 2. Bundesturnfestes in Wien, 15th-18th July 1926 , in ABPD 1926-1927.  
80 For instance RP, 27th April 1927, p.1. 
81 Beniston, p.175. 
  
  Page 175 of 272 
As Richard Geehr has pointed out, Kralik pointed to scapegoats for the causes and 
consequences of war.82  He promoted his version of a German-Christian message.  In the 
1920s, Kralik continued his association with the Christlich-deutsche Volksbühne.  In 1923, 
the tenth anniversary issue of the group’s magazine quoted him at length: 
‘The purpose of our People’s Theatre is to bring to the consciousness of 
each and every one in our fellow national community [Volksgenossen], in a 
lively way, the ideal goods of a nation, in a form in which they have 
become, in the Christian German cultural circle, the spiritual property of the 
German tribe.  Our Art is formed out of the people themselves’.83 
As Kralik put it: ‘To our people, the theatre is no business, but a national institution’.  This 
manifesto-like declaration from Kralik is counter-signed by Josef Rütsch, leader of the 
Catholic Vogelsangverein, and Michel (sic) Röbauer, Deputy Chairman of the North East 
Vienna section of the Alldeutsches Verband.  The christlich-deutsche Volksbühne was a 
common ground for those with radical German views of various kinds.    
From 1922 onwards, the early plays of Kralik were revived for young performers.  
Everything associated with the group was calculated to present an image of German 
Christianity, down to the Gothic script and Catholic imagery of posters for its productions.  
This was a widespread activity, as the Volksbühne aided many groups in many districts.  One 
of these alone, the Spielleute Gottes, gave 2700 performances, by invitation only, between 
1925 and 1933, approximately one performance every day.84  It was a group that was well 
regarded in some sections of the Viennese press.85 
Kralik used Reichspost to voice antisemitic and anti-democratic viewpoints.86  He published 
pamphlets which targeted younger readers and aimed to draw them into an antisemitic orbit, 
but the antisemitic context in which his plays were performed was as important as their overt 
content.87  Not every member of these groups, not even every group, would have had an 
exclusionary purpose, nor would every member have been susceptible to these messages, but 
activity layered upon activity in spreading exclusionary messages.  Practising Catholics who 
participated in these groups were exposed to sermons and parish newsletters which urged 
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Christians to ‘buy only from Christians’ and only to read the ‘Christian’ press – in other 
words, not the ‘Jewish’ press.88  As has been seen, Kralik could extend the boundaries of 
who might be allowed to belong to include Pan-Germans, whether Catholic or not, as long as 
they were Christian. 
A Muted War 
In April 1927, elections took place for the national parliament and for the Vienna Rathaus.  
Christian Socials and Pan-Germans stood together on a ‘Unity List’, the Einheitsliste.  In the 
municipal elections, the Socialists retained control of the Rathaus, with no change in the 
number of their representatives.  The Einheitsliste polled 35% of the vote in Vienna, far 
from a majority, but still a substantial proportion of the vote.  In the national elections, the 
Einheitsliste won 85 seats, down from its previous combined total of 92.  The Socialists 
moved up to 42% and 83 seats.  The largely anticlerical Agrarian League progressed from 
five seats to nine.  It was persuaded to bury its differences with the Christian Socials and to 
enter government, in the interests of a common bourgeois front.  The bourgeois coalition 
now had 94 seats, two more than before, and the Christian Socials, still under Monsignor 
Seipel, emerged as leaders of the government.89  Perhaps fear helped to bond the parties of 
the Right.  The Social Democrats were now the largest single party in parliament, and might 
still have capacity to grow further. 
On the day after the election, the Christian Social Reichspost pointed to setbacks for the Pan-
Germans, who lost the last two parliamentary seats they had held in Vienna.  Reichspost 
declared, probably with some relief: ‘Marxist Victory Thwarted’.90  The liberal Neue Freie 
Presse, traditionally a target for Reichspost because of its alleged Jewish connections, was 
no less triumphalist, with a headline of: ‘Social Democratic Assault Beaten Back’.  It 
continued: ‘Austria will not be ruled by Marxists.... the high water mark of the red terror has 
been reached’.91  While differences existed between Christian Socials and German 
nationalists, these could often be overcome for common bourgeois purposes.  Only the most 
extreme Nationalists, very few in number, stayed away from coalition.  Despite later 
attempts at the ‘decoupling of Christian Socials and the German nationalists’, they ‘shared 
political positions on a range of domestic issues’ throughout the First Republic.92  
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At the time of the elections, tensions between Left and Right were even higher than usual 
under the Republic.  In January of that year, a Socialist outing had turned into a political 
demonstration. Fighting broke out between the Socialists and members of a Right-wing 
veterans’ association, the Frontkämpfervereinigung.  Shots from the 
Frontkämpfervereinigung killed a man and child among the Socialists.  The trial of those 
alleged to have committed the killings took place in July 1927 but, despite the evidence 
against them, the accused were acquitted.  Socialist-supporting centres exploded into 
violence.  In riots in Vienna, the Palace of Justice was burnt down, the army was called in 
and, in the subsequent action, nearly ninety workers were killed and six hundred wounded. 93 
The public reaction of Social Democratic leaders was to blame the Vienna chief of police, 
Johann Schober, for these latest killings of workers.  Schober, who had also been police 
chief under the Habsburgs, now also led a Pan-German party in the national coalition with 
the Christian Socials.94  He had also expressed sympathy with Right-wing militias such as 
the Heimwehr.95  The Socialists denounced Schober as an ‘assassin’.   Even a priest, Father 
Lojka, forgot the seriousness of murder, favouring property rights over life.  He noted that 
the 1927 disturbances were nothing more than the result of the Socialists becoming worked 
up about some of their number being shot by people legally protecting their property.96  
Condemnations and recriminations came from all sides, and there were fears that serious 
armed confrontations would lead to civil war.  The Church made calls for its followers to 
join the Heimwehr.97  The Socialists called on their followers to leave the Church.98  
Somehow, the situation calmed.  Violence was still a frequent occurrence, but remained 
sporadic rather than systematic.  The main violence was between paramilitaries from the 
Social Democrats on the one hand and Heimwehr-like groups on the other.99  
In the late 1920s, for all the talk of a ‘Red Menace’, and while the Social Democrats were 
still nominally in control of Vienna, the Party’s position would come under threat from the 
superior forces that could back up the government if violence provoked a real crisis.  The 
events of 1927 had given the impetus to what has been described as ‘a sustained counter-
revolutionary thrust and the rapid growth of the Heimwehr’.100  Certainly, the radical Right 
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would have viewed its activities as counter-revolutionary, in terms of threatening to prevent 
by force the political, social and economic objectives of the Social Democrats, but it was 
elements of the Right that were behaving in a revolutionary manner, acting against the 
Republic.   
The events of Schattendorf, and of July 1927, have been singled out as the last chance for 
the warring groups of the Republic to lay down their arms, metaphorically and literally, and 
to work together.101  Yet, little more than a year later, a major event to commemorate the 
centenary of the death of one of Vienna’s most famous citizens, Franz Schubert, organised 
under the banner of the Deutscher Sängerbund, was attended by singers of all political 
persuasions.102  Leading political figures from all parties greeted the participants in July 
1928:  Social Democratic mayor of Vienna Karl Seitz; Christian Social chancellor Cardinal 
Seipel and German nationalist and Vienna police chief Johannes Schober.103  Police 
estimated that 200,000 singers came from all over the territory of the former Habsburg and 
German Empires.  During the eight days over which the event took place, much attention 
was paid to Schubert as a ‘true son of Germany’, but the event took on a political tone.  
Spontaneous cries rang out, calling for Anschluss.104  Remarkably, given the events of the 
year before, and despite new reports of a Heimwehr shooting of participants in a worker’s 
gathering in Au bei Kapfenberg, no trouble was reported at the Schubertfest.105   
One interpretation of the Schubert centenary is that it disproves that Schattendorf and its 
consequences were terminal for relationships between Austria’s competing groups.  It 
should be seen as an occasion at which Austrians could put aside their differences and rally 
to a Pan-German cause.  German solidarity was certainly on display during the event but, as 
has already been shown, this had very different meanings for different people.  The event did 
demonstrate that a broad form of Pan-Germanism could bring people together – as did the 
music of Schubert – but this was a passing moment.  It is just as important, for this study, to 
assess what the behaviour of delegates would have been away from the event.  Before the 
event, singers would have operated within their own, politically defined groups, whether 
Social Democrat or bourgeois, something recognised within the Social Democratic ranks.  
The Social Democrats went so far as to say that, while this was an event which demonstrated 
what would happen if Austrians were granted self-determination, they were the modern and 
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progressive side of a German future, compared with the nostalgia on display in the Trachtl 
and carriages of those on the Right who looked to the past.106  Too much should not be read 
into Pan-Germanism as a single unifying force.  The agendas and objectives of the groups 
that gathered for the celebrations would have been very different, as would their visions of 
society.  After the event, despite their common desire for a union with the kind of Germany 
that was on offer in 1928, they would go their own ways. 
In late 1929, Monsignor Seipel was a prominent figure in a group that wished to replace 
parts of the constitution, to the extent that the Republic would be transformed along an 
‘authoritarian course’.  Under these plans, the government would be run by a directly elected 
president with extensive powers, supported by a corporate chamber in Parliament.  Seipel 
expected that support in these objectives, if he needed resort to arms, would come from the 
Heimwehr.  The risk to democracy was such that Western governments threatened to 
withhold loans that were needed to keep the economy running.  In the end, the threats were 
not carried out.107   
Chancellor Schober entered into secret negotiations with the Social Democrats to achieve 
reform through legal means.108  In December 1929, a compromise agreement gave strong 
powers to the President, who could now issue emergency decrees, at least for a limited 
period.  The President could also dissolve Parliament.  Local government, including the 
Socialist stronghold of Vienna, was left largely untouched.  This was not the outcome that 
Seipel, and others around him, had intended.  Parliament may now have had to share power 
with the President, but democracy was intact.  While Seipel may have lost this battle, he felt 
he had not lost the war.  He lamented that ‘people are dissatisfied with the old forms of 
democracy and parliamentarism’, and predicted further turmoil before his kinds of reforms 
could be implemented.109 Seipel, and others on the Right, were disappointed that a more 
authoritarian stance, which would have favoured the national government that they 
controlled, had not been approved.   
Seipel and his German Nationalist allies found less agreement on the state in which they saw 
their future.  While Seipel had been publicly ambiguous towards Anschluss, foreign 
observers noted that in late 1929 he was changing his position.  Seipel was ‘coming out 
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definitely, though of course not publicly, as an opponent of the Anschluss…’.110  This did 
not stop Seipel from writing in private in 1930 that he had ‘no objection’ to Anschluss, but 
he did not want ‘agitation’.  He felt that Austrians, from their Habsburg heritage, were a ‘big 
state’ people, suited to a larger role in European politics.111   
Seipel may have had ‘no objection’, but he was no enthusiast for Anschluss and he could say 
one thing while meaning another.  In 1928, in an exchange of private correspondence in 
which he states he has no objection to Anschluss, Seipel writes of his belief that Austria’s 
Germans were part of a larger community not just of Germans but of Central Europeans:  
The question of whether or not Anschluss ought to come at any time is 
bound up with the other question of whether or not the Austrian Germans 
have trifled away their historical task for all time. This mission might be 
placed before them once more, either as an Austrian, an eastern European, a 
central European, or a pan-European task.112 
Seipel personified the position of many in the Christian Social party.  They viewed Austria 
as their rightful home, but they saw other homes, interpreted in many ways, in Germany and 
Central Europe.  Their Pan-German heritage was, however, only part of their identity.  They 
would have viewed the Republic as nothing more than a provisional stage in a longer 
Austrian history.  
Father Lojka in Weinhaus certainly opposed the idea of union with Germany, but he was no 
supporter of the Republic.  As has been seen, he was an antisemite who objected to anything 
that had the flavour, for him, of Socialism or Freemasonry.  By 1930, his Chronik entries 
show that he was turning against the Republic and democracy in other ways.  While most of 
Lojka’s concerns seem to have been of the everyday kind, he continued to be a keen 
chronicler of political developments  He wrote at length about the Heimwehr and one of its 
leaders, Richard Steidle.  Steidle was a man who had ‘finally unmasked himself and 
declared that the Heimwehr rejects democracy and parliamentarianism’.113   Lojka welcomed 
‘with an open heart’ the Heimwehr’s intentions to use Fascism as the basis on which to build 
society.114  He was not alone.  Elements of disaffected bourgeois society did the same and, 
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continuing a long tradition of political involvement, trade groups in the 1920s maintained 
links with radical groups such as the Heimwehr.115 
Lojka wrote approvingly of Steidle and followed Seipel in extolling an authoritarian 
approach to government that would replace democracy but, by 1930, this was not just the 
opinion of a few individuals in the fractious political climate of Vienna and Austria.  Across 
Central and Eastern Europe, many of the ‘nation states’ founded in the aftermath of the First 
World War had shed their democratic constitutions.  From Latvia through Poland to 
Hungary, authoritarian régimes had taken power one after the other, claiming that such steps 
were necessary to deal with economic and social crises, or to protect the state from the 
Soviet Union to the East.116  Some modelled themselves, to some extent, on Mussolini’s 
Fascist Italy, and it was well known that the Heimwehr received subsidies from Mussolini, 
in the shape of cash and arms.117  Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the 
Heimwehr was a home grown movement, whose origins were deep in Austria.118 
Lojka would have been aware of this, and of the swearing by the Heimwehr in 1930 of the 
Korneuburg oath, an undertaking to work to take power in order to renew the state and 
defeat those who promoted class struggle.119  This oath also declared the state to be the 
embodiment of the Volksgemeinschaft, the community of the people.  Lojka’s Chronik 
hinted heavily that he thought this Fascist style approach was an idea which might be 
applied successfully in Austria.120  It was not clear, however, what that Fascist style would 
be, nor where it would lead.  The Heimwehr was initially split over the question of 
Anschluss.  It was also clearly fascist leaning, but divided as to whether it should see its role 
models in Germany or Italy.  In April 1930, Steidle won financial support from Italy.  By 
September of that year, the far more German leaning Prince Ernst Rüdiger von Starhemberg 
had forced him out.121  To some extent, whether Austrians took a position for or against 
Anschluss was irrelevant  since, even in 1930, the Entente powers were not prepared to allow 
such a move. In 1930, the French banned the signing of the trade agreement between Austria 
and Germany as, in their view, this was a step towards Anschluss.122  
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A Political Reconfiguration 
In November 1930, national elections took place.  The Social Democratic Party emerged as 
the largest party, with 41% of the vote nationally and 72 seats, but short of a majority.  The 
Heimwehr broke its normal non-party stance and fielded its own candidates, giving it the 
appearance of being yet another political party.123  Heimwehr leaders in Styria and Salzburg 
had wanted to work with the National Socialists, while others elsewhere favoured the 
Christian Socials.  The Heimwehr won 6.2% of the vote and eight seats.124  In the end, the 
Christian Socials fell back to a little under 36% of the vote and 66 seats.  In order to form a 
governing coalition, the Christian Socials needed the support of Schober, who had 
established his own grouping, the Nationaler Wirtschaftsblock und Landbund, which polled 
11.6% and gained 19 seats.   
In Vienna itself, the 1930 elections gave the Christian Socials a bigger shock.  In the 1923 
national elections, they had been far the biggest party of the Right in Vienna, and with 
nearly 340,000 supporters they had commanded more than six times the support of the Pan-
Germans.  The Christian Socials must have been shocked in 1930 as, in Vienna, the Pan-
Germans surged past 150,000 votes, and the Christian Social Party fell back to 283,000 
votes.  If the Pan-Germans were not snapping at the tails of the Christian Socials, they did 
now at least have them in sight.125 
At this time, the National Socialists were far from being a threat in Austria.  In national 
elections in Germany in September 1930, they had polled 18%.126  In the 1930 Austrian 
elections, they polled three per cent and won no seats.127  They were not, though, without 
admirers.  Prince Starhemberg was happy that a large number of votes on the Right had gone 
against the government, and he was convinced that the Heimwehr and the National Socialists 
would eventually join together.128  His vision was to reunite all Germans and, in  October 
1930, he declared:  
We are all conscious that we are a German people; we want to make the old 
Ostmark German and Christian again; this will be only the first stage, until a 
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greater German Empire comes into being, which will last for many thousand 
years.129 
He vowed that he would now ‘lead the Heimwehr under the Pan-German idea against the 
Parliamentary parties’.130  Starhemberg was hoping to take it back to a state where it would 
be perceived as ‘above class’, for the whole Volksgemeinschaft.131  This was to be a pipe 
dream, and Starhemberg had significantly overestimated his own and his movement’s 
capabilities and appeal.   In Provincial Elections in 1931, the Heimwehr won no seats.  
Starhemberg was forced out as leader, then brought back again when his successor, Walter 
Pfrimer, took part in a failed Putsch in September 1931.132   
A little over six months later, in April 1932, the political climate had become even more 
radicalised.  In Germany, Nazi paramilitary units had taken to the streets.  In Austria too, 
especially in Vienna, these units stepped up their attacks and somehow evaded justice, for 
the most part.133  The Nazis put themselves forward as ‘men of action’, brave enough to take 
the ‘necessary steps’ to remedy the situation.  In Germany, they were beginning to have 
success in this portrayal.  If the Nazis could repeat their German successes in Austria, they 
might threaten Austrian independence. 
SUMMARY 
Elements on the Right struggled to find an accommodation with the Austrian Republic that 
came into existence in 1920.  Its constitution, according to some, was an alien imposition, 
and  some believed that, while the First World War was over, little more than the ‘fiction of 
Peace’ prevailed.  Many on the Right gave Austria as a state only qualified support, as they 
aimed for an eventual Anschluss, and the Right as a whole expressed its antipathy to the new 
world in many ways.  Social Democratic Vienna was pictured as a Bolshevik menace, 
another alien imposition.  Vienna was presented in opposition to the ‘true’ heritage of 
Austria, in its rural heartlands.  
In looking to turn back the clock to an idealised world, the Right tried to find ways forward.  
Anschluss was seen as one way out of the difficult economic conditions of the 1920s, but not 
by everyone.  Chancellor Seipel was not alone, and not just among the clergy, in staying 
loyal to an independent Austria.  His vision of Austria was not, however, democratic.  It was 
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the kind of Austria promoted by some bourgeois groups in familiar terms, as ‘Christian 
German’. German nationalists and Christian Socials sometimes stood against each other in 
elections, while at other times they formed electoral alliances and put together coalition 
governments.  In the militias, the barriers between them came down completely, as they 
mingled in local groups to protect bourgeois interests.  The militias, many of which were 
formed at a time of instability in the immediate post-war period, became in turn a cause of 
instability. 
The events of 1927 reinforced the division between a Socialist bloc on one side, and a 
bourgeois bloc on the other.  As part of a wider pattern of reaction in Europe, the likes of 
Seipel were reinforced in their authoritarian instincts, and others who shared this view came 
to prominence, such as Steidle and Starhemberg.  Their views found echoes in the parishes, 
such as in the Chronik of Father Lojka.  They could agree that their principal target was 
Bolshevism.  Seipel, Starhemberg and others could imagine Austria, somehow, as part of a 
Pan-German crusade in Europe, but they could  not agree on how.  In 1932, agreement, if it 
involved Anschluss, would have led nowhere anyway.  Without the consent of the Entente, 
any such move would have been blocked in the League of Nations.  In this, the pro-
Anschluss Right was without great influence. 
Yet, within Vienna, the Right did have influence, despite the political dominance of the 
Social Democrats at the City level.  The long term influences, the language and ideas that 
had been promoted by antisemitic politicians and the likes of Fathers Abel and Deckert, 
were still coming through, as attested by witnesses such as Funder and Lojka.  Their vision 
of how identity and belonging should be defined, as ethnic and exclusionary, was rooted 
deeply in sections of the Right, and taken to be a normal view of the world.
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CHAPTER 9:  ‘THE HOTLY RESISTED ANSCHLUSS’ 
At the beginning of 1932, the Christian Socials remained the major party on the Right in 
Austria.  Collectively, they supported Austrian independence, although some would have 
been of a mind that independent Austria did not have to be democratic.  Christian Social 
strength was, however, uncertain.  German nationalists had made great gains in the 1930 
elections.  The question in 1932 was whether elections to Vienna City Council would see the 
National Socialists mirror in Austria the growing electoral success of their German co-party.  
If so, the Nazis might threaten not just the democratic Republic, but the independence of 
Austria.  Nevertheless, changes in Austrian domestic politics alone, without changes in the 
international political and diplomatic climates would be insufficient to bring about 
Anschluss.   
This chapter divides the years 1932 to 1938 into four periods, each of which contains at least 
one major event in the shaping of Austrian history.  In the first three of these periods, to 
1936, the likelihood of Anschluss between Austria and Germany was slim.  Only from mid-
1936 could it be said that an imminent Anschluss began to look possible.  This chapter does 
not go into international events in detail, important as they were for the mechanics of 
achieving Anschluss.  This chapter shows instead how, right into the 1930s, those on the 
radical Right in Vienna, who wanted to pursue a policy of independence, remained a fairly 
coherent bloc, even if that bloc was beginning to erode at the edges.  After 1933, and the 
Nazi seizure of power in Germany, the idea of Anschluss with Nazi Germany, was fiercely 
resisted by many antisemites.  
This chapter begins to sum up answers to two key questions posed in this work, concerning 
the depth and extent of radical German nationalism in the city.  It examines the question of 
whether, by early 1938, many who had previously supported an independent Austria now 
saw Anschluss as the primary means by which their radical German visions could be 
achieved.  It does so by continuing to examine the activities of Pan-German and Christian 
Social activists, while looking at the impact on these circles of the rising Nazi Party.  This 
chapter sets its analysis after 1934 against the background of changes to the political form of 
the Austrian state.  It looks at whether, with regard to antisemitism, the practices, rather than 
the official policies, of the Corporate State helped to reinforce antisemitic and exclusionary 
visions of being German.  
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An End To Austrian Democracy 
On 23rd April 1932, Reichspost reported a series of political terror attacks, indicating the 
Nazis as the prime culprits.1  The newspaper also indirectly recognised the threat the Nazis 
now posed to the electoral base of the Christian Socials in Vienna, but less clearly.  
Reichspost was uncertain just how vulnerable the Christian Socials and the Pan-Germans 
were to the new threat from their Right, so the extent of the breakthrough that the National 
Socialists then achieved in the elections of April 1932 to Vienna City Council must have 
been a huge shock. 
On the day after the elections, 25th April 1932, the Viennese Socialist paper Das kleine Blatt 
trumpeted another successful campaign for the Social Democratic Party.  Its front page 
shouted out: Victorious in Vienna! to indicate the Socialist hold on the Council.  A smaller 
headline announced: ‘Swastika men halve the Christian Socials and annihilate the Pan-
Germans’.2  The figures made depressing reading for the Christian Socials.  The Social 
Democrats dominated, with 682,323 out of over 1.1 million votes.  The Christian Socials 
lagged far behind, on 233,461.  The most remarkable result, however, was that achieved by 
the Nazis. 
The Nazis gathered 170,000 votes more than they had won in 1930, the previous elections 
that had involved the whole of Vienna.  They reached over 200,000 votes in total.  The Pan-
Germans were almost wiped out.  They lost most of their 150,000 supporters from 1930, and 
fell back to 35,000 votes.  This was below even the levels of support they had achieved 
before their surge in 1930.  Most, if not all, of their defecting supporters must have passed to 
the Nazis.  Compared with the Social Democrats’ 66 seats, the Christian Socials had 19 and 
the National Socialists now had 15.  No other party was represented.  Das kleine Blatt was 
clear how it viewed the result: ‘The Christian Socials are defeated – now on to battle with 
the Swastika men!’3  
The result as it affected the Right in Vienna was replicated in large part in places where 
elections were held across Austria.  Christian Socials were repeatedly challenged by the 
Nazis for their leading position on the Right.  In elections to the Salzburg Landtag, the 
Christian Socials retained twelve of their thirteen seats, but lost the majority they had 
previously held there.  They also lost sole control of Lower Austria, but the big losers again 
                                                      
1 RP, 23rd April 1932, p.4, reports on the stabbing of a Schutzbund member in Liesing and a ‘stormy election gathering’ in 
Hadersdorf-Weidlingau.   See also dkB, 25th April 1932, p.3, on a bomb attack in Linz. 
2 dkB, 25th April 1932, p.1. 
3 dkB, 25th April 1932, p.1. 
  
  Page 187 of 272 
were the Pan-Germans, who lost all five seats they had held.4  In municipal elections in 
towns other than the provincial capitals in Carinthia and Styria, the Social Democratic Party 
had mixed fortunes.  The Party claimed that its vote was down in areas where workers had 
left because of unemployment.  In other towns, the Left vote held up.5  Das kleine Blatt 
favoured a Social Democratic interpretation of results, noting that the Social Democrats’ 
figures held up in Vienna at a level comparable with the elections of 1930.  The Christian 
Social Reichspost agreed, but from a different point of view.  ‘No red Austria’ was its lead.  
It continued: ‘Explosion of National Socialism, but great losses for the moderate bourgeois 
parties’.6 
On the same day, Das kleine Blatt reported the results of elections to state assemblies in 
Germany: ‘Huge Successes For The National Socialists’.7  In Prussia, eight million had 
voted for the Nazis, compared with 4.7 million for the Social Democrats, 3.4 million for the 
Catholic party, the Zentrum, 2.8 million for the Communists and 1.5 million for the German 
nationalists.  While these results were impressive for the National Socialists, and no doubt a 
sign of what might happen in Austria, the Nazis had still not managed a majority in Prussia.  
The pattern was repeated in Bavaria, Anhalt and Württemberg.8   
The figures across Vienna strongly indicate that the Nazis had made their gains almost 
exclusively from former supporters of the Christian Socials and the Pan-Germans.9  The total 
Nazi gain was 173,000, while the combined losses for the Christian Socials and the Pan-
Germans were 165,134.  In many districts, the gains made by the Nazis were extremely 
close to the joint losses of the Christian Socials and Pan-Germans.  In Simmering, the 
bourgeois parties lost 1,347 votes and the Nazis gained 1,166.  In Favoriten, the bourgeois 
parties lost 7,545 votes compared with 7,288 gained by the Nazis.  Only in Floridsdorf did 
Nazi gains significantly exceed these losses, which initially appears to suggest that, in this 
district, voters from other parties also crossed over.  However, turnout was up significantly 
in Floridsdorf on that of 1930, and the Social Democrats also gained over 2,000 votes.10  As 
John Lauridsen has observed: 
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‘The political reconfiguration [of 1930 to 1933] took place not between the 
blocs, but within the bourgeois bloc.  Furthermore, it was not only the 
adherents of the national camp who found their way to Nazism’.11 
The claim by Das kleine Blatt that the Christian Socials had seen their support halved was an 
exaggeration, but the party had lost about eighteen per cent of its vote.  The Pan-Germans, 
by contrast, lost three voters in four.   
The near elimination of the Pan-Germans shifted the political landscape.  If repeated at the 
national level, this would remove a potential government coalition ally from the Christian 
Socials.  While the Christian Socials had been able to find a modus vivendi with the Pan-
Germans, it was unlikely that the Nazis would accept a being junior partners of the Christian 
Socials.  The Christian Socials were also now on the verge of becoming a minority party on 
the Right in Vienna.  In five districts, they were displaced by the Nazis as the largest Right-
wing party.  In a further four, Nazi and Pan-German votes combined exceeded the Christian 
Social total.12  The Christian Socials now had clear water between themselves and their 
opponents to the Right in very few districts.   
After 1918, the Party had accepted that it would have to play second fiddle in Vienna to the 
Social Democrats, as it had expected.  The new prospect of falling further down the political 
pecking order would have been a shock.  The Nazis had roots in predecessor parties in 
Austria, not just in Germany, but only recently had they begun to develop an extensive party 
organisation in Austria.  This was paying off.13  Well informed Christian Social leaders 
would have been aware that membership of the Nazi Party, from a low base, was growing.14  
Nazi successes in the elections shook the national government.  The Buresch administration 
fell and was replaced by one led by Engelbert Dollfuss, who became Chancellor on 20th May 
1932.15  Dollfuss adopted the stance of a strongman, and brought the Heimwehr into his 
coalition government.16  This further split the non-Nazi paramilitary Right, as the Styrian 
Heimatschutz immediately broke relations with the Heimwehr.17   
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Das kleine Blatt saw the National Socialists as ‘the party of brutal reaction’.18  Other 
opponents of the Nazis in Vienna saw something new, not just reaction, and some of the 
most vigorous of these opponents were Catholic priests.  One such, Father Albert Schubert, 
was to be found in the district of Währing, at the church of St. Laurenz-Gertrud, where he 
was priest from 1923 to 1942.  In his Chronik, Schubert, like his near neighbour Father 
Lojka, encountered earlier, combined the everyday with the political.  In 1932, he recorded 
the plight of the unemployed and efforts to help them by the Church, Government and the 
City Council.   He noted the shortages of fuel and food and, in particular, the effect of 
inflation on those Mittelständer with fixed or barely rising incomes.  He paid great tribute to 
Cardinal Piffl, Archbishop of Vienna, who had died in April, just before the municipal 
elections.19  
While the parishes of Schubert and Lojka are divided from each other by little more than a 
ten minute walk, and both lie within the district of Währing, the two men were divided from 
each other in their approach to politics.  Schubert was in this respect much more directly 
engaged than Father Lojka.  As well as his Chronik, he had an additional vehicle of record, 
his parish newsletter, the St. Laurenz-Gertrud Pfarrblatt, established in 1932.20  A founding 
purpose of the newsletter was to provide a serialised history of the parish, which would give 
local people a better understanding of the church’s roots in the district.  The primary focus of 
the parish newsletter was religion, but it was also a favourite tool of Schubert’s for talking 
about current events.  In December 1932, he wrote that, while he did not engage in politics, 
he had to address the question of what the Nazi Party meant to religion.  Schubert did not see 
the Nazis as a form of reaction.  He recognised the Nazi Party not only as a political party, 
but as a totalitarian movement that aimed at forming people’s Weltanschauung.  Because 
many Catholics and even Protestants had shown that this was a dangerous movement for 
them, he had a responsibility to speak up.  As he put it:  ‘Should I be a dog who fails to bark 
when enemies break in?’21 
At the time when Schubert was writing, the Nazi Party was growing in strength.  It made 
gains in provincial elections in November, 1932 and April 1933.22  In the Viennese district 
of Währing, where Father Schubert was based, the Nazi Party had polled over 15,000 votes 
in the recent election.  This made it the largest party of the Right in Währing, with 28 per 
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cent of turnout.23   The party was able to produce a newsletter of its own, the NS Nachrichten 
für den XVIII Bezirk, and its December 1932 issue ran to 32 pages.  There were the expected 
propaganda pieces, including one attacking Jews for exploiting Gentiles in the Christmas 
trade, but the paper also carried nearly five pages of advertising.24  There were 
advertisements for small shops, delicatessens, radios for rental or purchase, skiing 
equipment, and for a French lady who taught English and Italian.  The businesses that 
advertised were not just in Währing, but from other districts, including Alsergrund, the 
Josefstadt, Wieden and the Innere Stadt.  Advertisements appeared for the perfumery Floris, 
in Vienna’s richest shopping street, Graben.  Floris described itself as an ‘Aryan firm’.  The 
Altes Währinger Brauhaus, in the very smart and respectable Gentzgasse, declared itself to 
be the meeting place of the local Nazi Party.25  This local party was attracting members, and 
these businesses did not want to miss out on their custom. 
Schubert was therefore taking on a significant local enemy.  His comments in the December 
1932 issue of his parish newsletter stirred up trouble with the Nazi Party in Währing.  They 
condemned his intervention in politics as part of a general trend for priests to act as 
propaganda agents for the Christian Socials.  In the January 1933 edition, Schubert asked 
why the Christian Socials complained of a lack of clerical support if priests were intervening 
on their behalf.  He added the reasons for his comments against the Nazis.  ‘Above all, I 
confirm that I distance myself from this movement not because of its political aims, but 
purely because of its world view.’26  He re-affirmed that a priest had a duty to lead, as 
politics had a cultural dimension.  ‘First and foremost, I am a Catholic priest, and I am so 
from complete conviction’.  He had no classes of ‘parish children’.  They were all the same 
to him, whatever their political allegiance, even if some had strayed.   
Schubert went on to rebut claims, made in letters he had received, that Hitler was a prophet.  
This was not, he says, compatible with Catholicism.  Nazism was more like an ‘idolatrous 
cult’, foreign to the German way, and he quoted Bismarck: ‘Bow only to God, not men!’  To 
make sure his parishioners understood that the Church was united on the matter, he stated 
that he was not alone in this belief and his curates fully supported him.27  Schubert, however, 
was not just replying to Nazi attacks on his intervention in politics.  He had a second reason 
for writing.   His ‘national feeling had been called into doubt’, even though he had an ‘inner 
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love for our German people’ and his whole heart reached out to his Sudeten German 
Homeland.  He reminded his readers that he was, after all, an honorary member of a 
Landsmannschaft, a cultural and welfare organisation called ‘Riesengebirge’, based in 
Trautenau, Bohemia.28   
This reference to his Sudeten background would have carried considerable weight with his 
readers.  The Sudetenland had connotations both as a German heartland and a place that was 
at that time said to be under threat from a Czechoslovak government allegedly 
discriminating against Germans there.  This reference placed Schubert firmly in the 
vanguard of German culture and its defence.  In January 1933, Schubert added to this image, 
when he defended himself from accusations by Nazis in the Währing district that he was 
close to Jews.  Father Schubert wrote in the parish newsletter: ‘I was a convinced antisemite 
before there were any Nazis, when certain gentlemen sat in junior school’.29  These ‘certain 
gentlemen’ were his Nazi accusers.  Schubert and the Nazis then exchanged insults in their 
respective publications.  Schubert would learn later that the Nazis had long memories. 
Not all priests played such a forthright role in politics, even though they would later be 
drawn reluctantly into this world.  The biography of Father Schwarz, of Alt-Ottakring, tells 
us that he had nothing to do with party politics, but he did run into controversy in other 
ways. In 1932, he was still picking up the pieces from the libel trial with which his 
predecessor had become involved.30  Separately, a dispute broke out between two curates.  
One alleged that the other had been signing cheques in the name of the other, while staying 
too long on holiday.  There were added suspicions of drink and gambling.  In the heat of the 
dispute, one curate went so far as to question Schwarz’s credibility as parish priest.31   
By 1933, Schwarz was recording how shortages of funds were making it difficult to find 
sufficient resources for the institutions for children that were run by the parish.32  As well as 
providing education to the young and deprived, he attempted to alleviate the problems of 
child birth and large families, by giving women information on natural birth control.33  
While this was not against the letter of Catholic doctrine, some of his more conservative 
fellow priests might have thought it against its spirit.  They would have stressed the need for 
love in a sexual relationship, with the objective of producing children, not pleasure.  
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Schwarz must have been mentally tough to provide this teaching.  In years to come, he 
would need this toughness. 
By this time, Austrian politics was about to reach a conclusion that many had feared, 
although the manner in which it came about was completely unexpected.  On 4th March 
1933, Parliament was left without senior procedural officers, after a series of resignations.  
In their absence, Chancellor Dollfuss suspended Parliament and announced he would rule by 
decree, as allowed under  laws dating from 1917.34  On 5th March, he went further, and 
announced that he would run the country in an authoritarian manner.  He gave assurances 
that this would be a temporary measure, solely to take firm action and circumvent delays 
caused by parliamentary debate.35   Despite this, Dollfuss would have had one eye on events 
to the North.  On 5th March 1933, the Nazi Party in Germany won 43% of the vote for the 
Reichstag elections and emerged as the largest party, consolidating Adolf Hitler in the role 
of German Chancellor that he had occupied since January.  These elections confirmed that 
Germany was run by a party with an expansionist policy and designs on Austria.36 
Despite reassurances from Dollfuss, the end of democracy was hastened through.  In this, he 
was supported by a Church which encouraged the restoration of ‘Austria’s traditional social 
order’.37  On 7th March 1933, the cabinet announced it would govern without Parliament.38  
On 15th March, Social Democratic and Pan-German MPs attempted to counter Dollfuss, by 
entering Parliament and taking their seats, but they were prevented from doing so by police.  
On 31st March 1933, the Schutzbund was banned and steps were taken to disarm it.39  One 
month after the suspension of parliament, the Church celebrated a new start for Austria with 
the ringing of bells.40   
On 23rd April, local and provincial elections in Innsbruck showed losses for the established 
parties.  Only the National Socialists made gains.41  In Vienna, the trend in voting patterns 
on the Right from 1923 to 1930 had been away from the Christian Socials and towards the 
Pan-Germans.  In 1932, the trend was even more distinctly away from the Christian Socials, 
and now towards the Nazis.  A ban was placed on all May Day activities, according to some 
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with the aim of preventing the Nazis and Socialists clashing.42  On 10th May 1933, all 
elections at local and national level were abolished.  On 15th May, the Nazis and the Pan-
Germans announced a joint front against Dollfuss, the ‘Union of Struggle’.43  Five days 
later, Dollfuss announced the founding of the Vaterländische Front, the Patriotic Front, a 
grouping to supersede political movements.44  Finally, in recognition of where he believed 
the most significant threat to his state-building project lay, on 19th June 1933 Dollfuss 
dissolved the Austrian National Socialists.45 
It has been argued that, initially, Dollfuss did not intend to go as far as he did.46  However, 
by Spring 1933, Dollfuss had seen from events in Germany that the Nazis could dominate 
the Right, and there can be little doubt that Dollfuss took the opportunity to launch a coup 
that was anti-Nazi.47  He would have been concerned that his party’s traditional bourgeois 
support was defecting to the National Socialists.48  Yet he would have known that there was 
also bourgeois opposition to Anschluss, with others sharing his fears of the kind of state that 
the Nazis were trying to create in Germany.49  Dollfuss himself had shown ambivalence with 
regard to the idea when, in the 1920s, he briefly supported the idea, as Austria faced 
economic collapse.50  Now, with the Nazis in power in Germany, he opposed it.  
The principal long-term enemy of the Christian Socials had been the Social Democratic 
Party.  Beyond the Christian Social rhetoric, however, few would have believed that the 
Social Democrats were an immediate threat to the post-First World War settlement.  This 
settlement may not have been ideal for the Christian Socials, but it gave them a share in 
power, and allowed the Church to exercise social influence.  The timing of the actions taken 
by Dollfuss and his allies points to their belief that the situation had changed.  For them, the 
threat from the pro-Anschluss bloc was now greater than that from the Socialist camp, and 
was reaching a critical mass.  This was clear from the elections, but it was also true in other 
ways.  Although the pattern varied across Austria, large numbers of members of the 
Heimwehr were said to be passing over to the Nazis by1932.51  
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Dollfuss acted when he did for several reasons.  He aimed to prevent Nazi plans to exert 
electoral pressure.52  The Nazis hoped that, even if they failed to win a majority, they could 
undermine the traditional bourgeois Right.  Dollfuss also intended to undermine the Social 
Democrats.53  His party’s conditional acceptance of democracy would also have played its 
part.  Dollfuss was also confident that no foreign interventions would come, despite earlier 
British and French protests against treatment of the Social Democrats by the Austrian 
government.54  Hitler was newly in power and preoccupied with internal affairs.  Mussolini 
also made it clear that if Germany intervened in any way he would use force to keep Austria 
free of German control.55   
In September 1933, the government and its supporters took to the streets in a demonstration 
of power.  Taking advantage of a conference of Catholics that was taking place in the city, 
Christian Socials and members of the Heimwehr assembled on the Ringstrasse.  Dollfuss 
announced plans for a Corporate State.56  German Christian values were to be at its heart.  
Father Lojka at Weinhaus believed the announcement was met with ‘enormous 
celebrations’.  He does not say by whom.57  At the highest levels, the Church echoed Lojka’s 
support for the building of a Catholic Austria, even expressing its ‘joy’ at the prospect.58  
Catholicism, Austrian patriotism, and ‘German values’ were intended to provide 
metaphorical common ground for Austrians, yet such a meeting place would be 
uncomfortable for Social Democrats, non-Catholics, Pan-Germans and others.  This vision 
sent out a message to Austrians that if they did not conform to these values, they would no 
longer belong in Austria.  Reichspost understood this perfectly well: ‘Austria is a Christian-
German state and, accordingly, it is organised to determine who can and may participate and 
who can and may not’.59  Some people tried to belong.  In an echo of the late 1890s, a spate 
of conversions and readmissions to the Church occurred from 1934 onwards, presumably for 
the same mixed set of motives as had existed earlier.60  
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This new version of independent Austria would need time to succeed, and its enemies were 
all around.  The threat from external enemies burst into the foreground when Nazi Germany 
introduced a tourist tax in May 1933.  Any German visiting Austria was obliged to pay 
1,000 Marks on crossing the border.  A seemingly small measure, the tax was intended to 
reduce Austria’s international earnings, hence threatening its economic viability.61  Internal 
enemies were easier to deal with.  In September 1933 internment camps for dissidents were 
set up.  Dollfuss’s opponents, whatever their political complexion fled abroad, but almost 
16,000 who remained in Austria ended up interned for political offences.62  Father Lojka 
applauded this anti-democratic stance, noting approvingly that Dollfuss was bringing in ‘the 
right men for the job’, in the way the Heimwehr was being used by the government.63   
Lojka was not alone in this view. A pastoral letter of December 1933 demonstrated the 
approval of the Church in Vienna for the Dollfusskurs.64  The Dollfusskurs would hand the 
Church a greater role in the moral basis of Austrian society, via a Concordat that was being 
negotiated.  It also aimed to strengthen Austrian independence, while emphasizing Austria’s 
unique combination of  attachment to a wider Deutschtum, in its language and culture, and 
its particular Volkstum, in its history, landscape, religion, customs, and arts.65  In this way it 
is not unreasonable to conclude, as has Julie Thorpe, that  ‘Austro-fascists as state builders 
and nation builders’, attempted to ‘fend off’ the Nazi state, while ‘mythologising’ and 
‘racialising’ a German identity against others within Austria.66  The pastoral letter singled 
out for praise the aim of Dollfuss to ‘erect a Christian-German state in our homeland’.  
These steps were, in fact, to be embraced ‘with our whole hearts’.67 
Between Republic And Corporate State 
On 4th October 1933, a small band of Nazis attempted to assassinate Dollfuss.  The reaction 
in Vienna, at least as recorded in what remained of the press under Dollfuss, was one of 
huge relief that the attempt had failed.68  On the evening after the attempt, Dollfuss 
supporters gathered outside the Chancellor’s office in central Vienna.  Among them were 
army units, Heimwehr groups, ‘Christian-German’ gymnastics groups, and societies loyal to 
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‘the fatherland’.  Red-white-red flags waved to celebrate that ‘a good angel looked over our 
Austria today’.69  This was a display of the assembled Catholic Right, demonstrating their 
fidelity to the separate path of development that Dollfuss was mapping out.70  The Nazi 
move was immediately recognised as an attempt not just to kill Dollfuss, but to destroy an 
independent Austria.  Dollfuss was lionised as leader of the struggle for the freedom of 
Austria.71  
Despite this, Dollfuss soon found that all opposition had not been stamped out.  The Social 
Democrats still kept an organisation of sorts in place.  The official policy of the Party was 
not to offer active resistance, as this would lead to bloodshed.  From exile, the Party’s 
leaders kept in touch with underground trade unionists, some of whom organised themselves 
into the Revolutionary Socialists.72  The Nazis had been forced underground but, in the long 
run, this only served to make them better organised.73  In Vienna, active Nazis were believed 
to be few in number, but they were audacious, and the police identified Nazis as the source 
of much agitation.   
Around 10 o’clock on the morning of 19th January 1934, for instance, Nazi flags were 
unveiled at the Technical High School in the Wieden district of the city.74  The flags, 
measuring three metres by one, were hung from several windows on the third floor, pointing 
in different directions for maximum visibility.  Made from crepe paper, the flags would have 
folded small, so that they could be smuggled in to the building.  The flimsy nature of the 
material used to make them would have meant, however, that they would tear easily.  They 
must have been raised from the windows with some care and it would have required some 
time to raise them.   
Despite this, and even though the police estimated that their officers reached the site within 
six to eight minutes of an alarm being raised, none of the students questioned admitted to 
having seen anything.  One student, Robert Rosenauer, stated that he was playing cards and 
had noticed nothing wrong until the arrival of the police.75  Another, Karl Kollar, from 
Währing, a member of the Deutscher Turnerbund, a gymnastics association with well 
known sympathies for a radical German stance, claimed not to be ‘otherwise politically 
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organised’.76  The incident was enough to cause the police to launch a significant operation, 
in order to check if the incident in Wieden was an isolated event.  Reports were obtained 
from several police stations across the city.  The police in Wieden reported that the flags 
had, in fact, only been hanging from the windows for a few minutes and had caused no great 
stir.  The reaction of the central police suggests otherwise, and they were taking no 
chances.77  In the case of one student, Kurt Steigl, they were correct to be suspicious.  A 
search of his rooms uncovered a quantity of pro-Nazi magazines and leaflets.78  
A week later, politics boiled over in Austria and workers in Linz rose in protest against the 
deterioration of their working and living conditions.79  Soon afterwards, Vienna’s Socialists 
came out onto the streets, to be met by a response from the Austrian Army, supported by the 
Heimwehr.  The Heimwehr added approximately 20,000 men across Austria to a 
gendarmerie and regular army which, under restrictions imposed by Versailles, totalled 
43,000.80  Fighting was recorded across the city, with the heaviest being reported in the 
Social Democratic stronghold of Floridsdorf.81   
From the immediacy of his language, Father Schwarz at Alt-Ottakring seems to have 
recorded in his Chronik the events in his parish as they happened.  On Monday 12th February 
there was ‘Revolution!  A whole class from the junior school had to stay in the presbytery, 
because Sandleithen was being shot at and shelled’.  The next day, a few women and only 
one man populated a near deserted church at Alt-Ottakring for the 6 a.m. Shrove Tuesday 
mass, and all of those were ‘intimidated’.  Despite being aware of the extent of the violence 
that had erupted on the streets of Vienna, Schwarz was shocked by the low numbers.  Barely 
two weeks earlier, more than 2,700 had attended Sunday masses in the parish, with six 
masses held between 6 a.m. and 11 a.m.82   
The government in Vienna had shown no hesitation in responding to the workers’ revolt.  
Maximum force was turned onto the streets.  Ottakring was particularly badly affected, as 
the Army deployed artillery in order to shell a number of model workers’ homes that had 
been erected by Vienna City Council.  Despite their solid appearance, these homes were no 
match for firepower of this kind and, after a few days, the revolt was crushed.83  The 
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workers’ homes had been intended as a permanent statement of how society could be 
changed away from the old order.  Their shattering was intended to show a different 
direction for society.  This was the Christian state against an allegedly Marxist Vienna. 
Supporters of the regime saw these events as a necessary re-imposition of order.  They also 
saw them as an essential stage in the work of building the new Austria.  For 1934, instead of 
beginning his Chronik with the usual list of staff changes and building works, Father 
Schubert at St. Laurenz starts his Chronik by saying that he must record the events of 
February, which he does in considerable detail.  Then he goes back to recording church 
building works.  This is not to suggest that Schubert, or his fellow priests, thought the 
struggle for the new Austria had been won.  They were acutely aware of the challenges and 
dangers ahead.  In 1934, Schubert’s near neighbour, Father Lojka, records street fighting 
between bands of Nazis on one side and Socialists on the other.  This, said Lojka, was 
despite the presence of the Heimwehr, and came after the events of February.  In an effort at 
deterring resistance, in February 1934 the government extended the death penalty, 
reintroduced in November 1933, to a range of offences including political revolt.84   
The government began to develop its long-term plans.  On 30th April 1934, Christian Social 
MPs and their allies met at Parliament, just long enough for Parliament to dissolve itself 
permanently, and to hand over all powers to its successor.  On 1st May 1934, Dollfuss 
declared Austria to be a Corporate State.  A new constitution incorporated a Concordat that 
had recently been agreed between the Vatican and the Austrian Republic, under which the 
Church gained increased influence over education and marriage.85  The Church drew benefit 
in other ways.  The authoritarian state forced schoolchildren to mass.86  In 1935, at the parish 
of Neulerchenfeld, in Ottakring, ‘Red’ buildings next to the parish church, confiscated after 
the 1934 uprising, were handed over for use by the parish.87  Between 1934 and 1937, fifteen 
church foundations took place.  At a time of severe restrictions on expenditure, these 
churches were partly funded by the State.88  Not that this pleased everyone connected with 
the Church.  Father Schwarz objected to plans for a new church at Sandleithen, within his 
own parish, as this would reduce the number of his parishioners.89  The State clearly thought 
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the support of the Church was worth having, and in return the Church endorsed the form of 
the state.  
In the parishes, priests joined in with this endorsement.  Father Lojka described 1st May 
1934 as a ‘day of rebirth’ and rejoiced that significant parts of the Concordat of 1933 were 
now part of Austria’s constitution.90  At Währing, Father Schubert was enthusiastic about the 
Christian elements of the constitution, but he was equally aware of its implicit German 
values.  The importance of this German dimension to Schubert’s thinking emerged almost 
subconsciously in comments he made later in 1934.  He announced this Corporate State as a 
second Gospel, the bringer of good news and wrote that, five months to the day after the 
celebration of the 250th anniversary of deliverance from the Turks, Vienna and Austria had 
been freed from an even greater threat, ‘Austro-Bolshevism’.  The state was now a 
‘stronghold of Christian-German culture’.91  
From The Assassination Of Dollfuss To Desertion By Mussolini 
As has been seen, despite the quarrels that had taken place on the Right, considerable 
overlaps still occurred.  Dollfuss, for instance, talked with a number of groups, including, in 
June 1934, the Sturmabteilung, the Brownshirts.92  This may have been political 
manoeuvring, but it still showed the existence of common ground on the Right.  
Nevertheless, feuds did boil over.  The Nazis were capable of extreme ruthlessness.  They 
had been declared illegal, but they had not been suppressed and, on 25th  July 1934, they 
took their revenge.  A group of Nazis seized public buildings across Vienna, kidnapping 
Dollfuss in the Chancellery in the process.93  Father Lojka notes this as nothing short of an 
attempt at ‘Revolution’, and troop movements in response were reported across much of the 
country.94  In Carinthia, an uprising by Nazis from Northern Germany was suppressed by the 
Austrian army, supported by local Heimwehr.  Mussolini assembled Italian army units on the 
border and let it be known he was still prepared to invade Austria, as he had been the year 
before, if German troops entered the country.  The Austrian army surrounded the 
Chancellery and the Nazis there surrendered, but it was too late.  In the confusion that had 
occurred as the Nazis seized the building, Dollfuss had been shot and mortally wounded.  
Before loyal troops could reach him, Dollfuss was dead.95   
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This was a blow on many levels to those who followed Dollfuss and who wanted to maintain 
Austrian independence.  Even allowing for the emotion of the moment, the expressions of 
grief to be found in parish Chroniken and correspondence come across as genuine and 
unexaggerated.  Fathers Lojka and Schubert were both deeply shocked that Dollfuss had 
been shot and left to die without access either to doctor or priest.96  Lojka described Dollfuss 
as a martyr.  Bells were rung at churches across the country.97  Lojka was not alone in his 
estimation of Dollfuss.  Double page magazine spreads show the enormous crowds that 
turned out in central Vienna for his funeral, packing the grounds of the Hofburg.98   
These crowds were a potent demonstration that a mass base still existed in support of 
Austrian independence.  The point was underlined by the heavy presence of the symbol of 
the  Vaterländische Front, the Kruckenkreuz, across the Hofburg and across the city.99  Yet, 
while the Nazis had failed, their boldness must have reinforced the impression that they were 
a growing force in the country.  Their Anschluss policy might succeed in winning significant 
support, now that the death of Dollfuss had deprived Austria of someone who had shown he 
was prepared to stand against them.  It also deprived Austria of a figure who had become 
known internationally, and it was a psychological blow to those who placed their confidence 
in the leadership shown by Dollfuss.  Lojka was convinced he knew the origins of the guilty 
men and he pointed the finger for the murder firmly at ‘former soldiers’ who had joined the 
Nazis.100  So did the press.101  Father Lojka seems to have expected that, after Dollfuss, 
Austria would turn to another supposed strong man to match other Fascist leaders.  He was 
disappointed that lawyer and career politician, Kurt Schuschnigg, had succeeded Dollfuss.  
He would have preferred Prince Starhemberg.102   
Over the next few years, the Church supported the Right’s position that Austria needed a 
strongman, but this was only partly in response to conditions of place and period.  The 
Austrian archbishops’ pastoral letter of 1919 had set out that they would oppose the state if it 
tried to carry through fundamental changes in the social or economic order, but the Church 
in Austria was not alone in adopting this position.   In Portugal, the Salazar dictatorship, 
often described as Fascist, but in reality an authoritarian state with a streak of reactionary 
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Catholicism, was supported by the Church, as it had been since 1928.103  In Spain, the 
Church supported a Right-wing coalition of parties which threatened to bring down 
democracy, if democracy was not to its liking.104  
Schuschnigg was expected to be the guarantor of Austria’s independence, but in order to 
hold Germany at bay he needed to keep a base at home and maintain the support of the 
European powers.  Internally, propaganda was being marshalled to promote both the 
Austrian Ständestaat as a state form and the idea of an independent Austria as a separate 
German state.  Pamphlets were prepared which suggested that Catholic Universalism and 
national culture were not mutually exclusive, and that the idea of Deutschtum existed within 
and as part of European culture.  It is unlikely that these somewhat dry pamphlets had a wide 
readership or impact.105   
Nevertheless, in April 1935 Schuschnigg might also have had cause for optimism that 
Austria had allies abroad.  At a conference in Stresa in Italy, France, Britain and Italy 
declared themselves united against any aggression towards Austria.  The independence of 
Austria was their goal.106  This unity was short lived, however.  A few months later, Italian 
troops invaded Abyssinia.  Britain and France criticised Italian actions, and Italy began to 
grow closer to Germany on the one side, and distant from France and Great Britain on the 
other.  This distancing soon intensified, when Italy and Germany supported a revolt by 
Spanish army units against the democratically elected government in Madrid in July 1936.107  
The united front formed at Stresa was effectively at an end, little more than a year after it 
had come into existence.  
The Writing On The Wall? 
Hitler expressed his intentions towards Austria in an increasingly hostile manner.  He had 
the confidence to do this because Mussolini had now told him he would raise no objections 
to German intervention of some kind in Austria.108  In July 1936, Schuschnigg was 
summoned to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden and told how to govern Austria.  The outcome 
was the July agreement, a ‘treaty of friendship’ between Germany and Austria.109 Under the 
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terms of this treaty, Germany promised not to interfere in Austrian internal affairs, and 
dropped the thousand Mark tourist tax.110  Austrian Nazis who had been arrested after the 
assassination of Dollfuss were released under an amnesty.  Schuschnigg agreed to bring 
Nationalist politicians who were sympathetic to the Nazis into his cabinet.111  
A secret protocol to the agreement also stipulated that Austria was a ‘German state’, which 
would follow a ‘German Course’.112  Austria would lend its diplomatic support to German 
foreign policy aims where it could.  This was in turn supplemented by the November 
Protocol, which established a German-Austrian Cultural Committee, to ensure sufficient 
‘German’ content in cultural areas, such as theatre, film and music.113  The meaning behind 
it was that Austria internally would follow a course which discriminated against those who 
did not comply with radical definitions of being German.  This did not mark a change in the 
stance of the Corporate State towards Jews, nor in its dealings with Nazi Germany.  In a 
1935 agreement on trade in films, the Corporate State had consented to check that all artists 
in film would provide proof of their Aryan origins.114  
The constitution of the Corporate State promised equality before the law, and some of the 
bodies created by the Corporate State, such as the Vaterländische Front, had Jewish 
representation.115  This, however, hid underlying attitudes and unspoken policies, evidence 
of which can easily be found.  Chancellor Dollfuss had been a member of the 
Antisemitenbund, and regularly spoke at its meetings when he was member of its student 
body.  Dollfuss was therefore a supporter of an organisation which demanded legal 
separation of Jews and non-Jews, quotas on employment, and the reversal of Jewish 
immigration.  Jews were racially defined as having one Jewish great-grandparent.116  
Aryanisation had been happening before the 1936 agreement.  Proponents claimed this was 
necessary to limit so-called Jewish domination of selected occupations.  This disingenuous 
position took no account of the custom and practice that excluded Jews from certain walks 
of life and therefore forced them into others.  This also ignored the reality that Jews were 
prominent and successful in some areas, working class and poor in others.117  
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From its inception, the Corporate State and its officers worked against the interests of 
Jews.118 Jews were refused state employment or had their contracts terminated.119  Non-
Socialist Jewish doctors were sacked under the pretext of being Social Democrats.120  The 
same happened to Jewish teachers.121  Such discrimination had a more profound meaning 
than just immediate exclusions.  Discrimination was being used both as a means to construct 
civic and ethnic barriers and as a long-term means to create a bond between those who 
belonged, or who were being told they belonged.122  
At the parish of Weinhaus, Father Lojka created in his Chronik a vivid image of the 
turbulence of this time.  Lojka may have contemplated Austria becoming a Fascist state but, 
as he said in his parish newsletter of June 1936, he would never be a Nazi.123  When, in July 
1936, the Austrian government announced the normalisation of German-Austrian relations, 
Lojka noted: ‘I hear the message clearly, but I do not believe it at all’.  He expected further 
attempts, along the lines of those of the violence of 1933 and 1934, ‘to absorb us (sic)’.  
Lojka recognised that as a result of the July agreements, Schuschnigg had no choice but to 
bring the ‘Nationalists’, as he described them, into government, but for him a Catholic’s first 
duty was to protect the Church.   Lojka believed that the Nazis, hiding behind the Pan-
Germans, were a threat to the Church.  ‘The will of the people for independence, begun by 
Dollfuss and continued by Schuschnigg, must be strengthened’, he wrote.  ‘May Austria 
resist Germany’s friendship in the way it would oppose its enmity!’124   
The political troubles and further street fighting of 1936 are reflected in Lojka’s notes on a 
visit by Cardinal Innitzer to the church at Weinhaus.  Innitzer paid his respects at Deckert’s 
grave, which was – and still is – at the rear of the church.125  According to Lojka, this 
required heavy security to prevent disruption by either Nazis or Socialists.  Lojka records 
that he did not involve himself in party politics, except where this intruded on broader moral 
issues.  He was not blindly loyal to the official Vaterländische Front, which he criticised for 
organising fund-raising dances during Lent.  Lojka argued instead that, to help Austria out of 
its dilemmas, people needed to show more self-responsibility.  Lojka was, of course, only 
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human and he did complain that, during Innitzer’s visit, he had to go with him from school 
to school, without being able to have breakfast.126 
Lojka also observed the activities of his fellow priests.  He described as ‘eccentric’ Father 
Leopold Schmid of St. Rochus, Leopoldstadt, met earlier in this work.  Lojka had read in 
newspapers that Schmid had allegedly been banned from preaching.  Lojka thought Schmid 
was an eccentric because he rejected both the Christian Socials, the men in power, and the 
Nazis, the coming men.  Lojka’s circle are said to find Schmid an oddity.127  According 
to Lojka, Schmid was something of a loner, not part of a wider group of priests.  This may 
have been true but, in 1936 Schmid, spoke at what he himself later described a ‘famous’ 
Vaterländische Front rally.  It is not known if this rally took place before or after the July 
agreements of that year, but Schmid seemingly had no trouble reconciling his Pan-German 
views with this.128 
Despite efforts by the Corporate State to gain complete control, Vienna remained a 
battleground for mass politics, and the major political groupings staged move and counter 
move.  In October 1936, a Vaterländische Front rally had attracted crowds estimated at 
360,000 in Vienna.129  In February 1937, German Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath 
had visited Vienna and found the streets lined with Nazi supporters all the way from the 
station to his residence, yet a counter-demonstration on a large scale was organised for the 
day of his departure, with crowds chanting ‘Heil Schuschnigg!’130  Nor had the Social 
Democrats on the ground given up the fight.  Just as the Nazis had done, they too were able 
to organise resistance to the Corporate State, often on a surprising scale and for what seem 
simply symbolic occasions.  In July 1937, Max Winter, Social Democratic journalist and 
politician, died in exile in the United States.  His body was taken back to Austria in secrecy, 
and a funeral under a false name was arranged for the Zentralfriedhof.  Word still made its 
way round the city.  The police were aware of the funeral, but were unable to prevent huge 
crowds turning out in memory of the man who had led the way in reporting the condition of 
the Viennese working class.  Vienna had not gone over to the Right-wing radicals, and Red 
Vienna as an idea had not been completely buried by the Corporate State.131   
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By late 1937, however, the threat from abroad was building.  An increasingly aggressive 
Adolf Hitler was becoming less and less patient towards Austria.  It was by now a clear 
possibility that if Hitler chose the military route, decisions over whether the Anschluss might 
happen would not be the prerogative of Austrians.  Father Lojka was well aware of this.  It 
was as if he had given up hope of Austria’s continued independence when he recorded in 
January 1938 that he was expecting the Germans to enter Austria at any moment.  Lojka’s 
fears seemed to be confirmed when the Nazis, apparently using people shipped from all parts 
of Austria, were able to organise large scale rallies in Graz and Linz, with swastikas 
covering the streets.132  The Nazis seemed to be on the verge of carrying out what he 
believed was the ‘Anschluss which has been hotly, if vainly, resisted for so many years’.133 
Lojka was not alone on the Right in being an ardent opponent of Anschluss.  The antisemite 
Leopold Kunschak had argued, as early as 1934, that all Austrians should be co-opted into 
the struggle against the Nazis, even the Social Democrats.  Kunschak had argued that the 
Jews should be separated from German Austrians, as foreigners, but he saw nothing German 
in the National Socialist movement either:  
‘The real enemy of our country and of that individualism which it is the 
historic mission of Germany to preach, is the distortion of the German spirit 
by Nazism’.134  
Kunschak saw in Nazism a totalitarianism that was opposed to Austrian German values.  
These men saw a conflict between Nazism and Austrian identity.  After 1933, ordinary 
Austrians may have felt a conflict between principle and their personal needs, as economic 
depression continued in Austria, while Germany was apparently an economic success.  Nazi 
propaganda regularly played on this comparison.135  Others, who saw themselves as good 
Austrians and good Germans, were positively attracted to an Austria that was once again 
part of Germany.  The two Nationalists appointed to Schuschnigg’s cabinet in 1936 were 
Edmund Glaise-Horstenau and Guido Schmidt.  Schmidt was a friend of Schuschnigg from 
their school days, who had already served in Schuschnigg’s cabinet.136  Schuschnigg had 
therefore already accommodated his views.  Glaise-Horstenau went on to occupy positions 
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of importance after Anschluss.137  In February 1938, neither Glaise-Horstenau nor Schmid 
would have seen Germany as a threat. 
Summary 
In 1932, the international environment meant that Anschluss between Austria and Germany 
was a long way from becoming a reality.  Within Austria, change was coming, as the Nazis 
registered successes in elections in Vienna.  In Germany, they were also still only a party 
aiming for power.  The Nazis then did well in local and regional elections elsewhere in 
Austria, confirming the decline of the Christian Socials in Vienna since the end of the First 
World War.  More importantly the traditional Pan-German movement collapsed as its 
supporters deserted to the Nazis.  Given the pressure on the Christian Socials, their vote held 
up relatively well in 1932.  The Christian Social ranks in Vienna and beyond did split, but 
the Party lost less than twenty per cent of its support, not half, as certain newspapers 
claimed.  The eighty per cent of the supporters who remained loyal to the Christian Socials 
from 1930 were voting for an independent Austria, but not for an inclusive ideal of Austrian 
identity.  The Republic in which they lived was fragile, and forever seemed to be about to be 
torn down.  In this, it was not untypical of Europe in this ‘contingent age’.138  
In Vienna, the traditional radical Right, via its component organisations and networks, 
continued to deal in stereotypes.  At the middle of many of the Christian Social elements 
within these networks sat priests, reiterating a message that Jews could not belong.  This had 
been a long-term process, the effect of which was to make it seem to many that exclusion of 
Jews was the natural order.  The Corporate State reinforced this thinking.  The Dollfuss and 
Schuschnigg cabinets re-assured foreign governments that the Corporate State was not 
antisemitic, but its anti-Jewish culture affected the lives of Jews, perpetuating and 
strengthening the social and economic discrimination against Jews that had been an 
underlying feature of life in certain circles in Austria.   
Under the Empire antisemitism had acted as a bond to bring Christian Socials and all but the 
most radical nationalists together in Vienna in the Christian Social Party.  In the Republic, 
the radical Right forged alliances against the common ‘Marxist’ enemy.  After 1932, a 
different realignment within the bourgeois camp took place, as German nationalists did not 
so much cross to the Nazis as become the major component of the Nazi movement.  After a 
change in international politics in 1936, a real division existed between the pro-Austrian 
Right and the Nazi Right. 
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By the opening of 1938, Anschluss was something that could occur, if Hitler kept his nerve 
while others lost theirs.  If successful, he would inherit a Vienna where a strand of 
antisemitism had permeated the city over a long period.  Yet followers of this strand held 
firm to a separate path for Austria.  They held views which are now rightly viewed as 
repugnant, but they did not fall into the trap of seeing Anschluss with the other antisemitic 
German state as the primary means by which their radical German visions could be 
achieved.  They were, as was Father Lojka, tempted by Fascism, but not Nazism.  They 
discriminated against Jews, but the discrimination that Jews, and others, experienced under 
the Corporate State was just a taste of things to come after March 1938.  
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CHAPTER 10:  ANSCHLUSS AND AFTER 
In February 1938, Hitler summoned Schuschnigg one last time to his Bavarian stronghold of 
Berchtesgaden.1  He berated and shouted, and in effect told Schuschnigg that Austria was 
now a German satellite state.2  Schuschnigg bided his time in giving his response, but a 
month later he attempted to break Hitler’s lock on the country.  On the 9th March, 
Schuschnigg announced that a plebiscite would take place in Austria, to settle once and for 
all the relationship between Austria and the German Reich.3  After nearly twenty years of 
independence, Austrians would at last be given the chance to decide for themselves if they 
wanted a free Austria to continue.  In effect, Schuschnigg was taking a huge gamble. 
Schuschnigg, and other Austro-Fascist politicians, had for some years attempted to cultivate 
allies abroad, in Italy, Great Britain and elsewhere, to prevent Anschluss.4  These attempts 
seemed to have failed, so Schuschnigg turned now to the Austrian people.  Two years 
earlier, he might not have made such a move.  A 1936 government report was of the opinion 
that the National Socialists were undermining Austria from within, exploiting ‘widespread 
disdain’ for Austria as a nation.5  The government feared that fifteen years of widespread 
rejection of the concept of an Austrian state, coupled with pro-Anschluss party propaganda, 
had eased the task of the Nazis in attacking Austrian independence.6  Schuschnigg must have 
felt that enough had changed in two years to give him a chance of winning. 
Voters were to be asked if they wanted a free, social, German, Christian, independent 
Austria.7  The question was carefully chosen.  A German Austria complied with the July 
agreements of 1936.  A Christian Austria satisfied the criteria for those who had long 
pursued a path of German Austrian nationalism, with a Christian element at the centre of this 
vision.  A free Austria was intended to send a signal to any potential allies that Austria might 
call on that Anschluss was not the desire of the Austrian people.  If the vote was carried, 
Hitler could no longer claim that Anschluss was simply the setting to rights of the unjust 
Versailles treaties, especially in their effects on Austria.  The ballot was scheduled for 13th 
March.  It did not take place.  By then, German troops had invaded and taken control of the 
country.  They met little resistance.   
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This chapter brings the long period from 1861 to 1938 to a close.  It outlines events in the 
days leading to Anschluss but, just as importantly, it follows beyond the Anschluss some of 
the individuals who have been encountered so far.  This is not just to tie up loose ends.  The 
reactions of these people to the Anschluss, and in some cases their fates, give as clear an 
indication as possible of their position towards the unification of Austria and Germany.  
Since there was no single position that all Austrians took towards the idea of Anschluss, it is 
not possible to extrapolate from individuals the position of all Austrians, but the attitudes of 
most of those followed here show that the Anschluss was not the deep-seated wish of all 
Austrians, even if many of them did want Austria to be defined as German and Christian.  
This chapter ends with a brief consideration of how some of the events and individuals 
covered in this work here have been reflected upon in post-War Austria. 
Anschluss 
On 3rd March 1938, the cover of the Österreichische Wochenzeitung showed Chancellor 
Schuschnigg addressing the Bundestag.  The Kruckenkreuz, personally chosen as a symbol 
of Austrian Christianity by Dollfuss, is aloft.8  In its incarnation under the Corporate State, 
the assembly is filled with civilians, military and clergy.  Austrians were here presented with 
an image of a country, through its various estates, united around their Chancellor and the 
values of the Corporate State that he led.  When Schuschnigg announced the plebiscite, it 
was not just the images in the Österreichische Wochenzeitung which suggested he had made 
the right decision.  Large crowds gathered across Vienna, and in other cities, waving 
Vaterländische Front banners.  Schuschnigg’s picture was displayed on walls all over the 
city.  Volunteers rode on the back of trucks, distributing pro-Schuschnigg posters and 
leaflets.9  The Chancellor’s supporters were numerous and energetic, and they were helped 
in their work by orders for the police to suppress their bitter opponents, the Nazis.  Eye 
witnesses among the Jewish community at this time reported a sense of optimism that the 
possibility of a takeover of Austria by Nazi Germany had been delayed, or perhaps even 
avoided altogether.10  The photographs in the magazines present an image of the solidity and 
strength of Austria, but the reality was one of insubstantial foundations.  Schuschnigg’s 
supporters were just one of the factions fighting for control of the streets. The crowds that 
gathered for Schuschnigg, just like those that would later gather for Hitler, were substantial, 
but they did not represent the whole of Vienna. 
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Hitler called Schuschnigg’s bluff.  In early March, the Germans made clear to both 
Schuschnigg and Austrian President Wilhelm Miklas that the holding of the planned 
plebiscite would be considered a hostile act.  At the same time, Germany announced that the 
prospect of the plebiscite was causing Austria to become unstable, with the fall-out affecting 
German citizens who lived in Austria.  Hitler therefore announced plans for a German 
‘peace-keeping’ operation if the plebiscite was not called off and, on the night of 11th March, 
German troops massed on the border.11   
In a last act as Chancellor, Schuschnigg ordered Austrian troops to offer no resistance.  He 
could not, he said, bear the thought of ‘German blood’ being spilled by Germans.  
Schuschnigg really had little choice.  Even if he could rely on the army, which had drawn up 
plans to resist a German invasion, it would not be strong enough to hold out for long.12  He 
had no assurances from either Britain or France that help would come, and even if it did 
come it would take time, might not be effective, and would only follow on from bloodshed.13  
Schuschnigg resigned, and in his resignation speech, broadcast by radio, he was clear that he 
was yielding to ‘brute force’.  He spells out that German rumours of workers’ revolts against 
the Corporate State and the need for a German peace-keeping force are ‘fabrications from A 
to Z’.14  This was bravery, when Schuschnigg knew that those imposing brute force would 
soon be in charge in Vienna.  Yet Schuschnigg’s words are revealing of how he still saw 
Austria: as a German state, but not part of the Germany that exists to the North.  He feared 
the spilling of German blood, whether this blood came from soldiers of the Third Reich or 
from those of Austria.  It can not be known how he felt about Austrian Jewish blood, and if 
he feared this too would be spilled.  
Crowds began gathering to cheer the new National Socialist Chancellor, Arthur Seyss-
Inquart, and waited for the arrival of German troops to enforce the Anschluss.  Seyss-Inquart 
was an appropriate symbol for the changing times.  He had been an advisor to Catholic 
Action, but also a go-between for Christian Social, Heimwehr and Nazi groups.15  Jews in 
Vienna and other cities, however, did not have to wait for the arrival of these troops for 
violence to break out against them.  Incidents took place across the country on the night of 
the 11th March, with neighbour turning on neighbour.16  As British journalist G.E.R. Gedye 
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recalled shortly afterwards, crowds sweeping across the streets of Vienna formed a ‘witches’ 
Sabbath’, ‘marching side by side with police turncoats’.  Cries of ‘Heil Hitler!’ mixed with 
‘Down with the Catholics!’17  The next morning, at 5:30 a.m. on 12th March 1938, German 
troops began crossing the border into Austria.  They began a steady progression towards the 
capital.  In advance of their arrival, the Luftwaffe flew over Vienna, dropping leaflets 
proclaiming friendship among all German people.  The intention was to reassure the 
majority of the population that they had nothing to fear.  Jews, Socialists and loyal Christian 
Socials would have experienced other emotions as they looked at the hundreds of bombers 
overhead.18 
Nevertheless, a large number of people were enthused, and crowds did turn out to cheer 
German troops in towns on the route to Vienna.  Crowds, however, are difficult to gauge as 
indicators of feeling.  The absolute numbers of those making them up may be large, but even 
a large crowd will be only a part of the whole population, often only a small part.  People 
may turn out to witness, not necessarily to cheer, an event.  They may be caught up in 
temporary emotion.  In Vienna, the crowds were large, but they were far from being the 
entire population.  They were, however, enthusiastic in their pent-up anti-Jewish rage.  After 
German troops arrived in Vienna in March 1938, round-ups of Jews proceeded at a frantic 
pace.  Large numbers of Jews committed suicide rather than fall into Nazi hands.19 
This is a world turned on its head, where  Stefan Zweig’s security has been smashed and 
replaced, in brutal fashion, by crowds inflicting violence and humiliation on people who, in 
law at least, until days before had been their equal citizens.  George Clare recalled boys he 
had known at school, who had been antisemitic then and who were now in SS uniform.  
Gedye confirms this picture, with reports of large numbers of those ‘barely out of the 
schoolroom’ in storm trooper uniforms.20  In these early days after the Anschluss Clare finds 
few opponents of antisemitism, however, apart from other Jews.  He highlights that many 
believed that Austrian and Viennese identity had become narrowly and ethnically defined.  
The ‘Viennese’ and the ‘Jews’ are no longer the same thing.  The Viennese marched in 
columns.  Jews stayed at home.  Clare talks elsewhere of a friend who had asked him to join 
militant Zionist organization Betar Trumpeldor.  He refused, ‘probably because by 
becoming a member of a Zionist organization I would have acknowledged that I was a Jew 
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and not an Austrian’.21  It is clear in his mind that by 1938 he could not be both, and he 
wanted to remain an Austrian.   
Clare’s observations are passionate, but they are also acute.  He does not fall for a simple 
story that anyone who was not a Jew cheered these events.  Even at the height of the frenzy, 
he recognises that ‘many thousands’ did not turn out to celebrate.  He points to ‘Social 
Democrats, Legitimists, true Catholics, Christian Socials, who put patriotism before 
opportunism, as well as people who were neither this nor that but just honest human 
beings’.22  Gedye found some who might otherwise have been considered to be antisemites, 
because of unthinking prejudice, so disgusted by the violence that they pleaded with him to 
report on it outside Austria, to try to find ways to stop it.23   
At the same time as Jews were being pilloried, other potential opponents of the new regime 
were being rounded up.  Social Democrats who remained in Austria were being interned. 
The same was happening with Christian Socials.  Some of them may have shared aspects of 
the Nazi view of Jews, but as Austrian patriots they were a threat.  As time passed after the 
Anschluss, even Pan-Germans were arrested.  Anyone who stood outside the Nazi Party, 
however much they had in common with it, was perceived as a threat.24 
The first evenings after Anschluss were a litmus test of the thoughts of many Viennese.  
Giving them the benefit of the doubt, it could be argued that, even though they knew about 
the Nuremberg Laws, those Viennese who were cheering Anschluss were still uncertain of 
the full meaning of the Laws.  After all, in 1938 even Die Wahrheit, an Austrian newspaper 
aimed at a Jewish readership, was somewhat underplaying the significance of the Laws.25  
This might not have become clear until later in the year, when Goebbels unleashed the worst 
of the German people against Jews on Kristallnacht.  Nevertheless, it would be fair to argue 
to the contrary that the first Kristallnacht took place in Vienna, and other Austrian cities, in 
March 1938.   
The Viennese who took part in the persecution of Jews had a good idea of what they wanted 
from Anschluss.  They understood the implications of the second class status that Jews 
would now experience in the Reich.  These crowds expressed their aims clearly, and in doing 
so they prepared the ground for the first public appearance in the city by Hitler, at the 
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Heldenplatz.  It was his first visit to the city since he had left for Munich in May 1913.26  If 
any doubts lingered in his mind as to how his fellow Austrians might react, Hitler would 
have been calmed by the reports that would have made it back to him.  
Supporting The Anschluss 
The postponed plebiscite gave way to a new vote, scheduled for 10th April, on union with 
Germany.  The ballot paper now carried a different message.  It began: ‘Do you agree with 
the reunification of Austria with Germany that was carried out on 13th March 1938?’  The 
ballot paper carried two circles, one larger, for ‘Yes’, the other for ‘No’.  This crude attempt 
to influence the vote was accompanied by propaganda measures.  Viennese newspapers 
displayed photographs of German troops leading food convoys into workers’ quarters.27  
German newspapers were harnesed for their propaganda skills.  They showed pictures of the 
factories and supposed model homes of German workers, with the jobs created by the Nazi 
state providing money to send children on state subsidised holidays.  Austrians, by contrast, 
were shown living in slums, with the unemployed passing their time on the streets.  These 
newspapers were often free.  They may have been published in Germany, with an apparently 
local circulation, but their intended readership was in Austria.  The front cover of the 
Stuttgarter Illustrierte showed in full page a young mother lifting a smiling blond child, 
above the caption ‘Adolf Hitler thinks of your children!’28   
The Nazis took nothing for granted as they put measures in place to ensure support for 
Anschluss.  Troops would be in the voting stations, and the ballot would by no means be 
secret.  The former bastion of Vaterländische Front views, the Österreichische 
Wochenzeitung retained its name, even if, on 7th April, where pictures of Dollfuss and 
Schuschnigg had once been prominent, Hitler was now on the front cover.  Under his picture 
is an exhortation to vote for Anschluss.  On 9th April, the ‘Day of Greater Germany’ was 
proclaimed from the Rathausplatz balcony of the Vienna city hall by the new Mayor of 
Vienna, Dr. Hermann Neubacher.  In his speech, Neubacher welcomed Hitler to Vienna, ‘as 
a soldier would his General, on entering a fallen citadel’.29  He describes the honour he feels 
at welcoming Hitler to Vienna, now Hitler’s city.  Hitler, dressed in formal civilian wear, 
took this as the greeting of Vienna and of the whole of German Austria.  He expressed his 
confidence that the next day’s plebiscite would bring an overwhelming and irreversible 
‘Yes’ vote.  This confidence was well-founded.  Apart from the measures that had been 
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taken to coerce Austrians into voting for Anschluss, two sources that might have been 
expected to oppose the plebiscite came out in support of Anschluss in different ways.  
The first of these sources was the Social Democratic Party leadership, by now mostly in 
exile or in hiding.  This should not be interpreted as a positive Social Democratic 
endorsement of the Anschluss, however.  Aside from the likes of Karl Renner, who gave 
only a ‘highly qualified’ support for Anschluss, and then ‘under duress’, Social Democrats 
had a rational position regarding the Anschluss.30  First, the Social Democrats recognised 
that any resistance, whether by not voting, or voting against Anschluss, was a futile gesture, 
likely to lead to loss of life.  As they had seen in Nazi Germany, resistance was met by 
massive retribution from the state.31  Second, a number of Social Democrats saw union 
between Austria and Germany, but not this Germany, as desirable, a culturally logical 
outcome.  The key here is that the Social Democrats believed that Nazi Germany would 
collapse under the weight of its own contradictions, to be replaced by a more ‘advanced’ 
regime.  Even if the advice is considered in hindsight to have been either wrong or naive, 
given the events of 1938 to 1945 in Austria, it was not a ringing endorsement of Anschluss 
with Hitler’s Germany.  It would be more correct to say that the Social Democrats had 
remained ‘steadfast’ in their aim of Anschluss with a democratic Germany.’32  The only time 
they had deviated was when, in the Nazi period, they fell behind Otto Bauer’s support for 
Austria as the second, better Germany: ‘a German land of freedom, a German land of spirit 
and culture’. 33  
The Austrian bishops of the Catholic Church, including Cardinal Archbishop Innitzer of 
Vienna, formed the second major source of support for a pro-Anschluss vote.  On the Sunday 
before the plebiscite, the Wiener Kirchenblatt carried the a pastoral letter from the bishops, 
‘A Solemn Declaration’.34  The bishops called on the people of Austria to carry out their 
‘obvious national duty’ in voting for the ‘fulfilment of a thousand year desire’ of the German 
people to be brought together in one state.  The letter went on to talk of the achievements of 
the Nazi regime, especially in the ‘social area’.  What the bishops thought of the Nazis’ 
‘achievements’ towards Jews in the social area is not stated.  Whatever they thought, they 
advised Catholics, ‘out of inner conviction’, to vote for the Anschluss.  In order to reach as 
                                                      
30 Robert A. Kann, ‘Karl Renner (December 14, 1870-December 31 1950)’, Journal of Modern History, (1950), Vol. 23, No.3, 
pp.243-249, here p.248. 
31 Kirk, p.50. 
32 Lauridsen, p.375. 
33 Stourzh, p.35. 
34 A ‘feierliche Erklärung’: Wiener Kirchenblatt, 3rd April 1938.  Available in ABPD 1938/2.   See also Diözesanblatt, 
22ndMarch 1938, p.23. 
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many Catholics as possible, this message was carried in many newspapers and parish 
newsletters.35  The message was signed by the Bishops of Austria with the words ‘Heil 
Hitler!’, although Archbishop Innitzer appears to have been reluctant to do so.36  
Nevertheless, this was a ringing endorsement of Anschluss, made after Innitzer had 
personally negotiated with Hitler the terms for the relationship between State and Church.  
The difference between the positions of the bishops on the one hand and on the Social 
Democratic leaders on the other is profound.  The latter were accepting the inevitable; the 
former were helping to make Anschluss with Nazi Germany desirable, acceptable and 
respectable. 
Father Schmid 
Many parish priests in Vienna must have struggled to reconcile this ‘thousand year dream of 
the German people’ with their own views.  Few priests had been enthusiastic about union 
with Germany, even before the establishment of the Third Reich.  One priest who was 
enthusiastic, however, was Father Leopold Schmid, of the Landstrasse.37  When Anschluss 
came, Father Schmid was quick to praise Hitler.  In his parish newsletter, he presented to his 
readers a lengthy explanation of his views and the journey he had taken in reaching them.  
He recalled the early 1920s, when he regularly addressed the Pan-Germans in Vienna, and 
how they had initially been sceptical of him.  Yet, he had always believed that religion 
should not divide Germans. He explained that, while he had supported the Vaterländische 
Front and the establishment of the Corporate State, this was solely as a necessary measure to 
fight Bolshevism.  He had always retained the hope of German unity.  He signs his 
newsletter ‘Heil Hitler!’  Given what is known of him it is unlikely that Schmid shared 
Innitzer’s reluctance in signing in this manner. 
The depth of Schmid’s feeling can be gauged from his marking of the Anschluss in his 1938 
Chronik.  Here, he heads the page with a single word, in large handwriting: 
‘Wiedervereinigung!’ – ‘Reunion!’  This sums up how German nationalists had felt about 
their struggle for Austria to be joined with the German state to the North.  They believed that 
Germans had once been united, and had become divided.  Whether they dated this division 
to the time of the Reformation, or to the end of the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
nation, or even to Austria’s eviction from what they saw as the rest of Germany, these Pan-
Germans thought they were putting Germany back together.  They did not see their struggle 
in Austria as creating something new, but recreating something that had been broken. 
                                                      
35 See, for instance, Katholische Aktion in der Alservorstadt, hereafter AV Pfarrblatt, April 1938. 
36 On Innitzer’s reluctance, see Reimann, p.110. 
37 This was the same priest who had been considered an outsider by his colleagues.  See page 204 of this thesis. 
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Subsequent events quickly led Cardinal Innitzer to see that he had been wrong in hoping that 
union with Germany offered the fulfilment of a dream, and he came to regret his 
endorsement of Anschluss on two fronts.  On the first, Innitzer was summoned to the Vatican 
in April 1938.  He was made to publish in the Osservatore Romano a qualification to his 
announcements in support of Anschluss.  This qualification stated that the bishops were not 
endorsing anything that came into conflict with Catholicism.38  On the second, he saw the 
Nazis go back, one by one, on virtually every agreement they had made with the Church in 
Austria.  The Nazis hit at those areas where the Church had the State had battled for decades.  
They made civil marriage compulsory, with the state recognising civil marriage without the 
need for a religious ceremony.39  Schools were taken into State control.40   
Then the Nazis moved against the institutions of the Church itself, closing down its many 
societies.  Umbrella organisations such as Katholische Aktion were disbanded.  This was a 
potentially fatal blow to the ability of lay members of the Church to come together in groups 
that were closely tied to the Church, and to the ability of priests to work through these 
groups to maintain contacts beyond masses.  Katholische Aktion, individual groups for men, 
women, boys and girls, Marian congregations for men, the Katholischer 
Arbeiterinnenverein, gymnastics groups named in honour of Karl Lueger, and bearing the 
words Catholic and German, had proliferated across the city.41  After the Anschluss, they 
were banned.  Worse still, Catholic youth organisations like the Pathfinders were closed, and 
members of these youth organisations were then automatically recorded as having become 
members of the Hitler Youth.  In many instances, no notification was sent to members that 
this had happened.  In this way, the Nazis could record the growing membership of their 
organisations.42 
The Church came to terms with the deal it had made with the Nazis.  In November 1938, 
Innitzer convened a gathering of young Catholics by St. Stephen’s Cathedral.  During 
prayers, he declared that there was only one Führer, Jesus Christ.  This stirred up local 
Nazis, who next day raided the Archbishop’s offices in central Vienna.  One young priest, 
Father Krawarik, who had served at St. Laurenz in Währing, and who would later serve at 
Alt-Ottakring, was looking out of a window to see what was happening.  Krawarik was shot 
and wounded in an eye.  Despite all of this, Father Schmid at St. Rochus continued to move 
                                                      
38 Scholz and Heinisch, p.109. 
39 AEDW WeCk, 1938. 
40 AEDW WeCk, 1938. 
41 For lists of associations at the parish level, and details of how frequently they met see, for instance,  NL Pfarrblatt, Year IV, 
No.2 or Hernalser Pfarrblatt, 1933, No.4, p.4.  
42 As recorded, for instance, in AEDW AOCk, 1938 as well as AEDW WeCk, 1938. 
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ever closer to the Nazis, especially after war broke out.  He regularly and willingly acted as 
an agent of their propaganda.  In this, Schmid must have become an annoyance for the upper 
hierarchy, especially as Cardinal Innitzer came into conflict with the Nazis in the year or so 
after the Anschluss.   
If the Church made efforts to control him, Schmid defiantly resisted.  By 1943 he was 
sending open letters to congregations at his present and former parishes, in which he insulted 
senior members of the Viennese clergy.43  He also broadcast on Radio Vienna, sending a 
message assumed to have been worded for him by the Nazi Propaganda Ministry.  This was 
counter to specific instructions from the office of the Archbishop.  It is not clear whether this 
was the final straw, but Father Pichler, who succeeded Schmid in 1944, recorded that 
Schmid had been dismissed from his parish.44  Schmid was an anomaly in his long-term 
support for the Nazis, and while some priests did exhibit an initial burst of enthusiasm for 
Anschluss in March 1938, this enthusiasm died down as the reality of the relationship 
between the Church and the Nazi state became clear.45   
This was not the case at the parish of Alservorstadt, where parish newsletters in 1938 carried 
items not found in other parish newsletters surveyed here.  The newsletter goes from an 
admiration of Fascist Italy in 1937 to placing two swastikas on its front page in 1938, 
describing them as symbols of German unity.46  It carries articles about how to check that an 
Austrian’s blood is truly German.47  It appeals for people to join the NS Volkswohlfahrt, a 
Nazi welfare organisation.48  These articles stand out as anomalies when the newsletter is 
compared with those from other parishes.  Elsewhere, clergy such as Archbishop Alois 
Hudal had tried to publicise what he saw as the common ground between Nazism and 
Catholicism.49 Hudal drew, at best, mixed responses from Austrian Catholics.50  The 
evidence, however, strongly favours an interpretation that priests in Vienna who supported 
the Nazis were rare.51  
Father Lojka 
                                                      
43 AEDW SRCk, 1944. 
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45 Scholz and Heinisch, 89-98.  
46 AV Pfarrblatt, May 1938, pp.111-113. 
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Fathers Lojka and Schubert, in the district of Währing, were not of the type of Father 
Schmid.  For all the differences of personality that come out of their writings, they belonged 
firmly to a large group that existed in the Church in Vienna at the time: anti-Anschluss, 
fiercely loyal to Austrian independence, and vigorously opposed to the Nazis.  Yet, as has 
been seen, they were also routinely and casually antisemitic.  Both priests inherited these 
attitudes from their predecessors, but sometimes they also seemed to relish them, to enjoy 
displaying them.  
After the Anschluss, Lojka was never directly critical of the bishops’ position, but his 
writings suggest that he was not surprised at how events turned out.  He records that the 
Nazis offered a hand of reconciliation when Gauleiter of Vienna Josef Bürckel declared that 
there was ‘no opposition between Christianity and Volkstum’.52  The bishops put forward 
their conditions for support in the plebiscite: no change to the Concordat and continuing 
Church control of the schools.  On 28th March 1938, following the instructions of the 
Austrian bishops, the Church at Weinhaus carried a huge poster in support of a positive 
outcome for the plebiscite.  This was a general instruction for all churches, and Lojka 
believed that in orders such as this the bishops contributed greatly to the overwhelmingly 
positive outcome of the plebiscite.53 
Lojka shows no surprise that the Nazis had gone back on their word, forcing the clergy to 
speak out against the new regime.  Although the bishops had tried hard to work with the 
‘new authorities’, Nazi pledges had been broken one after the other.  Religious rites were 
being refused to Catholics in public hospitals.  Cardinal Innitzer had been forced to rebut 
stories in the Tageszeitung, where he had been misquoted, and where it was alleged that he 
had ‘opposed the Führer’.  In Weinhaus after the Anschluss, the number of parishioners 
attending mass on Sundays was down to 894, as a result of ‘personal agitation and even 
worse means’.  Catholics who held true to their faith were losing jobs.54  The irony must 
have been lost on Lojka that members of the Church had supported quotas against Jews. 
By 1938, Lojka was 66 and should have retired.55  He carried on into the war years, but his 
Chronik entries become more sparse.  He records the death of Pius XI, but not the start of 
the war, although the war came inside his church when rooms at the presbytery were 
requisitioned for military service in 1941.56  Any close attention on Lojka that this created 
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did not alter his behaviour.  He remained motivated by religion above all, and his 1942 entry 
records the names of priests, German and Czech alike, who were executed on suspicion of 
involvement in the assassination of acting Reichsprotektor Reinhard Heydrich in Bohemia.  
Recording this information was an act of defiance.57  More than a year after being instructed 
to retire, Lojka finally requested permission to leave his parish, as Autumn turned to Winter 
in late 1944.58  Here, the trail on Father Lojka ends. 
Father Schubert At St. Laurenz-Gertrud 
Father Lojka’s near neighbour, Father Schubert, has been subject to more coverage in the 
history of Vienna, possibly because he was more publicly engaged.59  It has been noted in 
this thesis that on more that one occasion Schubert openly stated both his antisemitic beliefs 
and his opposition to the Nazis.  A study of antisemitism among the clergy, based on parish 
newsletters, claims that, apart from one brief effort in the parish newsletter, Schubert ceased 
his anti-Nazi activities after the Anschluss.60  Certainly, no evidence exists that Schubert 
ever recanted his antisemitism, but a different picture emerges with regard to his anti-Nazi 
activities after the Anschluss if sources in addition to the parish newsletters are considered.  
In his Chronik for 1938, he notes that the year has to be handled in two parts, because of the 
events of March 1938.  ‘Whoever is interested in the events of 1938 should not rely on this 
Chronik alone’.  They should instead refer to the parish newsletters, safe in an iron box, 
especially to those of 1934, the year of Dollfuss’s death and the suppression of a Nazi 
coup.61 
A single letter has been kept within the pages of the Chronik.62  It refers to the ‘suicide’ of 
Egon Friedl.  Friedl was a Jewish intellectual, who lived little more than two hundred metres 
from Schubert’s church, at Gentzgasse in the Währing district.  Friedl had thrown himself 
from the upper floors of his home as SS officers prepared to break in and arrest him.  The 
quotation marks around the word suicide are accurate, as it was at the very least an induced 
suicide.  If Schubert and Friedl did not know each other, they would have known of each 
other.  For a man of such strongly expressed antisemitic views, it is odd that Schubert should 
keep this letter, and odd that someone should choose to write to let him know of Friedl’s 
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death.  Whatever the reasons, this Chronik entry, and the retention of the letter, could have 
brought Schubert into considerable trouble with the new regime if either had been read.  
Schubert was in trouble regardless.  The Nazis remembered his attacks on them.  In April 
1938, a group of Nazis held a mock burial of the Vaterländische Front and of a priest, using 
children’s dolls, outside the church.63  The message was clear.  Schubert was a man under 
pressure, but it did not stop him finding ways to attack the Nazis.  He had not given up his 
opposition to them, and he found ways to hit at the heart of how the Nazis organised the 
state.  Nazi party officials entered into correspondence with the Archbishop’s office in May 
1939 to complain that Schubert had been making known his views on compulsory civil 
marriage, as introduced under Nazi laws.64  Schubert would address by her maiden name any 
woman who had not been through a Church service, but who had only been married by the 
state.  In refusing to acknowledge civil marriage, Schubert was refusing to roll over.   
His preaching must have been having an effect, for whatever reason.  Just a couple of 
months before the Nazis started their investigation, the parish management committee had 
requested permission to erect a loud-speaker for mass, as the large crowds were unable to 
hear Father Schubert preach.65  Perhaps this is where the missing parishioners from 
neighbouring Weinhaus were to be found.  Schubert was an antisemite, but despite claims to 
the contrary he did not give up the struggle against the Nazis.  Schubert did not live to see 
the end of the Nazis.  He died in April 1942, aged 67.66 
Father Schwarz 
Lojka and Schubert were not exceptional as priests in their antisemitism.  Many other 
parishes have been identified where priests used their newsletters, for instance, to spread 
antisemitic messages.67  This does not mean that all parishes held priests in this category.  
The parish of St. Anton in the Favoriten district, for instance, has been identified as carrying 
positive comments about Jews in its newsletter in this period.68  The parish of Alt-Ottakring, 
however, has been identified as a source of antisemitism, yet this judgement, on Father Karl 
Schwarz, should be reconsidered for a number of reasons.  Father Schwarz is singled out as 
an antisemite from a comment he made in his parish newsletter.  Yet the comment seems to 
have many possible interpretations.  In 1928, he wrote a story under the headline ‘Star or 
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Cross?’  The story describes how the modern struggle was no longer between Cross and 
Crescent Moon, but between Cross and Star.  ‘The five-pointed star, whether we call it the 
Freemasons’ or Jewish or Soviet star, conquers nothing.  On the one side is Christ, on the 
other is the Antichrist, that is the key struggle today more than ever’.69   
This article has been marked out as the sign of a conspiracy fantasy on the part of Schwarz, a 
conflation of Jews, freemasons and Socialists.  Given the way many priests described their 
world, this would often be a reasonable interpretation, but other interpretations are possible.  
Apart from the five-pointed star being problematic as a symbol of Jewishness, as the Star of 
David has six points, if the rest of the article concerned is read then this could all be taken as 
a parable for the modern world.  The quotation on its own does not give the whole picture.  
The message of the article as a whole could be re-phrased as ‘However we choose to 
describe the wrong path – as liberal, Jewish, or Socialist – in the modern world we are 
coming to the greatest struggle.  The only true path to salvation is through Jesus Christ’.  
This interpretation becomes more feasible if a little more is known about the priest in 
question, his background and the consequences of Anschluss for him. 
Schwarz was an old-school Catholic Austrian patriot, who had labelled the Nazis’ murder of 
Dollfuss as Austria’s blackest day.  For Schwarz, Dollfuss was a martyr.70  On 24th February 
1938, in Ottakring, Father Karl Schwarz was celebrating.  He seems to have been in the 
habit of making impromptu entries in his Chronik as the year progressed, rather than waiting 
until the end of the year, and this entry appears to have been made on this day.  His Alt-
Ottakring parish church was in need of urgent repairs, but the budget allocated to the church 
covered little more than its running costs.  Then came the direct involvement of the Minister 
for Education, who granted the necessary subsidies.  He entered this in the Chronik and 
called it a ‘miracle’.71  This was the sort of intervention that Schwarz would have hoped the 
Corporate State would make.  
Schwarz’s next entry is almost three months later, for 16th May 1938, after what he 
described as an ‘illness’ had forced him to stay away from Vienna, at the small town of 
Gablitz, from the day of the Anschluss to 12th April 1938.  When he returned, he found that a 
swastika flag had been unfurled at the church and other parish buildings.  He notes a large 
fall in attendance at mass, including the attendance of only ten children for the service for 
the local Gymnasium school.  In other years, children’s masses and processions had merited 
special mention in the Chronik because of their large turn-outs, and because the children 
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were the future of the Church.72  In the course of 1938, he notes the dissolution of all Church 
associations, including children’s groups and the Pathfinders, but also Catholic Action, with 
which he had close links.  The old Habsburg high celebration, Corpus Christi, was held for 
the first time without any participation by state officials.  No public gathering took place, as 
it was too cold, and only one school turned up for 7:30 a.m. mass.  At a personal level, a 
planned trip to Lisbon with the Redemptorist Order had to be called off.  Schwarz does not 
record the reason.73 
However, this lost opportunity to leave the country must have struck hard against Schwarz, a 
man who does not seem to have travelled abroad.  The timing of this planned trip and his 
‘illness’ and temporary departure from Vienna at the time of the Anschluss are significant.  
They point to plans by Schwarz and his personal circle to keep him away from the capital, 
because when the Nazis took control of Austria, Schwarz knew he would be among the 
persecuted.  The new authorities launched an investigation after Schwarz, complying with 
the law, registered his ‘racial origins’.  Minister Wallentin ordered investigations into the 
accuracy of statements by Schwarz and one of his curates, Fried, who had registered 
themselves as Jewish.74  Nothing more is known about Fried, but Schwarz had, it seems, 
converted to Catholicism as a youth.75  Forced to withdraw from his parish, initially to a 
monastic order, he then went on the run, adopting a disguise and a false name.  In this he 
was courageously assisted by his housekeeper and her husband.  They hid Schwarz’s 
departure by buying the necessary rail tickets for him.  They also continued to draw his food 
ration, until the deception was discovered.  Eventually, they stood trial and could have been 
executed, but they escaped this fate and survived the war.  Somehow, Schwarz ended up in 
the last place the Nazis would think to look for him: working as a chaplain at an SS hospital 
in Germany.  Late in the war, he was recognised by a wounded soldier who had been one of 
his parishioners in Ottakring.  From his hospital bed, the soldier told Schwarz that he would 
say nothing, and Schwarz survived.76   
In the fight to take Vienna, Ottakring was the scene of close quarters fighting, as resistance 
against the Nazis spilled onto the streets and workers took up arms.  The priest at the 
Catholic church of the Holy Spirit, on the Southern side of the district, sheltered 52 
Ukrainian slave workers from the Nazis.  Others were not so lucky, and the district was the 
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site of mass executions of slave workers by German troops as the Red Army closed in.  
Aerial bombing left many buildings burnt out.  These included the parish church of 
Neulerchenfeld, which was reduced to a shell.77  These scenes could not have been far from 
his mind when, in the months after the end of the war, one Karl Walcher, who had been 
appointed as the parish administrator when Schwarz was forced to step down from day-to-
day running of the parish, kept the Chronik of Alt-Ottakring up to date.78  On 1st May 1945, 
Walcher recorded that the swastika had gone from the parish buildings, and ‘the red-white-
red flag, the flag of Austria is flying.  God protect our country and our people’.79  The 
Austrian flag was also to be seen flying from other public buildings.  In October 1945, the 
entry reads that there was no sign of Schwarz, even though the parish had been ‘freed’ for 
five months.80  
Then, late in 1945, news reached one Anna Kohl in Ottakring that Schwarz had been seen 
living and working in a monastery in Bavaria.  He was on his way back and ‘he is fine’.81  
The writer of the Chronik then talks of everything going back to normal and makes no 
reference to any consequences that might come out of the war.  There were, however, 
consequences for Schwarz.  He did go back to Ottakring, but only briefly.  Schwarz retired 
on the grounds of what he described as an illness he had picked up ‘in the field’.82  
Schwarz’s biographer believed this had more to do with the rejection Schwarz experienced 
from his parishioners after his return in 1946, where he was still referred to as the ‘Jewish 
Priest’.83   
At this point, a discrepancy emerges between Schwarz’s biography and the correspondence 
in the archives.  According to the biography, Schwarz now took rooms in another parish in a 
different district of Vienna, where his role was restricted to the occasional hearing of 
confession, until his death in the late 1950s.  Correspondence between Schwarz and the 
Ordinariat reveals a different story.  Schwarz did retire, but he stayed only briefly in the role 
of father confessor in Vienna.  He subsequently wrote to Diocesan officials that his 
experience of not having a parish had come too soon.  Quoting from Genesis, he said he was 
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now like Rachel: ‘Give me children, or I will die’.84  He still needed to have parishioners.  
So this request to come out of retirement was granted, and he was given a parish in Bavaria.  
It was in Bavaria, it appears, that he had spent some considerable time on the run during the 
war.  Finally retiring after several more years’ service, Schwarz lived to the late 1950s.85 
The story of Schwarz is instructive when looking at antisemitism in the past.  It cautions 
against making judgements that are influenced by the group with which an individual is 
associated.  It also cautions that statements that appear to imply an antisemitic stance require 
analysis within a wider context.  It is understandable that a reading of the parish newsletter 
could lead to an interpretation that Schwarz was an antisemite.  Even without the knowledge 
of Schwarz’s own background, however, other interpretations of his writing would be 
possible.  The priests examined here were highly motivated by religion, and dedicated their 
lives to the service of the Church.  The evidence does suggest that a large number of them 
were unpleasant, antisemitic and could be described in modern terms as racist.  That does 
not mean that modern interpreters should read antisemitism into everything that appears, on 
the surface, to be antisemitic.  This was a complex world.  Comments about ‘following stars’ 
need to be taken in the religious context in which they were meant, rather than being read as 
signs of antisemitism.  It may be just as likely that the curate who questioned Schwarz’s 
credibility as a priest, in the dispute over stolen cheques mentioned earlier, was antisemitic 
and thinking of Schwarz’s Jewish origins.  Without knowing more about the curate who 
made the comment, however, it is impossible to know for certain. 
The View From Post-War Austria 
Schwarz’s biography had joint authors, one of whom, Wolfgang Kluger, was the son of a lay 
helper at masses at Alt-Ottakring from the 1920s onwards.  Kluger had been baptised by 
Schwarz at Alt-Ottakring and knew him well.  The second author was Monsignor Franz 
Loidl, who wrote or co-authored a number of biographies of priests for the Church after the 
War.  These biographies are revealing for what they show about post-War attitudes.  No 
biography of Father Dittrich or Father Deckert has been published in this series, nor of 
Fathers Lojka or Schubert, yet Schubert had been well-connected in his lifetime.  He had 
received papal honours, and the church at St. Laurenz had been chosen as the Dollfuss 
memorial church.  Plans for the demolition of the old church and the raising of a modern 
church to cope with larger congregations were well advanced when Anschluss came and 
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brought a halt to them.  The plans had the explicit approval of Dollfuss’s widow and of 
Cardinal Innitzer.86 
The many priests who merit an entry in the series includes those who served in Ottakring 
and Währing, such as Leopold Engelhart, who was at Neu-Ottakring from 1938.87  The 
series also includes a number of priests elsewhere who suffered persecution or died at the 
hands of the Nazis, such as Father Otto Neururer, a priest in the Tyrol who resisted the 
Nazis.88  Over the years several works, including one in this series, have been written about 
Father Latschka.  None of those that have been investigated for this study were critical of 
him or of his attitudes.  Latschka has instead been allowed to speak freely through these 
works, stating his views without any critical appraisal.  One biography, written in 1962, 
quotes extensively from Latschka’s entries from the Chronik at Neu-Ottakring from 1899.  
Passages about the dreadful conditions of the working classes in late nineteenth century 
Vienna are accompanied verbatim by Latschka’s explanations for this state of affairs: that 
the Jew (sic) was exploiting these people.89  
At several levels, this biography seeks to validate Latschka’s opinions.  The statement is 
made that Latschka’s views are being repeated without comment, for their ‘interesting 
insights’ on Vienna at the turn of the twentieth century.90  This attribution of ‘interesting 
insights’ suggests that the author thought they were worth bringing to the attention of a new 
public.  The choice of the 1899 Chronik entry, rather than the 1897 Alt-Ottakring Chronik 
on which Latschka based this entry, is also significant for the views of the biographer 
towards Latschka.  This, after all, is Latschka’s Vienna, which he conceptualised as a city 
where Christians were being held in robot to the Jews.  The very title of the biography 
indicates how Latschka was viewed when this work was written.  He is described as a 
Seelsorger, a German term often translated as ‘Pastor’, but one with a literal meaning of 
carer of souls.  Less than twenty years after the end of the Second World War and the 
discovery of the Holocaust, it was acceptable to repeat without condemnation the words of a 
Catholic priest who had preached some of the worst vitriol against Jews in Vienna and the 
Habsburg Empire.  It was acceptable for this priest to be described as a ‘carer of souls’.91   
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This lack of direct engagement with the attitudes of Latschka and his associates and 
successors still occurs.  A recent biography of political theorist Alfred Missong states that 
Missong developed a Catholic social politics that was free of antisemitism.92 It is well 
known that Missong polemicised against the book by Bishop Hudal that attempted to build 
bridges between the Church and the Nazis.93  Missong belonged to a circle that opposed 
racial antisemitism, and no suggestion is made here that Missong was racist.94  Missong did 
not, however, reject a debate that was based upon the alleged attributed characteristics of 
Jews.  Writing in the 1930s, Missong described Father Joseph Deckert as having an 
honoured place in Church history, as the man who laid the spiritual seed from which 
Lueger’s ‘people’s movement’ had grown.95  Missong also claimed that, in opposition to the 
racial antisemites, Deckert had succeeded in reducing the ‘Jewish question’ to one of 
religion and morality.96  Leaving aside whether there was a ‘Jewish question’, rather than an 
antisemitic question, Missong is describing the same Deckert who wrote that he was a 
confirmed racial antisemite.97  This is to say nothing of where or how, according to 
Deckert’s world view, Missong would have placed Jews who rejected Judaism, whether for 
some other religion or for none. 
Attempts have been made to come to terms with the past, some more profound than others.  
The Christian Social Party became, in effect, the Austrian People’s Party.98  The Church 
reflected on its time under the Corporate State and the Anschluss in a book on Church 
organisation in Vienna under Innitzer’s leadership from 1932 to 1945.  The book contains 
much reflection on practical matters, such as the redrawing of parish boundaries, and the 
relatively significant number of church foundations in Vienna between 1934 and 1937.  No 
comment is made on why these years would have seen these foundations, as the Corporate 
State paid off its debts to the Church.  The years of Anschluss are described as difficult years 
for the Church in Vienna.  The index makes no reference to Jews or to antisemitism.  
Numerous Viennese, of all political persuasions and none, of various religious beliefs and 
none, were persecuted during the Anschluss and spent time in prison and camps.  Priests and 
others were executed for aiding resistance, sometimes of the most minor kind, but resistance 
                                                      
92 Alfred Missong jun, ed., Alfred Missong: Christentum und Politik in Österreich: ausgewählte Schriften 1924-1950, (Vienna: 
Böhlau, 2006), Introduction.  
93 Stourzh, p.39. 
94 John Connelly, ‘Catholic Racism And Its Opponents’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 79, No. 4 (December 2007), 
pp.813-847, here p.814.  
95 Alfred Missong, Heiliges Wien: ein Führer durch Wiens Kirchen, (Vienna: Dom-Verlag, 1930, 1970 edition), p.239. 
96 Missong, Heiliges Wien, p.239. 
97 Deckert, Rassenantisemitismus?, p.43. 
98 Lauridsen, p.22.  
  
  Page 227 of 272 
of any kind required enormous courage.  Some Viennese were fortunate enough to be able to 
move on after the war.  Kurt Schuschnigg, last pre-war Chancellor of Austria, was arrested 
by the Nazi regime in 1938 and was imprisoned until 1945.  In 1946, still only in his late 
forties, he moved to the United States, where he became a professor of law at the University 
of St. Louis.  He retired to rural Austria some twenty years later.  It had been Schuschnigg 
who had pushed Dollfuss to execute leaders of the 1934 Socialist uprising. Schuschnigg, 
questioned about this many years later, described his action as a ‘faux pas’.99 
Other ways in which some of the characters encountered in this work are still remembered in 
Vienna may surprise modern readers, especially when contrasted with those who are not 
commemorated.  Yet it is difficult to ascribe a single meaning to the ways in which they are 
remembered.  These are complex matters.  The British and the French still have monuments 
and signs of remembrance for the builders of Empire.  Cecil Rhodes, the spiritual godfather 
of the British Empire as it reached its greatest extent, is remembered today in an arts centre 
that bears his name on the site of his birthplace in the small English town of Bishop’s 
Stortford.100  The street leading to it is Kimberley Close, named after the mining centre in 
South Africa from which Rhodes established a commercial, political and military presence.  
Perhaps only those who are well versed in the history would draw the connection between 
this and a man whose views would nowadays be classed as racist.   
This is not too dissimilar from the situation in Vienna today.  Vienna is still the home of the 
Karl von Vogelsang Institute, with its Leopold Kunschak rooms.  Those with a limited 
knowledge of history might be unaware that Vogelsang was an antisemite, who seems to 
have based his antisemitism on religious and allegedly economic grounds.101  During a long 
career, Kunschak proposed the separation of the ‘Jewish nation’ from the ‘German majority’ 
of Austria.  He also believed that no Jew could ever cease to be a Jew, even after conversion 
to Christianity.102  Kunschak was able to resume a career as a politician after the Second 
World War, and is even now remembered officially by the Vienna City Council for his 
election to the freedom of the city in 1946.103  Vienna is also the home of Dr.-Karl-Lueger-
Platz as well as Dr.-Karl-Lueger-Ring.  There is no clamour to rename these places as they 
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sit in truce with Dr.-Karl-Renner-Ring or the numerous other places named after Marxist 
heroes and heroines, such as Friedrich Engels and Rosa Luxemburg.104   
Perhaps, however, this does no more than to point to Renan’s formulation that societies and 
nations survive not through their power to remember what binds them together but through 
their power to forget what divides them.  Joseph Deckert’s grave is in a well tended garden 
at the rear of his old church in Weinhaus.  In the leaflets on sale there, his name is given as a 
founder of the church that stands there now.  He is credited as the driving force in raising the 
funds for the building.  There is no mention of his antisemitism.  At the church of St. 
Laurenz in Währing, a stained glass window commemorates the work of Father Schubert.  
Again, there is no mention of his antisemitism.  Adam Latschka remains honoured for his 
social work among Christians, and a Viennese street, Latschkagasse, is still named after him.  
Once again, there is no mention of his antisemitism.  Father Johannes Krawarik, the priest 
wounded as Nazis stormed the Diocesan office, and against whom no accusations of 
antisemitism are laid, served to 1968 as parish priest at Alt-Ottakring, immediate successor 
to the ‘Jewish priest’, Father Schwarz.  The square next to the church at Ottakring is named 
after Krawarik.  But in Vienna, one priest is unremembered, at least publicly, and there is no 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents the principal conclusions that have been reached in response to the 
questions posed in this work, concerning the nature, aims, depth and extent of radical visions 
of German identity in Vienna, between 1861 to 1938.  Summaries are given of the themes 
that are central to the work, such as the nature of debates over identity and belonging, and 
include discussion of whether antisemitism was widespread, even in Red Vienna.  The 
conclusions emphasize the importance of looking not just at comments in historical 
isolation, but examining individual and shared world views, for a clearer understanding of 
people’s underlying attitudes and deeply held beliefs.  This chapter then addresses the 
lessons to be drawn from Vienna in terms of understanding and applying models of 
nationalism.  Finally, it returns to considering events shortly before and just after the 
Anschluss, to understand how some were attempting to shape and define identity and 
belonging, and what this meant in terms of radical German nationalism in Vienna. 
A chronology of the period studied here reveals the complexity of life in a major European 
city from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century.  Within this complexity, however, 
themes constantly re-emerge that are important for this study.  Time and again, for instance, 
the state addressed questions of how it derived its legitimacy while, at the same time, 
questions were raised as to who could legitimate the state, who could belong to this state, 
and the forms that belonging and participation should take.  The questions were often put in 
simpler terms.  Who was a German?  Who was an Austrian?  What should happen to those 
who were considered to be different? 
Nation And Identity: Dialogues On The Radical Right 
At the start of the period under examination, large tracts of the Habsburg lands were part of 
the German Confederation, but the German speakers who occupied these lands had more 
than one identity that they could share: German, Habsburg, Christian, Catholic being among 
them.  Those on the German radical Right came to argue about subsets of these groupings, 
of whether a Catholic or a Protestant identity was the essence of being Austrian or German, 
or whether an Austrian should be seen as Austrian first, then German, or vice-versa.  At 
various times, these aspects of identity took on different levels of significance, and aspects 
were stressed in different measure as a response to perceived threats or opportunities.  The 
one thing that the radical Right seems to have agreed upon was that a true German was an 
antisemite.  
The radical camp split into those who favoured union with Germany and those who 
remained loyal to an Austrian vision, in one form or other.  As the period progressed, the 
latter were generally members of the Christian Social movement, although some Christian 
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Socials wanted Anschluss.  Whether Pan-German or Christian Social, antisemites defined 
Germans as a distinctive group of people, different from others.  They emphasized ideas of 
belonging to a distinct territory, even if they varied the territory or territories that they 
emphasized, and suggested powerful links between nation and territory.  They used a 
common language, common traditions and a shared history in order to promote unity.  They 
argued about the nature and political objectives of the nation.   
These groups had different objectives when it came to the state in which they felt they 
should be based, but many models of nationalism presuppose that nationalists would wish to 
bring together all co-nationals in one state.  Pan-Germans would ultimately have expected 
Germans to come together in one state.  Christian Socials generally regarded the German 
nation as a collection of tribes, each of which had the right to its own religion.  This does 
not, however, make the Christian Socials less nationalist than the Pan-Germans, in the sense 
that they would respond forcefully to any perceived threat to German culture.  At these 
points, they were nationalists foremost, with the nation their primary concern. 
All radical Germans emphasized kinship and the ethnic nature of nationalism, and they 
believed that the German nation was rooted in the past.  Pan-Germans also appealed to the 
strength they felt would come from what, in their eyes, was a modernising of society through 
the nation-state.  Pan-Germans were ultimately ethnic, political nationalists.  Christian 
Socials adopted a more culturally nationalist tone when this suited their objectives.  Under 
the Empire, they proposed hierarchies of nations, but all nations, Jews excluded, were to be 
allowed their own culture, to some extent. 
The radical Right struggled to find common ground over religion.  While religion was not 
the only area that drove a wedge between Pan-German and Christian Social antisemites, it 
was key, especially after the fall of the Empire.  Under the Empire, dynastic attachment kept 
many German Austrian antisemites loyal to the Habsburgs.  Under the Republic, though, 
religion dictated for many whether union with Germany or a separate development for 
Austria was to be promoted.  Occasionally, even the Catholic clergy, like Father Schmid or 
Cardinal Innitzer, could say that religious differences should be set aside in order to bring all 
Germans together.  On the whole, however, this did not apply. 
The shifting alliances and the sometimes apparently contradictory positions adopted by 
people on the radical Right demonstrate that no single model of the nation and nationalism 
has universal validity, but models of the nation and nationalism are useful tools, if they are 
applied as complements to each other, and if it is recognised that they do not tell the whole 
story.  Nationalism may be a political programme used to benefit those who would form an 
elite in a new, nationalised state, but this does not mean that nationalist politicians do not 
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also believe that a nationalised state would be good for the people they define as their nation.  
Even if nationalists move from one position to another, this does not necessarily invalidate 
the models described here.  People form coalitions of interest with similar groups which may 
at other times be rivals.  People also emphasize different aspects of their identity at different 
times, so someone can be a cultural nationalist at one time, then be radicalised into political 
action later. 
It would also be far from correct to say that the nation had or has a monopoly over 
definitions of identity or belonging.  In the period under consideration, religion, or a lack of 
one, was clearly a significant factor in identity.  This can be seen from conversions and 
reconversions, to and from Catholicism.  In the 1890s, the taking of power in the city by the 
Christian Socials was followed by a spate of conversions to Catholicism in Vienna.  Then, 
Pan-German successes initiated a brief swelling of Protestant numbers.  In the 1920s, in Red 
Vienna, approximately 20,000 people a year were leaving the Catholic Church.  After 1933, 
with Dollfuss in power, a wave of re-conversions followed.   
Individual causes of these conversions to, and departures from, various churches are difficult 
to establish, and while conversion or departure was a one-off act, involvement in church 
ritual was part of a banal process that reinforced identity, a form of daily plebiscite that 
Renan would have recognised.  Further daily plebiscites were made possible by formal and 
informal networks, and by places which at first sight may not seem to have any political 
purpose: the singing societies, voluntary associations, church groups and even masses and 
pilgrimages.  These groups on their own may seem to lack a greater significance, but they 
were important collectively.  Individual churches, for instance, may have been relatively 
small, but the twenty-one districts in Vienna each held several parishes.  Each church held 
several masses a day, and on Sundays and feast days these churches were full, and the priest 
was often a key player in wider antisemitic networks, which overlapped each other many 
times.  These networks, as has been seen, had a considerable extent at any one time and a 
considerable durability over time.   
These networks also, in ways that echo Rogers Brubaker’s hypothesis, provided places 
where identity could be formed as a process, not just as a fixed set of attributes.  Social 
interaction among a group of people who shared views on the world would have helped to 
create or confirm radical opinions.  On the Christian Social side, they would have set these 
opinions first in a bourgeois world of Habsburg loyalty, then in a bourgeois world of 
opposition to the Republic.  They would have confirmed these people in their view that a 
‘true’ German way was a Catholic German way.   
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German nationalists were less fortunate.  Fewer in number than the Christian Socials, they 
did not possess their own networks as counterparts to those that formed around the Church 
or Christian Social groups.  They did, however, have access to those shared areas of social 
life and charitable activities which were open to Christian bourgeois.  The Three Camps 
model did not apply here, and German nationalists and Christian Socials could rub shoulders 
together in, for instance, the bourgeois singing groups that gathered under the umbrella of 
the Österreichischer Sängerbund.  These groups allowed a common bourgeois front, right 
into the First Republic, and sometimes provided Christian Socials and Pan-Germans with 
common ground.   
By 1930, the Christian Social vision of identity was under challenge as the dominant vision 
on the Right.  In the elections of that year in Vienna, record numbers of people on the Right 
voted for a political movement which aimed at bringing together the entire German nation in 
one state.  It is difficult to say whether they were voting for this option out of conviction, 
rather than, say, despair at the economic circumstances.  It can be said that by 1930 the 
overlapping networks on the radical Right made acceptance of the idea of union with 
Germany something to be considered by some former Christian Social voters.  It can be said, 
too, that the 1932 elections showed that the most radical version of nationalist exclusion, in 
the ideas of the Nazi Party – if not the ways in which they would be implemented – had 
found acceptance by many on the radical Right.  
Julie Thorpe rightly rejects interpretations of this breakthrough in 1932, and the subsequent 
Nazi takeover in 1938, as the outcome of a linear tradition that links Pan-Germanism from 
Schönerer in the 1880s through to the Nazis.1  Thorpe draws attention to a widespread 
Austro-centric interpretation of Pan-Germanism, a view which pointed to ‘Austria’s unique 
identity as a German state and to the shared national identity of Austrian Germans and other 
Germans in Central Europe’.  Thorpe also points to how Pan-Germanism could be defined in 
many different ways.  This could be beneficial in helping competing radical groups, who 
might be different from each other in many ways, to reach agreements of convenience.  As 
Thorpe says, over the years, Nazis and Austro-Fascists clashed, but often converged in the 
idea of building ‘a new state of German citizens’.2  
Nevertheless, the extent of agreement should not be exaggerated.  The Austro-fascist vision 
of Austria as a German state was very different from that of the Nazis.  Nor should the 
widespread acceptance of a common German heritage that transcended state boundaries lead 
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to a conclusion that Pan-Germanism was the ‘unifying creed of all Austrians before 1938’.3   
Otto Bauer did not talk of Austria as ‘the better Germany’ because he accepted Pan-German 
themes of ‘blood and soil’.4  Bauer’s vision of ‘Germany’, however much it would have 
privileged German culture over others, was ultimately based on a Socialist internationalism, 
which separated it from the vision of the radical Right.  Despite the Social Democrats being 
perhaps the last allies he could call on in his struggle with the Nazis, Schuschnigg would 
therefore have no dealings with ‘Marxists’.5 
Vienna As An Antisemitic Hotbed? 
Christian Socials and German nationalists tried hard to recruit people to their viewpoint and 
between them gathered sizeable support in Vienna, even if this support remained a minority 
overall.  However, the impact on the city of their visions of exclusion can not be understood 
by studying them in isolation, and the context of the city has to be taken into account.  This 
was a predominantly working class city, where the Social Democratic Party influenced life 
at many levels, even before it took control of Vienna after 1918.  Neither the Party, nor the 
movement as a whole, was the same as the working class, but the reach of the Social 
Democrats was such that an analysis of their position with regard to antisemitism is required, 
especially as there has been criticism of their actions, policies and attitudes.  If an 
examination of the context leads to a conclusion that the radical Right was not alone in 
making antisemitism widespread, then its share of the responsibility for the scenes of 1938 
and afterwards is limited. 
In order to reach a conclusion, it must be remembered that few would have imagined, even 
as late as the 1930s, that exclusionary prejudice could lead to the genocide of the Holocaust.  
Social Democrats therefore prioritised the class struggle over the struggle against prejudice.  
Social Democrats considered Christian Social attacks on ‘Jewish Capitalism’ to be a 
political lie of convenience.  Christian Socials made life difficult and deeply unpleasant for 
Jews without influence or power, yet they formed opportunist coalitions with the rich, 
regardless of their confessional status, when both stood to gain from such coalitions.  The 
Social Democrats were asking why the Christian Socials would form alliances with Jewish 
capitalists if antisemitism was the main thrust of the Christian Social programme.  As for 
Social Democratic use of stereotypes, these, however distasteful, should not be equated with 
antisemitism.  Vienna from the 1860s to 1938 was a world where stereotype and caricature 
were used extensively.  This world of stereotypes may seem crude and harsh under modern 
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analysis, but the use of stereotypes does not necessarily indicate antisemitism.  Stereotypes 
were short-cuts that formed part of a very specific assault on Christian Social propaganda.   
This work has shown that much criticism of the Social Democrats is unjustified.  It accepts 
that, just as it would be mistaken to suggest that all supporters of the Christian Social Party 
were antisemites, it would be mistaken to suggest that all Social Democratic supporters were 
immune from antisemitism.  However, in short, and while accepting that tactical 
considerations came into play, and mistakes were made, Social Democratic analysis of 
antisemitism derived from a Marxist viewpoint which differentiated neither capitalists nor 
proletarians by race, religion or nationality.  Class was all that mattered. 
Anschluss And After 
In 1932, whatever the desires of the Austrian people, the international situation would not 
have allowed Anschluss to happen.  The Anschluss of 1938 was the result of changes over 
the previous handful of years to the political, diplomatic and military environments in 
Europe.  However, when the Anschluss did come, huge crowds gathered to celebrate in 
Vienna.  The people making up these crowds would have come for a variety of reasons, 
from deeply-felt conviction about the events that were taking place through to simple 
curiosity.  Some celebrated a new start, in a state that apparently offered a way out of the 
Depression.  Others, like Father Schmid, rejoiced at the re-union of German peoples who 
had been separated in the nineteenth century.  Alongside these crowds, though, other events 
demonstrated the depth and nature of the sentiment that some shared for this particular 
Anschluss.  The mobs that attacked and demeaned Jews effectively executed the first 
Kristallnacht in the newly unified Reich.   
These mobs help to answer the first key question posed at the beginning of this work, of 
whether, by 1938, support for radical German nationalism had become deeply embedded in 
the political and social life of Vienna.  The answer is that radical German nationalism was 
deeply embedded among certain sectors within Vienna.  The mobs were the product of an 
explosion of feeling that had been built up by groups and networks of many kinds, political, 
social and charitable among them, with their long history of promoting an exclusionary 
vision of belonging, especially towards Jews.  The nature of the radical vision that had been 
propagated was extreme.  Metaphors and imagery that portrayed Jews as alien intruders, 
exploiters, and even vermin, had for long been common on the radical Right.  Those who 
would nowadays be expected to give a moral lead against these positions, such as the clergy, 
were often to be found using such language.  By 1938, the everyday, unthinking repetition of 
viciously expressed views of racial hierarchy were ingrained among certain sectors of the 
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Viennese population.  The result was that these views were deeply held by those who 
believed them.  They were not opinions that could be easily changed. 
The second key question addressed by this work is whether Anschluss was the fulfilment of 
the visions that those with radical definitions of being German had been supporting in the 
lead-up to 1938.  The clear answer to this is that it was not the fulfilment of the dreams of all 
of them.  In the long period before 1938, significant numbers opposed union with Germany, 
often for many different reasons.  After 1938, they often paid for this opposition.  Despite 
the common ground of antisemitism between the post-Anschluss régime and many on the 
radical Right, supporters of an Austrian particularist path were frequently harassed, 
oppressed and jailed.  Even those who had been prepared to resort to strong-arm tactics 
against the Social Democrats were not necessarily supporters of Nazi aims.  Some on the 
Right, like Fathers Lojka and Schubert, even opposed the Nazis, in their own ways. 
The final key question concerns the extent of support in Vienna for Anschluss.  This requires 
some quantification of the extent of support for union with a Nazi-led Germany which, it 
was already clear by 1938, promoted exclusion through state sponsored, and often state led, 
violence.  Any attempt to put a figure on how many in Vienna supported union with a Nazi-
led Germany necessarily involves a degree of speculation.  This speculation as to their 
numbers is worthwhile, however, as it provides a means of assessing their strength as a 
group compared with others, and an estimate is possible by using the evidence at hand.   
The most tangible evidence to be found is in the election results of 1930 and 1932 in Vienna.  
In the 1930 national elections, the Pan-Germans won 150,000 votes in Vienna and the Nazis 
won almost 30,000, giving a total of nearly 180,000 Viennese who voted for parties which 
had Anschluss as the overriding objective of their programmes.  In 1932, the combined total 
was just short of 240,000, although this time the vast bulk of support was for the Nazis.  
Again, caution must be exercised about the motivations behind voting Nazi, but the voting 
figures strongly suggest an interpretation that about 240,000 adults, approximately nineteen 
per cent of the city’s mature population, supported the version of Anschluss that Hitler 
represented in March 1938.6  
Final Remarks 
Extreme response to change was a major theme to emerge from this work.  Many reacted 
angrily to the rapidly expanding Jewish population of the city in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, to the wartime refugee crises, to the fall of the Empire, and to the newly 
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Social Democratic Vienna of the 1920s.  Radicals, angered by changing economic and social 
conditions, used images of an idealised pre-industrial and ‘pre-liberal’ social order to 
promote an exclusionary vision.  They talked of the recreation of something that had not 
existed, and put forward scapegoats who were said to be responsible for change, rather than 
confronting the realities of social and economic trends that were taking place over a long 
period. 
It has been recognised that the explosion of violence that took place in 1938 in Vienna was 
the result of both long-term and immediate causes, but much debate has taken place over the 
years as to where and how an exclusionary vision of identity and belonging took root.  This 
work has contributed to the debate by examining events over a relatively long period.  It has 
gone into the daily lives of some of the key players in events, the priests of Vienna, to 
explore their involvement in politics, but set against the context of their other activities and 
those of others who were involved with the movement.  It has shown that priests were not 
just low level agitators in the Christian Social movement.  This would be true if only power 
was taken into account, but these priests had access to another important commodity: 
influence. The priests were not just confined to their parish churches.  They were present in 
the daily lives of many people.  They called on the support of numerous curates.  They used 
their influence within networks of antisemitic sympathisers and activists.  
The priests encountered earlier in the period influenced not just those around them, but those 
who came after them.  Father Lojka explicitly identifies the preaching of Father Deckert as 
one influence on his decision to become a priest.  Other priests, from around the turn of the 
century, show the influence of their predecessors in the language they use, and the ways in 
which they use it: they are confident that the antisemitism they express is, for many, an 
orthodoxy.  Yet a tension in their language sometimes betrays a frustration that they have 
not won their battle everywhere.  
In examining the stance of associations in spreading an exclusionary message, it is 
appropriate to divide them into three groupings: those where evidence clearly shows that 
they adopted a stance towards exclusion; those that appear not to have adopted an 
exclusionary stance; and those where the findings strongly suggest that exclusionary visions 
were prominent, but where further research would be of benefit in reaching more definitive 
conclusions.    
In the same way as liberal political groups moved towards a nationalist or antisemitic 
standpoint, it has been well documented by others, such as Pulzer and Boyer, that many 
associations and societies followed the same path.  The research for this work has uncovered 
further evidence of this process.  Some associations, such as the Academic Association of 
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German Historians, were formed to promote a nationally exclusive vision, and the evidence 
suggests that this incorporated antisemitism.  Other associations, such as Jung-Währing, 
expressed an explicitly antisemitic purpose.  Others had an indirectly, but strongly, 
antisemitic intent.  Father Abel turned to the Marianische Kaufmannskongregation to recruit 
members for pilgrimages, but his weapon, and his aim, was the antisemitism of the crowd.  
Abel, and others like him, perceived associations as a tried and tested means to spread their 
message.  
The issue of exclusion penetrated many associations, although the members of some, such as 
the seminar of the geographers, or the Deutsch-österreichische Schriftsteller-
Genossenschaft, seem to have held out against exclusionary visions.  With others, the 
findings are less clear, but point strongly to their pursuing an exclusionary agenda.  The 
singing groups examined here, one of the most highly active sets of associations, need to be 
considered carefully.  Explicitly exclusionary statements do not come through, but other 
evidence points to the prevailing attitudes among these societies.  They belonged to umbrella 
groups that were organised along political lines, aligning with political movements which 
had an antisemitic agenda.  They were in attendance at events, such as wedding 
anniversaries, which were patronised by important members of the antisemitic Christian 
Social movement.  Tellingly, some of their publications shared the language of radical 
Germans from this time.  The Währinger Liedertafel talked of the need to ‘protect’ a ‘true’ 
German identity, without explaining why this protection was necessary, nor against whom.  
In the 1900s, they talked of how they had been unappreciated in this role in their early days, 
but that this had changed.  This corresponds to the period in which exclusionary 
developments took place among other associations, and reflects the exclusionary language of 
Vienna of the time.  Overall, the findings gathered here, coupled with those from other 
works, demonstrate the involvement of a considerable number of associations, made up of 
people with status and therefore with influence, in the creation of an exclusionary vision.  
However, further research, on these and other associations would yield a more 
comprehensive picture.  
Groups and individuals on the radical Right, the priests, journalists, teachers, society 
members, politicians and others, whatever their motivation, were the causes of the long-term 
growth and persistence of antisemitism and a brand of German nationalism based on 
exclusion.  They helped to make acceptable antisemitism and extreme nationalism as a 
natural basis for the understanding and foundations of society.  Responsibility for the 
exclusionary vision ultimately lies with those attempting to create it, not with those who 
miscalculated its importance or who were unable to stop it.  The irony is that when the Nazis 
arrived, they did not just target Jews, Social Democrats, Communists and others who did not 
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fit their world view.  They rounded up many who had laid the foundations for extreme views 
to be accepted by a large part of the population of the city.  Those spreading these messages 
had played with fire in exploiting vicious forms of exclusionary nationalism and 
antisemitism, and now they too were paying the cost. 
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APPENDIX A: NATIONALISM – A TYPOLOGY 
 
Developed and extended from categories suggested in John Hutchinson, Modern 
Nationalism (Fontana, London, 1994). 
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APPENDIX B: SOME CATEGORIES AND ASPECTS OF ANTISEMITISM1 
Antisemitism is defined here as a range of attitudes characterised by prejudice against Jews 
simply for being Jews.  These attitudes are directed against people who are of Jewish origin, 
or who are considered to be Jewish by the person who is antisemitic.  Antisemitism may be 
expressed against individuals, but it is based on views of Jews as a group.  Antisemites often 
justify these views by claiming that Jews possess certain attributes which make them 
different from others, and that Jews are harmful to the community in general.  The categories 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and some overlap each other.  





Jews are considered an intruder into Christian culture.  In its least 
aggressive form, religious antisemitism against an individual would 
cease when a Jew converted to Christianity.  
Economic 
 
Jews are defined as a group which looks after its own interests, to the 
detriment of others.  Jews are said to work in sectors which they 
‘dominate’. This overlooks historical circumstances that led to some 
Jews becoming heavily involved in some sectors because of their 
exclusion from others. 
Social 
 
Jews are considered to be unsuited to the company of non-Jews.  
Students who refused to duel with Jews on the grounds that they were 
unworthy of ‘demanding satisfaction’ formed a notable manifestation 
in Vienna between 1860 and 1938  
Political 
 
This is the organised expression of antisemitism through political 
means.  It is intended to be the means to implement discriminatory 
measures against Jews. 
Racial Jews are considered to be at the bottom of hierarchies of ‘races’. 
Biological 
 
Jews are not even considered to be part of the human race, but 
another species altogether, ‘vermin’ infesting society. 
 
 
                                                      
1 This appendix has drawn from several sources, but especially Pulzer, Political Antisemitism, passim, and Scholz and 
Heinisch, p.18.  
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Antisemites may perceive a need to defend their societies against 
Jews, or to attack alleged ‘Jewish interests’.  The antisemitism of 
clerical circles in the 1860s was characterised by defensive language, 
but later became increasingly attacking. 
Genuine Versus 
Opportunistic  
Antisemites may genuinely believe in their case, or they may display 
antisemitic attitudes solely for their own gain.  Karl Lueger’s 
antisemitism has been described as both genuine and opportunistic. 
 




In the context of this work, antisemitism and radical nationalism 
overlap.  Antisemites of all varieties agreed on their hostility to Jews, 
and could promoted an exclusionary vision of identity.  Pan-German 
antisemites and particularist Austrian antisemites, however, frequently 
came into conflict over how to define who belonged in society.  
Divisions were strong where religion was concerned, or as to whether 






Some antisemitism has inaccurately been described as mild or 
moderate.  Any form of antisemitism discriminates on the basis of 
irrationally attributed alleged attributes. 
Apparent 
Antisemitism 
Comments or attitudes which are not based on antisemitism may be 
described as antisemitic when their context is not taken into 
consideration.  Misunderstandings of this kind derive from 
anachronistic interpretations of comments from the past, especially 
when the interpretations are made by people living in a post-Holocaust 
world. 
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This map shows modern day Vienna, and the boundaries of each of its districts.  Districts I 
to IX, plus XX, which was part of the Leopoldstadt until 1900, comprise the extent of 
Vienna City Council until expansion in the 1890s.  Most suburbs beyond this line were then 













I Innere Stadt VII Neubau  XIII Hietzing  XIX Döbling  
II Leopoldstadt  VIII Josefstadt  XIV Penzing  XX Brigittenau  
III Landstrasse  IX Alsergrund  XV Rudolfsheim-
Fünfhaus  
XXI Floridsdorf  
IV Wieden  X Favoriten  XVI Ottakring  XXII Donaustadt  
V Margareten  XI Simmering  XVII Hernals  XXIII Liesing 
VI Mariahilf  XII Meidling  XVIII Währing    
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APPENDIX D: THE PRIESTS OF THE FOUR PARISHES  
Alt-Ottakring (Ottakring until 1897) 
Years Priest 
1848-1874 Emmanuel Paletz 
1874-1889 Carl Dittrich 
1889-1897 Wilhelm Pokorny 
1897-1899 Adam Latschka 
1899-1928 Johannes Pax 




1899-1905 Adam Latschka 
1905-1911 Franz Edelbauer 
1912-1938 Leopold Rössler 
 
St. Josef, Weinhaus 
Years Priest 
1858-1874 Adam Schwandner 
1874-1901 Joseph Deckert 
1901-1910 Joseph Pachmann 
1910-1921 Ludwig Heppenheim 
1921-1944 Leopold Lojka 
 
St. Laurenz-Gertrud, Währing 
Years Priest 
1850-1872 Joseph Magnollo 
1872-1884 Adolf Khu 
1884-1897 Ignaz Aumann 
1897-1907 Johannes Panholzer 
1907-1923 Johann Treml 
1923-1942 Albert Schubert 
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APPENDIX E: ELECTIONS IN VIENNA, 19321 
Table 1: 1932 Absolute Figures  











I 20367 -3349 7522 176 8919  3574 
II 84536 -1362 13409 312 55153  14153 
III 86048 150 19278 1252 43980  20007 
IV 31633 -2361 9507 6472 11367  9840 
V 58420 -2700 11474 7197 33474  11415 
VI 30829 -2936 8216 4621 14567  7351 
VII 36365 -2997 10068 5595 16277  9043 
VIII 26992 -2142 7494 4832 11106  7533 
IX 50846 -3625 11525 537 27270  10755 
X 95831 3064 13530 319 69366  9398 
XI 31857 -417 7239 134 21619  2320 
XII 71871 -70 13280 361 46081  10128 
XIII 85716 -262 17649 783 49441  15542 
XIV 46633 -1963 8904 190 29843  6072 
XV 35600 -1775 7646 254 20246  6540 
XVI 98354 -3161 15251 400 65390  11700 
XVII 55504 -1760 12023 216 31778  9416 
XVIII 53535 -3729 12737 933 23903  15065 
XIX 35800 -1220 7720 333 19439  7705 
XX 55793 -293 8811 143 41970  6200 
XXI 63537 3243 10178 216 43751  7705 
Totals 
 
  233461 35276 684940  202875 
 
This table compares the results for the Christian Socials, Pan-Germans and Nazis in the 1932 
Vienna elections.  Districts where the Nazi vote alone exceeded that of the Christian Socials 
in 1932 are highlighted thus:  15065   .  Districts where the combined total of Nazi and Pan-




                                                      
1 The sources for this appendix are Seliger and Ucakar, Vol. 2, pp.1158-1178; RP 25th April 1932; and NZ, 25th April 1932.   
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Table 2: Christian Social And Pan-German Losses To The Nazis, 1932 
District Individual Party 
Losses Between 
































     
I 496 4091 -3349 4587 2429 -2158 52.95 
II 4661 7341 -1362 12002 11060 -942 92.15 
III 6014 11201 150 17215 14762 -2453 85.75 
IV 2440 5979 -2361 8419 7019 -1400 83.37 
V 3077 6681 -2700 9758 8402 -1356 86.10 
VI 2305 4280 -2936 6585 5238 -1347 79.54 
VII 2473 5131 -2997 7604 6442 -1162 84.72 
VIII 1978 4432 -2142 6410 5157 -1253 80.45 
IX 2942 6704 -3625 9646 7852 -1794 81.40 
X 1914 5631 3064 7545 7288 -257 96.59 
XI -360 1707 -417 1347 1166 -181 86.56 
XII 2316 5477 -70 7793 7855 62 100.80 
XIII 3409 9413 -262 12822 11941 -881 93.13 
XIV 1358 3498 -1963 4856 4567 -289 94.05 
XV 1403 3681 -1775 5084 4805 -279 94.51 
XVI 2939 6624 -3161 9563 8849 -714 92.53 
XVII 2285 4806 -1760 7091 6869 -222 96.87 
XVIII 3783 7666 -3729 11449 10800 -649 94.33 
XIX 1335 4386 -1220 5721 5234 -487 91.49 
XX 1629 3192 -293 4821 4727 -94 98.05 
XXI 1101 3715 3243 4816 5195 379 107.87 
Total   -29665 165134 147657 -17477  
Average Per District  -1413 7864 7031   
 
This table compares the 1930 national elections in Vienna with the 1932 Vienna municipal 
elections.  It compares the losses suffered by the Christian Social Party and the Pan-Germans 
on the one hand, with the gains experienced by the National Socialists on the other.  In only 
two districts, XII (Meidling) and XXI (Floridsdorf), were National Socialist gains greater 
than the losses of the other two parties, and then only by 62 votes in Meidling.  The Nazis 
gained heavily in Floridsdorf, but the Social Democrats also gained 416 votes compared 
with 1930.  This suggests a broad correlation between voters who left the traditional main 
Right-wing parties and voters picked up by the Nazis but, as can be seen, not all voters who 
left the Christian Socials and Pan-Germans voted Nazi.  
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
This bibliography is comprised of items which have influenced the development of this 
work.   Not all of the books, articles or archive items that have been consulted have been 
included here, nor even all media.  Items which have not been referenced in the text, but 
which have been of importance to the thinking behind this work, are included here.  
ARCHIVES AND LIBRARIES CONSULTED 
ARCHIVE / LIBRARY SPECIFIC MATERIAL 
REFERENCED IN TEXT, 
WHERE APPROPRIATE 
ABBREVIATION USED IN 
TEXT 
Diözesanarchiv, Wien Alt-Ottakring Chronik AEDW AOCk 
Alt-Ottakring Correspondence AEDW AOCor 




Währing Chronik AEDW WäCk 
Währing Correspondence AEDW WäCor 
Weinhaus Chronik AEDW WeCk 
Weinhaus Correspondence AEDW WeCor (See note 
below) 
St. Rochus Chronik AEDW SRCk 
St. Rochus Correspondence AEDW SRCor 
Grinzing Chronik AEDW GrCk 
Archiv der 
Bundespolizeidirektion 
Unless otherwise stated, all 
material from here is a police 




Strafpolizeiliche Agenden ABPD St 
No distinction made in certain 
years 
ABPD 
Wiener Volksliedwerkstatt WVLW 
Wienbibliothek Im Rathaus WbiR 
Wienbibliothek Im Rathaus Handschriftsammlung WBiR Handschrift 
Wienbibliothek Im Rathaus Musiksammlung WbiR MkS 
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ARCHIVE / LIBRARY SPECIFIC MATERIAL 
REFERENCED IN TEXT, 
WHERE APPROPRIATE 
ABBREVIATION USED IN 
TEXT 
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek ÖNB 
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Musiksammlung ÖNB Musik 
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Zeitungssammlung ÖNB Zeitung 
 
A Note On Materials From The Police Archive In Vienna 
The Police Archive – Archiv der Bundespolizeidirektion – provided material that was split 
between administrative work and work involving investigation and prosecution.  In the later 
years covered, many files covered both aspects.  All documents are referenced here by date, 
where a date was given, as the files are ordered chronologically. 
The Chronik Or Gedenkbuch Of A Parish 
Thanks to information from Dr. Johann Weißensteiner of the Archives of the Archdiocese of 
Vienna, it is understood that, in the period under consideration, priests were understood to be 
under strict instructions not to keep personal diaries.  The Chronik, or Gedenkbuch, was 
therefore their primary record of activities in their parish.  The instruction did not stop many 
of them recording personal observations. 
Parish Correspondence 
Correspondence in the Archdiocesan Archives often carries an alphanumeric reference.  This 
is not referenced here, as it is not universally used.  As the files in each box of 
correspondence are generally held in date order in files, the date of the item is the primary 
indicator used here. 
A Note On The Correspondence From The Parish Of Weinhaus 
The box for the correspondence from Weinhaus was divided into folders for the years 1754-
1852; 1853-1899; 1900-1910; and 1911-1950.  The folder for the years 1853 to 1899, which 
covered the bulk of the Deckert years at the parish, was missing.  Despite the efforts of the 
staff in the Archive, this could not be found.  Fortunately, some correspondence from the 
period, and copies of Deckert’s will, were found in the folder from 1900-1910, since some 
disputes in which Deckert was involved continued after his death.  The Weinhaus Chronik 
was also complete for the whole period, and other items such as Father Deckert’s 
publications were also available. 
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PARISH NEWSLETTERS 
Parish newsletters varied considerably.  Some ran to many pages, others to a handful.  They 
generally reflected the wealth and status of the parish. So, the newsletter of the 
Piaristengemeinde in the Josefstadt was filled with advertisements in the 1930s, but the 
newsletter for Neulerchenfeld began with four sides, of which one and a half were 
advertisements.  They were meant to raise funds, as well as to spread the word of the 
Church.  Publication could be erratic, and issue numbers did not always correspond to the 
month of the year.  In the text of this work, the year and either the number of the issue or the 








III – Landstrasse  St. Rochus St. Rochus 
Pfarrblatt 
SR Pfarrblatt 
VIII – Josefstadt  Alservorstadt Katholische Aktion 
in der 
Alservorstadt, 
changed to  
Pfarrblatt der 
Alservorstadt in 
October 1938, after 





Monatsblatt MT Pfarrblatt 
XVI – Ottakring  Alt-Ottakring Alt-Ottakringer 
Pfarrblatt 
AO Pfarrblatt 













XVII – Hernals  Hernals Hernalser Pfarrblatt Hs Pfarrblatt 






















NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS CONTEMPORARY TO THE PERIOD 
Arbeiter-Zeitung NS Nachrichten für den XVIII Bezirk 
Christlich-Soziale Arbeiter-Zeitung Österreichischer Arbeiter-Zeitung 
Christlich-Deutsche Volksbühne Österreichischer Reformer 
Das Kleine Blatt Ottakringer Rundschau 
Das Vaterland Reichspost 
Der Floh Sportblatt am Mittag 
Deutsche Zeitung Unentgeltliche Nachrichten der organisierten 
Ottakringer Hausbesitzer 
Die Bombe Volksblatt 
Die Debatte Währinger Bezirksnachrichten 
Freies Blatt  Wiener Abendpost 
Österreichische Wochenzeitung Wiener Bilder 
Konstitutionelle-Vorstadt-Zeitung Wiener Diözesanblatt 
Montags-Zeitung Wiener Landwirthschaftliche  
Neue Freie Presse Wiener Zeitung 
 
UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL CONTEMPORARY TO THE PERIOD TO 1938 
Kralik, Richard von, Gedicht zum 10jährigen Gründungsfeste und zur Fahnenweihe des 
Christlich-deutschen Turnvereines Kleinmünchen, (1923), available in WbiR 105926. 
Selections from the Nachlass Richard von Kralik, available in WbiR Handschriftsammlung 
Psenner, Ludwig, Brief an Franz Stauracz, 6th February 1889, in WBiR 
Handschriftsammlung, H.I.N. 33168 
Songheets for 1864 to 1866 for Programm und Liedertext zur Fest-Liedertafel, dated 2nd 
March 1864 to 20th December 1866, available in WbiR, under ‘Bräunhaus-Saal in Ottakring’ 
as author 
Thirty cinema programmes for the American Bioscop (sic) cinema, January 1910 to January 
1911, available in WbiR, catalogue B 210361 
Cinema programmes from the 1930s in WBiR, catalogue 211664L 
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Abel, Heinrich, Pater Abel, S.J. und die Wiener Männerfahrten nach Maria-Zell, (Vienna: 
Marianische Kongregation der Kaufleute, 1907)  
Abel, Heinrich, ‘Los von Gott?’ Vier Conferenzreden des hochwürdigen Herrn P. Heinrich, 
S.J., (Vienna: Verlag der Reichspost, 1899) 
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Atmosphär Österreichs, (Vienna: Ambr. Opitz, 1908) 
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